The Concept of Pramātā According to the Nyāya and the Advaita Vedānta: A Critical Study

Abstract

All our successful action depend on valid cognition (pramā). The valid cognition is attained from valid instrument of cognition (pramāṇa). We can cognize an object (prameya) with a valid instrument. All these are done in which agent remains in the center. An agent can validly cognize an object by pramāṇa. But the question is - who is considered as an agent or pramātā? Etymologically, pramātā means the locus of pramājñāna or the person who has the pramājñāna. However, ‘the locus of pramājñāna’ is not the only feature of pramātā. Pramātā should be conscious. The statement ‘someone possesses cognition but he is unconscious’ is a contradictory proposition. Most of the Indian philosophical schools accept that mind, sense-organ and object are not conscious. According to them, ātmā (self) is the only conscious being. For this reason, ātmā should be the pramātā. Naiyāyikas accept this notion. According to them, cognition remains in self. Cognition is the accidental quality of self. However, Advaita Vedāntins do not accept pure self as pramātā. According to them, cognition cannot remain in self by inherence relation. Moreover, if impermanent cognition becomes the quality of self, then self cannot be eternal. Advaita Vedāntins think that self which is limited by antaḥkaraṇa (internal organ) is taken as pramātā. But, how can it be possible? To find the actual nature of pramātā, we have presented the arguments of the Naiyāyikas and Advaita Vedāntins regarding pramātā in this paper, and try to understand the nature of the pramātā.