Plurality in Contemporary ‘Ontologies’: A Critical Reflection

Abstract

Ontology is generally thought to be the study of the nature of being or, to put the definition in more contemporary terms, the study of what kinds of things (or ‘entities’) are essentially there. For example, in deciding the ontological status of an individual, the fundamental problem facing us is, roughly, the problem of universals: because it is agreed that there are particular or singular objects, the problem becomes one of forming a consensus on whether there are abstract objects. Given, however, that there exist particulars, another problem arises about the nature of those particular entities; an example of this problem is the mind-body problem where it is to be decided whether human beings are constituted by two kinds or only one kind of entity. The reductionist approach to the question of dualism tends, roughly, to reduce the mental to the physical (or, more broadly, the material). The phenomenalists, on the other hand, would say that although material objects exist, they are more ‘derivative’ rather than basic in nature1. For some minds, plurality does not, by itself, imply a decline in explanation; the reality, for them, manifests itself in innumerable ways. Our task in this paper is not to venture into the prefatory questions about a synthesis, or to use a less ambitious term, ‘compromises’ between the two positions. The task is more modest: to reflect on the revival of ontologies. The aims of this paper will be 1) to provide an exegetical, although limited, view on the contemporary ‘ontologies’ – world-views that are apparently irreconcilable; and 2) to try and reflect on this question of ambivalence, arguing that it would be more prudent to deeply reflect and analyze the problem rather than attempt a synthesis. It would not come to us as a surprise, however, if a cursory discussion on the attitudes latent in this division between opposite ontological theories comes at some point in this paper. However, that discussion would, at best, be a supplement, a derivative, rather than one of the central points of the paper.