

**Appendix-I**

**Agreement on Persons of Indian Origin in Ceylon**

October 30, 1964

**AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE  
GOVERNMENT OF CEYLON ON THE STATUS AND FUTURE OF PERSONS OF  
INDIAN ORIGIN IN CEYLON BY EXCHANGE OF LETTERS**

**New Delhi**

**LETTERS**

PRIME MINISTER  
INDIA

No. 446/PMO/64

New Delhi,  
30th October, 1964

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. CIT/ICP/62 of date, which reads as follows:

"I have the honour to refer to the discussions which we have had from the 24th to the 30th October, 1964 regarding the status and future of persons of Indian origin in Ceylon and to refer to the main heads of agreement between us which are as follows:

1. The declared objective of this agreement is that all persons of Indian origin in Ceylon who have not been recognized either as citizens of Ceylon or as citizens of India should become citizens either of Ceylon or of India.
2. The number of such persons is approximately 975,000 as of date. This figure does not include illicit immigrants and Indian passport holders.

3. 300,000 of these persons together with the natural increase in that number will be granted Ceylon citizenship by the Government of Ceylon; the Government of India will accept repatriation to India of 525,000 of these persons together with the natural increase in that number. The Government of India will confer citizenship on these persons.
4. The status and future of the remaining 150,000 of these persons will be the subject matter of a separate agreement between the two governments.
5. The Government of India will accept repatriation of the persons to be repatriated within a period of 15 years from the date of this Agreement according to a programme as evenly phased as possible.
6. The grant of Ceylon citizenship under paragraph 3 and the process of repatriation under paragraph 5 shall both be phased over the period of 15 years and shall, as far as possible, keep pace with each other in proportion to the relative numbers to be granted citizenship and to be repatriated respectively.
7. The Government of Ceylon will grant to the persons to be repatriated to India during the period of their residence in Ceylon the same facilities as are enjoyed by citizens of other states except facilities for remittances and normal facilities for their continued residence, including free visas. The Government of Ceylon agrees that such of these persons as are gainfully employed on the date of this Agreement shall continue in their employment until the date of their repatriation in accordance with the date of their repatriation in accordance with the requirements of the phased programme or until they attain the age of 55 years, whichever is earlier.
8. Subject to the Exchange Control Regulations for the time being in force which will not be discriminatory against the persons to be repatriated to India, the Government of Ceylon agrees to permit these persons to repatriate, at the time of their final departure for India, all their assets including their Provident Fund and gratuity amounts. The Government of Ceylon agrees that the maximum amount of assets which any family shall be permitted to repatriate shall not be reduced to less than Rs. 4,000.
9. Two registers will be prepared as early as possible, one containing the names of persons who will be granted Ceylon citizenship, the other containing the names of persons to be repatriated to India. The completion of these registers, however, is not a condition

precedent to the commencement of the grant of Ceylon citizenship and the process of repatriation.

10. This Agreement shall come into force with effect from the date hereof and the two Governments shall proceed with all dispatch to implement this Agreement and, to that end, the officials of the two Governments shall meet as soon as possible to establish joint machinery and to formulate the appropriate procedures for the implementation of this Agreement. I have the honour to propose that the above sets out correctly the Agreement reached between us. My letter and your reply thereto shall constitute an Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Ceylon.

Accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.”

I have the honour to confirm that the above correctly sets out the Agreement reached between us. Your letter and my reply thereto shall constitute an Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Ceylon.

Accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Sd /-

LAL BAHADUR

Prime Minister of India.

Her Excellency

Sirimavo R.D. BANDARNAIKE,

Prime Minister of Ceylon,

New Delhi.

**Appendix – II**

**Indo-Lanka Accord**

***Colombo, 29 July 1987***

The president of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, his excellency Mr. J.R. Jayawardene, and the Prime Minister of The Republic of India, His Excellency Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, having met at Colombo on July 29, 1987.

Attaching utmost importance to nurturing, intensifying and strengthening the traditional friendship of Sri Lanka and India, and acknowledging the imperative need of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka, and the consequent violence, and for the safety, wellbeing and prosperity of people belonging to all communities of Sri Lanka.

Have this day entered into the following agreement to fulfil this objective

1. In this context,

1.1 Desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka:

1.2 Acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a 'multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual plural society' consisting, inter alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burghers:

1.3 Recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured:

1.4 Also, recognising that the Northern and the Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups:

1.5 Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious plural society, in which all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfil their aspirations:

2. Resolve that:

2.1 Since the Government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining provinces to join to form one administrative unit and also by a Referendum to separate as may be permitted to the Northern and Eastern Provinces as outlined below:

2.2 During the period, which shall be considered an interim period (i.e. from the date of the elections to the Provincial Council, as specified in para 2.8 to the date of the referendum as specified in para 2.3), the Northern and Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will form one administrative unit, having one elected provincial council. Such a unit will have one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers.

2.3 There will be a Referendum on or before 31st December 1988 to enable the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether:

a) The Eastern Province should remain linked with the Northern Province as one administrative unit, and continue to be governed together with the Northern Province as specified in para 2.2 or:

b) The eastern province should constitute a separate administrative unit having its own distinct provincial council with a separate Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers.

The president may, at his discretion, decide to postpone such a referendum.

2.4 All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence or other reasons, will have the right to vote in such a referendum. Necessary conditions to enable them to return to areas from where they were displaced will be created.

2.5 The Referendum, when held, will be monitored by a committee headed by the Chief Justice, a member appointed by the President, nominated by the Government of Sri Lanka, and a member appointed by the president, nominated by the representatives of the Tamil speaking people of the Eastern Province.

2.6 A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the Referendum.

2.7 Meetings and other forms of propaganda, permissible within the laws of the country, will be allowed before the Referendum.

2.8 Elections to Provincial Councils will be held within the next three months, in any event before 31st December 1987. Indian observers will be invited for elections to the Provincial Council of the north and east.

2.9 The emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern Provinces by Aug. 15, 1987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the island within 48 hours of signing of this agreement. All arms presently held by militant groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka.

Consequent to the cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups, the army and other security personnel will be confined to barracks in camps as on 25 May 1987. The process of surrendering arms and the confining of security personnel moving back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect.

2.10 The Government of Sri Lanka will utilize for the purpose of law enforcement and maintenance of security in the Northern and Eastern Provinces the same organizations and mechanisms of Government as are used in the rest of the country.

2.11 The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under The Prevention of Terrorism Act and other emergency laws, and to combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged and/or convicted under these laws. The Government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youth with a view to bringing them back into the mainstream of national life. India will co-operate in the process.

2.12 The Government of Sri Lanka will accept and abide by the above provisions and expect all others to do likewise.

2.13 If the framework for the resolutions is accepted, the Government of Sri Lanka will implement the relevant proposals forthwith.

2.14 The Government of India will underwrite and guarantee the resolutions, and co-operate in the implementation of these proposals.

2.15 These proposals are conditional to an acceptance of the proposals negotiated from 4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986. Residual matters not finalized during the above negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this agreement. These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India co-operating directly with the Government of Sri Lanka in their implementation.

2.16 These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India taking the following actions if any militant groups operating in Sri Lanka do not accept this framework of proposals for a settlement, namely,

- a) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka
- b) The Indian navy/coast guard will cooperate with the Sri Lankan navy in preventing Tamil militant activities from affecting Sri Lanka.
- c) In the event that the Government of Sri Lanka requests the Government of India to afford military assistance to implement these proposals the Government of India will co- operate by giving to the Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and when requested.
- d) The Government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are resident here, concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.
- e) The Governments of Sri Lanka and India will co-operate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

2.17 The government of Sri Lanka shall ensure free, full and fair participation of voters from all communities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in electoral processes envisaged in this agreement. The Government of India will extend full co-operation to the Government of Sri Lanka in this regard.

2.18 The official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Tamil and English will also be official languages.

3. This agreement and the annexure thereto shall come into force upon signature.

In witness whereof we have set our hands and seals hereunto.

Done in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on this the twenty-ninth day of July of the year one thousand nine hundred and eighty-seven, in duplicate, both texts being equally authentic.

Junius Richard  
Jayawardene

President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri  
Lanka

Rajiv Gandhi  
Prime Minister of the Republic of India

Annexure

1. His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that the Referendum mentioned in paragraph 2 and its subparagraphs of the agreement will be observed by a representative of the election Commission of India to be invited by His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka.
2. Similarly, both heads of Government agree that the elections to the provincial council mentioned in paragraph 2.8 of the agreement will be observed and all para-military personnel will be withdrawn from the eastern and northern provinces with a view to creating conditions conducive to fair elections to the council.
3. The President, in his discretion shall absorb such para-military forces, which came into being due to ethnic violence, into the regular security forces of Sri Lanka.
4. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that the Tamil militants shall surrender their arms to authorities agreed upon to be designated by the President of Sri Lanka. The surrender shall take place in the presence of one senior representative each of the Sri Lanka Red Cross and the Indian Red Cross.
5. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that a joint Indo-Sri Lankan observer group consisting of qualified representatives of the Government of Sri Lanka and the Government of India would monitor the cessation of hostilities from 31 July 1987.
6. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India also agree that in the terms of paragraph 2.14 and paragraph 2.16(c) of the agreement, an Indian peace keeping contingent may be invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities, if so required.

**Source:** Sri Lanka Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process  
(SCOPE) (Official Website)



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**Appendix – III****The Initial Induction of the IPKF**

When the IPKF was first inducted into Sri Lanka, it was assigned a limited role confined to the surrender of arms by the militant groups and the supervision of the ceasefire. The IPKF was therefore structured accordingly, and one infantry division, excluding its heavy equipment, armour and artillery, was sent to Sri Lanka. This induction was completed by 4 August 1987.

Additional inductions were carried out once the fighting with the LTTE started on 7 October 1987. To cater for the expanded role now allotted to the IPKF, one more Infantry Brigade (plus) and a division headquarters were inducted into the Eastern Province. By the end of September 1987, the IPKF had four infantry brigades (plus) deployed, covering the entire area of the Jaffna peninsula and the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

A standard infantry division has an authorized strength of about 16,000 personnel. Therefore, the three divisions in Sri Lanka technically should have had 48,000 personnel. However, the total strength inducted into Sri Lanka on 7 October 1987 was only around 29,000 personnel. This was because mobilization had not been ordered, and so the infantry units were nearly half their authorized strength. On an average an infantry battalion had a total combatant strength of 800, and the inducted average strength of battalion was only 350 to 400. As a consequence a task that could have been performed by one infantry battalion had to be allotted to two infantry battalions.

**DEPLOYMENT UP TO 7 OCTOBER 1987**

Two infantry division HQ and five infantry brigades were deployed.

**IPKF NORTH**

HQ IPKF (54 Infantry Division)—Palaly

91 Infantry Brigade—Jaffna Peninsula

47 Infantry Brigade—Vavuniya Area

IPKF EAST

- 18 Infantry Brigade—Mullaitivu Area/Trincomalee (later moved to Jaffna)
- 340 (Independent) Infantry Brigade—Trincomalee
- 76 Infantry Brigade—Trincomalee

OTHER UNITS

The following supporting units were also deployed:

- 15 Mechanised Battalion
- 831 Light Regiment
- Battery Parachute Field
- Troop of T-72 Tanks
- 8 Engineer and 110 Engineer Regiment, less one Field Company

DEPLOYMENT AFTER 7 OCTOBER 1987

IPKF UNITS

- HQ 54 Infantry Division and Divisional troops—Palaly
- 41 Infantry Brigade—Jaffna
- 91 Infantry Brigade—Protection of lines of communication
- 18 Infantry Brigade—Navatkuli area
- 115 Infantry Brigade—Point Pedro area

36 INFANTRY DIVISION

- Division HQ and divisional troops—Trincomalee
- 47 Infantry Brigade—Killonochchi sector
- 72 Infantry Brigade—Vavuniya sector
- 340 (Independent) Infantry Brigade—Trincomalee/Muttur
- 76 Infantry Brigade—Batticaloa sector

ARMOUR AND ARTILLERY

*Armour:* 36 Inf Div had the Regimental HQ 65 Armoured Regiment and one and a half squadrons, while 54 Inf Div had one and a half squadrons

*Mechanized Infantry:* 36 Inf Div had 113 Mechanized Battalions and 9 BRDMS, ex 17 Mechanized Battalion, while 54 Inf Div had 15 Mechanized Battalion

*Artillery:* 68 Field Regiment was attached to 36 Inf Div, while 93 Field Regiment (less one battery) and 831 Light Regiment were with 54 Inf Div.

*Air Observation Post:* 36 Inf Div had 26 AOP Flight, while 54 Div had 10 AOP Flight

*Attack Helicopters:* 36 Inf Div was allotted two helicopters, while 54 Div also had two

*Commandos:* 36 Inf Div was allotted 10 PARA with one team ex 9 PARA, 54 Inf Div had 1 PARA.

Appendix - IV



விடுதலைப் புலிகள்  
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

3/8/87

I will make a statement to hand over arms at the public meeting schedule for 4 Aug at 5 PM.

There after we will work out the modalities of handing over the arms

வ. பிரபாகரன்.  
V. PIRABAKARAN  
LEADER

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Signed in my presence

*[Handwritten signature]*

Day Gen

COE Peace Keeping Force

Jaffna

03-08-1987



Appendix-V

कर्नल टी पी एस बरार  
*Col T P S Barar*

कमान अफसर  
*Commanding Officer*

16763/TPS

१ मराठा एफू बाई  
1 MARATHA LI  
द्वारा ए पी ओ  
C/O 56 APO

06 Apr 88

*Dear General,*

1. Thank you very much for your congratulatory letter on my being selected for the HC Course.

2. Sir, I do not know how to express our feelings when you were posted out. We all in the 'JANGI PALTAN' were very upset, as we know the constraints you were working under. I do hope the "higher ups" understand and every thing is settled. We miss you a lot. Thank you once again for all you have done for us. We learnt a lot under your command.

*Please convey our regards to Mrs Harkirat.  
With lots of regards  
& best wishes.*

Maj Gen Harkirat Singh  
Maj Gen Operational Planning & Training  
Headquarters  
Western Command  
Chandimandir - 134107

*Yours sincerely,  
Lippy*

Appendix-VI

लेफ्टिनेन्ट जनरल रणजीत सिंह दयाल, परम विशिष्ट सेवा मेडल, महावीर चक्र, ए डी सी (अवकाश प्राप्त)  
 कर्नल आफ दि राजपूत रेजिमेन्ट  
 सदस्य संघ लोक सेवा आयोग  
 Lieutenant General Ranjit Singh Dyal, PVSM, MVC, ADC (Retd)  
 Colonel of the Rajput Regiment  
 Member of Union Public Service Commission

Dholpur House  
 5, Shahjahan Road.  
 New Delhi-110011

4004/RSD/1

23 Sep 87

*My dear Harkirat,*

1. Thank you very much for your DO No 7748/HS/1 of 5 Sep 87. I am equally grateful to you for your kind felicitations on my appointment as Member of Union Public Service Commission; I really value your thoughtfulness.
2. My thoughts have always been with you all ever since you left your permanent location to perform the most difficult and delicate assignment. I, however, have full faith in your stewardship and professional competence to face any odd which may come against you. I shall look forward to meet you all when you come back after successful completion of your task. May God bless you all and give you all the wisdom and strength to perform your task as expected of you.
3. When you write back home please convey my regards to 'Rita'.

*With regards  
 Yours sincerely  
 Rajni*

Maj Gen Harkirat Singh  
 GOC  
 54 Inf Div  
 c/o 56 APO

Appendix – VII

ब्रिगेडियर सुरजीत के धवन  
कमाण्डर  
Brigadier Surjit K Dhawan  
Commander

मुख्यालय  
४७ इन्फेन्ट्री ब्रिगेड  
द्वारा ५६ ए पी ओ  
Headquarters  
47 Infantry Brigade  
C/o 56 APO

12945/SKD/Pers

19 Jan 88

*My Dear General,*

1. This is to express my deep gratitude for your kindness and magnanimous nature. I had the privilege of serving under you as one of your bde cdrs during a period when Bison Division was involved in active operations and implement the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. Under your guidance and leadership, I have learnt a great deal and this learning will always help me in my future career. I cannot find adequate words to thank you enough for your kind guidance and benevolent nature. I do hope that I will have an another opportunity of serving under you.

*With fond regards to you and Mrs Harkirat Singh  
from both of us.*

*I remain*

*Yours very Sincerely,*

*Surjit*

Maj Gen Harkirat Singh



Appendix – VIII

*Col Ashok N. Kohli*  
Commanding Officer

282/2/A

१५वीं बटालियन संकनाहक इन्फेन्ट्री  
15th Battalion The Mechanised Infantry  
C/o 56 APO

28 Jan 88

*Respected General,*

1. It is rather unfortunate that I could not pay my respects prior to your departure from the island as you had left before my return from lve. I must admit Sir, it was indeed a fine experience and a pleasure to have worked with you. Once our emp had been seen in the right perspective, thereafter your understandings, sincere affection gave me tremendous confidence and inspiration to work.

2. It would please you to know that the fmn has reaped a rich haul of gallantry awards (PVC-1, MVC-3, Vrc-21, UYSM-1, YSM-2 and SM-31). My bn has earned 1 Vrc and 5 Sena Medals and 2 Mention in Despatches. Should this be an indication, undoubtedly we as a fmn and a unit must have done very well! I am enclosing an extract from the India Today which may interest you.

3. May I request you to kindly pay my warm regards to the lady. If there is anything I can do in my 'little' way; I would be honoured.

4. With respectful regards.

*yours sincerely*  
Ashok

Maj Gen Harkirat Singh  
MG (Ops, Plg & Trg)  
HQ Western Command  
Chandimandir



Appendix - IX

ब्रिगेडियर समेराम, वी एस एम  
*Brig Samay Ram, VSM*  
 कमाण्डर  
 Commander  
 12840/SR/1

मुख्यालय १११ इन्फेण्ट्री ब्रिगेड  
 HQ 115 Inf Bde  
 धारा ११ ए पी को  
 c/o 56 A P O

02 Apr 88

*My dear General,*

1. Hope this finds you in the best of health and happiness.
2. I am writing this just to remind you that it took me a lot of time to reconcile with your sudden departure. I was so very happy to serve under your able leadership and considered myself most fortunate to have once again been associated with you especially under the trying conditions of war.
3. My regret is that we could not give you a befitting farewell which you so much deserved.
4. I will always cherish the thoughts of this momentous association and look forward to soldiering with you in the future also.
5. I take this opportunity of wishing you a very fruitful and enjoyable tenure in your present assignment.

*Please convey my respects to Gen Nayyar I hold him in high regards.  
 With Best wishes and regards to you as well as the gracious lady*

*Yours sincerely  
 H. Singh*

Maj Gen Harkirat Singh  
 MG GS (Ops & Plg)  
 HQ Western Command  
 Chandimandir

Appendix –X

## The LTTE—Organisation, Hierarchy, Characteristics and Tactics

### GENERAL

The LTTE has, over the years, successfully withstood the might of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF). The LTTE has waged a war for *Eelam* using both reason and attrition in their quest for a free Tamil land, but thus far their dreams for a free and liberated motherland have remained distant. As mentioned earlier, the LTTE not only well trained possesses it also, the most modern equipment including small arms, wireless facilities, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, AK-47s and 5.56 assault rifles, perhaps even missile technology. They are committed to their aim to achieve *Eelam*.

The LTTE confronted the IPKF offensive launched on 10 October 1987. When operations were launched there was parity between the two forces, however, before they were driven out of their bastion in Jaffna, the Tigers extracted a heavy toll from the Indian Army in terms of personnel casualties and damage to weapons, equipment, and vehicles. The LTTE, on retreating from Jaffna, moved into the Vanni forest, where they were prepared to fight a much superior force in numbers. The Indian Army at this stage had built up its force from one Division to an equivalent of six Divisions.

### ORGANISATION

The LTTE leadership's pecking order in 1987 was:

- Supreme Military and Political Commander (Pirabakaran)
- Deputy Leader No. 2 in Military Command (Mahattaya)
- Political Adviser (Anton Balasingham)
- Secretary International Affairs (Kittu)
- In-charge of Fund Raising and Procurement of Arms (Lawrence Thilakar)
- Political Wing (Yogi)
- Military Wing (Shankar alias Baby)



Intelligence Wing (Pottu)

LTTE Cadres—Boys and girls. The LTTE cadre is organized into squads of 7, 15, and 30.

Squads could also be of 60 persons, depending upon the particular assignment. While squads of 7 or 15 persons were used for laying an ambush, 50-60 were used for launching an attack/raid. It was felt that all members of the squads were not armed. Possibly one weapon was allotted to 3-4 cadres. Thus in a squad of 7, there would be 2-3 weapons, which is why very few weapons were recovered from the dead or wounded LTTE cadres.

#### HIERARCHY

In the formative years, the LTTE comprised the following leaders:

VELUPILLAI PIRABAKARAN ALIAS THAMBI

He is the founder leader of the LTTE and the supreme military and political commander, who is also solely in charge of the intelligence and telecommunication codes. Pirabakaran hails from Velvettithurai (VVT) town and belongs to the fishermen community (Melongikaraiair, who are engaged in business and smuggling in VVT. Another sect of this community is called Kilongikaraiair, who are more in numbers and are involved in fishing and are of a lower caste than the Melongikaraiair. Kuttimani and Thangathurai belonged to this community).

Pirabakaran's father, Velupillai, was a divisional agriculture officer in Jaffna. He has been living in Trichy since 1983. In 1985, Pirabakaran married into a family from Punkuduthivu, his father-in-law being a schoolteacher in Jaffna. His wife is Mathivadani and they have a son Charles and a daughter Mayuri. His wife accompanied Pirabakaran throughout the conflict against the SLA and also the IPKF. Her personal baggage comprised precisely three saris (one in use, one in the wash and one ready to wear). They lost one of their children while on the move in the Vanni jungles and the funeral was attended by thousands of his loyalists without leaking the information about its time and place. Later, a gynaecologist was kidnapped from the outskirts of Chhavakachheri to help Mathivadani Pirabakaran deliver a baby in the thick of battle.

Pirabakaran has an older brother who is an officer with a foreign merchant navy company. He has two sisters, one of whom is married to Dr Madivadanam who was originally working in Mannar but who now

resides at 26th Street, Nanganallur, Chennai. The other sister lives in K.K. Nagachennai. It is learnt that they are not on good terms with Pirabakaran but they did meet him during his visit to Madras in July 1987.

Pirabakaran studied up to the 8th standard and at the age of 17 joined the Tamil Students Organisation (TSO), founded by Kuttimani and Jagan. It was Chetty who taught Pirabakaran how to handle arms and explosives. In 1975, Pirabakaran killed Duriappa, the Mayor of Jaffna.

#### MUKUNDAN, ALIAS UMA MAHESWARAN

Uma Maheswaran joined Pirabakaran in 1975. In 1976, Pirabakaran murdered Patrick, a pro-Sri Lankan, while he was asleep. Pirabakaran was then involved in revolutionary activities including bank robberies and murders from 1976 to 1981; during this period he and Kuttimani shot Chetty and separated from the TSO in 1981 to join hands with Raghavan to form the LTTE.

#### MAHATTAYA SRI ALIAS MAHENDRARAJA

Mahattaya hail from Poligandy near VVT, but had settled in Vavuniya. He studied up to the 10th standard and belonged to the barber community. He joined the LTTE in 1977 and was one of the senior-most cadres. He was respected and feared by his cadres but had very good relations with them. The LTTE did not have separate regional commands till 1984. When Jaffna Command was formed it was given to Kittu, contrary to Mahattaya Sri's aspirations leading to a misunderstanding between him and Pirabakaran. However, it did not openly manifest itself. He owed his status as No. 2 in the military hierarchy to the exit of Raghavan from the LTTE, the death of Paramadeva (brother of late Vasudeva, PLOTE), and the physical disability of Kittu.

He was a strong man, yet humble in his dealings. However, he did not hesitate in liquidating cadres who disobeyed or disagreed with the top leadership. Mahattaya Sri was married to the widow of an LTTE cadre. He was personally in charge of the anti-IPKF operations of the LTTE. He was also the president of the LTTE's political outfit, the People's Front of the Liberation Tigers (PFLT). Mahattaya died in 1994 under mysterious circumstances. He was probably killed for disagreeing with Pirabakaran.



## SATHASIVAM KRISHNAKUMAR ALIES KITTU

Kittu's father Sadasivam, owns a printing press, in the Veerabahu Building, near the bus stand in Point Pedro (NE of Jaffna). He studied up to the GCE 'O' level. In 1977, he went underground after the bank robbery in Nirveli, when Sri Lankan Rs. 78 lakh was taken from a van owned by the bank. He was the regional commander, LTTE Jaffna, and militarily in charge of the Jaffna peninsula till early 1987. He held discussions with Jayant Kotelawala over the exchange of prisoners.

In May 1987, there was an attempt on his life in Jaffna, suspected to be by a rival faction within the LTTE, in which he lost his left leg. He came to India in July 1987 for further treatment. He returned to Jaffna in the same aircraft as Pirabakaran after meeting the Prime Minister of India. He was planning to obtain a 'No Objection Certificate' to return to India after treatment in UK. This was done in September 1987. Since then he lived in the UK, releasing statements on human rights. He was the secretary of International Affairs and the LTTE spokesman in London.

His older brother assists their father in the printing press. His fiancée Soudamini was a student of the medical college in Jaffna and a daughter of a post master. While she was in the custody of the IPKF during the operations, I met her and she was keen to go back to medical college to complete her education. She also made a request to join Kittu, which was sent to the Headquarters OFC at Madras. In January 1993, Kittu committed suicide along with nine others when the ship they were sailing in, M.V. Ahat, was intercepted by the Indian Navy.

## ANTON BALASINGHAM

Balasingham is the political adviser to the LTTE and is based in the UK. He is 65 years of age, a Catholic, and hails from Jaffna. In the early 1970s, he worked in the British High Commission in Colombo as a translator and obtained a British passport and emigrated to London. He did not support any Tamil group till 1977, although the GUES (General Union of Eelam Struggle), TELO and the LTTE tried to draw him into their fold.

In 1978 he supported the LTTE and prepared a document for the youth conference in Cuba, which was attended by two representatives of the LTTE and Loganathan as the representative of the TULF. In 1980, he arrived in Madras from London to settle the differences between the LTTE and the PLOT. In early 1985, after the talks in Thimpu, he was

deported from India along with Chandrahasan but he returned later the same year. There was a bomb explosion at his house in Besant Nagar and the state authorities suspected that the LTTE was itself responsible for it.

Pirabakaran isolated Balasingham while drawing Thilaker and Dileep Yogi closer. Lawrence Thilaker was of equal rank as Kittu and in charge of fund-raising and procuring of arms. In early 1978, Balasingham regained prominence. During the period the IPKF was in northern Sri Lanka, I met Balasingham and his Australian wife, Adele, on a number of occasions at the LTTE headquarters at Jaffna. He is addicted to liquor and suffers from diabetes requiring daily insulin injections. He and his wife escaped through Point Pedro when the operation was launched by 115 Infantry Brigade, by pretending to be paddy field workers. He is also very fond of dogs and they accompanied him in the boat during his entry into Jaffna in July 1987.

**DILIP YOGI, ALIAS NAREN, ALIAS NARENDRAN  
(ORIGINAL NAME)**

He is aged about 35 years and hails from Vannarpannai, Jaffna and resides on Ramanathan Road at Kalatty near Jaffna University. His father was a teacher and his mother is from Nachinar Koviladi, Jaffna, near the university. He belongs to the Vellala community, and comes from an upper middle-class family. He was a good athlete. As an undergraduate of Hindu College at Jaffna, Yogi went to London to study Engineering but interrupted his studies in 1986 when his brother Gohan alias Ponnaman was killed in an explosion at the Kaithadi while fixing an explosive to a bowzer.

After 1984, he actively participated in LTTE activities and was brought into prominence by Pirabakaran in the latter half of 1985 to the disappointment of many senior cadres including Balasingham. He has one brother living outside Sri Lanka. During the IPKF operations he was in-charge of the political affairs of the LTTE for the entire peninsula and also the general secretary of the PFLT.

**SHANKAR ALIAS SWARNALINGAM**

Shankar hails from Vavuniya where the family owns property. His father was an Overseer in VVT and his mother comes from Velvetti, near VVT. He studied at Point Pedro in Hardley College till the GCE



advance level. In 1975, he completed a diploma in Aeronautical Engineering in HIET, Madras. In 1977, during the general elections in Sri Lanka, he was a hard-core supporter of Pulendran, the UNP candidate from Vavuniya. Natesan of the PLOTE killed Pulendran in 1983.

In 1983, Shankar took part in the attack on the Chavakachcheri Police Station. In 1985 he joined the LTTE and gained the confidence of Pirabakaran. In 1986 he went to London to purchase arms and returned in 1987. It is believed that for some time he was an informer for the Sri Lankan police.

The year 1983 proved to be a turning point in the history of the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka. President J.R. Jayewardane in an interview to Graham Ward published in *The Daily Telegraph* on 18 July 1983 said, 'I am not worried about the opinion of the people of Jaffna, now we cannot think about them. Not about their lives or opinion about us.' Five days later, the LTTE killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers when a truck in which they were travelling hit a landmine laid by the militants. The following day, the Sri Lankan Army went on a rampage and killed 41 civilians in Jaffna. By 24 July, anti-Tamil violence had spread in Colombo, and on 25 and 27 July, in two separate incidents, 53 Tamil prisoners were killed in the Welikade prison by armed Sinhalese prisoners. This is when India came into the picture and Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, condemned the anti-Tamil attitude of the Sri Lankan Government.

## CHARACTERISTICS AND TACTICS

### LEADERSHIP AND MOTIVATION

Young, educated, and imaginative, this rugged band of militants and battle-tested junior leaders rise in the hierarchy only after proving themselves in battle. Therefore, by the time a Tiger assumes the responsibility of a leader, he would have proved his physical courage and tactical brilliance, thus claiming respect and total obedience from his subordinates. The leaders of the LTTE are tuned to leading from the front. Their motivation is by far their greatest asset, and an unshakeable faith in the justness of their cause makes them capable of the ultimate sacrifice. The tales of their sacrifice and martyrdom have made many a Tiger a demi-god among the local population and also role models for future Tigers. The cyanide capsule hanging round their necks, to be used by the wearer if captured, is itself an indicator of the extent of the motivation. The LTTE believes hanging that power flows from the

barrel of the gun, therefore it has always resorted to the use of force rather than negotiated settlements and they will sacrifice their lives to achieve their goal of *Eelam*.

#### TACTICAL CONCEPT

The Tigers can be considered to be a band of expert guerrillas, well-versed in urban resistance and unconventional warfare tactics through their confrontation with the SLSF over the years. Their basic principles are speed, stealth, and surprise. They are experts in the use of modern weapons. In keeping with guerrilla tactics, the LTTE seldom launches an offensive in the classic sense, however, its defences were well-fortified and well-integrated, along the line of resistance, with extensive layouts of IEDs/booby traps. The LTTE is also well trained in fighting limited battles from fixed positions.

#### TRAINING

The Tigers have well-organized training camps for their cadres under the supervision of experienced instructors. The cadres have been drilled in some of the important aspects of battle and field craft. They possess a thorough knowledge of the ground and terrain in their area of operations. They maintain a very high standard of fire discipline. They have achieved expertise in mine warfare to include preparation, planning, and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and booby traps. They have good knowledge of the usage of communication equipment, i.e. I COM walkie-talkie and high frequency sets. They also have good knowledge of organizing and setting defensive positions, roadblocks and carrying out raids. They give adequate attention to propaganda and political ideology.

#### OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The Tigers, except in one situation at Kopai north, Jaffna, during the operations in 1987, did not launch an attack in the classical sense due to lack of combat support elements, e.g. armour, artillery, and air power. They repeatedly attacked the 4th Battalion, the Mahar Regiment because the IPKF had hit a training camp, which was well-fortified, and the LTTE succeeded in delaying the advance of the Indian troops by over



48 hours. They generally prefer hit-and-run tactics with a view to causing some casualties and confusion.

#### DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The Tigers established three tiers of resistance against the IPKF offensive, basically covering the main road axes converging at Jaffna town, the first tier being along Kotitadi-Kopai north-Urumpirai-Marutha-Namadam and Manipai. The second tier was on the outskirts of Jaffna city along the Navatkuli-Kokkuvil line. Lastly, the defensive positions had well-sited and fortified bunkers with machine guns and automatics. They effectively used treetops, water tanks and housetops for snipers with telescope sights.

#### INTELLIGENCE AND SURVEILLANCE

The Tigers had a well-coordinated network for gathering intelligence and surveillance. This included informers, and the Tigers moved on foot, bicycles and motorcycles to obtain information. A dedicated common network ensured quick and early dissemination of information to the area leaders to enable them to react and take timely evasive action.

#### AMBUSHES

Ambushes were the main tactics of the Tigers to impose caution, delay and attrition on advancing columns of the Indian Army. Ambush sites were well selected on straight stretches of roads with extensive built-up areas all around. Having ambushed a foot patrol or a vehicle by using IEDs and heavy volume of automatic fire, the militants would melt away into the built-up areas.

#### ARMS AND AMMUNITION

The Tigers are equipped with a large variety of weapons, some of which are most modern while others are outdated. The weapons generally found on the cadres were AK-47s, SLRs, G-3 rifles, carbines, light machine guns (LMGs), 0.50 inch heavy machine guns (HMGs), RPG rocket launchers and grenade launchers. Some HMGs were also mounted on jeeps/vans which were generally deployed along the first

tier of defences or areas dominating the beach sites. The LTTE had its arms and ammunition in safe caches at a number of places. Ammunition/ weapons that were recovered were found to be well-sited and protected. The ammunition was placed 3-4 feet underground in huge quantities at a number of sites all over the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE higher command ordered the cadres to buy all available polythene and grease to preserve the weapons and ammunition in the lagoons. The large recoveries in December 1987 were an indication of the extent of preparations and the quantum of arms procured by the Tigers for a prolonged war. They have also acquired the capability to manufacture indigenously, hand grenades and 60 mm., 81 mm., 120 mm. mortars.

#### MINE WARFARE

The Tigers have perfected the art of mine warfare. A major portion of the IPKF's casualties in personnel and vehicles have been due to the tremendous destructive power of the IEDs. The IEDs and the Claymore Mines using large-size barrels/jerricans packed with explosives and detonated electrically from about 200-300 m. away, were placed in pre-planned and well-organized networks covering all the major roads and axes. The damage to the T-72 tanks, BMP-2s and other vehicles is testimony to the potential of these IEDs whose use has been perfected by the Tigers. This also resulted in creating a mine psychosis among the Indian troops. The Tigers are adept at laying a large variety of booby traps to cause delay and casualties.

#### PROPAGANDA

The Tigers have a well-organized network of radio and TV stations and newspapers. Popular appeal was garnered by using local sympathizers to circulate literature and anti-IPKF/India propaganda. A poster campaign was used extensively to spread rumours and threats alike. The LTTE understands the importance of psychological warfare and uses it to its advantage through propaganda employing the media, non-resident Tamils in Europe and USA, and the opposition parties in Tamil Nadu. The LTTE press, till it was destroyed by the troops of the 91 Infantry Brigade, published a daily newspaper to keep the Tamils up-to-date with political developments and the heroic deeds of the LTTE cadres in their quest to achieve *Eelam*, to fulfil the people's aspirations.



## COMMUNICATIONS

The Tigers have a very efficient and ultra-modern communications system. The equipment used is lightweight, easy to operate and carry. They have very efficient long-distance communications equipment. For inter-area communication, they used HF sets and depended on Japanese-made walkie-talkies of the VHF type, which were used for short-range communication as they are easy to operate and carry. Transmissions are made in Tamil and codes are used effectively. They are capable of controlling operations with the help of modern radio sets covering the HF, VHF and HF spectrum. They had the capability to know each and every move of the IPKF.

## WEAKNESSES

Some of the major weaknesses noticed:

*Fear of isolation:* When bypassed, the LTTE cadres tend to panic and abandon their positions easily.

*Night Operations:* The cadres were found to be effective only by day. At night, the fire was inaccurate and cadres tended to panic on being engaged.

*Administration:* Guerrillas as a rule live off the land and once this was denied the group tended to break up easily. They depend extensively on local support for administration, resupply of ammunition and information.

## EPILOGUE

The Tigers are undoubtedly a dedicated band of modern urban guerrilla fighters. The extent of resistance they provided to the IPKF by the skilful use of the available resources is worth appreciating. They undoubtedly used their strong points—knowledge of the ground, popular support, and mine warfare—effectively. Their success against the SLAF has added to the mystique that has come to be built around them. Coupled with this, they have resorted to coercion to obtain a large following among the people. ‘Lamp Post’ and ‘Tyre’ treatments were common against those who offered resistance.

Major General Ashok Mehta, the GOC of the Infantry Division in Batticaloa, said,

The LTTE must be credited with a near-maniacal sense of motivation. No other fighters in the world today go around popping cyanide pills as easily as they do. Is the LTTE, led by the legendary Pirabakaran the greatest guerrilla force of its time? Certainly, is the ungrudging answer. The finesse with which they have now humbled the Sri Lankan security forces and earlier, more than matched the awe and might of the IPKF must find it a place in the Mao Tse Tung Hall of Revolutionary Fame.

**Appendix-XI**

Questionnaire

Interviews in Sri Lanka

1. How did Sri Lankan government seek to accommodate the ethnic groups since its independence?
2. Do you ever think that there was a connection between Indian Tamil in Sri Lanka and Tamil people in India?
3. Would you say that failure of Sri Lankan Government to accommodate the ethnic groups is reflection of rebellious war?
4. What were the reasons which attributed to the making the ethnic conflict between the state and Tamil people in Sri Lanka?
5. Please provide your explanation of the historical outlines of the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic conflict and polarisation in the country.
6. In what conditions and How did the Sri Lankan government decide to use of the armed forces or military forces for the resolution of the ethnic conflict in the state?
7. What is your own observation about the nature and style of initial political system sought to be attained by the state and the government in power (1950)?
8. Do you think that there were the external actors who assisted in provoking the ethnic conflict?
9. What is the contemporary political situation and the approach assumed by the Rajapaksa's regime?
10. What is the approach of Sri Lankan government towards India in the post-civil war period?