Neurological Reductionist Theory of Self

Abstract

My primary concern in this paper will be regarding the nature of the entities we call selves or persons. This is a metaphysical or ontological question. However, this metaphysical question is intimately connected with the phenomenological question. In the first section of this paper, I would like to explore the different ontological stances one may take regarding self. The second section includes exploring the different grounds for retaining the notion of self in bigger metaphysical picture. In the concluding section of my paper, I would like to collate all the fragments of arguments to get a total picture of the main structure of the argument. I would also like to mention at the end the ontic status, I would like to confer to the self and also the theory of self that would stem on being conferred upon such an ontic status. While arguing for such a theory I would include on the one hand the positive arguments in favour of the thesis I would like to uphold and on the other hand show how the proponents of contemporary theories of self could explain the phenomenon which could not otherwise be explained by the traditional theories of self. Not only evidences from current research disprove some of the traditional functions and attributes assigned to self like epistemic transparency, etc. but also these (traditional) self-theories cannot accommodate many of the functions which currently neurosciences ascribe to the self.