Bhᾱsarvajña’s Revolutionary Epistemology: A Critical Analysis of Medieval Innovations in the Theory of Perception (Pratyakṣa)

Abstract

This paper explores the contribution of naiyᾱyika Bhāsarvajña (c. 950 CE) in Indian Nyāya Philosophy. He was one of the most celebrated figure of medieval Indian philosophy and his work centres around at the intersection of Classical Nyāya and the critical debates of his time with the school of Buddhist and Jaina philosophers. Focusing on his iconoclastic work ‘Nyāyasāra’, this paper will try to explore how his definition of Perception (Pratyakṣa) both differ from Maharṣi Gautama’s original doctrine of Perception and yet remains faithful to the core fundamentals of Nyāya tradition. Bhāsarvajña’s neo conception of Perception as “the instrument of correct and direct cognition” [“samyak aparokṣa anubhava sādhanaṁ pratyakṣam”] not only gave him liberty to confront and defend the contemporary challenges against Nyāya philosophy, but it also allowed him expand the possibility of Nyāya Epistemology to include both ordinary and higher forms of experience. His methods made him look like an ‘Ekadeśī’ philosopher, who was influenced selectively form different schools of traditions yet remain faithful to his own identity and school. In this way, Bhāsarvajña contributed in shaping the progress and development of Indian Logic and Epistemology during a decisive moment of intellectual turmoil.