

2014

M.A. / M.Sc.

1st Semester Examination

PAPER—ECO-104

Full Marks : 40

Time : 2 Hours

The figures in the right-hand margin indicate full marks.

Candidates are required to give their answers in their own words as far as practicable.

Illustrate the answers wherever necessary.

Group—A

1. Answer any two questions of the following : 2×2
- (a) Is linear programming technique an improvement over classical technique of optimisation ? Explain very briefly.
 - (b) What is complementary slackness in non-linear programming problem ?
 - (c) What are maximum and minimum value functions ?
 - (d) Define injective and subjective functions.

(Turn Over)

2. Answer any *one* question of the following : 1×6

(a) Illustrate with the help of an example, non-linearity in economics.

(b) Find the solution set of the inequality :

$$\left| \frac{x+3}{2x-6} \right| \leq 1.$$

3. Answer any *one* question of the following : 1×10

(a) For a non-linear programming problem with linear constraints, show that the constraint qualification will invariably be met and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions will always hold at an optimal solution.

(b) Check whether the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are satisfied by the following problem :

$$\text{Minimize } C = (x_1 - 4)^2 + (x_2 - 4)^2$$

$$\text{Subject to } 2x_1 + 3x_2 \geq 6$$

$$- 3x_1 - 2x_2 \geq -12$$

$$\text{and } x_1, x_2 \geq 0.$$

Group—B

4. Answer any *two* questions of the following : 2×2

(a) Define pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for a Normal-form finite game.

(b) What do you mean by extensive-form representation of a game.

- (c) Distinguish between static and dynamic optimisation.
 (d) Write a macroeconomic problem of optimal control.


5. Answer any *one* question of the following : 6×1

- (a) Show, with suitable examples, the limitations of the arguments of backward induction for a reasonable play.
 (b) What are the different types of steady states in systems of two linear differential equations? With a suitable example draw a phase diagram to show the unstable node.

6. Answer any *one* question : 1×10

- (a) Define subgame and SPNE.

Represent the following extensive form game in Normal-form first. Then find out the Nash equilibria of the formal form game. Also find out the SPNE of the game and comment.



- (b) (i) Solve the following problem using optimal control theory :

$$\max \int_0^1 (x - u^2) dt$$

$$\text{s.t. } \dot{x} = u$$

$$x(0) = 10$$

- (ii) Write the necessary conditions for optimisation when there is discounting. How can you solve the following maximisation problem using current valued Hamiltonian :

$$\int_0^T e^{\rho t} [ax - bx^2 - cy^2] dt$$

$$\text{s.t. } \dot{x} = y - dx$$

$$x(0) = x_0.$$
