# Chap-06:

## Critical Evaluation of the Unity Thesis

In the previous chapter we have discussed some opponent's view where they claim that unity of consciousness may breakdown in some behavioural and clinically disordered person though Bayne does not accept such views. It appears that in some cases such as microstructure of perception, the emergence of thought, minimally responsive patients, the case of anosognosia, spilt brain patients, hypnosis etc. have two stream of consciousness but Bayne argues that in all those cases consciousness are unified in subject's phenomenal field.

Now in this context we are going to offer our project in a different mode of expressions, named re-thinking of the unity thesis. We will see that the claim of Tim Bayne in respect of the unity thesis has a special force to overcome all the criticism against the unity thesis made by the opponents. It is cleared that the unity thesis is clearly and distinctly established by Tim Bayne. He claims that not only there is a plausibility of phenomenal unity of consciousness, but it also a unique and acceptable theory in this field. He has also claimed that the mereological account of unity thesis is more plausible rather than closure account of unity thesis. It is obviously true that Bayne's mereological account of phenomenal unity is very much unique and exclusive; yet, some possible objections might be raised against mereological account of phenomenal unity which will appear as a big challenge to the unity thesis. These objections are as follows:

First: It is said against Bayne's mereological view that the mereological view of the unity of phenomenal consciousness is neither primitivist view nor substantive because it provides oneness or singularity of total experience as ground of mereological account of phenomenal unity. Farid Masrour, one of the leading thinkers in contemporary era, raises such objection against mereological account. According to him, mereological view mainly

provides an account about oneness of total experience. He opines that mereological account of phenomenal unity is similar with 'Newtonian space model' to which the most fundamental fact that relations of co-spatiality between various points (or regions) of a space is the fact that these points (or regions) are parts of the same single space. Masrour claims that it is possible to provide an alternative account of mereological model through which the phenomenal unity of consciousness may be explain clearly and plausibly without the help of unity thesis of Tim Bayne. This alternative account is called as 'connectivity view' or 'unity of chain view'. This can also identify as 'Leibnizian view'. Briefly, Farid Masrour maintains that in Leibnizian views of space, the oneness of space emerges from certain conditions over spatial relations. Similarly, according to connectivity view, unity relations are grounded in the existence of unity paths and facts about membership in the unity path. This view is 'Leibnizian' in the sense that it accounts for unity relations in terms of local relations such as spatial or causal relations between experiences. He defines the notion of 'unity path' in the following way: 'There is a unity path between two experiences $Em$ and $En$ if and only if $Em$ is bound with $En$ or there is an $Er$ such that $Em$ is bound with $Er$ and there is a unity path from $Er$ to $Em$.'[1] He maintains that every path consists in a chain of binder experiences and such experiences are bound by the path. An experience is treated as a member of a unity path in the following ways: 'An experience is a member of a path if and only if it is one of the binders in the path or one of the experiences that are bound by the binders in the path.'[2] The property of a set of experiences can be explained by the notions of unity path and path membership. Masrour identifies such property of a set of experiences as 'minimal connectivity.' He also defined the notion of 'minimal connectivity' in the following manner: 'A set of experiences, S, is minimally connected if and only if there is a unity path, P, such that all members of S are members of P.'[3] Again, a set of experiences is unified in virtue if it

is minimally connected. So Masrour claims that the connectivity view is primitivist and substantive because it builds unity in phenomenal consciousness from the grounds up.

In response to this objection, following Tim Bayne, we can say that his approach to mereology were primarily designed to explain the notion of phenomenal unity rather than 'some independent relation that might function as its metaphysical basis'.[4] Since it is no doubt to confess that Bayne's mereological account of phenomenal unity might be directed to one kind of metaphysical structure but it is not the sense that his account is fully metaphysical. It may be that we find a structure of Newtonian views of space into Bayne's view when he says that 'a pair of experiences to occur within a single phenomenal field *just* in for them to enjoy phenomenality', but it is not fully metaphysical and there is no require any alternative metaphysical account like connectivity view provided by Farid Masrour. Indeed, in the beginning of mereological account, Bayne emphasizes to the discussion of the nature of phenomenal consciousness. He thinks that the words 'conscious', 'experiential', 'phenomenal' are synonyms. He maintains that specific conscious states, by virtue, are different with each other from their phenomenal character or content. Bayne's main intention is to build a phenomenalogical account of phenomenal unity. So it is not acceptable of Masrour's objection against Bayne's mereological account.

Moreover, when Masrour remarks that some binder experiences make a unity path through chain and experiences are bound by the unity path then it is questionable in which label of consciousness make such chain and who the maker is. We think that the phenomenology of phenomenal unity plays an important role. Again we think that there is no new information in the notion of 'path membership' mention by Masrour because Bayne explains his notion of unity of experience by the concept of subsumption.' So Masrour's objection against mereological account of phenomenal unity has lost its contextual appropriateness.

Secondly, the second objection raises against Bayne's mereological account of phenomenal unity is that the mereological account of phenomenal unity provides an account only of synchronic unity or unity –at-a-time but this account fails to capture the pinpoint of diachronic unity or unity over time. Masrour, himself claims that he will be able to provide a uniform unity account that can highlight both on synchronic unity and diachronic unity.

In response to this objection, we think that either he is not aware about the aim of Bayne's mereological account of phenomenal unity or he raises such objection consciously which is not important for this account. Bayne clearly mentions that a stream of consciousness is a segment of experience which is unified at-a-time and over-time or synchronically and diachronically but stream metaphor aptly captured the aspect of consciousness through time. He maintains that field metaphor captured the structure of consciousness at-a-time. For this, Bayne emphasizes on the synchronic unity of phenomenal consciousness. He also points out that the notions of subject's unity and representational unity failed to reach at the heart of the unity of phenomenal consciousness. So such unity does not capture the deeper and the primitive unity involving the fact that these two experiences possess a conjoint experiential character. Again Bayne does not deny the existence of diachronic unity rather; he thinks that we might discuss the nature of diachronic unity in different aspects. So the mereological account of phenomenal unity thesis is unique and plausible for its purpose.

Moreover, Bayne's unity thesis relating to phenomenal consciousness can easily explain the temporal structure of consciousness. In other words, full unity of phenomenal consciousness will be revealed into instantaneous snapshots of any subjects experiences. He holds that ' 'we can take a slice' of the stream of stream of consciousness for our study though consciousness is temporally extended.'[5] He also identifies two aspects of the structure of temporal consciousness – firstly, conscious events are located in objective time and

secondly, conscious events also represent events as occurring at particular time. First is identifies as temporal structure of vehicles of consciousness, second is temporal structure of content of consciousness. So it is more plausible to explain the time slice of the unity thesis in terms of the temporal structure of the vehicles of consciousness rather than the temporal structure of its content.

Thirdly, another objection against mereological account of phenomenal unity raised by Masrour, is that Bayne's unity thesis is purely structural or logical matter. That is to say, phenomenology relating such unity is one kind of bare phenomenology. [6] In briefly, according to Bayne and Chalmers, the feeling of pain and the seeing of the book is being unified with each-other make a difference between subject's overall phenomenology. In their view, having two experiences in a conjoint manner does not make any substantial contribution to the phenomenology or content. Unity is fully structural or logical matter and the phenomenology related with is bare phenomenology. For this, Farid Masrour objects it as bare unity views. Mereological view of phenomenal unity provided by Bayne is bare where bare unities are one kind of connections between experiences that can occur independently of any experience of a specific relation.

Masrour presents an alternative account. He claims that this alternative account is more acceptable and flawless. According to him, phenomenal unity between experiences makes a substantial contribution to subject's overall phenomenology and content. For example, when one can claim that one has experiences of the singing of the birds and the feeling of elation which are bound with each other, then there is some gap in description of concerned phenomenology. Generally, a question arises as to the description of how they are bound. They can give an informative answer when those two experiences are described as bound in so far as the experience of the singing of the birds are taken as the cause of her elation. Similar things can be said when experiences are connected but not bound. In such a

case, the unity path connects the experiences and this unity path makes a substantial contribution.

In response to this objection, we can say that it is not clear what the term 'bare' signifies in 'bare phenomenology'. Some possible literally meaning of the word 'bare' that can be apparently discerned are 'lacking the content', 'naked', and 'commonplace' etc. Now, if Farid Masrour accepts Bayne's unity thesis in the first sense, 'lacking the content' sense of 'bare' – it is not acceptable because if we re-visit Bayne's unity thesis, we will see that subjects have two experiences –$e_1$, $e_2$ simultaneously and, at the same time, subsumed by total experience. In this case, the act of subsumption is neither conceptual, nor metaphysical, they are true by nature. In other words, subjects have a phenomenology of $e_1$ experience, phenomenology of $e_2$ experience and conjoint phenomenology of unified experiences of $e_1$ and $e_2$ subsumed by $e_3$. So, the first sense of the term 'bare' is not acceptable.

Again, if we think that he accepts the word 'bare' in the sense 'naked' and identifies it as bare phenomenology, it is not plausible also. Bayne's unity thesis is not void. The foundation of his mereological accounts of phenomenal unity is tripartite conception of experience. He opines that a range of distinct phenomenal properties get involved in an experience produced by tasting an orange. The properties are 'sweetness', 'tanginess', and 'orangeness'. Each of these phenomenal properties gets associated with distinct experiences that are parts of the more complex experience of tasting the orange. Again, this experience will be a part of more complex experiences. Complex experiences of the last sort may be modality specific or it may involve contributions from multiple modalities, such as experience associated with one's total perceptual phenomenology. So it is not correct to say that Bayne's unity thesis is 'bare' in this sense.

Again, if he considers Bayne's unity thesis as bare in the sense of 'commonplace' – this also not fully acceptable, we have seen that he introduces many terms like 'subsumption', 'phenomenal field', 'maximally fine grained', 'overall', 'modality specific', etc. to account his unity thesis of phenomenal unity. This presentation makes his unity thesis as unique and extra-ordinary.

Moreover, if Masrour intends to object that there is no new insight of pure phenomenology or descriptive phenomenology in the mereological account of Bayne's unity thesis, then we might concede with this objection apparently but it is not a flaw of Bayne's mereological account. It seems to us that the main aim of Bayne's unity thesis is to build an account of unity of phenomenal consciousness. In such cases, introducing the notion of 'phenomenal field', 'what it is like' etc., Bayne highlights such phenomenology which is fruitful for his account. Bayne' purpose was not explored the pure phenomenology or descriptive phenomenology for this unity thesis.

So we think that there is no valid ground for identifying Bayne's unity thesis as 'bare unity theses and characterizing the phenomenology related with the unity thesis as 'bare phenomenology'.

Fourth, David. J. Bennett and C.S. Hill raise an objection against Bayne's mereological account of phenomenal unity. According to them, the unity relation introduces by Bayne's is one unity-making-relations.[7]Bayne thinks that experiences are unified in being subsumed within an overarching experience. Subsumption holds to serve as a single, unity making and universal relations. Better, Bennett and Hill claim that consciousness possesses many unities making relations. Some of them are join fairly wide swaths of the experiences of a subject at a time; some of them are join more narrow swaths of experiences. Unity

relations are positively pluralist. They also claim that such unity making relations belongs to different mental levels.

We think that it is an important and more plausible objection against mereological account of Bayne's phenomenal unity of consciousness. It is obviously true that we enjoy various kinds of unity relations in our consciousness, viz, objectual unity, subject unity, access unity phenomenal unity etc. Bayne himself is aware about the fact that it is possible to have various kinds of unity relations within our consciousness. Rather, the primary aim of his unity thesis is to find and illustrate the nature of phenomenal unity in phenomenal consciousness. He maintains that subject unity and representational unity failed to reach at the heart of the unity of consciousness. He proposes to explore the conjoint experiential character in order to provide a deeper and primitive unity thesis. Even when we enjoy 'what it is like' experience in to our 'overall' phenomenal field, such unity originates by subsumes multiplicity of consciousness. The unity of experiences in the form of 'what it is like' of overall phenomenal field of subject's consciousness comes as only 'one' – not two or more. So, Bennett and Hill may provide a unique account by mentioning many unity making relations but Bayne's theory has not lost its importance.

Fifth: According to Bayne, subsumption relation is one kind of species of part-whole relations where some experiences are the part of subsuming experiences. Against this view, D.J. Bennett and C.S. Hill claim that experiences are joined by one or more of our many unities making relation into consciousness but they do not bear a part-whole relation to some larger experiential whole.[8] It is true that some of our experience appear to us as part-whole relations with each other. However, they claim that we cannot find any phenomenon of our experiences which is unified through introspection. They also object that they are unexpectedly instructed by Tim Bayne to discern the presence universal distinct relations through introspection.[9]

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In response to this objection we can say that this objection is not strong enough to counter against Bayne's mereological account of phenomenal unity because the primitive of Bayne's mereological account is the notion of subsumption. He explains the notion of subsumption with the help of the relation between parts and wholes. When one experience subsumes another experience we can say that the former contains the latter. A subject's total experiential state is a whole that includes other experiential parts. These experiential parts may be subject's overall perceptual experiences. These total phenomenal states are characterized as 'homeomerous'. In a sense, experiential parts are 'like-parted'. In other words, all the parts that compose the total state share their experiential nature. Now if we assume that the notion of parts-whole relations may be applicable but not so in all cases, then the target of the notion of subsumption fails to reach their goal. Obviously, the primitive foundation of mereological account will be weak which is not acceptable to Bayne. Again, it might not be possible to capture the phenomenal field of consciousness fully without the help of introspection. The opponents might raise question about the viability of introspection. However, Bayne claims that we are aware of the contents of those states only via introspection. The plausibility of this claim is much stronger. Bayne points out that the viability of introspection can be shown if we take 'conscious states' to include thoughts. This becomes apparent when we note that there surely is an introspectible difference between consciously judging that that it is cloudy and consciously hoping that it is cloudy. Bayne argues that if it is possible for introspection to distinguishes thoughts that differ only on the basis of the moods or attitudes associated with those thought then we must admit that introspection has access to more than the contents of thoughts we can introspectively distinguish between visual experiences having the same content easily. So, it would be plausible if we consider Bayne's claim as *simple a claim* rather than an instruction.

Sixth: In the mereological account, T. Bayne and D. Chalmers opine that not every collection of experiences constitutes a unified experiential whole, only those that enjoy a 'conjoint phenomenology'. By the 'conjoint phenomenology' he explains that 'two experiences have conjoint phenomenology' if and only if 'there is something that it is like for the subject in question to have both experiences together.' The opponent asked 'what is involved in a subject having both experiences together.'[10] Two possible accounts may be given – one of which claim that 'a pair of experiences has a conjoint phenomenology if, and, only if, they are connected by the primitive relationship of experienced togetherness.'[11]Another accounts hold that 'a subject S has a pair of experiences together if S has both experiences *simultaneous*, with no further condition or constraint. B. Dainton thinks that though the mereological account is offering nothing new and distinctive, yet, the first alternative is the viable rather than the other. In this sense, conjoint phenomenology of a unified conscious state is one whose constituent experiences are all mutually co-conscious. Van Gulik raises a similar but an important question about the notion of 'conjoint phenomenology'. As he mentions, it requires more than the mere conjunction of phenomenal states, for being had by the same subject at one and the same time does not entail that E1 and E2 will be phenomenally unified with each other. He asks whether the phenomenal unity between E1 and E2 require having an experience of the conjunction of E1 and E2. He also notes that this requirement might seem to be too strong, for it is not likely to be convinced for all possible crosswise conjunctive pairing among all at one's many experiences at-a-time. So Van Gulick concludes, it is unclear just what conjunctive phenomenal character could be 'given that it must be something more than just having the *conjunction* of what – *it-is-likeness, but weaker than having the what-it-is-likeness associated with an experience ofconjunction.*'[12]So, it is not clear what actually mean by the term 'conjoint phenomenology.'

We, following T. Bayne, don't regard this phrase as unproblematic. Indeed, it may be that it is one of the most troublesome phrases in the philosophical discussion. Tim Bayne captures the notion of 'conjoint phenomenology' by appeal to the notion of 'what it's likeness.' In his words, 'experiences are phenomenally unified with each other exactly when they exemplify conjoint what-it's likeness'.[13] For example, happiness and a thought are phenomenally unified with each other if it will enjoy the phenomenal character associated with the happiness and with the thought. By contrast, phenomenal togetherness will be absent, if the happiness occurs in one stream of consciousness and the thought in another. The main feature of conjoint phenomenality describe by T. Bayne, involve within a 'single phenomenal field'. This unique feature do not involve in Dainton's account where he characterized 'conjoint phenomenology' as 'they are connected by the primitive relationship of experienced togetherness." So there is no doubt to confess that Bayne's notion of 'conjoint phenomenology' is new one. Again, in response to Van Gulick, we think, this objection is an important challenge to Bayne's notion of phenomenal unity. It is one kind of Dilemma that has two horns. First horn of this dilemma concern with the conjunction of phenomenal states and second horn concern with identifying 'phenomenal togetherness' with an experience of conjunction. Bayne replies this objection by three complicated ways:

I): it is not clear what experiential content amount to. Most representationalists assume that all our experiences have a mind –to-world direction of fit. Some other holds that some types of experiences have world-to-mind direction of fit. Though he supports the later views, yet, he opines that it is a complicates matters, what it would be to have an experience whose content is fixed by conjoining the contents of a world – to-mind state with that of the contents of a mind – to-world state. Second is that the plausibility of the conjunctive analysis depends on what kind of cognitive constraints govern consciousness. For example: one has an experience with content <p>.He/she believes that he/she has an experience with the content

<p>. in such case, the conjunctive analysis would be implausible if one has an experience of <q> and an experience of <r> and then two experiences are phenomenally unified with each other, but he/she does not believe that he/she has an experiences <q&r> for its complexity. Final complicated factor involve one's attitude to the conjunctive analysis and conception of the degree to which consciousness is unified. Like Bayne, we also think that we find certain kind of difficulty to provide a settled view of the conjunctive analysis. We also observe that there is no alternative account of conjoint phenomenality. We suggest that there is need more research work on the unity of consciousness.

Seven**:** Bayne claims that phenomenal unity relation is a universal unity relation. He points out that two experiences are phenomenally unified when there is a single experience that subsumed all of them. C.S. Hill asks whether this unity connect all of the conscious experiences of a subject or 'some' of them. He also expresses his about the universality of phenomenal unity relation. Again he asks what the operative notion of an experience here is, in what sense of 'experience' it is said that experienced are generally subsumed by more encompassing experiences.[14]

In response to this worry of C.S. Hill, we might say, following Bayne that all of our conscious experiences connect together as a conjoint manner. My visual experience of red rose, auditory experience of a bird's singing on a tree and my olfactory experience of a smell are had together as co-subsumed, they are connected as components, elements or parts of a single encompassing conscious state. The opponent might object that some cases of behavioural and psychological dissociative cases like split brain syndrome, hypnosis, minimally responsive patient's consciousness may appear as parted but Bayne shows us that we find a fundamental unifying feature through introspection. It is pretty clear that phenomenal unity possess universal character for its mereological character, its phenomenality, its subsuming feature, its accessibility and introspectibility as single unity

relation. To reply on Hill's worry about the nature of 'experience', following Bayne, we might say that Bayne uses the notion of 'experience' in tripartite conception. According to this individuation of experiences should be made in terms of subjects of experience, times and phenomenal properties or events. A range of distinct phenomenal properties get involved in an experience produced by tasting an orange. These properties are 'sweetness', 'tanginess', and 'orangeness'. Each of these phenomenal properties gets associated with distinct experiences that are parts of the more complex experience of tasting the orange. Again this experience will be a part of more complex experiences. Complex experiences of the last part may be modality specific. Bayne wants to restrict the tripartite conception of experience to the individuation of maximally specific or fine-grained phenomenal properties.

Eight: R. Van Gulick one of the commentators' raises a question against Bayne's notion of phenomenal unity and his account of the self. He discusses whether Bayne able to build an adequate definition of phenomenal unity. He also asks whether phenomenal unity characterized by Bayne really difference from representational unity. He opines that Bayne explain phenomenal unity in several ways from which we can mention at least three specifications. These are as follows:

i) They are subsumed by a single conscious state, i.e. by being parts or components of that single state, ii) they occur within a single phenomenal field and iii) They possess a conjoint experiential character.[15] Though Bayne claims that these three features will captured the real nature of phenomenal unity but actual situation is very different. On feature of these three is not supposed to be the cause of the other. It is not pretty clear that these feature individually or collectively reveal the requisite sense of phenomenal unity. Again Bayne distinguishes his concept of phenomenal unity from representational unity. R.V.Gulick claims that Bayne's notion of phenomenal unity is essentially related with representational unity. He argues that virtual conception of the self necessarily entail that phenomenal unity is

'essentially representational.' Gulick suggest, 'Phenomenal unity might be a special type or sub-domain of representational unity, perhaps a minimal unity of coherent content needed to construct the viewpoint of an experiential self.'[16] So Gulick asks why Bayne believes phenomenal unity is not essentially connected with representational.

To replies Gulick critics, following Bayne, we think that Gulick is right on both counts. We have already highlights Gulick's notion of conjoint phenomenolity just in previous point. Here we point out that the *togetherness* that characterizes phenomenal unity is experiential. Moreover, if we consider these three specifications of phenomenal unity as simultaneous feature then the problem would be remove.

We have also share Van Gulick's another comments concerning the relationship between phenomenal unity and representational unity. We think though there are different accounts in which phenomenal unity treated as 'essentially representational', yet, the entire are not equally plausible. There are two kinds of 'essential' connections between phenomenal unity and representational unity: *direct* and *indirect*. In later sense, phenomenal unity requires representational unity if and only if experiences which will be phenomenally unified belongs to such experiences most of which are representationally unified with each other. Gulick accepts the connections between phenomenal unity and representational unity more direct sense. Bayne opines that Gulick's suggestion that phenomenal unity might be a 'special type or sub-domain of representational unity' – is neither strikes him as plausible nor acceptable. Bayne's argues that the existence of inconsistency in the content of consciousness shows that phenomenally unity of experiences is possible without being representationally unified.

Again, following Bayne, we might say that phenomenal unity is not essentially connected for their different content. Phenomenal unity possesses 'phenomenal contents' [17] whereas representational unity possesses 'representational content'. In his words: 'Although

the content of the agnosic's experiences of the car are not representationally integrated in the way that they ought to be, we have no reason to deny that they are phenomenally unified with each other within the context of a single overall visual state.'[18] So we conclude that though Gulick's objection against Bayne's notion of phenomenal unity is not apparently plausible us, yet, it is necessary required for further work.

Nine: Wanja Wiese, a contemporary commentator proposes an approach to the problem of phenomenal unity in that the problem of phenomenal unity (PPU) can be explained without making strong metaphysical assumptions. He objects to Bayne's view that we do not require individuation criteria for phenomenal states because the problem of phenomenal unity can be presented through phenomenal properties. He also claims that Bayne does not provide a phenomenological characterization properly in the sense that he just specifies *that* there is a 'conjoint phenomenology'. Bayne only thinks that phenomenal unity goes along with phenomenal difference. Wanja Wiese objects that Bayne's characterization does not specify *what* a conjoint phenomenology really is. Barry Dainton ignores this problem because there is no necessity of phenomenological description of the phenomenal difference. To him, co-consciousness is a basic fact of the experiential relationship. [19] On the other hand, M. Tye maintains that consciousness is synchronously unified but this unity does not go along with a phenomenal difference. So Wanja Wiese identifies two kinds of problem of phenomenal unity. These are as follows: 'provide possible phenomenological characterization of the phenomenal difference' and 'provide analysis of these characterizations on sub-personal levels of description'.[20] He also identifies the problem respectively as the *first problem of phenomenal unity* (1PPU) and the *second problem of phenomenal unity* (2PPU). He is interesting to the first problem and provides a possible solution from the 1-st person perspective by considering the phenomenological dual to Bradley's regress (PB). To discuss the bundle theory of objects, Bradley raises a problem

which is called as Bradley's Regress. According to Bradley, an object is merely a 'bundle' of properties. Bradley's Regress wants to prove that the motion of two things being related an infinite regress. Maurin reconstructs Bradley's regress in the following way:[21]

*(U): There can be contingent unity in complexity.

*($D_{truth}$): If <P> and <Q> have different truth conditions, then what reality must be like for <P> to be true is different from what it must be like for <Q> to be true.

*($D_{maker}$): If P and Q are different, then something must make this difference.

Wanja Wiese reformulates phenomenological dual of Bradley's regress assuming that there can be 'phenomenal unity in phenomenal complexity', [22]-

'two distinct phenomenal properties F and G are instantiated, and they are related by Rpu. So not only F-ness and G-ness and the property of being related by Rpu are instantiated (with respect to the same organism), but also the proposition <Rpu (F, G)> is true (this is what is meant by 'phenomenal unity in phenomenal complexity' in what follows).'

Following Maurin's proposed Bradleyian Regress, W.Wiese proposed following possible solutions to the phenomenological dual of Bradley's regress:[23]

1.1.Identify a fundamental phenomenal property $F_{fund}$ on which all other phenomenal properties depend for their existence (example: the directionality of the experienced temporal flow).

2.2. Identify a class of phenomenal properties Fglue which depend for their existence on other phenomenal properties, such that a difference in the other phenomenal

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properties goes along with a difference in the gluing property (example: the phenomenology of field transitions).

3.3. Identify dispositional cognitive states or processes that have the potential to combine different experiential contents.

4.4. Identify a phenomenal difference without presupposing that there is some (additional) phenomenal property that *makes* the difference (example: the difference between experiencing first A, and then B, and experiencing A – followed –by-B).

He thinks that the possible solution can inspire to conceive seriously as a alternative of single state conception proposed by Tim Bayne and others. He also identifies the inadequacy of Single state conception of unity of phenomenal consciousness because it does not build any phenomenological characterizations. Hence it does not solve the problem of phenomenal unity. He reminds us that though Bayne's mereological relations between phenomenal states treated as a metaphysical facts but it can also be treated as a phenomenological fact. Hence it creates a worry between two putative features of phenomenal unity relation which is called *phenomenality* and *globality* by W. Wiese. In other words, if we think that split-brain subjects do not possess phenomenally unified conscious experiences, they have not any phenomenological characterizations because general people do not know what kind of 'what it's like' to be a split-brain patient possess. Similarly, Bayne's mereological account do not conceptualized phenomenal unity in terms of a single global phenomenal state.  So W. Wiese object against Bayne's mereological accounts that this account does not specify *what* a conjoint phenomenology is or *what* the phenomenal difference is.

In response to this objection, following Tim Bayne we say that the aim of Bayne's mereological view is not metaphysical though his approach seems apparently metaphysical. Even when Bayne opines that phenomenal unity goes along with phenomenal difference, he

actually wants to make distinction between phenomenal state and phenomenally conscious mental state. He points out that these two states possess structures that are different from each other. Owing to this difference between their structures it will not always be possible to capture the neurological relations between the phenomenal states in terms entailment relations between the contents of phenomenally conscious mental states. A subject's total phenomenal state is required to capture the phenomenal character of the states which that total phenomenal state subsumes. Some phenomenal states of a subject may be associated with particular intentional states but the states that possess complex phenomenology cannot be paired with any intentional state in that manner. Such a complex state is the subject's total phenomenal state, which captures what it is like to do the subject at the time in question. The phenomenal character of such complex state can be determined by the subjects various intentional states, but we shall hardly find a single intentional state with which it can be paired. Bayne claims that the fundamental difference between the notion of a phenomenal state and the notion of phenomenally conscious intentional state helps the mereological model of phenomenal unity to survive the failure of closure. So Wanja Wiese may provide another account to characterize 'conjoint phenomenology' or 'phenomenal difference' but I think that there is no any dimness in Bayne's account to understand such notion.

**Ten:** Another important objection rose against Bayne's mereological model concerns partial unity. Bayne claims that though it is possible for partial unity to exist independently, yet it is also possible for phenomenal unity, associated with it to exist parallel. Some theorist, who accept partial unity model, mention some behaviorally disordered persons such as split brain, person under hypnosis, minimally responsive persons etc. They argue that a split brain subject has only a single but only partly unified consciousness. Briefly, the highest and comparatively more important and complex part of the brain, the cerebrum is divided into two hemispheres – the left cerebral hemisphere and the right cerebral hemisphere. The left

hemisphere is connected to the right side of the body; the right hemisphere is connected to the left side of the body. These two parts of the cerebrum are responsible for accomplishing different function. While the left cerebral hemisphere is responsible for word formation and the ability to analyze, the right cerebral hemisphere is linked to our non-verbal abilities. The division of the cerebrum in two halves first appeared in discussions in the year 1960. Before this it was salient, that in the case of right handers, their left cerebral hemisphere is more effective than the right hemisphere. In other words, it was salient that the left cerebral hemisphere is more dexterous than the right cerebral hemisphere. Since most human beings are right handers – this fact helps to prove that the left cerebral cortex is more powerful.

However, after 1960, this idea has changed. In the meanwhile, the various ideas and experiments conducted on patients' neurological diseases helped change this idea. The patients were affected by epilepsy. A typical surgical procedure followed for the treatment of epilepsy is known as commissuretomy. In commissurotomy the corpus callosum is removed. In general, the left and right sides of the brains is able to communicate with each other. As a result, it can be seen that the left and the right sides of the brain are acting in entirely different manners.

Later, Gazzaniga [24] continued research on this and proved that if the connection between the left and right brain is disconnected then the concerned individual faces self-contradiction within himself. If the said individual tries to attack his wife with an axe in his left hand, then his right hand attempts to stop his left hand from doing so. It is hence prove that each hemisphere of the brain has a mind of its own. If the right cerebral hemisphere is freed from the influence of the left cerebral hemispheres then the right hemisphere expresses its own emotions, desires and so on. Such experimentations on split brain patients have shown that the complete experiences of each hand reveal the opposite brain. In the case of

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visual experiences, every retina reveals any one hemisphere. The special dexterous of each hemisphere can be inspired from the patient's behaviour.

The experiments of Roger Sperry and his colleagues have established that patients could easily able to identify the objects touched by the right hand though the same was not so easy for the left hand. Hence they concluded that in the case of object names, the left hemisphere is more effective than the right hemisphere. Further experiment has shown when the situation arises to determine an object based on touch alone, then, if the object is placed on the left visual field, the left hand can identify it, whereas the right visual field and the right hand cannot do the same. From this it was decided that the right hemisphere is more adept at synthetic perceptual insight. On the other hand, the left hemisphere is more adept at analytical and verbal abilities. So it can be said that subject has a single but only partly unified consciousness.

In response to this objection Bayne argues that phenomenal unity is both transitive and symmetrical. This claim is grounded on the supposition that the phenomenal field cannot fragment in such a way that can make the possibility for the failure of transitivity. Thus, the *transitivity thesis* claims that phenomenal unity is transitive with respect to simultaneous states. That is to say, for any three simultaneous experiences, $e_1$, $e_2$ and $e_3$, if $e_1$ and $e_2$ are each phenomenally unified with $e_3$ then they must also be unified with each other.

We have seen that Bayne distinguishes his notion of partial unity from Tye's notion. Tye understands partial unity in terms of relations between the contents of consciousness. For Bayne partial unity occurs if and only if $e_1$ and $e_2$ share an experiential part. Bayne further points out that some kind of 'partial unity' may be found in cases involving unconscious mental states, such as belief state, which are merely dispositional states. However, Bayne maintains that when we consider the possibility of partial unity we must focus on relations

between conscious states. Bayne admits that we cannot call the idea of partial unity as incoherent on the basis of the theory that no consistent assignment of partially unified states to subject of experience is available. For to do so would involve the assumption that simultaneous experiences, belonging to the same subject, must be phenomenally unified – which is the central idea of the unity thesis. The main point is that the unity thesis is not a conceptual truth and this is particularly important for Bayne because he begins his explorations with conceptions of subjects of experience in biological terms. Moreover, he acknowledges that on another view of subjects as 'networks of functionally defined mental states' it is possible for a subject to have experiences that are not phenomenally unified. Thus, simultaneous but disunified experiences can be assigned to such a subject.

He further opine that one important argument for rejecting partial unity is based on the difficulty in projecting oneself into the perspective of a partially unified subject. Thus argument is known as the projectability argument. [25] Bayne presents this argument in the following manners:

> '(1) If partial unity were possible then there would be something distinctive it is like to be a partially unified subject – there would be such a thing as a partially unified phenomenal perspective.
>
> (2) We are unable to project ourselves into a partially unified phenomenal perspective.
>
> (3) If there were such a thing as a partially unified phenomenal perspective then we should be able to project ourselves into it.
>
> (C) Thus, partial unity is impossible.'

He mentions Hurley's view where he maintains that the first premise of the above argument is problematic. She thinks that it is not possible to see the difference between full unity and partial unity in subjective terms. For Hurley the difference between full unity and partial unity concerns the relation between token experiences and the subjective perspective can have access only to the content of experience (phenomenal character). In order to make her point she considers two subjects of experience $S_1$ and $S_2$. $S_1$ is said to have two unified experiences, an experience of red at a definite location in her visual field ($V_1$) and of an experience of hearing a violin ($V_1$). By contrast, $S_2$ has a partially unified consciousness in that she experiences such as an experience of red ($V_1$) and two experiences of hearing a violin ($a_1$ and $a_2$). Both the auditory experiences are unified with her visual experience but they are not unified with each other. This is so because $a_1$ and $a_2$ have exactly the same phenomenal character, they are phenomenal duplicates. This is why there is no subjective contrast between $S_1$ and $S_2$. Hence, there will be nothing like distinction partially unified phenomenal perspective. This is why 'what it is like' tests fail to capture the structure of consciousness. This also shows why projectability cannot succeed.

Bayne contends that Hurley's argument against projectability argument rests on the possibility of phenomenal duplicates. Bayne has already shown that his tripartite conception of experience rejects the possibility of phenomenal duplicates. However, Bayne admits that on other views of consciousness Hurley can make his point. Bayne maintains that those views are 'unattractive' and, thus, the first premise of the projectability argument is secure. The first premise claims that 'there would be such a thing as a distinctive partially unified subjective perspective.'[26]

The second premise of the projectability argument claims that we are unable to project ourselves into a partially unified perspective. Lockwood counters this claim by suggesting that it is not difficult to project oneself into a partially unified perspective by

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imagining each of subjects overlapping experiences ($e_1$ & $e_3$ and $e_2$ & $e_3$) successively. He acknowledges that such successive acts of imagination may not generate that sort of experience of $e_1$ & $e_2$ which would be possible if we could imagine $e_1$ & $e_3$ and $e_2$ & $e_3$ all at once. Yet, he maintains that this will not deter us from projecting ourselves into a partially unified perspective.

Following Nagel, Bayne gives a different reason for admitting the tenability of the second premise. In order to make his point Bayne considers same objections to Lockwood's proposal. He mentions Peacocke's contention that the successive acts of imagination would not capture the phenomenon of imagining the simultaneous experiences of a single subject. Dainton's objection to Lockwood's proposal highlights the fact that in those successive acts of imagination the e3 type of experience in $e_1$ & $e_3$ will not be numerically identical with the $e_3$ type of experience in $e_2$ & $e_3$. Bayne thinks that such objections do not show why one cannot 'stipulate that one is imagining the simultaneous experiences of a single subject'.[27] He considers a notion of 'projective imagination' to show why such a stipulation is not possible. According to Bayne such projection is possible when one imagines something 'from the inside'. Following Nagel he calls the state as 'sympathetic imagination'. By putting oneself, in 'a conscious state resembling the thing', one imagines sympathetically that thing. Thus, 'one can sympathetically imagine only' what it is like to be in a certain type of conscious state. [28] Since sympathetic imagination involves replication of the state being imagined it must possess the same structure as their targets. This distinguishes sympathetic imagination from perceptual and propositional imagination. For this reason, Nagel thinks we cannot sympathetically imagine what it would be like to echolocate – we do not possess the ability to echolocate like bats. Thus, from the successive acts of projection we can at best imagine being a subject will one sort of phenomenal state followed by another. It is not possible to stipulate that one is imagining the simultaneous experiences of a single subject for it does not

extend to sympathetic imagination. On this ground Bayne concludes that the second premise of the projectability argument remains secure.

However, Bayne justifiably claims that the third premise of the argument is not secure. He argues that neither imagenability in general nor sympathetic unimaginability proves impossibility. On the basis of the fact that we are not capable to imagine what it is like to be a bat we cannot conclude that there is nothing it is like to be a bat. The third premise could be defended only if there were grounds to hold that our projective abilities exhaust the space of phenomenal possibilities which is not at all the case. Being unable to project oneself into the perspective of a disunfied subject does not prove that such subjects are impossible. These considerations lead Bayne to maintain that the third premise of the argument is not secure.

In a bid to salvage something from the wreck of the projectibility argument Bayne explains the reason why we think that there are possible phenomenal perspectives which we cannot access imaginatively. One reason for admitting the possibility of such phenomenal perspectives is that we can conceive them. Hence, Bayne thinks that arguments against partial unity must explore, first, whether there might be the possibility of any incoherence in the notion of partial unity. Thus, he constructs a conceivability based argument against partial unity. Bayne distinguishes between strong inconceivability and weak inconceivability after Van Clave (1983). Something is strongly inconceivable for S when S seems to see that it is impossible, whereas something is weakly inconceivable for S if S cannot see that it is possible. Weak inconceivability follows from strong inconceivability but not vice versa. Bayne notes that 'strength' have depends upon the content of the inconceivability intuition. Bayne thinks that partial unity is not strongly inconceivable. For he doubts that first person acquaintance with consciousness manifest any substantive features of consciousness as necessary features. He suspects that first person reflection on consciousness provides grounds

for thinking that certain features of consciousness derives from the contingent aspects of one's own cognitive architecture. However, following Bayne, we can say that it is a prudent position to 'retain partial unity as a potential model of consciousness' though the possibility is surrounded with an air of suspicion.

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