

## Some Findings on The Relationship Between Identity And Nature of A Person

Shewli Dutta

**Abstract:** The problem of personal identity is fundamentally different from that of identity of objects in that persons are thinking intelligent beings endowed with the power of self- reflection. 'Person' may refer to a human or a biological organism (third person) or a psychological entity (first person). In this article I argue that the relation between nature and identity of a person is a two way relationship: in case of third-persons identity follows from nature and in case of first person (i.e. myself) identity precedes nature. The nature of a person is a crucial decisive factor only for identification of 'other' or third-persons. A person's knowledge of his own identity may be corroborated by evidences of various types; however, it may not be determined by any criterion.

**Keywords:** identity, personal identity, self reflection, first person, third person

It is generally held that nature of an object is a crucial determinant of the identity criteria of that object, since identity criteria are part of nature. Problem arises when we focus on personal identity as it is difficult to answer what a person is or what is meant by the nature of a person. The term 'person' refers to a human animal or a biological organism (the third person) on one hand and something mainly psychological (the first person) on the other. The word 'person', when viewed from psychological or first-person perspective, involves an intimate or subjective ('personal') connotation which makes persons distinct from any other object. In this article I shall argue that the relation between nature and identity of a person is a two way relationship. In case of third-persons, identity follows from nature and in case of first person (i.e. myself) identity precedes nature. The entire discussion is divided in three sections. In the first section I analyse terms such as 'person', 'nature' and 'identity' and also present the views of prominent philosophers on the relationship between nature and identity of persons. In the second section I try to establish that nature of a person determines the identity criteria of the same only in the context of 'other' or third persons. In the third and final section it will be argued that in case of first-person the direction of the relationship is exactly the opposite.

### I

In most discourses on personal identity the words 'person', 'self' and 'I' are used interchangeably and they refer mainly to the first person. Consequently, in the discourse the

question 'what is a person' is very often reduced to the question 'what am I'. However, if we look at the word 'person' from the perspective of a layman (i.e. if 'person' is an empirical person) then its meaning encompasses both oneself and others. That is, if the word 'person' does not refer to any separate entity but to 'I', 'you' and 'he' or 'she' then all people in the universe will come under the purview of the word. In that case the question 'what is a person' will assume an independent meaning and to answer it we shall have to refer to some essential properties to be possessed by every person (including myself) and which define the nature of persons uniquely. John Locke, for example, provided a definition of 'person' which according to most of the philosophers delineates some essential features in the nature of persons. According to Locke, a person is, "... a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking..."<sup>1</sup>. The essential qualities for being a person, according to Locke, are thinking, self-awareness, and consciousness of the past and present. David Wiggins opines that to be a person not only possession of self-consciousness is required, one must have a considerable amount of past history and one should be aware of his own identity through this history. I am certain that I have all these characteristics (Wiggins calls this "characteristic functioning"<sup>2</sup>), and can assume that there are other persons who also have a considerable amount of past history and who are equally aware of their identities through their pasts. Clearly, Wiggins provides no additional insight over and above Locke. According to philosophers these characteristics are necessary to identify something as a person and only through these properties persons can be distinguished from all other beings in the universe.

On the other hand, the meaning of the word 'nature' is extensive. 'Nature' includes a bundle of personal characteristics including ways of thinking, feeling etc. All the fundamental dispositions and traits of persons are also part of the nature of persons. Let us begin the discussion with the example of a tree. A tree goes through various structural changes in its entire life span. From the very beginning till the end the tree evolves continuously in spite of continuous change. Since these changes are not accidental (i.e. these changes have not occurred in a brief moment of time) and are not inconsistent with each other (i.e. any one of these changes is not contradictory to any other), the bodily continuity (that is, continuity of the specific form<sup>3</sup> and *same* matter) of that tree determines its criterion of identity. Bodily continuity involves spatio-temporal continuity between various tree phases of the same tree. That is, every present existence of that tree is spatio-temporally continuous to its prior existence. Spatio-temporal continuity can be understood in terms of a temporal chain among various existences of that tree. For example,  $X$  at time  $t_1$  is spatio-temporally linked with  $X$  at time  $t_2$ ,  $X$  at time  $t_2$  is spatio-temporally linked with  $X$  at time  $t_3$  and so on. Therefore  $X$  at time  $t_1$  is spatio-temporally linked

with  $X$  at time  $t_1$ . Hence the identity criterion of a tree (i.e., continuity of the same body) is determined by its nature that involves various kinds of changes of the form (i.e., bodily form) throughout the spatio-temporal existences of that tree.

Though 'nature of persons' primarily stands for all the essential properties possessed by a person, it may comprise some contingent properties as well. Let us elaborate the idea with an example. Philosophers who hold the view that the essential properties of a person are possession of self-consciousness and the ability to become a *subject* (as opposed to an object) of thought, will consider possession of a body with a particular shape as a contingent property. For instance, to Descartes<sup>4</sup>, even though possession of a body may be characteristic of a person (because Descartes believes in interactionism) it is not essential. On the contrary, Bernard Williams or P. F. Strawson will classify possession of a spatio-temporal body as one of the essential properties of persons. Therefore, to understand the nature of a person it is important to incorporate all these properties (especially all those properties which are considered as 'personal' properties, i.e., properties that belong only to persons).

What, on the other hand, do we mean by 'identity' of a person? Like 'nature', the word 'identity' also has a broad meaning. Generally, in philosophy, 'identity' refers to a particular type of binary relationship. Any two objects are said to be identical to each other if and only if the properties possessed by the first object are exactly same as those possessed by the second object and the second object is a spatio-temporal continuation of the first object ('identity of indiscernibles'<sup>5</sup>). This is the relationship of an object with itself. This type of identity (i.e.,  $a = a$ ) is also referred to as 'numerical identity'. However, in common usage, the word 'identity' has yet another meaning, which is characteristic or qualitative similarity between any two objects without any claim to spatio-temporal continuity. Here, being identical does not mean  $a = a$ ; what it actually purports is identification. In the phrase 'personal identity', the term 'identity' may not only refer to numerical identity but may imply identification as well. To explore the relationship between 'personal identity' and 'nature of a person' we must take both meanings of identity into account.

But to find out the relationship between nature and identity we must first understand what 'other persons' are. That is because if by the term 'person' we understand only first-persons we may not fully appreciate the deep-rooted relationship between identities of persons and nature of persons. Only one aspect of this relationship would be revealed to us but not the entire picture as the nature of a person from the first person account is entirely subjective in nature. There is no doubt that to myself I am a person, but whether all the natural characteristics of a person are also applicable to me completely depends upon my interests, beliefs and structure of knowledge towards myself. If it is logically (and in fact empirically) possible that there are other persons each of whom must possess all the properties of persons, they should have self-

consciousness and must be subjects of experience. In this context, Galen Strawson's observation is important. He argues that, "If one is self-conscious, one must possess the concept of (ONE) SELF [and] one must possess some conception of the subject of experience."<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, "one must in some manner possess the concept of what is not-self, [and] one must in some manner possess a conception of what is not a subject of experience."<sup>7</sup> According to him, it follows that "[...]self-consciousness not only requires possession of conceptions of *not-self* and *subject of experience*. It also requires possession of a conception of that which is both not-self and a subject. So that [...] one must possess the concept of other subjects."<sup>8</sup> What is a subject? Strawson replies, "[...] a physical being that has experiences of various sorts, and is actively self-conscious in the sense that it actually has thoughts of the form 'I am *F*' or 'My *F* is *G*' – is my candidate for the position of minimal self-conscious subject."<sup>9</sup>

Why conception of self requires the conception of not-self? The question can be restated in the following way: why is it important to me that there are other persons in the universe except myself? There are two obvious replies to this question. First, only in this way we can grasp the entire domain of persons and therefore can understand the nature of persons. Second, if there are no other persons, I am the only existential object, then it would lead myself to absolute solipsism and there would be no way to know whether I am a person. Accordingly, to admit the existence of a self, one must automatically admit the existence of others (i.e. not-selves). And to analyse the relationship between nature of persons and identity of persons, it is necessary to include both selves and non-selves, for nature of a person means nature of both selves (i.e., first persons) and not-selves (third persons or others).

## II

Philosophers, who think that there is a deep relationship between the identity-criteria of an object and the nature of that object, mainly argue that the direction of the relationship is from nature to identity. From this view it transpires that the knowledge of the nature of persons is a necessary precondition for determining the identity criteria of persons. Notable among these philosophers are Locke, Perry etc. However, not all of them have used the word 'nature'. Locke has used 'idea' and Perry has employed the word 'concept'. Words such as 'idea', 'concept' etc. do not indicate anything other than what is being referred to as 'nature'.

Locke argues, "It being one thing to be the same *Substance*, another the same *Man*, and a third the same *Person*, if *Person*, *Man*, and *Substance*, are three Names standing for three different *Ideas*; for such as is the *Idea* belonging to that Name, such must be the *Identity*: Which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would possibly have prevented a great deal of that Confusion, which often occurs about this Matter, with no small seeming Difficulties; especially concerning *Personal Identity*, [...]"<sup>10</sup>

From Locke's view it transpires that the name of an object is associated with the idea of that object and the idea of an object determines its identity conditions. It is clear that the term 'idea' and the term 'nature' are more or less synonymous. That is because by 'idea' of an object we actually refer to some of its essential properties which are an indispensable part of its nature.

John Perry employed the term 'concept' instead of 'nature'. 'Criteria of Identity' is according to him the "unity relations, between simultaneous events or non-simultaneous object-stages"<sup>11</sup>. He argues, "the concept of a personal history is intimately associated with the concept of a person; *someone could not be said to have mastered the concept of a person if he could not say, given the requisite information, whether two events belonged to the history*"<sup>12</sup> of one person."<sup>13</sup>

It has already been noted that, philosophers who have argued about the relationship between the nature and identity of persons have mostly implied first-person by the term 'person'. This is because, according to them, determining the identities of other persons or third-persons or not-selves is a trivial issue and can therefore not be a part of any serious philosophical debate. Shoemaker argues that if persons are in all respects similar to material objects or organisms, then "there would be no more reason for speaking of a problem of personal identity than there is for speaking of a problem of canine identity, and there would be no more of a philosophical problem about the nature of persons (as such) than there is about the nature of stones (as such)."<sup>14</sup>

But if there is no 'other' and 'person' refers only to the first-person then how the nature of a person plays an important role in determining his identity criteria becomes obscure. Even the philosophers who by the term 'person' have otherwise implied first-person, have nonetheless employed third-person metaphors and assumed the third-person viewpoint while describing thought experiments on the nature or criteria of identity. The problem with their views is the following. Each of them admits the logical as well as empirical possibilities of the existence of other or third-persons. However, they demonstrate the peculiarity of the questions related to the nature of persons and that of personal identity from first-person perspective. The only meaningful interpretation which is possible out of this apparent contradiction is that the nature of a person is a crucial decisive factor *only for identification of other or third persons*.

The last point can be illustrated in the following way. Let  $X$  be a person whom I know and assume that I have been a witness to various incidences of  $X$ 's life. Whenever I see  $X$ , I immediately identify him as the  $X$  that I know. Question is: what is the basis on which I am able to identify  $X$  as a person and also able to conclude that  $X$  is identical with his/her previous existences? My answer to this question will be the following. I know that  $X$  is a person for I know what a person is and how to identify a person as a person. To me a person is an entity that

possesses self-consciousness, who is the owner of various experiences and is able to recollect his/her past experiences, and finally, who is spatio-temporally continuous. It is true that I have not observed *X* continuously all throughout his life to be able to infer that *X* is spatio-temporally continuous. But from *X*'s behaviour, his bodily similarity, his memory I can verify whether the claims made by *X* about his past life is true. The factors on the bases of which I had identified *X* as *X* were indeed part of *X*'s nature.

In the above account, what is meant by *X*'s spatio-temporal continuity? Any discussion on the matter would inevitably involve the idea of a particular body with a particular shape. It has been mentioned that possession of a body is part of the nature of a person to philosophers who regard person as a psycho-physiological construct. For, according to these philosophers, it is impossible to understand the spatio-temporal continuity of a person without reference to a particular body. Personal identity may be established only by means of (some or the other version of) the bodily continuity criterion. But in order to establish the (spatio-temporal) identity of *X* of yesterday with *X* of today I need to observe *X* incessantly since yesterday. Otherwise, there is a possibility that at some moment when I was not looking *X* might have been replaced by his/her replica or an identical twin. It is logically possible to establish the identity, i.e. spatio-temporal continuity, of *X* using the bodily continuity criterion, but for an individual observer it is practically impossible to attain this feat. It is possible only for an automated device, which can incessantly watch *X* for enabling the application of the bodily continuity criterion.

It is clear that to establish the identity of a person by means of the bodily continuity criterion we have to stretch our imagination a bit too much. In most attempts of establishing personal identity by bodily continuity we end up assuming the identity of the concerned person on the basis of bodily similarity. Possibly this is the reason why Williams did not attempt to explain personal identity solely on the basis of bodily continuity, but admitted memory as the other important criterion.<sup>15</sup>

If, on the other hand, memory is accepted as the only criterion of personal identity then it is impossible for a person to establish the identity of any (third) person barring himself. For, it is not possible for witnesses to verify the memory claims of a person without a bodily counterpart. Clearly, in case of third-person identification bodily continuity is an important characteristic. This problem can be shown to exist for other psychological criteria as well. In each case the recognition or reidentification that 'it is the same person' is possible, but that is not sufficient for establishing numerical identity. That is, in each case, establishing the identity of a third-person ultimately reduces to an inductive generalization. Qualitative similarity may be a necessary precondition for numerical identity, but it is by no means a condition necessary as well as sufficient.

But I have already admitted that one cannot rule out the fact that in each of the above cases it may be logically possible to establish identity. For instance, we can imagine a highly sophisticated device capable of recording the exact mental and physical states of a person every moment. That is the only way in which identities of third-persons may be established using memory or advanced psychological criteria. But, again, such a possibility seems remote outside the world of science fictions.

It is by no means ambiguous whatever criteria I may employ to identify a third-person they are part of the nature of that person. Whether the identity criteria of a person will be physical, psychological or psycho-physiological is decided by what I understand by the term 'person' or what I consider to be the essential properties of the nature of a person. Whatever it may be, except for a few obviously impossible imaginary situations, it seems trivially true that any criterion of third-person identity boils down to conditions of identification. Clearly, therefore, the true meaning of the assertion that the nature of a person determines the identity of that person is that the nature of the person provides certain identification marks.

### III

In case of self-identity, the aforesaid argument is significantly different: here nature presupposes identity. It is unbelievable that I acquire knowledge of my own identity from my nature; that is, I first analyse my nature and then deduce my identity. I do not have to analyze my own nature to convince myself that I am myself. The conviction that I am myself is self-evident, natural and primitive.

I begin with a thought-experiment from Shoemaker's *Self-knowledge and Self-identity*. Shoemaker imagines that in a fine morning he finds himself with a new appearance and comes to know that his original body has been replaced by another, though his brain remains same. He is also informed that the actions and events he claims to have done in the past were done, not by the person whose body he has now, but by the person whose body he had in the past. Shoemaker comments,

"let us imagine that I have found myself in the position just described, and that I am listening to a debate whether I am S.S., the person who did certain things in the past, things which, as a matter of fact, I have a clear memory of doing. It is agreed by all concerned that the body of S.S. (or at any rate the body S.S. had in the past) is now a corpse, and that my present body is the body (or at any rate the former body) of someone of whose past history I have no knowledge at all. It is also agreed that my memory claims correspond to facts about the past history of S.S., that my interests, tastes, mannerisms, personality traits, and the like closely resemble those of S.S., and so on. Naturally I agree with those who say that I am S.S. But their reasons for

saying that I am S.S. can hardly be my reasons for saying this. I say that I am S.S., not because I claim to remember doing the things that S.S. did, but because I do remember doing those things."<sup>16</sup>

Clearly in this quotation a sharp demarcation exists between the third-person and first person versions of personal identity. To determine the identity of a person the facts which are considered from a third-person point of view are in no way similar to the facts that are considered by the person himself. Some facts or events which had happened to me may be relevant to you for judging my identity, but these are distinct from the facts that I consider as important for discerning my identity. From the above account of Shoemaker it appears as though a person deduces the knowledge of his identity from his memory of past events. That is, if I remember a past event and am sure that that is an event of *my* past life, then that certainty of memory helps me prove my identity to myself. It also transpires that the memory which a person uses for deducing his identity is always genuine and not apparent memory. That is because, apparent memory leaves the possibility of misidentification.

But there remains one question. When Shoemaker, on the basis of his memory, states "I am S.S.", does the statement really establish the identity of Shoemaker with himself? That is, is the statement, 'I am S.S.,' really a statement about identity? Had he been suffering from amnesia and had forgotten his name, could Shoemaker still not prove his own identity to himself? In other words, if one fine morning I forget that my name is Shewli and claim that "I am Sita", does this latter claim, disprove my identity with myself? From Shoemaker's opinion it appears that 'I am Sita' is not an identity statement; since my memory had failed me and I could not remember my true name. Besides, if memory and other psychological continuities become the criteria of identity then self-identity cannot be established in case of brain damage leading to amnesia.

Next, I shall probe the statement 'I am myself' or 'I am I'. Clearly, this statement is a statement of identity, since denying it would lead to a contradiction of the form  $p \neq p$ . If someone asks me whether I can prove to myself that I am indeed myself the question will sound meaningless to me because the fact is self-evident to me and does not require any proof, certainly not the evidence of any memory. As Thomas Reid claims, "The conviction which every man has of his identity, as far back as his memory reaches, needs no aid of philosophy to strengthen it, and no philosophy can weaken it, without first producing some degree of insanity"<sup>17</sup> The conviction about one's own identity is so deeply rooted in one's mind that any criterion or evidence to that effect is considered superfluous. My knowledge about my own identity cannot, therefore, be verified using any criterion – including that of memory of past events of my life, since to me such verification is devoid of any meaning.



I am claiming that the knowledge expressed by the statements 'I am myself' or 'I am I' is primitive and does not require any criteria. But, it may be argued that, it does not imply that no criterion is needed for any first-person knowledge of identity. Personal identity is the identity of a person between any two moments (i.e., present and any past moment). In this case the form of a first-person identity statement should be, 'I broke the front window yesterday.' But then the identity between my past and present selves is established using memory. Hence it may be alleged that memory or other psychological continuities are veritable criteria for establishing first-person identity and our claim that no criteria is needed for establishing first-person identity is baseless. Further, it may be said that the literature on personal identity is not concerned with identity statements like 'I am myself' but with first-person statements such as 'I broke the front window yesterday' and that the knowledge of identity expressed by the latter statement is not primitive.

In response to such objections I shall maintain that they have been raised without first realizing my point on first-person identity. What I have termed as primitive is the knowledge of first-person identity. Such knowledge may be expressed by any first-person identity statement; whether that is 'I am myself' or 'I broke the front window yesterday' does not make any difference whatsoever to our claim. We have used statements like 'I am myself' or 'I am I' since these are direct and analytical identity statements of the form '*A* is *A*'. But we have an independent reason for delineating first-person identity as primitive.

It may be explained in the following manner. A person's knowledge of his own identity may be corroborated by evidences of various types but it may not be determined by any criterion. Whenever a person remembers anything about his past, the form of such remembrances is 'it is an incidence of *my* past life', not that 'it is an incidence of some or other person's past life and since I am remembering it I am that person'. It is not the case that I first remember the experience of some past occurrence and infer next that since every experience must have a subject therefore I am identical to that subject of experience. That is to say that neither my memory nor consciousness provides me with the requisite criteria for establishing my identity with my past self. Further the distinguishing feature of the remembrance 'it is an incidence of *my* past life'<sup>18</sup> is that I am the subject of the statement and it is also 'I' who is asserting the statement. Such assertions are impossible without the knowledge of identity of one's own self. Exactly the same thing can be said about the statement 'I broke the front window yesterday'. Possibly this is the reason why Butler had observed that, '[...] And one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity.'<sup>19</sup>

In this context, the following comment of Williams is relevant: 'A criterion, however, must be used by someone. This is a point that has been notably and unhappily neglected by

theorists of personal identity.<sup>20</sup> At least two persons are needed for applying a criterion of personal identity – the first one is the person whose identity will be verified and the other one is the person who will apply the criterion. But for verifying self-identity no criterion is required.

Question is, if at all, how does identity determine the nature of one's own self? When someone tries to understand why he is identical with his past existences, then one has to probe one's own nature (i.e. essential and contingent properties) in search of an answer and then only the importance of criteria comes into existence. But this necessarily means that to a person the knowledge of his identity precedes any analysis as to the causes of that identity which are ingrained in his nature. This knowledge or conviction of one's own identity can never be regarded as deduced from nature. Rather, this conviction is primitive, and when we analyze it the nature of the person may be derived. Thus, only in case of first-person or self the numerical identity ' $a = a$ ' is trivially or tautologically true.

Let us elaborate this idea further. The conviction that 'I am identical with myself' is not verifiable by means of any verification principle. It is possible that a lot of drastic changes have taken place throughout my life, my body may have been partly replaced and my memory has partially lapsed so that it has become very difficult for others to identify me as myself. But to myself, my identity is clear and obvious. My memory (recollection of past experiences) may be an important yardstick of my identification for others or an important tool to myself for proving my identity to others; but the conviction that 'I am myself' is independent, underived and not based on any criteria. It is by nature unanalyzable and *causasui*. What comes out of this conviction is my own typical nature (i.e. essential and contingent properties) which includes the consciousness that I am identical to myself.<sup>21</sup> Even if I am unable to recollect important facts of my life my identity with myself is not affected. But this conviction can never be a yardstick of my identity to others. Perhaps Russell would like to christen this kind of knowledge of one's own identity a 'knowledge by acquaintance'.

When someone says that 'I am I' he basically claims that he is identical with himself, that he has no doubt that he is himself. Here knowledge of identity provides the only criterion of identity. My knowledge that 'I am myself' is sufficient to identify myself as myself and I do not require any further criteria. Mohapatra argues that,

"Of course by claiming that persons are self-knowers it is not denied that people could be sometimes unsure of, even wrong about, their own identity; but what is important is that they can be, and generally are, right about it. It is this fact that people can make identity-judgments about themselves and are in a position to make them without using any criteria and without needing any justification of their judgments, and further that they can be and generally are, right about them, which constitutes an important difference between the identity

of persons and that of other material things, and accounts for there being a special problem about the matter".<sup>22</sup>

In this context, it is possible to distinguish between the identities of first and third persons in the following way. If a person analyzes his own nature in search of the causes of his identity and concludes that his nature is responsible for this identity then he is analyzing nature from the perspective of a third person. That is to say, when a person claims that he is himself because his bodily features, memory, past experiences, physical and mental characteristics etc. bear evidence to the fact, then he is essentially regarding himself from the viewpoint of a third person. The person is actually applying all the criteria he uses to identify a third person upon himself. But, as mentioned already, there are important distinctions between identifying a third person and identifying oneself. Self-identity is immediate and does not require any proof whereas the identity of a third person has to be established by means of the criteria of identity. Probably because of this unique self-evident nature that self-identity is so well received and widely discussed in the literature on personal identity. Perhaps this is why Reid, Butler etc. have called it 'strict' and 'philosophical' and Descartes has described it as first principle.

Finally, it should be noted that it remains uncertain which characteristics a first-person will make use of while analysing his own nature from a third-person point of view. According to most philosophers memory, character trait etc. are crucial for determining first-person identity whereas body takes a backseat. A person can assert, 'This is my body', and also, 'This is not my body', while facing a mirror. It is not clear whether a person regards his body as an identifying essential property while analysing his identity from a third-person perspective.

#### Notes and References

1. Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, p. 335
2. Wiggins, David. *Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1967, p. 55
3. Each and every kind of tree has a specific structural form that is generally treated as an identification mark. For example, an oak tree has a specific form that is distinct from the form of a mango tree. Similarly, every tree has a particular chemical-physical composition that uniquely defines that tree and generally remains unchanged throughout its life.
4. Descartes, Rene. *The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. 2*. Rendered into English by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, Dover Publications, New York, 1979, pp. 150-152.
5. Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm. *Discourse on Metaphysics and the Monadology* Tr. George R. Montgomery, Section 9; Prometheus Books, New York, 1992.
6. Shoemaker, Sydney and Galen Strawson, "Self and Body", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, 73, 1999, p. 309.

7. Ibid, p. 309
8. Ibid.p - 310. In the discussion on persons and substances it has been pointed out that the meaning of the phrase, 'a person is a substance' means a person is a subject of experience or subject of thought and it is verifiable by the first-person. Therefore, if there are other persons, he must be a subject of his own experiences and can verify his experiences as his experiences.
9. Ibid, p. 309
10. Locke, *op. cit.*, p. 332.
11. Perry, John ed. *Personal Identity*, University of California Press, London, 1975, p.11.
12. According to Perry, the life or personal history of a person is a process, a sequence of events, and criteria of identity is "unity relations between simultaneous events or non-simultaneous object (here person) stages". It follows that the unity relation between sequence of simultaneous or non-simultaneous person stages, comprise the identity criteria of a person. And obviously, the identity criteria of a person are related to the concept or idea or nature of that person.
13. Ibid, p. 11
14. Shoemaker, Sydney. *Self-knowledge and Self-Identity*, Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1971, p. 7
15. Williams, Bernard: *Problems of the Self, Philosophical Papers (1956-1972)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973
16. Shoemaker, *op. cit.*, p.32
17. Reid, Thomas. *Essays on the Intellectual Power of Man*, ed. A. D. Woozley, Macmillan, London, 1941, p. 200. Emphasis mine
18. We are not claiming that statements such as 'it is an incidence of *my* past life' imply that all memories are veridical and misremembering leading to misidentifications are not possible. The meaning of the word 'misidentification' in the context of self-identity is to confuse events of other persons' past lives with those of one's own. But that in no way affects the knowledge of self-identity.
19. Butler, Joseph. "On Personal Identity" in Antony Flew ed. *Body, Mind and Death*, Macmillan Publishing Co, London, 1964, p. 167
20. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 13
21. The statement, 'I am myself' or 'I am identical with myself' is a statement about my thinking. This statement expresses that I am a thinking being. I can assert the statement, 'I am myself' at any moment of my existence, and every assertion is no doubt true. This 'I' (i.e., the 'I' of the statement 'I am myself') is the subject of my thinking, and remains identical with every next and previous utterance of 'I'. The thinking being that 'I' refers to conjoins every personal existence of myself. 'I', therefore, refers to persons, persons are thinking beings and thinking beings are substances that remains identical in spite of various changes. Probably this is the reason why anti-reductionist philosophers have opined that persons are substances.
22. Mohapatra, P. K.: *Personal Identity*, Decent Books, New Delhi, 2000, p. 57