

## Concluding Observations

Now we are entering into the long cherished area of the thesis that is into the concluding observations. In the beginning, we have proposed to show the possibility and relevancy of the unity thesis of Tim Bayne.

In the first chapter we have shown that various philosophers and thinkers provide definitions and explanations of consciousness in their own perspectives. We have discussed the nature and kinds of consciousness but it is proved that to define consciousness in a sentence or a group of sentences is impossible. It is also proved that all the discussions regarding this matter provide only some collections of words without presenting the real form of consciousness. Discussions are going on but we are yet to achieve a conclusion about what consciousness is. In our above discussion we have discussed that phenomenal consciousness is also identified as experience. Curiously there are a significant number of philosophers and neuroscientists who deny the existence of phenomenal consciousness. However, the concept of phenomenal consciousness is most problematic. Really, it seems that at the time of discussion of phenomenal consciousness, we came across the difficult philosophical purposes that are un-addressable and hard questions that are unsolvable.

The second chapter of my thesis is divided into two sections. In the first section I have highlighted on the nature of phenomenal consciousness which is the key concept of my thesis. Here I mainly deal with our basic question: how do phenomenal qualities come into a full accounting of what happens when a person is having a perceptual experience or sensations? These basic questions are addressed by the following theories shortly: Qualitative Event Realism, Dualism, Representationalism, Higher-Order Theories, Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism etc. From our above discussion we have seen that phenomenal

consciousness has still remained a puzzle for many philosophers as well as for readers. We can say that phenomenal consciousness is conceptually different from other types of consciousness. Some conscious states are phenomenal. Also we can say that phenomenal consciousness is not a functional notion. If a robot with a computer brain has been conceived which is behaviorally and computationally identical with us then the following fundamental question arises. How can we make difference between what it is like to be us and what it is like to be that robot? We can also ask whether there is anything at all that it is like to be the referred robot. If there is nothing it is like to be that robot then this robot is called a 'Zombie'. Thus zombies are, at least, conceptually possible. The second section of this chapter deals with the possibility of the unity of phenomenal consciousness. Here we have seen that in the history of philosophy, there are two opposite views about the possibility of the unity of consciousness. Some philosophers, like Rene Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Immanuel Kant and Frenz Brentano hold that consciousness has a unity. They claim that human consciousness is unified. This 'unity of consciousness' is often described in three distinct ways - - First, it holds that at any particular time, there is a unity to those things I am experiencing now; that is, something are in my consciousness while many others are not. It is called the 'contents of consciousness'. Secondly, consciousness seems unified over time in that there seems to be continuity from one moment to the next, or even across a whole lifetime of conscious experiences. Thirdly, these conscious contents are experienced by the same 'me'. In other words, there is a single experience as well as the stream of experiences. Tim Bayne mentions two views related to the unity of consciousness; one is Liberal, another is conservative. According to the Liberal view, we can give a unique account of the said unity that coheres with the accounts of perceptually conscious states and phenomenal states. On the contrary, the conservative view explains the unity of consciousness in two different ways, i.e. from the perspective of phenomenally conscious states and that of non- phenomenally

conscious states. They do not accept any unique account about both the states. They also hold that the form of conscious state is not a category. Yet conservatives are likely to need a third account of the unity of consciousness in order to accommodate with the background state on level. Bayne holds that all background conscious state are higher form of complex state space. That means these background conscious state is there as basis yet subject's specific conscious state is directed towards a specific object. Consider the normal waking state, the dreaming, hypnosis or REM state of an individual which happens as a context of background state of his conscious state. Generally in neuroscientific discussion, it seems that the contrast between different background states of consciousness is the difference between different levels of consciousness because a distinction between degrees of contrast made through the background state of consciousness. It is debatable because a delirium person may be more conscious when he backs his natural life. But it is not the case that he is more conceiving than his previous position. On the other-hand, British philosopher David Hume, Thomas Nagel (1971), Donald Davidson(1982), D. C. Dennett, Gerard O. Brien and Jon Opie (1998) and David Rosenthal have argued that the unity of mind has been greatly overstated. According to them it may be that there are real unities of some kinds in the parts which do not enter into consciousness. But our all conscious states and acts do not cohere with each-other. They claim that fewer of our conscious states may be unified, or our whole consciousness is less unified than we think. Thus our all conscious states will never be unified with each other. Here we conclude that the concept of phenomenal unity is one of the main bases of the discussion of stream of consciousness or the field of consciousness. Indeed, two experiences within a single phenomenal field is nothing but a conjoint phenomenality. In this case, though we get something 'what it is like' experience but they are not only two various experience; they also together form 'an experience'. Again, it can be said that there are many phenomenal fields in our consciousness. In any such field, innumerable experiences take place

simultaneously. But if we consider such experience as having only conjoint phenomenal character, then it does so conditionally because there are no substantive thesis to explain the relation between phenomenal unity and phenomenal field. Better, such experience is a way to explain the concept of phenomenal unity only. Although there is no gain denying that phenomenal unity is a puzzling nature of consciousness, yet, the multiplicity of object and their relations in our daily life are not separated from each other. They are the most important elements of our state of consciousness. I think that keeping aside all the debate I can say that there is an internal connection between the different consciousnesses of different times. In that sense, there must be a unity of consciousness. It may be designated as phenomenal consciousness.

Nature of Phenomenal Unity and the Unity thesis is the pinpoint of the third chapter in this thesis. Here we have highlighted Tim Bayne's Unity thesis critically. In this connection we are to highlight on mereological account, partial unity and the closure account elaborately. Tim Bayne considers the unity as a 'deep' characteristic of normal walking experience. He also maintains that this type of unity is also characteristic of other background states viz REM dreaming, hypnosis, and various pathologies of consciousness. Tim Bayne and David Chalmers propose a universal unity thesis: Necessarily, for any conscious subject of experience(S) and any time (t), the simultaneous conscious states that S has at t will be subsumed by a single conscious state –the subject's total conscious state. On the basis of certain features of the above mentioned definition of the unity thesis, Tim Bayne claims that this thesis satisfies the desiderata for our acceptable unity thesis. First this unity thesis is necessarily unique and true. Secondly, this thesis is also very interesting and hopefully guides us to construct a proper theory of consciousness. Thirdly, though this thesis faces some criticism yet there is no obviously decisive counter example. So it is plausible. He also claims that the above mentioned unity thesis is more acceptable because it can explain more

satisfactorily the unity of consciousness than the representational approach. Since there are some difficulties which the unity thesis faces. These are as follows--The first problem is concerned with subjects of experiences. It is clear that the plausibility of unity thesis does depend on how we conceive of subjects of experience. However, according to the Organismic conception of subject, subject of experience means, human beings. So, it indicates only to human's experience. Secondly, there is the problem is concerning the determination of the types of necessity required for the unity thesis to be true. We obtain unity in consciousness not only in our daily life, but also in the states of several impairment of consciousness. All our conscious states come to me as a unified component into a single phenomenal field being generated in a particular moment of conscious act. Bayne contend that we never have dis-unified experiences. Bayne admits that he does not prefer any conceptual or metaphysical truth by this unity thesis. He even does not imply that the unity is grounded on the truth of nature. Thirdly, there is the issue of the temporal structure of consciousness. Unity thesis asserts that subject's simultaneous conscious states will be phenomenally unified with each-other. In other words, full unity will be revealed into instantaneous snapshots of any subjects experiences. Tim Bayne thinks that such objection is not very important because we can 'take a slice' of the stream of consciousness for our study though consciousness is temporally extended. Bayne shows that the motivation behind the unity thesis cannot be appreciated by an appeal to the contents of consciousness. Conscious events occurring at different points of time may have identical content. Yet the conscious events occurring at different points of time are not phenomenally unified with each other. Thus, the self-same content may be found in several cases of conscious events and these states may or may not occur within the same temporally extended stream of consciousness. Hence, it is clear that there was no single phenomenal state that subsumed them. Hence, Bayne contends that the temporal framework in question is that of clock-time.

Here, we observed that phenomenal unity is a type of conjoint phenomenality relation. We find the concept of unity in consciousness through the discussion of such relation. We already say that unity of consciousness ‘mean’ the phenomenal unity of consciousness. Sometimes it is termed as ‘co-consciousness’. Tim Bayne explains the phenomenal unity in consciousness into two aspects – one is mereological aspect of phenomenal unity, another is phenomenal unity of closure. According to the mereological account, phenomenal unity is the relation between token experiences. Token experiences such as my backache and my visual experiences of a galloping horse are parts of a single composite experience, and, so, phenomenally unified with each other. Bayne thinks that the tripartite approach is better than the vehicular approach, which tries to individuate experiences in terms of their vehicles, i.e. by appealing to the physical –functional basis of experience. Bayne has rightly pointed out that in dealing with the unity of consciousness we must not forget that experiential states are states of organism – they are not states of the parts of brains. Since the unity of consciousness is an experiential aspect of consciousness. We should not allow any sub-personal features of consciousness in their identity condition. For Bayne, the tripartite conception of experience provides the epistemic basis of the mereological account. The mereological account of phenomenal unity raises the central question regarding the possibility of partial unity but leaves it open. A full analysis of the unity of consciousness should answer the question whether it is possible for two or more simultaneous experiences to be merely partially unified. Phenomenal unity is both transitive and symmetrical. The question has been raised as to its transitivity. Bayne thinks that it is a prudent position to ‘retain partial unity as a potential model of consciousness’ though the possibility is surrounded with an air of suspicion. Again the closure account tries to understand phenomenal unity in terms of relations between the contents of the unified states. According to this account all three states are phenomenally unified in virtue of a particular feature of the relation between the contents

of V3 on the one hand and the contents of V1 and V2 on the other. This feature is explicated in terms of the closure of the phenomenal content under conjunction. Bayne identifies three reasons for being sympathetic to closure account. First, Phenomenal unity very often goes together with closure. If we consider the mereological conception of phenomenal unity we shall see how closure naturally follows from this conception that is to say if the content of V3 entails the contents of V1 and V2 then we can find a reason why any subject who had a V3 type experience must enjoy V1 type and V2 type experiences. Secondly, closure follows from the representational conception of experience. In this conception phenomenal character is fixed by representational content and, so, conjoin phenomenal character should be explained in terms of conjunctive content. Thirdly, the closure account shows clearly the intuition contrast between unity of consciousness and other forms of mental unity. It is possible to believe both  $\langle p \rangle$  and  $\langle q \rangle$  without believing  $\langle p \ \& \ q \rangle$ , where belief is taken a dispositional state. Same in the case with desire, Bayne, as a liberalist, point out that it is not possible for anyone to consciously judge  $\langle p \rangle$  and  $\langle q \rangle$  without, at the same time judging  $\langle p \ \& \ q \rangle$  unless this subject has disunified consciousness. As to the question which forms of consciousness are forms of phenomenal consciousness thinks are divided into two groups. First, the conservatives hold that perceptual experiences, bodily sensations and affective experiences are modes of phenomenal consciousness and deny that thoughts are phenomenally conscious as such. Liberals, however, maintain that conscious thoughts possess a 'what its likeness' to the sense in which perceptual states and bodily sensations possess 'what its likeness.' The closure account faces some challenges. This account of phenomenal unity will fail if it can be shown either that a creature conscious state are conjunctively unified without their being phenomenally unified or that phenomenal unity is possible without conjunction unity. Bayne first considers whether phenomenal unity can fail in the presence of conjunctive unity. In other words, we have to consider whether it is possible for a subject to have conscious states

with contents  $\langle p \rangle$ ,  $\langle q \rangle$  and  $\langle p \& q \rangle$  yet those states are not phenomenally unified. Such a situation might arise if it were possible for a subject to have simultaneous states with the same phenomenal character, or, in other words, to have phenomenal duplicates. In such a situation the subject would have two token  $\langle p \rangle$  experiences; one phenomenally unified which the other one left alone. However, Bayne's tripartite conception of experiences does not admit the possibility of phenomenal duplicates. Hence, if any two or more states are conjunctively unified then they must also be phenomenally unified.

Bayne, next, considers those objections to closure that try to show why inference from phenomenal unity to conjunctive unity might not be possible. The first objection attempts to show that a subject may have phenomenally unified states with inconsistent contents. However, it is usually claimed that no state can have inconsistent content. Hence, either we have to admit that the consistency constraint preclude states have inconsistent content or we have to admit that closure is false. One such example originally presented by Aristotle is the waterfall illusion. This illusion is generated by looking at a waterfall for certain stretch of time and then shifting one's gaze to a stationary object. The after effect produces an illusion of movement in that we are still aware of the features in their 'proper' locations although they are seen as moving. Some thinkers claim that here we are conscious of the object as both moving and not-moving which is logically impossible. The Devil's Pitchfork and the Brentano's version of the Muller-Lyer illusion are examples provide cases where we have visual experiences whose contents are mutually inconsistent, resulting in the absence of conjunctive unity.

In the fourth chapter of my thesis, we consider Bayne's arguments in defense of the unity thesis. All these arguments are considered from first person and third person perspective in respect of the unity thesis. In respect of the first person perspective, following Bayne, we argue that introspection plays a key role in supporting of the thesis. From the



third-person perspective serious objections have been raised against the unity thesis on the basis of a number of physical and clinical phenomena. Those objections want to show the disunity of consciousness in the accounts of these phenomena. We respond to such opposite views by establishing the unity of consciousness even in the cases of apparent disunity which can be accounted for by Bayne's claim that subjects hold a single stream of consciousness that quickly switches between two clusters of contentful states.

In chapter five, we have mentions some opponent's view where they claim that unity of consciousness may breakdown in some behavioural and clinically disorder person though Bayne does not accept such views. Apparently, it seems that in some cases such as microstructure of perception, the emergency of thought, minimally responsive patients, the case of anosognosia, spilt brain patients, hypnosis etc. have two stream of consciousness but Bayne argues that all those cases consciousness are unified in subject's phenomenal field.

The last chapter of my thesis is critical evaluation. Here I would like to draw about some objection against mereological account of phenomenal unity of phenomenal consciousness raised by some eminent thinkers. I have argued that though some of those objections are more important, yet they cannot reject the mereological account of the unity thesis anyhow. But one question may arise in this connection in this form: why should we defend the unity thesis? It has already been shown that there are several theses that want to explain the unity of phenomenal consciousness from different perspectives and each and every thesis has its own importance in its own framework. Still I want to opt the unity thesis as pictured out by Tim Bayne as one of the most affective and relevant thesis in this field having a dynamic status to defined the alternative explanation of the unity of phenomenal consciousness given by the opponents through its own light.

In other words, it can be said that there is various reasons for the establishments of the said thesis:-

**First:** It has some positive aspects to explain the nature of consciousness without following in any kind of category mistakes. In his book 'The Concept of Mind' Gilbert Ryle strongly criticized the fictional story of Cartesian Dualism of mind-body problem which is very conventional among theorists and common people. According to Descartes, in between body and mind, -body is conducted spatially, mechanically and it is also realized externally and directly. On the other hand, mind operates indirectly, non-spatially and non-mechanically. Materialistic philosophers criticized Descartes's dualism. They hold that mind has no independent existence and everything can be transformed into materials. Again, criticizing Descartes's dualism, idealists philosophers maintain that body has no independent existence and everything centers round mind and mental act. But Ryle criticized Descartes dualism of mind-body with the help of logical analysis. Ryle logically explained the relation between the kind of words used to expressed mind and its category and the kind to express 'body' and 'existence'. With the help of this analysis, Ryle thinks that both materialist and idealists are deceived by some misleading questions like 'is there any existence of mind?' or 'has body any unique existence?' He considered those questions as strange because these questions arouse a thought -either mind is a category or body is itself a category and these two things can't go hand in hand. According to Ryle, this exclusive disjunction is not logical because from any one logical point of view it could be quite appropriately said that mind has its own existence and from another point of view of logical perspective it can be true that body has its own entity. The existence of mind and the existence of body and these two expressions do not denote two different species of existence because 'existence' is not a genus. These only indicate different meanings of the term 'existence'.

Similarly, following Tim Bayne, we can analyse the mereological account of the unity of phenomenal consciousness through the logical analysis. Whatever have been uses in the words to explain the phenomenal unity and unity relation make a logical explanation of relation with each-other, we think that both many unity making relation theorist and single state conception theorist have been deceived by the blunder idea because whatever follows from the such question is that either phenomenal consciousness has unified character and explained it through the many unity making relation or phenomenal consciousness has unified feature and explained it only through single state conception or one experience view. We think that this exclusive disjunction is irrational because it may be that there are many unities making relation in one point of view. On the other hand, there is one experience account or/and single state conception account in another point of view. Both these expressions do not identify the unity of phenomenal consciousness as two distinct species or two distinct unities. We have observed that the aims of every unity thesis are to explain the unity of phenomenal consciousness. All these accounts only identify the various aspects of the accounts of the words 'unity'. So there is no category mistake in Bayne's unity thesis for accepting the mereological account of the unity of phenomenal consciousness as unique and substantive than the other.

Second: With the help of this thesis, we will be able to explain the problem of consciousness affectively and we will get the plausibility of getting a unique way to explain the historical problem without any ambiguity. One of the main problems of consciousness arises whether phenomenal consciousness is unified or not. Here we have seen that in the history of philosophy, there are two opposite views about the possibility of the unity of consciousness. Here we have great deal about philosophical debate. Some theorist claims that human consciousness is unified. Some other argues that the mind's unity has been greatly overstated. They point out that it may be that there are real unities of some kinds in

the parts which do not enter consciousness. But our all conscious states and acts do not cohere with each-other. They claim that fewer of our conscious states may be unified, or our whole consciousness is less unified than we think. Hence our all conscious states will never be unified with each other. But keeping aside all the debate, we find an affective, plausible, and unique answer from this thesis that though some cases of behavioural dissociation and clinical disorder, person loss their unity for some moment but they actually enjoy 'overall' unity of their fine grained phenomenal field of phenomenal consciousness level in normal and many abnormal cases. This is the uniqueness of Tim Bayne's unity thesis.

Third: The thesis of Tim Bayne, directly or indirectly incorporates all the views hold by the opponents. We have seen that the opponents of Bayne's introduces various terms like 'unity path', 'path membership', 'many unity making relation', 'pluralistic account of unity' to characterized the phenomenal unity of consciousness. Tim Bayne also introduces some unique terms like subsumption, fine grained phenomenal property, phenomenal field to characterized the unity of phenomenal consciousness. So there is nothing new in the opponents view to offer any blow to the unity thesis. Their main aim is to unveiled the key feature of the unity of phenomenal consciousness. To do this they take a various methods, various ways though Bayne's thesis seems to us more rational and substantive to accept this account. .

Fourth: Here we may sight the Kantian conception of Copernican Revolution. There it is said that the thesis of Copernicus is more acceptable than the Tolemi as the thesis of Copernicus is able to explain the astronomical situation effectively. On the other hand, Kant's view of knowledge as demanded by Kant is more acceptable than the traditional views as Kant's critical theory offers a more comprehensive thought in this regard. Similarly I think that the unity thesis of Tim Bayne is more rational and logical than the others to deal with the problem of consciousness. Briefly, Kant believes that someone makes a radical change of all

the procedures in the field of science when a particular situation demands. As a result that science becomes the science in the true sense of the term and gradually leads to progress. Not only mathematics and physics but also Copernicus brought about the same sort of change in the sphere of astronomy. Copernicus gave 'helio-centric' explanation in place of the then conventional 'geo-centric' explanation. Predecessors of Copernicus decided that the Earth remains unmoved and the Sun rotates round the Earth whenever they watched that the Sun was revolving from the east to west. Copernicus proved their observation as an incorrect one because the same solar motion is to be found if the Earth moves round the Sun with an onlooker on the surface of the Earth. Later so many astronomical incidents could be easily explained on the basis of Copernicus's theory of helio-centric explanation not on that geo-centric explanation. In the same way Kant has regarded his invention in the world of philosophy as equivalent to the revolution of Copernicus. Predecessors of Kant thought that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But with this very concept, our evaluation of an object to enrich our knowledge might be meaningless if we do not depend on our experience. For this very particular reason Kant said that objects must conform to our knowledge as an alternative explanation. With this concept Kant showed that a priori knowledge could be explained on the basis of this project but this is not at all possible with the help of old theory. He said that a human mind always inherits a priori knowledge. According to Kant, mind becomes active in any subject of knowledge. So to say, mind applies its own form of knowledge over the elements of any knowledge. These forms of knowledge are determined by two human faculties – sensibility and understanding.

Similarly, I think that Bayne's philosophical discussion of the unity of phenomenal consciousness is equivalent to the notion of Kantian Copernican Revolution. Opponents of Bayne proposes 'bottom –up' account to explain the synchronic unity of phenomenal consciousness but it fails to reach the deep and primitive feature of the unity of phenomenal

consciousness. Rather, one can easily explain the ‘at-a-time’ unity of phenomenal consciousness by the ‘top-down’ account proposed by Tim Bayne. Again one can get a clear conception of the unity of phenomenal consciousness through the notion of ‘conjoint experiential character’, ‘overall experience’, ‘phenomenal field’, ‘maximally fine grained feature’, ‘notion of part-wholes relation’, ‘notion of subsumption’ characterized by Tim Bayne. Even, Bayne’s account of tripartite conception where he maintains that ‘individuation of experiences should be made in terms of subjects of experience, time and phenomenal properties or event’ – is no doubt a new one. We also give a deep and primitive account of unity of phenomenal consciousness through the notions of ‘modality specific’, ‘phenomenal property’ etc. which will not be possible by opponents account. So, I think that there is no incoherence to claim Bayne’s account of phenomenal unity as revolution like Kantian Copernican Revolution.

At last, it is true that the discussion of the unity of phenomenal consciousness will not complete without the discussion of self. In the history of consciousness we find three important role of self or ‘subject of experience’; these are: *ownership* component of the self-role, *referential* component of the self-role and *perspectival* component of the self-role. Some theorists hold that the entity, playing as a self- role, is nothing less than an animal, the members of certain species. This view is called biological account of self. Biological account of the self, claims the owner of one’s mental states as an organism. Another approach to self follows from neo-Lockeans perspectives where they claim that the self is purely psychological. According to this account, selves are minds – networks of intentionally and causally integrated mental states. There we find a third one that explained the self as phenomenological. According to phenomenological account of the self, ‘the identity condition for selves involve essential reference to stream of consciousness – that is, sequences of phenomenal states that are bound together by chains of phenomenal continuity’.

We, following Bayne, think that neither psychological nor biological account of self-reach to the necessary and deep links between the unity of consciousness and the self. Self is a merely virtual object. Identity of such an object is given by the intentional structure of the phenomenal field. Following Dennett's terms, we may say that self is a Centre of phenomenal gravity. There is nothing more in the self than what we take there to be. Rather we can say that self is a non-negotiable feature of our cognitive architecture. Thus it is not possible to know about one's own self without the thinking away of one's own life.

Again, if we do not admit the unity among phenomenal properties of phenomenal field of consciousness, then our daily life will be disrupted in every moment. Our thought, intention, feelings, happiness, sorrow, emotions, desire, belief, perception, sensation etc will be full of lying-in-room of untidiness. All worlds will be a sacred place of indiscipline. So keeping aside all the debate, all curiosity about the link between the self and the unity of consciousness, we conclude that there must have unity of our consciousness and for more explanation it would take the space of another thesis. Those who think or believe that unity of phenomenal consciousness is not possible are dwelling upon in their own reality. I think the cases of disunity as shown by the opponents are nothing but the contextual manifestation of the unity. The whole matter can be represented in an argumentative form. The concept of disunity necessarily comes after the concept of unity. Without the existence of unity, there is no plausibility of the explanations of this disunity. Unity of phenomenal consciousness always remains as the locus of the so-called-disunity.