

Chapter-VI

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Sri Lankan society is an ethno-religious mosaic. Within the various ethnic groups, there exists clear and categorical religious divisions. To some extent, ethnicity and religion also have a regional basis and that is why the Tamil militancy has a strong geographical dimension that led the demand of a separate independent state. Among the various ethnic and religious groups, Tamil Hindus are pre-dominant in the Northern province and this group maintains a significant presence in the Eastern Province as well.

The eastern Province is an ethnically mixed area where the Tamils, the Muslims, and the Sinhalese are present in significant number; though, the Tamil have a slightly higher statistical edge. Indian Tamils who were brought from southern India by the British in the 19th century to work on Tea and Coffee estates are concentrated in the central and Uva, Sabaragamuwa Provinces.

Sinhala Buddhists are generally predominant in all parts of the country except the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Muslims have a significant presence in the eastern province, but on the whole, they are scattered throughout the country. Christians maintain a significant presence in the coastal areas of Sri Lanka. They are, however, found in all parts of the country in small numbers. Malays are mostly concentrated in and around the city of Colombo and the western province.

The ethno-national crisis in Sri Lanka leads to the significant concern of the transnational political phenomenon. Aspiration to keep up the unitary systems and arrangements of the state, while deteriorating the political resolution to the dreadfully ethno-national civil conflict in Sri Lanka, provoked the ethnic conflicts between the Tamils, minority group and the Sinhalese,

the majority national group in the island. It has well been seen in the present study how Sinhalese political elites made efforts to build up solidarity that ignited the conflict regarding the search for echelons of power since nation building process in Sri Lanka. In this respect they put forth their reluctance to be in the network of power relations with the Tamils that resulted in the Tamils loss of faith in them and in the state apparatuses. This particular phenomenon triggered the violence exhibited by LTTE as rebellion group.

The Sinhalese people were desirous to establish the sovereign unitary state. The Sinhalese influential political leaders realized the aspirations of the Sinhalese people and implemented the unitary state system in the island. Due to the desires of Sinhalese people and the populist political advantage, they did not dare to restructure the British model of political structure. In comparison, for the Tamils marginal section, this strategy obstructed their normal life. *Firstly*, they were worried about the implementation of the Sinhala language merely an official language which would only be the reason of complications in their putting into practice and executing the functional tasks of their occupational works and obstruct their promotional benefits in the higher position of the public offices or employment sections. *Secondly*, they were persuaded that enactment of the Sinhala only Act (1956) as an official language would ultimately diminish fundamental rights of the Tamils in the island. Then, *thirdly*, it generated the first communal turbulences between the Tamils and Sinhalese. In this background, the B-C treaty signed on July 26, 1957 embodied a prevalent and an extensive decentralization of power to eradicate the ethno-national strains. Furthermore, it had the kernel of a probable federal resolution in the extensive tenure. While the conditions of the treaty were openly published, there was a strong revolutionary demonstration/protest, largely occurred from the Sinhala radicals of Bandaranaike's personal campground and the UNP, who stood in the antagonism.

Subsequently, one more endeavor to sort out the national crisis in 1965 was arranged. This period, the UNP assumed a plan of action, and discussed about the agreement on the basis of the earlier Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam agreement which was held in 1957. Dudley Senanayake, the UNP Prime Minister, and Chelvanayakam, the FP leader, made an agreement which projected a reasonable degree of delegation and decentralization of power through the state apparatuses and it also advocated the system of district council bodies in the Tamil dominated regions of the island. In spite of the circumstance that the main Sinhalese followers did not support a resolution of the political sovereignty or federal method, the FP, the topmost Tamil based parties in the mainstream politics, had prolonged to be obligated to a wide-ranging political resolution to the national struggle within the constructive organization of an integrated Sri Lanka.

When Sri Lanka achieved independence in 1948, there were high expectations that the country would become a model democracy. Universal franchises were introduced in the country in 1931. Thus, democratic institutions and traditions were very much in place and political violence was not an issue throughout the country. Till the late 1950s, there had been no serious indicators of economic and social catastrophes. Things however took a new turn since 1960s.

Forces of Sinhalese nationalism started gaining momentum since the time of independence. Most of the Sinhalese educated rural people had anticipated that after independence their status in terms of culture would be elevated. However, soon it became clear that a conflict between Sinhalese educated rural elite and the English educated urban ruling elite came to the forefront. Moreover, about one million Indian Tamil were disenfranchised in 1948 under the Ceylon Citizenship Act. More than three lacs Tamil were repatriated to India under the Indo-Ceylon Agreement 1964. The Ceylon Citizenship Act reinforced ethnic politics in the country and thereby reduced the electoral leverage of the Indian Tamils who remained as an improvised

community. Thus, over the years, language issue became the source of conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalese.

Afterwards 1977 ethno-national hostility in contradiction of the Tamil populace in the region of Jaffna, the Tamil aggressive insurgencies strengthened and amplified their base in Tamil young people as the Tamil belief battered in the unbiased transfer of the state and its organizations subjugated by the Sinhalese people. The Tamil young people believed that they would neither attain the fairness from the political institutions or organizations of the Sinhalese nor the Sinhalese politicians would pursue a political adaption outside of the unitary state arrangement. Growing Tamil aggressiveness in the north-east had warned the central-government which was controlled by J.R. Jayewardene. Therefore, the government elevated military actions in contradiction of the Tamils, especially the Tamil rebellion activities and achieved some triumph or victory.

In the above stated context, the study emphases on why the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE had regularly opted to resume to warfare after fairly short-range political assignment in search of a solutions. Some argumentative statement had presented in backing of the declaration. *The first* point is that the situations of political engagement were not sufficient enough to lead the mainstream parties to the struggle toward a reliable negotiation. Intermediation, opportunities, and dialogs were essential but inadequate apparatuses for effectually changing the course of the struggle. The purpose, as I have made the argument in this thesis, is that the focus of this struggle supporting course had been the non-dialogue and non-conversation of the fundamental problem of clash - i.e. power and authority of the state. The political parties in the state had not been, either through dialogs or through warfare, able to make an alternative arrangement for the negotiation on this fundamental question of the power of the state, and this had delivered the struggle both stubborn/

intractable and prolonged.

The second fact is that to comprehend the changeable and multiplicative dynamics of Sri Lanka's struggle, it is essential to differentiate its ethno-national clash character from the ethno-national warfare procedure. It led to dualistic corollaries. *First*, whereas the ethno-national struggle might assume the chance of bargain capable for comprising a settlement, Sri Lanka's ethno-national warfare is brawled on non-negotiable tendencies and choices for the reason that it had been driven by twofold contradictions and conjointly exclusive state-building programs. *Second*, the warfare had generated two types of combat machineries, one connected to the government and the other to the LTTE, that attained an extensive degree of self-government and authoritative control from the political developments. Whereas the struggle for state building provides the ethnic warfare a non-negotiable aspect, it correspondingly endures to provide that warfare a continuing dimension for procreation. In contradiction of this backcloth, the two major revelries i.e. the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE emerged as rebellion group appeared to understand that the problems of state control and its authoritative power would probably be made a decision not at the compromise or negotiation board, in Legislature, or in the *Parliamentary Select Committee chambers*, but on the battleground. It seems that the state-pursuing marginal nationalism led by the rebellion organization LTTE and the state-endorsing popular nationalism of political class of Sinhala subjugates equivalent stages of bellicosity, which was a main impediment to civil confrontation resolution and ethno-national conflict solution.

Thirdly, discussions between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE can only be operative in diminishing the possibilities of warfare if such discussions aim at, and lead to reconstructing state-power on the basis of the ethnicity. The ethnicity-based reconstruction of the state-power

has been an important prerequisite for negotiated eradication of the ethno-national warfare. This entails an impressive the ethno-national cooperation among Tamils and Sinhalese leaders supported by the common-masses in the major ethnographic framework, which had not materialized or shaped up.

During the end of 1985, after the collapse of Indian intermediated peaceable negotiation between the government of Sri Lanka, united Tamil fighters and the TULF leaders in Thimpu, Colombo started to look into various possibilities to allocate the powers with the Tamil national people without consideration the underpinnings of the unitary state arrangement. This improvement ultimately completed in the development of the Indo-Lanka Agreement of 1987 and the 20th constitutional modification (November 1987) of Sri Lanka.

Over the years, powerful non-state rebellion groups like ULFA, TNLF, TNRF and LTTE became very strong and they developed interconnections to further their objectives in India and Sri Lanka. There were some economic linkages among these non-state actors. As a result of which these non-state elements could spread their anti-state activities in both the countries. More specifically, India's national security interests were affected by the unlawful activities of these non-state armed groups.

Though the treaty endeavored to decentralize several powers to the regional apparatuses, it did not encounter the essential methods of the federal state arrangements nor acquired some advanced stages to offer the political sovereignty beyond the existing system of unitary state arrangement. Colombo had inclined into the greatest ruthless stage of the civil warfare after the pulling out of the IPKF in 1991. In actual circumstance, the Indo-Lankan Agreement could have been well-thought-out as a legitimate allocation of power deed on the table had it permitted the regional bodies to function autonomously without intervention of the administrative Head who enjoys the supremacies of powers to interrupt into the functions of

these bodies through the administrative-governor. New Delhi provided serious assistance in facilitating Sri Lankan military ability, while assuming a public attitude that it would not involve in defence support with government of Sri Lanka in spite of popular disagreement to such a strategy in government of Tamil Nadu.

Afterward the taking out of the IPKF and the succeeding murder of Rajiv Gandhi (May, 1991) by the Tamil rebels in 1991, India took a policy of a *hands-off* step, mainly over the national problem in Sri Lanka. In the wake of 9/11, the codification of the global perspective on the LTTE brought to light the grave security menace posed by LTTE and laid emphasis on the adoption of zero tolerance in combating terrorism. During the post-cold war period, the phase between 1991 and 2009 established a matured of Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral cooperation. Therefore, the ethno-national problem presumed not as much of important in security tophus of India.

The Sri Lanka's ethnic problem exemplified the interaction of the internal and inter-state matters in the framework of internal armed struggle in a state. Sri Lanka's territorial proximity to India and the Sri Lankan Tamils' comradeship in terms of ethnicity feeling shared by Tamil Nadu's citizens became instrumental in provoking a reflection of Sri Lanka's national turmoil in Tamil Nadu. The downfall of the Sri Lankan civil warfare in May 2009 unfolded a new more space of prospects to expand and extend the reciprocal relations between New Delhi and Colombo. It was envisaged that a negotiated resolution of the political feature of the Sri Lankan ethno-national struggle would enable New Delhi and Colombo to overcome the obstructions postured by the Indian state of Tamil Nadu issue along with another intercontinental apprehension. On the other hand, the deferment of the Sri Lankan government in solving the question of nationality became a referent fact in strategies of New Delhi regarding Colombo in the post-civil-war framework and is instigating to carriage complications in India-Sri Lanka bilateral co-operations.

The course of Indo-Sri Lankan relations in regard to the ethno-national problem was controlled and governed by the changing pattern of geo-political certainties, the security interests and correspondingly the rapid aspiration in both states to expand and strengthen the mutual cooperation, regardless of reciprocal variances. The new certainties, for example the increasing political and monetary power of New Delhi and Colombo's tactical significance in the Asian drama in the post-Cold War framework, were changing the provincial political and security dynamic forces. The rise of India as a regional supremacy with international determinations had, in a way, improved the tactical values of Sri Lanka, and led its leading organisers to exercise this to their benefit. Sri Lanka's increasing co-operative relations with Beijing as well as China and its strong-willed antagonism to the Indian scheme of extending the Palk Channels which has been termed as *Sethusamudram* exposes that Colombo has been steering its external strategy more confidently, possibly owing to the understanding that the changing pattern of the regional and intercontinental political framework allowed for such strategic independence. But during the same time there was a solid consciousness and responsiveness that Colombo cannot provide to disconnect and disassociate itself from New Delhi, which would be disadvantageous to the Sri Lanka's topographical comforts and political benefits and diminish its geostrategic importance. Possibly, owing to such an understanding, the two states had boarded on the way of greater commercial arrangements.

The greatest apparent lesson is that it is difficult to make well the divergence of ethno-national groups that had grown-up in the course of the civil warfare that continued an overall generation. The demise of the ethnic-warfare had prevented the murders and assassinations in the combat ground and the battleground; there were not any more body baggage arriving into the Sinhalese villages and no dangerous threats and coercions from the LTTE terrorism or suicide bombers. The second significant lesson of the Sri Lankan 26-year warfare experience is in what way a state turned to be militarized in a prolonged civil warfare, and in what way such militarization

moved institutionally embedded. There are three powerful instances be enough to ascertain this argument. The foremost is the anticipated growth in military expenses, previously considered. The second instance is the aggressive and military acts of the police forces, who had been involved in the warfare for the years in the state. There were a police *Special Task Forces (STF)* who were soldierly trained and skilled to deploy in the eastern areas of the country. More significantly, the general police force envisioned for civilian affair was gradually equipped for combatant and anti-terrorist collateral responsibilities. The third instance is the *Prevention of Terrorism Act 1979*, which was formed permanently and enacted in 1982 and permitted the administration and security military forces to trample on fundamental democratic values. The Sri Lanka will need to pull down these organizations of warfare if it desires to recover its democratic probates and credentials in society.

The third significant lesson that emerges from the exegetic analysis brings to focus the challenges encountered by a nation in the post-war period in reinstating democracy in the wake of subversion of the ideals of democracy by war atrocities. It is factual that the state well-maintained a veneer of demarcate systems for more than 26 years while a warfare fumed on areas of its territorial range. In the meantime, as the election processes were regularly arranged and governments were replenished, the world confidently believed that the democratic process in Sri Lanka had been almost stable and intact. But it is perfect in the reconsideration that what persisted of Sri Lanka's democratic governance was gradually blemished. K. M. de Silva, replying to prevalent democratic election malpractices and misconducts that had developed practically the norm, explained the phase 1994–2001 as the voting procedure in conflicts.

The ethno-national crisis in Sri Lanka had extensive effect on the security scenario of India. Therefore, the study examines the nature of India's security concerns arose due to internal ethnicity and political developments in Sri Lanka since independence. In due course, New

Delhi became actively involved in the peace process of Sri Lanka. Hence it is important to understand the intricacies involved in India-Sri Lanka bilateral relations since 1987 with special emphasis on the role played by the government of Tamil Nadu.

In respect of the research questions and hypotheses framed in Chapter one of the thesis, answers are as follows: a. The process of nation building in Sri Lanka has largely been affected by the prolong ethnic conflict since 1950s; b. Ethno-nationalism has been an important factor that largely affected the course of social harmony since independence; c. Ethnic politics in Sri Lanka had posed immense security challenges before India in the sense that Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India was assassinated by the LTTE militants in 1992 resulting in the arrest of few suspected LTTE cadres; d. The Government of India sent a clear message to Sri Lankan President that India did not intend to create any partition in Sri Lanka, but at the same time New Delhi would not tolerate any policy of Sri Lanka that could cause to Indian interests; e. The role played by the Government of Tamil Nadu has been of utmost importance because of differences of opinion with Central Government in New Delhi. Both M.G. Ramachandran and Jayaram Jayalalithaa, the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu extended sympathy and support towards Elam Tamil issue in Sri Lanka. Ramachandran had great respect and confidence in the LTTE leader Prabhakaran, in contrast to the stand taken by the Government of India; f. bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka in the post-LTTE period has been largely confined within security framework, though trade and commerce occupies a very important space.

Lastly, the scholar is of the assessment and view that the procedure encompassed by the consecutive Sri Lankan administration strictly driven and dominated by the political groups of Sinhala who constantly politicised the state-building process and effectively marginalized the sectarian group, especially the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. Unfortunately, these steps to shape

a effective unitary state building significantly reinforced weakening the Tamil belief in reasonable distribution of the state and its organizations and generated the secessionist violent activities. Actually, Sri Lanka's bloodstained civil warfare was an ethno-separatist revolution in which several groups defined themselves and their adversaries by the ethnic traditions and customs.

The most important challenge for New Delhi in dealing with Sri Lanka came from time to time, especially the influence of Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Furthermore, India lacks a long-term tactical strategy wanted at shaping a durable relationship with Colombo, a significant shoreline country of the Indian Ocean Area. This area has been very important for India as an emerging international power. Subsequently, after virtually thirty years of the ethno-national struggle, the existing condition and upcoming viewpoint in Sri Lanka represents significant challenges and probable prospects for India.

During the post-civil-war, Sri Lankan government and politics had been transforming intensely with an ostensible movement in the direction of a further comprehensive political situation. But, a revival of Tamil chauvinism is to be expected due to the lack of a mechanism to address the socio-political negotiations and complaints. This will create a confrontation for both New Delhi and Colombo. The Sri Lankan government, in this respect, must correspondingly maintain extreme development proportion due to consider its increasing desires and determinations, which comprise developing objectives of its common people; restructuring battlefield zones; and converting South Asia's transportation center.

In the meantime, the changing aspects of geopolitical aspects of Asia Pacific have been swiftly ever-changing. The current nearness and intimacy of Colombo with Beijing will have the effect and impact in the Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral partnership. In particular, China had been growing and rivalry between most important IOR power was developing. In this background, the geo-

strategical position of Sri Lanka at the crossways of the main oceanic channels in the area made the nation-state enormously important in the tactical calculus of India and other outside forces functioning in the region. This represents a privileged moment for Sri Lanka, which was enduring the procedure of state restructuring as well as is considering to describe and restructure is the symmetric relationships with its neighbouring states in the region. The existing framework turn out to be all the much more pertinent in the analyze of upcoming outlines, as it might bring out a domino outcome with values for the next generations to bring about the peace. India's capability to shape an inventive external strategy vis-à-vis Sri Lanka by eliminating the contradiction in its dealings with Colombo and reasonably evaluating the connection of foreign powers will regulate the intensity and course of its upcoming reciprocal bonds with Colombo as well as Sri Lanka.

Acknowledging its positional facilities, Sri Lanka strategies to progress its seaport, airports, and railways system, further solidification its regional connection with the confidence of developing into a most important transportation center. These progresses may attract dominant actors to upsurge their foothold in the landmass state. The IOR oppositions, for instance, between India and China has been growing, with both states attempting to encourage Indian Oceanic shoreline states with trade & business and concessional advances for the progress. Sri Lanka performed this challenge for its particular advantage in the war and post-war phase. China's probable exaggerated IOR existence might afterward motivate other emerging powers to enhance their stage of involvement with Sri Lanka in an attempt to contradict the balance China's influence. On the other hand, there were two foremost issues that had an effect on the India's security i.e. Terrorism and Political unrests sustained provided that the socio-economic problems and political violence continue and the movement of weaponries into the zone endures unrelieved.

Keeping in view the security concerns of India, the Security threats to the Indian state were no longer restricted to state borders. They have extended crossways the boundaries of the state. This international dimension can merely be tussled by the reciprocal relations as well as the regional strategies and security arrangements. Due to the significance of the security, the state and government must provide study and the segments to increase the proficiency and ability to expand the security analyses. There must be energetic harmonization and a functioning preparation between the armed and noncombatant divisions of the administration, policy study and non-governmental establishments and several other bodies included and encompassed in the security explorations.

The present study demonstrates new areas/avenues for further research in the field. A new area of research may be conducted on the present ethnography of Sri Lanka in the backdrop of post-LTTE developments. Furthermore, in depth analysis would be required to study the growing role/importance of China in the domestic affairs of Sri Lanka. The present study raises viability of alternative administrative mechanism for the accommodation of different ethnic groups in the multi-cultural society of Sri Lanka.