

Negotiating Economic Blockade: Consumption of Goan classes and masses as portrayed in local press of the 1950s

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Abstract

Soon after India's independence in 1947, the Government demanded that Portugal handover the Portuguese territories on the western coast. However, the Portuguese Prime Minister Salazar refused to oblige from his stated policy that the territories were not colonies, but an integral part of metropolitan Portugal, which were renamed 'Overseas Provinces'. This paper is an attempt to analyse effects of India's economic blockade on Goa from 1955 to 1961, and its influence on the transformation of food habits of the urban Catholic Goans. I will use content analysis of the local press, supplementing it with ethnographic as well as archival records.

Keywords: Economic blockade, Portuguese India, food consumption, local press, remittances

1. Introduction

Since, initially, India did not want to use military action it resorted to other stratagems, though, with little success. When diplomatic maneuvering and satyagraha yielded nothing substantial, India tried to use another means and resorted to enforcing an economic embargo. That meant that no commodities would be allowed into the Portuguese territories in India, which depended heavily on the import of food as there was not enough production for sustenance. Nevertheless, the move by India was thwarted partly by the Portuguese by increasing the imports of food stuff from overseas.

The business houses in Goa helped the colonial power to restore normalcy in making available the day-to-day goods for consumption by using the local press to publicize the products that were imported and enticing the buyers, thereby creating an image that there was nothing lacking for the local community, while the reality was the opposite. The food that was imported was out of bound of the common people who had no money to buy in the face of large-scale unemployment and still larger incidence of

under employment. Many Goans were dependent on remittances from their relatives working in India, which was stopped as well. Though salaries were increased, it was only for those in government service who had the power to buy commodities that were obviously in short supply. Prices were hiked up and inflation was the order of the day.

2. Planning of the economic blockade

At the time of India's independence on 15 August 1947, Portugal and France continued to have their colonies in India. While Portuguese colonies comprised Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra, and Nagar Haveli, French colonies were Pondicherry in Madras, *Chandernagore in Bengal Presidency*, Karikal, Mahe and Yanam.¹ In order to include these territories in the mainland Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Prime Minister thought that there was no need to take any forceful action against the foreign powers and that they would take it through diplomatic efforts.

Due to the reluctance and doubts about Portugal's sincerity in establishing relations, as well as its attitude towards Pakistan and Hyderabad, the latter under the Nizam's rule, it took nearly two years to set up a Portuguese legation in New Delhi. India settled for a legation, alleging that it did not have enough trained diplomatic personnel to appoint at the office of an embassy.² Vasco Garin, the Portuguese Charged' Affair took charge of his office in India on 27 January 1949.³ It was much later in November 1949 that Parekhet Achuta Menon took charge as the Charged' Affair at Lisbon.⁴

Oliveira Salazar refused to discuss the issue diplomatically and contested that those territories were not colonies, but extensions of Portugal and that they were an integral part of Overseas Portugal (*Ultramar Português*) and called them Overseas Provinces.⁵ He introduced a new statute, '*Estatuto do Estado da India*' on 1 July 1955, to meet the charge that the Portuguese administration was not dictatorial. It proclaimed Portuguese India to be an autonomous unit enjoying administrative decentralization. Salazar commented, "if the 'case of Goa', meant the transfer of sovereignty of the Portuguese territories to India for sure this problem would not be solved in a peaceful way".⁶ It may be noted that even when the diplomatic relations were not established, both the governments maintained an amicable attitude, though there were under currents. There used to be cooperation in managing the affairs between them, especially with regards to the supply of the commodities on which Goa was almost fully dependent on the neighboring territories.⁷

The Indian government felt that the Portuguese delegation had no significance and was of no use as Portugal had rejected various offers of negotiations.⁸ The authorities also pointed out the recent developments in Goa while referring to the repression of anti-Satyagraha and anti-terrorist movements by the Portuguese authorities. These developments forced Nehru to make an announcement in the Indian Parliament that the Government had handed over a note to the in charge of Portuguese affairs in New Delhi, asking them to close the Portuguese delegation till 8 August. He also pointed out that India had closed its Legation in Lisbon in 1953, because of the refusal of the Portuguese government to discuss the Goa problem.⁹ However, at that time, the Indian government had not asked the Portuguese legation in Delhi to be closed, since they expected that it would be possible to reach a solution peacefully.¹⁰ In spite of the growing tension between India and the Portuguese authorities, Nehru's decision came

as a surprise. He added that the closure of the Legation does not mean cut off of the diplomatic relations as there was still a Portuguese Consulate in Bombay and an Indian in Goa. What will be lacking is a hierarchical representation by both the governments as the Consul Generals were withdrawn.¹¹

In the meanwhile, the Indian government geared up to take steps to force Portugal to leave the territories. It unilaterally decided to suspend from 24 July 1955, the railway traffic between India and Goa. However, the line was not reopened until after 1961. The news was announced by All India Radio and by the Bombay papers, Indian Express, Hindustan Standard, and others. This development was reported in the Goan press on the next day, that is, 25 July.¹² Consequently, the trains ran only between Mormugão and Sanvordem. Thus, Goa was isolated from India as there was no railway connection between Castle-Rock, in the Indian territory and Sanvordem on the Goan side.

The Prime Minister explained that this measure was mainly taken because of certain difficulties regarding the functioning of the railways. His contention was that the Portuguese authorities did not give any assurance for their moral of obstacles. These referred to the presence of Portuguese soldiers posted at the stations to prevent any untoward incidents or terrorist attacks. The Portuguese authorities refuted this claim and said that they are there only to protect the train and the passengers. But the Prime Minister mentioned that the railway from India up to the border of the Portuguese territory would continue.¹³ In reality, Salazar had predicted that Nehru might use a blockade to force them to hand over the territories. The question of Goa is the most delicate and serious...India has many possibilities, best said indefinite, to create difficulties and complicate the life in Goa: it has territorial contiguity, economic dependence, employment and economy of our immigrants are the weapons that can be used effectively against us.¹⁴

In the meanwhile, Nehru reiterated his stand of solving the "Goa Problem" peacefully. In this, he was backed by the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress which unanimously approved the stand taken by Nehru regarding the Goa problem.¹⁵ However, the members of the opposition Jan Sangh and their supporters protested his attitude toward trying to peacefully resolve the situation. They demanded that strong action should be taken against Portugal. The request for closure of the Consulate was an outcome of this demand. The leader of the Socialist Party, Prajash Kripalani emphasized that the government had only two alternatives: to permit the movement of the Satyagrahis (Passive resistance) or to start a limited war with Portugal. On the other hand, the communist leader Gopalan suggested economic sanctions against Goa and if necessary, military action.¹⁶

Much before the decision to close the Legations and stoppage of the train services, India had initiated some restrictions to put pressure on Portugal,¹⁷ namely imposing the need for a permit to enter her territories with effect from 7 September 1954.¹⁸ India had also initiated economic action of political pressure on the Portuguese. The Governor of Goa informed Lisbon that when he requested seeds for cultivation, the Indian authorities took months to inform him that it would not be possible to supply them. He also claimed that Goans who went into the Indian Territory, to buy some kilos of paddy were imprisoned.¹⁹ The Reserve Bank of India refused to transfer Indian currency to

Burma for making payments for the purchase of rice and instead made him pay in pound sterling, alleging that fifty percent of the requested money issued to buy weapons to send to Lisbon.

As you will be worthy to verify, the reason attributed to that suspension is presented in a contradictory manner. Some newspapers say that it was due to the fact that the Government of Goa was using 50% of such facilities for the "purchase of armaments", which would have "moved to Portugal". Others, that the measure was only temporary, and due to the negotiations, that currently existed between the Governments of India and the Portuguese on the "Goa issue".²⁰

Goa's dependence on the neighboring territories of India continued, with commodities imported into Goa. However, all was not well on this front. The comments made in a letter sent by the Governor of Goa on 3 July 1951 to the Portuguese Legation in Delhi show how in a clever way India had started pressuring the Portuguese in Goa. He commented that while Portugal accepts all the requests made by India, there was no reciprocation and it only made it difficult for them.

A similar procedure is not seen on the part of the Indian authorities because they hinder everything and grant nothing, including rice seeds, which has caused us serious embarrassment, but that I am trying to solve with our own resources. A different policy I think is very dangerous because it would be tantamount to giving ourselves in pieces.²¹

The importance of rice in the diet of Goans was well known to Indian authorities. Their staple food, yet not available in enough quantity, because the area used for cultivation was not adequate and the methods used to grow rice were not innovative. Goa depended on imports of rice to meet the demand of the population since the rice grown in the territory was sufficient for only five to six months. Using rice as a means to suppress the Portuguese was therefore just the right decision. The Governor also commented that the allegations of the Government of India that the times were difficult for the food production were not justified.²²

The Governor also suggested that the solution to solve such problems lied in using own recourses. Interestingly, at this point of time, he had envisaged that dependence on India for seeds had to be brought to an end. According to him, self-reliance had to be followed, if not, it would mean that they were handing the power in parts. The Governor also warned the Central Government that the proposal from India to start public transport from Bombay to Goa by Bombay transporters was not feasible. He objected to such move because he feared that the road transport between Bombay and Goa will be under the control of the Indian Government, as the transport system there, was nationalized and under direct administration of the Indian authorities.²³ This would definitely jeopardize the free flow of traffic from across the territories which would lead to severe repercussions on the movement of people and goods. This fear of the Governor appears to have come true when the latter political developments took place and the railway transport was stopped at the border of the Indian Territory. He also complained about the transfer of funds to Burma for the acquisition of rice. In this case, Burma was ready to accept Indian rupees, which only needed to be transferred, but the Reserve Bank of India forced him to transfer in pound sterling, to deprive them of this

valuable foreign exchange, for future needs.²⁴

3. The implementation of the blockade

Scholars usually distinguish between negative and positive sanctions when analyzing economic embargos. According to Barber (1979), negative sanctions are the best-known economic instruments of diplomacy. They are imposed in order to inflict an economic damage to one or more countries. Looking at the object of sanctions, we can distinguish three kinds of sanctions: boycotts, embargoes and financial sanctions.

A boycott is a restriction of imports of one or more goods from the target country (the one on whom the sanction is imposed). It takes place to lower the demand for certain products from the target country. Moreover, it attempts to reduce the target's foreign exchange earnings and therefore its ability to purchase goods. In the case of Goa, it had limited export since its industrial production was limited and it catered mainly to the local population. However, there was some local produce that was exported to India and the exporters suffered because their produce could not be carried across. These included coconuts, copra, coconut oil, areca nut, and salt. The government tried to overcome this problem by exporting the products overseas. For example, we find that a special order was issued to solve the depreciation of areca nut because Indian importers had stopped buying it.²⁵ The boycott clearly penalizes the producers and the exporters.

A sanction aims to induce damage to a particular industry or sector of the target country. They are usually criticized as ineffective because target countries are able to find alternative markets or arrange triangular purchases to circumvent import controls. In the case of Goa, it was definitely ineffective since it hardly had any industry worthy of producing and exporting the end product. Except for the mining industry on which Goa was dependent for financing its economy, others were producing goods that were mostly absorbed by the locals, and surplus if any was exported. With the industrial production being insufficient goods were imported to make up the deficiency. In a talk delivered by the then Governor of Goa, Quintanilla e Mendonca Dias, at the 'Feira das Industrias Portuguesas' (Portuguese Industrial Fair)²⁶ which was held in Lisbon in 1951, he points out that the products of the industries of sugar cane, jaggery, ice, and cold drinks, shoes, cotton cloth, gold jewelry, embroidery, and laces, were all locally purchased. There was no surplus for export. Among the bigger industries, he pointed out the export of coconut, copra, and oil, cashew nut as giving some revenue to the government. However, the local production of cashew nuts was not sufficient and these had to be imported from Mozambique to fulfill the need of the industry. Another industry that helped to earn from export was the canning industry of which there were two factories in Margão, Salcete, namely Costaand Company and Monte Silva and Company. The export of salt also earned some revenue.

An embargo aims to restrict exports of certain products to the target country. This is the most common technique. The prohibition on exports may be partial or complete. The Indian Government kept pending the applications for granting of import licenses on essential goods. Exports to Goa for any merchandise, and food stuffs to other Portuguese territories were also prohibited. The blockade envisaged prohibition on the movement of Indian goods and services, particularly of food grains and books and newspapers. People were also stopped from crossing over the border, especially those

dealing with businesses related to the import of products from India unless they had a visa, which was difficult to obtain.²⁷

Roads linking Goa, Daman and Diu were blocked by India. No ships carrying cargo to be delivered to Goa could touch any of the Indian ports.²⁸ Finally, financial sanctions restrict or suspend lending and investing in the target economy. Besides, foreign assets of the target economy may be frozen. In this regard, the currency from India was used by the people of Portuguese India. Restrictions were enforced on the money exported by the Indian Government, which placed the Portuguese in an awkward position. Therefore, the embargo was clearly the hardest sanction that resulted from the so-called economic blockade started in July 1955 because it acted directly over the circulation of some of the essential articles to Goa.

Goa had no industry worth the name to process goods and services and thus activate the economic order and generate jobs. This left the people with no other solution than to migrate in search of employment. What first started with the men of labour class later encompassed the children, family, and women. While the Goanelite, the 'Batcaras', that is the landlords and the 'descendentes', Goa's Portuguese Europeans, remained in Goa.²⁹ They looked upon the emigrants with scorn and sneers and nick-named them 'Bombaistas' or 'Mumoicares'.³⁰ However, over the years with the economic situation deteriorating the landed gentry also joined the exodus since the land was not giving enough to live a life without difficulty. Fortunately, a number of the youngsters and second-generation emigrants joined schools and institutions of higher education to better their social and professional status.

Goa's economy was trade-based rather than development-oriented, as developing economies should be for their survival and flexibility. Goa depended heavily on imports for their sustenance and most of it was imported from neighboring territories. Rice, wheat and pulses, green vegetables, onions, potatoes, chilies, kerosene cooking oil and 'vanaspati', sugar and jaggery were some of the items that were imported from across Goa's border. Its economy was entwined with that of British India and after independence and formation of Union of India, with this new nation state.

The money to purchase these commodities came through Goan emigrants settled and working in the Union of India and from those working on board the ships. The latter had signed on Indian articles of agreement, to be paid in Indian Rupees.³¹ Money remitted by these emigrants sustained the Goan economy and enabled the Goan people to purchase the goods that were available in the markets, which were mainly from India. These imports were not affected by any Custom's tariffs or barrier of any other kind. Payments were made in Indian Rupees which was also legal tender in Goa.

The Government of India, also took a number of measures which would help the execution of the blockade. Under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, a notification was issued to put restrictions on the transmission by post of articles containing bank or currency notes, cheque, securities and financial instruments to Goa unless a license was obtained for the purpose from the Reserve Bank of India by the authorized dealers in foreign exchange.³² This notification was followed by a Postal notice,³³ which said that any article posted in contravention of any of these restrictions would not be accepted by the Post Office in India. However, if inadvertently accepted,

it would be returned to the sender of it or detained by the Customs authorities empowered on that behalf, without any refund of postage or other charges paid by the sender of the said article.

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, issued the Export Trade Control Order under the Import and Export Control Act, 1947 prohibiting the export of goods like food grains, sugar, vanaspati, cooking oil, kerosene, etc. Further, the Customs authorities at the minor ports along the west coast of India were instructed not to pass shipping bills of goods meant for Goan ports. Similarly, an Import Trade Control Order was issued under the above Act, 1947 banning imports into India from Portuguese territories including Goa.³⁴

4. Goa's state of affairs due to the blockade

The economic blockade had a strong impact on food necessities especially because it was based on two ways of embargo: the embargo on imports and communications and the embargo on the currency. At the beginning of January 1956, Banco Nacional Ultramarino and the Goa Accounts Department ceased to accept the Indian Currency. On 12 January, the River Navigation Department affixed at its ticket counter a notice informing the commuters that they will not accept any Indian currency henceforth. Later, on 2 February the Customs, the Railways, and the businessmen also stopped accepting it. Since the currency was not accepted by the bank, the local businessmen could not transact with the Indian currency or make payments with it. This meant that the local economy became completely frozen.

As the railway was stopped the postal correspondence was also interrupted. Then, the Portuguese postal correspondence to Goa, Daman and Diu, started to be sent through Pakistan instead of India from 6 August 1955. The stoppage of the postal correspondence led to big problems and anxiety for the relatives of the emigrant Goans who depended on the remittances to buy the food. Unfortunately, despite their importance for local economy, there is scarce data about the movement of remittances. According to Stella Mascarenhas-Keyes, "are liable estimate of the magnitude of such remittances has been impossible to obtain partly due to the lack of appropriate official statistics and as these were sent via the post office or by personal conveyance". This mode of transfer was probably used because the immigrants found it to be practical as there was only one bank, the official bank, National Overseas Bank (Banco Nacional Ultramarino).³⁵ The quote of the correspondent of *The Observer* from Bombay:

Unless you declare war, there is nothing that Nehru can do now. The economic restrictions are at their end, which need to be imposed, because the Goans, residents of India continue to send the funds to their parents and relatives in the Portuguese territories at the value of 100.000 pounds every month. If these remittances are stopped, they will cause big difficulties for women and children. To liberate Goa without violence will be difficult for Nehru.³⁶

5. Impact of food due to the blockade

We may say that the economic blockade led to a "food blockade". I use this expression because, infact, the economic embargo and the different sanctions really affected the access to the food either because food supplies were not possible to import and either

because there was no valid currency to buy it. Therefore, different committees were made responsible in order to help ease up the problem. Their main mission was to arrange the import of food items and distribute them to the people. The authorities had also to check for any hoarding by unscrupulous persons. The government was keen that big queues were not found, which would give an idea that there were a shortage of food and people were in distress. The local press carried various notices issued by different committees which were responsible to import and organize the distribution of essential food items. People were informed about the import of food and when and where it will be sold. In order to control over charging, the price at which it was to be sold was also notified. To facilitate the population to buy the food without hustle, many shops were appointed as retailers in various parts of Goa. The government also opened various units from where rice was distributed to the people. The Portuguese government had to take action to get the food for the people to overcome their hardship and more importantly, to create a politically motivated scenario to show the Indian government, that the blockade imposed by them was inconsequential.

Ration cards were issued to the people to collect monthly ration of food stuff. A committee called *Comissão de Assuntos Economicos* was responsible to organize the sale of food. The committee used to put up a notice on the local papers informing people about the availability of goods. One such notice tells that in order to avoid hoarding of potatoes recently imported by the local businessman, the Committee took the deliberation, with the concurrence of his Excellency the Governor General, to sell the potatoes in retail, not more than 16 *arrateis* (1 *arratel* about 450 gms) per person.³⁷ The retailers had to weekly report to whom it was sold, what quantities, and at what price, among other details.

The Portuguese Central government had authorized the creation in the overseas territories of three types of organizations for economic co-ordination that is, Committees to regulate imports, Committees for exports, and Economic Institutes.³⁸ However, for better co-ordination and functioning the Portuguese Government decided to disband and amalgamate these Committees to create the Junta de Comércio Externo, in the overseas provinces. The Junta in Goa began operations on 1 May 1956. Henceforth, the Junta controlled the imports and exports of the *Estadoda India Portuguesa*. The government hoped that this measure would help in overcoming the problem of the availability of food due to the blockade.

In the meanwhile, some institutions and associations in Portugal started collecting food and other items to be sent to the soldiers who were posted in the *Estado da India Portuguesa* to help mitigate their problems. Cigarettes, tobacco, wines; chocolates, jams, medicines, books, tin stuff, flour, etc. were collected by Portuguese Caritas from donors.³⁹ The “*Obra das Mães pela Educação Nacional*” also sent clothes for babies and 20 kilos of honey which was needed in Diu. Probably there were press releases and requests published in the Portuguese papers for food and other items needed by the soldiers in the *Estadoda India*.

A major step taken by the authorities was to start the airlines *Serviços de Transporte Aéreos da India Portuguesa* in August 1955, with two planes in the fleet, which would fly from Goa to Daman and then Diu and Karachi.⁴⁰ This made it possible to bring goods by air from Karachi to the Portuguese territories. In fact, Karachi became the

entrepôt for Goa's foreign imports. Pakistan also developed a good business base with Portuguese India, with local businessmen importing several items like cereals, rice and even ayurvedic medicines.⁴¹

An air link between Goa and Angola and Goa and Mozambique was also established, and Transports Aereos Portuguese (TAP) introduced direct flights from Lisbon to Goa and vice-versa from July 1961. The Portuguese government also started importing goods by air from Pakistan, Malaysia, and Singapore, and as far as Holland and Portuguese Africa.⁴² The Portuguese shipping company Companhia Nacionalde Navegação (C.N.N.), was roped in to collect goods from the European Continent using steamer 'Timor'. The ship started touching those Ports where there were goods destined for Goa.

As rice was—and still is—the staple of the Goan food habits, it had to be imported. In addition, other food supplies were imported from different places: tea from Ceylon, coffee from Angola, jiggery from Pakistan, vegetable oils from Holland, chilies from Singapore, Ceylon and Pakistan. The vegetables and pulses were cultivated in limited proportion, besides being a seasonal crop. C.N.N. was also roped into collect goods from the European Continent using steamer 'Timor'. The ship started touching those Ports where there were goods destined to Marmagoa Harbour.⁴³ From Australia came wheat, flour, butter and other items. C.N.N. started routing their ships from East Africa to Mormugao port, bringing goods from overseas for the merchants of India Portuguesa. It originally had only two annual sailings in 1956, which later increased to 12.⁴⁴ Shipping agents for mining companies were requested to bring in goods needed by the territory on their incoming journey.⁴⁵

6. Role of the local press

Not much is reflected in the local press about the problems faced by the population.⁴⁶ But the very fact that there were arrangements made by the government to bring and distribute the food in a controlled manner with limited quantities made available for purchase by individuals, shows the problem. Hoarding of goods was observed and the government had to take measures to stop. It was not only rice, but potatoes, onions, chillies, pulses on which the locals depended for their meals were difficult to find or were very expensive. This meant that only those with more economic power could accede the opportunities offered by the parallel market. And among them we can include especially Catholics living in urban spaces and with food habits more close to the Portuguese ones because the alternative goods offered by the market were mainly imported from Europe. People with economic difficulties and not so close to the Portuguese habits started feeling hardship to get the food. As the products were from far away destinations, they were not fresh. This was especially with vegetables and fruits. Another example was the availability of beef, which earlier came from neighboring territories. The Government now tried to fulfill the need of beef with imported frozen meat. This was done on experimental basis. From the notice, it looks like it was sold only in Panjim market. (I remember that my father used to go early in the morning to buy the best and be sure to get it.)⁴⁷ The sale was not a regular feature. It depended on the arrival of the ship with the consignment. The 'Avisos', shows that the distribution is not even once a month. So, what did the people do during the intervening period if there were no fridges?

Licenses for importing food, especially rice were issued to those who applied. The government also took steps to import food, and have rice in stock for distribution to the people. For this to be more effective it had opened 99 centres (postos) as per the notice issued by Comissão de Assuntos Económicos, dated 30 May, 1955.⁴⁸ At some point in time, there was more than required, so the government decided to stop importing and close the distribution centres.⁴⁹ It was not only rice that was sold by the Comissão Coordenadora das Importações e Exportações. It also imported other commodities like oranges and lemons all the way from Mozambique. The availability and sale were publicized through an 'Aviso' so that a wider number of people were covered. In this way, the government was trying to create an atmosphere to show that everything was normal.

The Portuguese Government attempted all these measures to show the world that they were not affected by the blockade. By the time the blockade progressed into the late fifties and early sixties it looked like there was no shortage of food since the best was available. A glance at the local papers will show that products ranging from children to adult foods, medicines, and tonics were offered. The newspapers were full of the advertisement of these products. However, and reiterate, these were accessible only to those living in the cities and who had the economic possibility to buy it, especially the rulers and the local elite. Advertisement on the papers, showed Danish Butter, various medicines, tonics, whisky, and other products inserted by different importers. Different products from Nestlé were advertised for children, which changed their diets replacing the traditional preparations.

Advertisements were enticing people on how to change their food habits. The frozen chicken was suggested as well as food enhancers like Maggi-cubes. Infact, in those days 'Maggi' ruled the kitchen, especially in the preparation of soups and 'Arroz refogado' (pulav). There were other brands, but this was the most sought-after. Its use in the preparation of food continued even later and still at present. An advertisement for a packet soup showed the people the advantage they would have if it was used instead of a homemade one. It tells that people would have to buy various ingredients and would have to waste time going shopping and spending on petrol to travel. So, the best solution was to use packet of 'Maggi – Sopado Lar – with Portuguese Taste'. The advertisement also emphasized that it was much more economical and tastier. Fresh milk was another product that underwent a change in the way it was consumed. Tinned milk in condensed or powder form substituted it for many.

7. Conclusion

In conclusion, we may say that politically the blockade was an attempt to generate an oppressive situation leading to the surrender of the Portuguese government with the aim of India reintegrating all the colonial territories into the mainland.

The Portuguese Government took various measures to see that food was available to the people by issuing legislation in this regard and making arrangements to import food from overseas. It even established a local airline Transporte Aereos da India Portuguesa, which was the only one amongst other Portuguese colonies, to facilitate air transport the goods. The business houses in Goa also helped the colonial powers by increasing the imports of food and publicizing them using the local press and enticing

the buyers, creating an image that there was nothing lacking when the opposite was the scene. Food was out of bound due to unemployment and the stopping of remittances from India.

Those who could afford changed their eating habits due to the availability of different products that were imported. Tinned stuff replaced fresh products for cooking, for example, *tomatada* (tomato puree), green peas, fruits, and olive oil was added to the diet by many. *Bacalhau* (drycodfish) also flooded the market. Fruits, pulses, butter, cheeses, alcohol, etc. made their appearance in different varieties.

Food was used as a tool for that inspite of the very discreet way it was made. In fact, closing the territorial communication and blocking the currency exchange was a hidden measure to difficult the access to the food. However, the measures used to overcome the situation were well succeeded in the urban places. Those were the places where people were more connected to European habits and also where the press had more influence. So, the press was a very important tool both to advertise new food products as well as to teach how to use them. To ascertain extent, the press was one of the best tools to overcome the embargo situation.

References

¹In October 1954, the French settlements were transferred *de facto* to India. By 1956 an agreement was signed to give a *de jure* status to the transfer. For details see, 'Treaty of Succession of the French Establishments of Pondicherry, Karikal, Maheand Yanam', in *Indian Year book of International Affairs*, V, 1956, pp.175-88.

²Portugal, Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros: *Vinteanos de defesa do Estado Portuguêsda India, (1947-1967)* (Twenty Years of defense of the Estado Portuguêsda India, (1947-1967). Vol. I, Lisboa, 1967, (Hereafter M.N.E.), p.67.

³Ibid, Vol. I, p.119; Arthur Rubinoff: *India's Use of Force*. Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1971, p.48.

⁴M.N.E., *ibid*, p.124.

⁵The *Acto Colonial* (Colonial Act) was passed by the Portuguese Parliament and became a part of the Portuguese Constitution. It was published in 1930 in order to substitute Chapter V of the 1911 Constitution. Article 7 of the amended Act, dated 21 May 1935, specifies that this law was applicable to the Overseas Colonies of Portugal. This act denied civil liberties to the Goan people and designated the citizens of Goa as *assimilados* (assimilated) and *indígenas* or 'nativos' (natives). Subsequently, by a legal change dated 11 June 1951, the Constitution was amended (Law 2.048) and art.134 transformed the then overseas territories into "províncias" (provinces) of Portugal, thus transforming the empire into a political constellation. This decentralization process aimed at guarantying politico-administrative autonomy to the provinces (art.148).

⁶A Vida, 26 July 1955, p.1.

⁷"The economic life of Goa is inevitably connected with India's" Nehru at the Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee in Sitapur on 21 August 1955, in *Nehru on Goa*, New Delhi, Goa Freedom Publications, n.d., p. 37; Nuno Alves Morgado, 'Notas para um

estudo do desenvolvimento económico do Estado da Índia' (Notes for a study of economic development of Estado da Índia) in Boletim Informativo da Junta de Comércio Externo, May 1961, p.9.

⁸AVida, 24 July 1955, p.1.

⁹Lourdes Bravoda Costa Rodrigues: 'Economic Blockade', Boletim do Instituto Menezes Bragança, 1994, no.170, p.137.

¹⁰AVida, 28 July 1955, p.1.0

¹¹Ibid, Nehru's speech in the Parliament.

¹²Ibid, 25 July 1955, p.4; Diário de Goa, 26 July 1955, p.4.

¹³Ibid, 28 July 1955, p.1. Other local papers also carried the speech of the Readministering the Parliament.

¹⁴Salazar in his speech delivered on 20 October 1949, M.N.E., p.157; Shrikant Ramani: Operation Vijay. The Ultimate Solution. Panjim, Broadway Book Centre, 2008, p. 21.

¹⁵Ibid, 27 July 1955, p. 1; "We attach great importance to the basic principles governing our policies, international policies especially", Nehru at a news conference in New Delhi, 31 May 1956, In Nehru on Goa, p.15.

¹⁶Ibid, 30 July 1955, p.1.

¹⁷Heraldo, 1 September 1954, p.2; M.N.E., p.262.

¹⁸Heraldo, (Suplemento) 3 September 1954, p.2; Free Goa, 10 September 1954, p.5. By a notification dated 10 April 1954, the Government of India imposed restrictions on travel from the Portuguese to Indian territories. Under the new regulations, all local government officials, (including) of civil, military, or other departments of the Government of Portuguese possessions were required to obtain permits from the Indian Consulate General in Goa for entry into or transit through Goa. Similarly, the Government of Bombay Province imposed restrictions on motor traffic between Daman and Nagar Aveli; P.P. Shirodkar: Goa's Struggle for Freedom. Delhi, Ajanta Publications, 1988, p.108.

¹⁹M.N. E., Governor's letter to the Portuguese Cultural A'ttache, Vol. I, p. 257; Maria Manuel Stocker, Xequê-Mateia Goa. Lisboa, Temase Debates, 2005, p.92

²⁰"Como V.Ex.a se dignará verificar, a razão atribuída para essa suspensão é apresentada por forma contraditória. Uns jornais dizem que foi devida ao facto do Governo de Gôa ter estado a utilizar 50% de tais facilidades para a "compra de armamentos", que teriam "seguido para Portugal". Outros, que a medida era apenas temporária, e devida às negociações que presentemente existiram entre os Governos da Índia e o Português sobre a "questão de Gôa" Letter of Vasco Garin to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Portugal dated 14 April, 1951, *ibid*, p. 261.

²¹"Não se vê por parte das autoridades indianas igual procedimento pois tudo dificultam e nada concedem, inclusive sementes de arroz, o que nos tem causado embaraço sérios, mas que estou tentando resolver com recursos próprios. Uma política diferente julgo-a perigosíssima, pois equivaleria a entregarmo-nos aos pedaços", *ibid*, p. 262

²²Ibid. Information of the Governor General of Estado da India, Lisbon, 3 July 1951.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid, p.264.

²⁵Official Order (Despacho) of the Governor General dated 24 July 1956, *Boletim Oficial*, II series, n^o,30, 26 July 1956.

²⁶*O Heraldo*, 11 July 1951.

²⁷Olivinho Gomes: 'The Economic Blockade of Goa. Its implications and consequences' in *Boletim do Instituto Menezes Bragança*, 1989, no.159, pp.69-95.

²⁸Maria de Lourdes Bravo da Costa Rodrigues: *100 years of Goa Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1908-2008)*. Panjim: Goa Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2008, p. 41.

²⁹The 'descendentes' were those Portuguese Europeans who came on work to Goa, either as bachelors or married with their families. The children of the latter and those of the bachelors who got married to their own race people were called 'descendentes'. Many of them continued in Goa even after their tenure ended and incorporated well with the local society. After liberation, many of them decided that Goa was where they would like to remain and did not return to Portugal.

³⁰J.B. Pinto: *Goan Emigration. Saligao*, n.d., p.3.

³¹Gomes, Olivinho, *ibid*, p.76.

³²Notification No. F.E.R.A. 37/55 R.B. dated 2 May 1955 issued under the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947.

³³Gomes, Olivinho, *ibid*, p.77. Postal Notice issued under no. C.69.5/55 on the basis of the Director-General, Posts and Telegraphs, endorsement no. N.C. 69-5/55 dated 25 August 1955 and endorsed later by the Central Board of Revenue, letter n.90/56/55L.C. dated 10 September, 1955 from its Land Customs Wing.

³⁴Customs Manual, Central Board of Revenue, 1955, New Delhi, p.78.

³⁵Stella Mascarenhas-Keyes: 'International migration: Its development, reproduction and economic impact on Goa upto 1961' in Teotonio R. de Souza(ed): *Goa Through the Ages, An Economic History*. Vol II. New Delhi, Concept Publishing House, 1990, p.250.

³⁶*AVida*, 16 August 1955, p.1.