

Bhāsarvajña's Revolutionary Epistemology: A Critical Analysis of Medieval Innovations in the Theory of Perception (Pratyakṣa)

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Abstract

This paper explores the contribution of naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña (c. 950 CE) in Indian Nyāya Philosophy. He was one of the most celebrated figure of medieval Indian philosophy and his work centres around at the intersection of Classical Nyāya and the critical debates of his time with the school of Buddhist and Jaina philosophers. Focusing on his iconoclastic work 'Nyāyasāra', this paper will try to explore how his definition of Perception (Pratyakṣa) both differ from Mahārṣi Gautama's original doctrine of Perception and yet remains faithful to the core fundamentals of Nyāya tradition.

Bhāsarvajña's neo conception of Perception as "the instrument of correct and direct cognition" ["samyak aparokṣa anubhava sādhanam pratyakṣam"] not only gave him liberty to confront and defend the contemporary challenges against Nyāya philosophy, but it also allowed him expand the possibility of Nyāya Epistemology to include both ordinary and higher forms of experience.

His methods made him look like an 'Ekadeśī' philosopher, who was influenced selectively from different schools of traditions yet remain faithful to his own identity and school. In this way, Bhāsarvajña contributed in shaping the progress and development of Indian Logic and Epistemology during a decisive moment of intellectual turmoil.

Keywords: Bhāsarvajña, Nyāya philosophy, Perception (Pratyakṣa), Ekadeśī, Medieval Indian Logic, Epistemology.

The medieval period of Indian Philosophy (c. 800–1200 CE) was a time of intense intellectual activity. Long-established traditions were forced to respond to a new and sophisticated arguments from Buddhist and Jaina thinkers. In this critical moment, some philosophers remained loyal to their traditional schools but showed remarkable flexibility in adapting and reshaping inherited ideas yet being faithful to his own school. One such figure is Bhāsarvajña, a Nyāya philosopher from

Kashmir, whose contributions to epistemology deserve greater recognition than they have received in modern school of Philosophers.

Flourishing around 950 CE, Bhāsarvajña holds a considerable place in the history of Indian Philosophical thoughts. As the author of the 'Nyāyasāra' and its auto-commentary, the 'Nyāyabhūṣaṇa', he pioneered what is often considered as the medieval phase of Nyāya philosophy (Madhya-kālīna Nyāya-Prasthāna). His method was enriched by careful selection, adaptation and modification of conventional doctrines, which led his successors describe him as an 'Ekadeśī' philosopher—one who identifies with a particular school of thoughts but brings forward important qualifications and innovations.

This study focuses on Bhāsarvajña's account of Perception (Pratyakṣa), perhaps his most significant contribution to epistemology. By analysing his definitions, classifications and justifications; the paper tries to explore how he created an important bridge between classical Nyāya theories of knowledge and the advanced logical systems developed by his Buddhist and Jaina contemporaries. In order to admire the originality of his work, it is important to place it in its historical context.

During the 9th and 10th centuries, Kashmir was considered to be the most active centres of philosophical thoughts in the Indian subcontinent. Here, multiple traditions flourished side by side, which gathered a rich atmosphere of debate and intellectual cross-overs. Buddhism, especially the logical-epistemological tradition that began with Dignāga (c. 450 CE) and was further developed by Dharmakīrti (c. 600 CE)—had by this time produced rigorous frameworks that directly challenged the Brāhmāṇical school of thoughts. Beside of that, the Jain philosophers, particularly Siddhasena Divākara and his successors, had advanced their own systematic approaches. They also shared certain methods with Buddhist logic while preserving distinctive doctrinal positions. These new thoughts challenged the basic fundament of the Nyāya school of Philosophy founded by Mahārṣi Gautama. Nyāya philosophy had until then focused largely on its sixteen categories (ṣoḍaśa padārthāḥ) and it was their comprehensive framework for logical and metaphysical inquiry.

Against this backdrop, a new generation of Brāhmāṇical philosophers emerged. They sought to revive the traditional Hindu logic by introducing the methodological innovations of their Buddhist and Jaina contemporaries. This intellectual strategy required considerable philosophical sophistication, as it demanded the ability to distinguish between methodological techniques which could be profitably borrowed from other school of thoughts and doctrinal positions that required to be defended against the heterodox challenges.

The Buddhist and Jaina logical traditions had introduced several innovations that created a direct challenge to the classical Nyāya epistemology. Most significantly, they had shifted their focus from the comprehensive treatment of sixteen logical categories to the concentrated analysis of the means of valid knowledge (Pramāṇa). This methodological shift reflected a more focused epistemological approach that

helped to perceive a better analytical precision.

Furthermore, Buddhist logicians had developed a sophisticated analysis of Perception that distinguished between conceptual (*kalpanā*) and non-conceptual (*Nirvikalpaka*) cognition. They have argued that only the *Nirvikalpaka* cognition constituted genuine perception. This position directly challenged the Nyāya understanding of Perception, which included both determinate (*Savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*Nirvikalpaka*) forms as the legitimate perceptual knowledge.

On the other hand, the Jaina tradition contributed its own epistemological innovations, particularly in its distinctive treatment of the relationship between different *pramāṇas* and its sophisticated analysis of the logical structure of Inference. These changes put a lot of pressure on traditional Nyāya thinkers. They had to either firmly defend their old ideas by rejecting all new ones, or adapt by taking in some helpful parts of the new ideas while still holding on to their core beliefs.

Anyway, let us now return to Bhāsarvajña's philosophy, which is our main focus. His biggest contribution was not just in the ideas themselves, but in the way he approached philosophy. Earlier Nyāya thinkers usually wrote long commentaries on Maharṣi Gautama's 'Nyāya-sūtra'. Bhāsarvajña, however, did something different—he wrote an independent book that dealt only with the theory of *Pramāṇa* (means of knowledge).

This was a major shift in method. It made his work closer in style to what Buddhist and Jaina philosophers were doing at the time, while still staying true to Nyāya principles. His book, 'Nyāyasāra' (Essence of Logic), was written as a 'Prakaraṇa' (manual)¹, not as a commentary. This allowed him to study problems of knowledge in a clear and organized way, rather than being tied to the structure of the original sūtra. Because of this, he could respond more directly to the new and complex arguments raised by Buddhists and Jainas, while at the same time strengthening Nyāya philosophy. It should be noted that, 'Nyāyasāra' is the very first manual (*Prakaraṇa*) of its kind in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature.

Bhāsarvajña introduced a bold and controversial idea by reducing the traditional sixteen categories of the Nyāya system to just one main category, that is, 'Pramāṇa' (means of knowledge). He argued that this single category could be developed in such a way that it would include and explain all the other fifteen categories of classical Nyāya philosophy. This move showed the clear influence of Buddhist and Jaina thinkers, who also focused more on questions of knowledge and ways of knowing, rather than giving equal attention to all logical and metaphysical subjects.

However, Bhāsarvajña's reduction of the traditional sixteen categories of the Nyāya system was not merely imitative. Rather than simply adopting Buddhist or Jaina categorical schemes, he developed an integrative approach that incorporated the essential insights of the traditional sixteen categories within an expanded understanding of *Pramāṇa*. This integration allowed him to maintain continuity with traditional Nyāya concerns while achieving the analytical focus characteristic

of contemporary logical developments.

He explained this reduction by showing that Pramāṇa plays two important roles:

1. It is the tool that gives us valid knowledge.
2. It is also the basis for logical arguments.

With this dual view, he could show that all the traditional topics of Nyāya, like reasoning, fallacies, and metaphysical questions; can fit inside one broad framework of knowledge.

Another big step he took was to say that there are only three kinds of pramāṇas:

- Perception (Pratyakṣa)
- Inference (Anumāna)
- Verbal Testimony (Śabda or Āgama)²

This was different from the classical Nyāya system, which accepted four, the extra one being Comparison (Upamāna). By leaving out Upamāna, his theory looked closer to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system and also to some Buddhist and Jaina ideas. Although he was a Naiyāyika, Bhāsarvajña often gave new interpretations instead of simply repeating old views. That is why he is remembered as an ‘Ekadeśī’ philosopher—someone who stays within a tradition but also criticizes it from inside.

His reasoning was that Upamāna is not really a separate source of knowledge. He argued that, Upamāna (Comparison) belongs to the Āgama or Śabda (Verbal Testimony) pramāṇa; so there is no need to accept this pramāṇa as a separate pramāṇa. This showed his careful and precise way of thinking, always looking for economy and clarity in ideas. In this case, the question naturally arises as to whether this view of Bhāsarvajña regarding the division of pramāṇa contradicts Maharṣi Gautama’s view on the division of pramāṇa? Because, it mentioned earlier that, according to Maharṣi Gautama, the pramāṇa is four-fold. That is, 1. Pratyakṣa (Perception), 2. Anumāna (Inference), 3. Upamāna (Comparison) and 4. Āgama or Śabda (Verbal Testimony)³. As a result, despite being a naiyāyika, he has opposed Maharṣi Gautama’s view on the division of pramāṇa, an objection that has naturally been raised.

Bhāsarvajña defended this innovation by arguing that his theory is consistent with Maharṣi Gautama’s fundamentals. He also argued that Maharṣi Gautama’s acceptance of four kinds of pramāṇas was intended to establish a minimum rather than a maximum number and that analysis revealed the logical dependence of Upamāna on Āgama or Śabda. This strategy allowed Bhāsarvajña to maintain royalty for traditional authority while justifying contemporary innovations.

From the above discussion, we may observe that there is a presence of uniqueness in Bhāsarvajña’s philosophy. Therefore, we will now try to explore more of his philosophical conception. So, now we will elaborate the central theme in this paper, i.e., Maharṣi Gautama’s theory of Perception through the eyes of Bhāsarvajña.

Bhāsarvajña's most significant contribution to the theory of perception lies in his innovative definition, i.e., "**Perception is the instrument of correct and direct cognition**"⁴ This definition represents a fundamental departure from Mahārṣi Gautama's classical formulation, which characterized perception as "**that type of knowledge which is produced by the intercourse of the sense organs with its objects and which is inexpressible by words or without the word or name, which is always right or accurate (unerring) and also which is well-defined.**"⁵

The philosophical significance of this definitional innovation becomes apparent when we consider the theoretical challenges it was designed to address. Mahārṣi Gautama's definition, while historically influential, faced the significant limitation that it could not accommodate cases of divine or yogic perception, where sense-object contact is not operative. This limitation created the logical fallacy of Avyāpti⁶, since the definition failed to cover all legitimate instances of perceptual knowledge.

Bhāsarvajña's alternative definition addresses this limitation by focusing on the essential characteristics of perceptual knowledge rather than its typical causal conditions. By characterizing perception in terms of correctness (Samyak), directness (Aparokṣa), and experiential nature (Anubhava), he developed a more inclusive framework that could accommodate both ordinary sensory perception and extraordinary forms of direct awareness.

The careful construction of Bhāsarvajña's definitional formula reveals sophisticated philosophical analysis. The term '**Samyak**' (correct) serves to exclude doubtful and erroneous cognitions from the scope of valid perception, addressing the same concerns that motivated Mahārṣi Gautama's inclusion of 'non-erroneous' (Avyabhicāri) and 'determinate' (Vyavasāyātmaka) in his definition. However, by using a single term to address both concerns, Bhāsarvajña achieved greater theoretical economy while avoiding the logical redundancy or Gaurava doṣa⁷ that some critics had identified in Mahārṣi Gautama's formulation.

The term '**Aparokṣa**' (direct or immediate) is the most important part of Bhāsarvajña's definition of perception. Instead of describing perception only in terms of its usual cause, like the contact between sense organs and objects; he defines it by its essential nature, that is, the immediate access it gives to its object. This way, the definition can cover both ordinary sensory perception and extraordinary cases of direct awareness, without needing to change the basic structure of the definition.

The inclusion of '**Anubhava**' (cognition) helps to separate valid perception from memory (Smṛti)⁸. Actually, in order to prevent the fallacy of ativyāpti⁹ in memory (Smṛti), the word 'Anubhava' is given in the general definition of perception. According to the Naiyāyikas, memory is a kind of mental state but is not true, so is not knowledge. The memory (Smṛti), even when accurate, does not have the immediacy that true perception has. This is why, Bhāsarvajña employed the term in characterising perception.

Bhāsarvajña also classifies perception into **yogic or transcendental (Yogi Pratyakṣa)** and **non-yogic or non-transcendental (Ayogi Pratyakṣa)** forms. This was a major innovation that reflects his broader philosophical commitment in accommodating diverse forms of valid cognition within a unified epistemological framework. Unlike earlier traditions that focused mainly on ordinary sensory perception, his system makes room for extraordinary forms of perception as well.

Non-yogic or Non-transcendental perception (Ayogi Pratyakṣa)¹⁰ refers to the familiar kind of sensory knowledge that arises when the senses interact with their proper objects, supported by conditions like light, space, time, merit (dharma) and suitable circumstances. The most efficient or special cause (Sādhakatama kāraṇa) of this pratyakṣa is the sense-organ, because for the sense-organ, pratyakṣa jñāna (perceptual knowledge) is produced by the contact (sannikarṣa) of the sense-organ and with its corresponding object. Bhāsarvajña's treatment of this type mostly follows the Nyāya tradition, though he makes some refinements to address the philosophical debates of his time.

Yogic or Transcendental perception¹¹, on the other hand, refers to direct awareness that goes beyond the limits of ordinary sensory cognition. This includes knowledge of objects far away in space or time, or of realities that cannot normally be reached by the senses. Bhāsarvajña further divides this into two types: perception during meditative absorption (**Yuktāvasthā**) and perception outside such states (**Ayuktāvasthā**).

This new classification served several purposes. First, it gave a systematic way to include the extraordinary insights claimed by yogic practitioners, bringing religious and philosophical concerns together. Second, it answered Buddhist critiques about the limits of ordinary perception by showing that the Nyāya system could also recognize and analyse non-ordinary forms of awareness.

Bhāsarvajña's discussion of the difference between determinate (Savikalpaka) and indeterminate (Nirvikalpaka) perception shows his deep engagement with the Buddhist debates of his time. While he accepted the usefulness of this distinction, he gave it a distinctly Nyāya interpretation that differed in important ways from Buddhist views.

According to Bhāsarvajña, Indeterminate Perception (Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa) is the awareness of an object's mere existence, without recognizing its name, universal, or relational qualities. This kind of perception happens at the very first moment of sensory contact and provides the basic awareness on which determinate perception later develops¹².

Determinate Perception (Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa), on the other hand, is awareness of an object along with its conceptual features, such as its name, universal properties and relations. This type of perception depends on the activation of conceptual dispositions (Saṃskāra) that connect the object with these conceptual categories. Bhāsarvajña argued that determinate perception must be based on indeterminate perception, since conceptual recognition requires prior awareness of

the object itself¹³.

This framework allowed Bhāsarvajña to respond to Buddhist claims that only indeterminate perception is a true source of knowledge (pramāṇa), because determinate perception supposedly involves conceptual construction that distorts reality. By showing that both forms of perception are valid sources of knowledge, Bhāsarvajña defended the reliability of ordinary conceptual awareness while still recognizing the foundational role of non-conceptual perception.

Although Bhāsarvajña introduced important innovations, he remained faithful to central Nyāya principles. He upheld epistemological realism, affirmed the independent existence of external objects and accepted the validity of inferential and testimonial knowledge- all aligns with the core philosophical commitments of Nyāya philosophy.

At the same time, his new definitions and classifications show how he responded to philosophical challenges that earlier Nyāya thinkers had not fully addressed. By offering broader definitions and more systematic classifications, he strengthened Nyāya epistemology and made it more capable of engaging with the sophisticated arguments of Buddhist and Jaina philosophers.

One of his most notable contributions was his treatment of extraordinary forms of perception. Traditional Nyāya acknowledged divine and yogic perception but had not developed systematic ways of analysing them. Bhāsarvajña expanded on this, showing his commitment to building a comprehensive epistemology that could account for the full range of cognitive experiences recognized in Indian philosophy.

His innovations must be seen as direct responses to challenges raised by Buddhist and Jaina logicians. For example, Buddhists argued that perception could not involve direct contact between sense and object, based on their analysis of visual and auditory perception. It requires systemic refutation that traditional Nyāya approaches had not provided. Bhāsarvajña defended the theory of sense-object contact with careful logical reasoning. His defence demonstrates sophisticated understanding of the logical structure of Buddhist arguments and it also develops innovative responses that maintain traditional Nyāya commitments while addressing legitimate philosophical concerns. His analysis of the nature of visual rays and their contact with distant objects, though outdated by modern science, was a sophisticated attempt to explain perception in its causal terms that could withstand any logical criticism.

Bhāsarvajña's discussion of the relationship between conceptual and non-conceptual perception shows his careful engagement with Buddhist arguments about the epistemic status of determinate cognition. By creating a framework that accepts the basic role of non-conceptual awareness while also defending the validity of conceptual knowledge, he was able to respond to Buddhist criticisms without giving up the core commitments of Nyāya philosophy.

One of Bhāsarvajña's most refined strategies was his way of interpreting traditional texts so that they could support new philosophical developments. Instead of rejecting older authorities in favour of new ideas, he developed interpretive methods that showed how innovations could be made consistent with traditional teachings. His discussion of Maharṣi Gautama's enumeration of four Pramāṇas (means of knowledge) is a good example of this. Instead of claiming that Gautama has mistaken, Bhāsarvajña argued that a closer analysis of the logical relations among the Pramāṇas shows that Upamāna (Comparison) belongs to Āgama (Verbal Testimony). This approach allowed him to respect traditional authority while also justifying new theoretical refinements.

This interpretive skill also appears in his treatment of definitions. Rather than dismissing Gautama's definition of perception as inadequate, Bhāsarvajña suggested that it was designed to address particular philosophical concerns of its time. He argued that new challenges required additional definitions, but these could be added without discarding the essential insights of the original.

Bhāsarvajña's lasting contribution to Indian philosophy lies in showing how one can remain faithful to traditional commitments while also learning from alternative approaches. His work offers a model of philosophical innovation that avoids both blind traditionalism and uncritical acceptance of outside ideas.

The sophistication of Bhāsarvajña's methods reflects a wider trend in medieval Indian philosophy, when established schools had to respond to strong challenges from rival traditions. His ability to preserve the identity of Nyāya thought while also adopting useful ideas from Buddhist and Jaina sources shows how creative synthesis can strengthen, rather than weaken, traditional commitments.

His work on definitions, classifications and interpretation provides tools that are still relevant today, especially in situations where long-standing traditions face challenges from alternative approaches with different methods and assumptions.

Bhāsarvajña's contributions to epistemology had a lasting impact on later Indian philosophy. His expansion of the theory of perception to include extraordinary forms of awareness influenced later Nyāya thinkers, particularly Gangeśa Upādhyāya, the founder of the Navya-Nyāya school. Many arguments developed by Raghunātha Śīromaṇi and other Navya-Nyāya philosophers clearly show his influence.

More generally, his work raised the level of sophistication in epistemological discussions across Indian philosophy. Through his precise definitions, systematic classifications, and careful interpretations, he set standards of philosophical rigor that shaped later developments in multiple schools.

His integration of religious and philosophical concerns, especially in his treatment of Yogic Perception established a model for systematic philosophical analysis of extraordinary cognitive phenomena. This approach continues to shape contemporary discussions about consciousness and spiritual experience.

From a cross-cultural perspective, Bhāsarvajña's work also demonstrates sophisticated approaches to several issues that remain central to epistemological enquiry. His analysis of the relationship between conceptual and non-conceptual awareness anticipates current debates about sensation and perception. His treatment of extraordinary awareness provides resources for thinking about mystical and contemplative experiences.

Finally, his methodological approaches in emphasizing definitional precision, systematic classifications and interpretive sophistication, offer models of philosophical analysis that go beyond their original cultural and historical context. Contemporary philosophers working on perception, consciousness and cross-cultural philosophical dialogue can still draw valuable insights from his theoretical innovations.

Bhāsarvajña's contributions to epistemology show a high level of philosophical sophistication, especially in the way he brought together diverse insights into a coherent systematic framework. He was able to respond to the challenges of his time while still remaining loyal to the core commitments of the Nyāya tradition. This balance reflects both his logical skill in building adequate theories and his interpretive ability to maintain continuity with earlier traditions.

At the same time, some aspects of his approach reflect the historical limits of medieval philosophy. His defence of the sense-object contact theory, though logically refined, was based on assumptions about the nature of perception that modern science has since overturned. Similarly, his inclusion of Yogic Perception within systematic epistemology, while philosophically innovative, rests on metaphysical ideas that many contemporary philosophers would question.

From today's perspective, Bhāsarvajña's lasting importance lies less in the specific theories he defended and more in the methods he used. His focus on clear definitions, careful classifications and nuanced interpretations continues to be valuable for philosophy, even if some of his conclusions need revision in light of modern knowledge. What makes his work enduring is his intellectual rigor and his openness to dialogue across traditions. His method provides a model for engaging with competing viewpoints without losing clarity. In this sense, his legacy speaks not only to historical debates but also to the continuing importance of methodological precision in philosophy.

Contemporary epistemological debates about the nature of perception, the relation between conceptual and non-conceptual content and the epistemic status of extraordinary forms of awareness can benefit from his insights. His analysis of the logical relations between different forms of perception offers resources for thinking about the structure of perceptual experience. His treatment of the determinate–indeterminate distinction provides alternatives to modern debates about conceptual content, avoiding some of the difficulties that have troubled recent discussions. By focusing on the temporal and logical sequence of different forms of awareness, rather than their essential nature, he suggested new ways of moving past theoretical

deadlocks.

His systematic treatment of extraordinary forms of awareness is also very significant. It offers resources for contemporary philosophers who were interested in the epistemic status of mystical, contemplative and other non-ordinary forms of experience. Rather than simply rejecting such experiences as epistemologically irrelevant or accepting them without any criticism, his framework suggests methods for systematic philosophical analysis that takes into consideration both their distinctive characteristics and their potential epistemic contribution.

This shows the sophistication of Medieval Indian philosophy in responding to cross-traditional challenges. Bhāsarvajña's ability to preserve Nyāya commitments while drawing on Buddhist and Jaina insights demonstrates how creative synthesis can strengthen, rather than weaken, a tradition. His definitional innovations and classificatory refinements in perception theory remain lasting contributions and his integration of extraordinary awareness into epistemology provides a model for expanding the scope of philosophical inquiry.

More broadly, his work illustrates how traditions can innovate without abandoning their roots. In today's context of cross-cultural philosophical dialogue, his methods offer valuable resources for developing approaches that respect multiple traditions while also advancing theory beyond the limits of any single school.

The significance of his contributions lies not only in their historical value but also in their relevance for contemporary philosophy of perception, consciousness studies and cross-cultural dialogue. His insistence on definitional clarity, systematic classification and interpretive sophistication shows how rigorous methods can yield insights that remain useful across time and culture.

Future research on Bhāsarvajña should focus on his responses to Buddhist and Jaina challenges, his interpretive strategies and his influence on later Indian philosophy, especially Navya-Nyāya. Such work would deepen our understanding of Medieval Indian thought while also enriching current debates about perception, consciousness and cross-cultural philosophy.

The Medieval period of Indian philosophy, represented by thinkers like Bhāsarvajña, was a crucial stage in developing sophisticated methods for addressing theoretical challenges while staying true to tradition. His work shows that intellectual traditions survive not by resisting change but by engaging with it thoughtfully and constructively.

Bhāsarvajña's contribution to Indian philosophy shows how a tradition can remain faithful to its roots while still growing in new directions. In the 'Nyāyasāra', his reflections on perception reveal both his respect for earlier Nyāya thinkers and his willingness to refine their ideas in light of strong challenges from Buddhists and Jains. By defending perception as both immediate and conceptually shaped, he managed to hold on to Nyāya's realist vision of the world without ignoring the undeniable role of thought and language in shaping human experience. What

makes his approach especially striking is his profound respect for other philosophical traditions. He carefully studied Buddhist, Jaina, and other schools not to oppose them blindly but to learn from their insights, drawing on their strengths to reinforce the Nyāya framework. In this way, he not only kept Mahārṣi Gautama's teachings alive but also gave them a sharper and more resilient form that could withstand the sophisticated debates of his own time. Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña, therefore, comes across not just as a commentator but as a creative philosopher whose work helped carry Nyāya forward, reminding us that intellectual traditions survive not by resisting change but by engaging with it in thoughtful and constructive ways.

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Notes

1. It is defined in the Parāśara Upapurāṇa, “a book which concerns itself with the topics of a portion of a śāstra, which may deal even with matters not included in the śāstra”. [Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic (Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools)*, p.356] Again, referring to the features of the Prakaraṇa text, it is said in the ‘Saptapadārthī’ that, Prakaraṇa śāstra is that type of a śāstra which refers to a scripture that deals with a particular part of the scripture. Not only that, the subject which was not discussed in the original scriptures is also in the Prakaraṇa śāstra; i.e., “Śāstraika Deśasaṅgbaddhaṅ Śāstrakārjāntare Sthitam, Chōhuh Prakaraṇang Nāma Granthabhedang Vipāshchitaḥ” [Amarendra Mohan Tarkatirtha and Narendra Chandra Vedantatirtha (ed.), *Śivāditya’s Saptapadārthī*, p.13].
2. “tribhidhaṁ pramāṇam-pratyakṣamanumānāgama iti”. **Bhāsarvajña, Nyāyasāra, Swami Yogindrananda (ed.), Nyāyabhūṣaṇam, p.79**
3. “pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni”. **Nyāya-Sūtra, 1.1.3, Gautama, Tarkavagisa (ed.), Nyāyadarśana, vol.I, p.83**
4. “samyak aparokṣa anubhava sādhanam pratyakṣam”. **Bhāsarvajña, Nyāyasāra, Swami Yogindrananda (ed.), Nyāyabhūṣaṇam, p.84**
5. “indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam”. **Nyāya-Sūtra, 1.1.4, Gautama, Tarkavagisa (ed.), Nyāyadarśana, vol.I, p.104**
6. According to Nyāya Philosophy, there are usually three types of fallacies in any one definition; namely, 1. Ativyāpti, 2. Avyāpti and 3. Asambhava. Contextually, now we will discuss about the fallacy of Avyāpti. ‘Avyāpti’ or limitation of the attributes to only a portion of the class defined, occurs in definitions which are too narrow. For example, when we define a cow as a tawny (an orange-brown or yellowish-brown colour) animal. **Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa, Tarkasaṁgraha, Goswami (ed.) Tarkasaṁgrahaḥ, p.25**
7. A fallacy of Gaurava happens when the law of Parsimony gets violated. The law of Parsimony is a hypothesis which says that in order to get to a conclusion, one must follow the simplest path. For example, while giving the lakṣaṇa of pratyakṣa, if we say that “Indriyārtha Sannikarṣa Janyaṁ Jñānaṁ Pratyakṣam Jñānaṁ”, the secondary mention of the word ‘Jñānaṁ’ is not necessary here. Though, there is nothing wrong with this lakṣaṇa. However, as with the aid of the first mention of the word ‘Jñānaṁ’ fulfills our purpose of getting the lakṣaṇa of pratyakṣa, so we do not need secondary use of the word. With the further use of the word ‘Jñānaṁ’ for the second time, there

may be a violation of the law of parsimony.

8. “anubhavaśabdasya grahanam smaraṇasyāpi vyavachhedārthamityarthah”. **Vāsudeva Sūri, Padapañcikā, K. Sāmbaśivā Śūstri (ed.), The Nyāyasāra of Bhāsarvajña (With the Commentary Padapañcikā of Vāsudeva Sūri), p.8**
9. According to Nyāya Philosophy, there are usually three types of fallacies in any one definition; namely, 1. Ativyāpti, 2. Avyāpti and 3. Asambhava. Contextually, now we will discuss about the fallacy of Ativyāpti. ‘Ativyāpti’ means ‘Alakṣyavṛttitva’, that is, the lakṣaṇa of an object is given in such a way that the lakṣaṇa exceeds the target object (lakṣya vastu) and also applicable to other objects (alakṣya vastu). That is, the lakṣaṇas are given in a way that applies to the target object (lakṣya vastu) and then to the another object (alakṣya vastu). For example, if it is said that the one who has horns is a cow, then just as this lakṣaṇa will apply to cows, it will also apply to animals other than cows, such as buffaloes, goats etc., because they are also horned animals like cows. As a result, the fallacy of ativyāpti will be occur in the lakṣaṇa. **Annam Bhaṭṭa, Tarkasaṁgraha, Goswami (ed.) Tarkasaṁgrahaḥ, p.27**
10. “prakāśadeśadharmādyanugrahādīndriyārthasambandhaviśeṣeṇa sthūlārthagrāhaka”. **Bhāsarvajña, Nyāyasāra, Swami Yogindrananda (ed.), Nyāyabhūṣaṇam, p.102**
11. “yogi pratyakṣau tu deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭārthagrāhakaḥ”. **Bhāsarvajña, Nyāyasāra, Swami Yogindrananda (ed.), Nyāyabhūṣaṇam, p.170**
12. “prathamōkṣasannipātajam hi jñānam samayasmarānaviśeṣaṇagrahaṇanirapekṣamutpannam, tena tannirvikalpakam”. **Bhāsarvajña, Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, Swami Yogindrananda (ed.), Nyāyabhūṣaṇam, p.176**
13. “viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvatsambandhānām swarūpagrahaṇe hi paścād daṇḍītyādi jñānamapi bhavati, tasmānnirvikalpapūrvakameva savikalpakam”. **Bhāsarvajña, Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, Swami Yogindrananda (ed.), Nyāyabhūṣaṇam, p.99**