WITTGENSTEIN'S RESPONSE TO G.E. MOORE BY WAY OF EXPLICATING HINGE CERTAINTIES IN HIS ON CERTAINTY: A RETROSPECTION

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Abstract: Moore attempted to respond to scepticism by directly demonstrating his certain knowledge of the external world on the basis of some propositions which he claimed to know contra the sceptic, e.g. "Here is one hand and here is another", "The earth existed for a long time before my birth". Wittgenstein in *On Certainty* contends that Moore cannot claim to know the things he asserts. Neither these propositions are subject to doubt. Wittgenstein does not question that the objects of Moore's assurances are the most imperturbable of our beliefs; he only questions whether Moore and philosophical tradition are right to call these assurances 'knowledge'. Moore type propositions constitute the framework of discourse within which more particular claims of knowledge and expressions of doubt make sense. These kinds of certainties are like hinges on a door, which must be fixed in order for the door of enquiry, of questions and answers, to function in any significant way. In the course of our daily lives, by observation and instruction, we become aware of these foundations of language game unreflectively and unself-consciously, without any deliberation. This background is deeply ingrained—so deeply as to be inexpugnable. Yet the sceptic wishes to question its existence. But even the linguistic format to which the sceptic must conform so that another can understand his challenge presupposes the existence of that which he wishes to challenge the existence of community and its linguistic practices and the world. The secptic's doubt is thus self-defeating. Moore need not provide his counter-argument against scepticism, since the sceptic's doubt does not make any sense.

Key words: Bounds of sense, certainty, community, doubt, game, grammatical rules, hinge, inherited background, knowledge, saying, scepticism, showing, trust, world picture

I

In the last eighteen months of his life, Ludwig Wittgenstein took a series of notes on matters related to knowledge, doubt, scepticism, and certainty. These notes were later collected and edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright and published under the title Uber Gewissheit which was translated into English by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscomb under the title On Certainty. On Certainty is Wittgenstein's response to scepticism and to G.E.Moore's attempted refutation of it.

II

In his two articles 'A Defence of Common Sense' and 'Proof of an External World' (which were Moore's best ones, according to Wittgenstein), Moore claimed to know a number of propositions for sure that were typically thought to be opened to sceptical doubt . Such propositions are: "Here is one hand and here is another", "The earth existed for a long time before my

birth", "I have never been far from earth's surface", "Some things existing on the earth die, and human beings are among the things that die" etc. Moore attempted to respond to scepticism by directly demonstrating his certain knowledge of the external world on the basis of those propositions which he claimed to know contra the sceptic. His classic example argument runs thus.

Here is one hand and here is another.1.

Therefore (from (1)), two physical objects exist.2.

Therefore (from(2)),an external world exists . 3.

Moore says that he knows P ("I have two hands") and that he has evidential support for his knowledge of P, since he can see that he has two hands and so forth. Moore's claim to know P is pivotal, since once this claim to knowledge is secured, the conclusion of the anti-sceptic follows almost without any difficulty. If one does know that one has two hands (and knows that having two hands entails that there is an external world), then he is granted all the rest - that he must know at least intuitively that there is an external world, or that one is not a handless BIV. The argument rests on closure principle for knowledge: For all agents, Φ, Ψ, if an agent knows a proposition Φ, and knows that Φ entails a second proposition Ψ , then that agent also knows Ψ . [1]

III

In On Certainty, at the very starting point, Wittgenstein claims that Moore's proof is wrong. The propositions which Moore claimed to hold with absolutely certainty is the class of propositions that is the focus of his thought in the text. Examples of Moore-type propositions that Wittgenstein gives are: 'I have two hands'; 'The world is more than five minutes old'; 'My name is Ludwig Wittgenstein'; '12×12=144'. Wittgenstein argues throughout On Certainty that one cannot properly claim to know a Moore-type proposition.

Wittgenstein adheres to the standard view of knowledge as justified true belief, and maintains the view that both the claim to knowledge and the possession of knowledge is conceptually linked to justification:

Whether I know something depends on whether the evidence backs me or contradicts me. [2]

In order for someone to claim to know a proposition, it is essential for him to be able to give 'compelling grounds'[3] in favor of his claim, the sort of grounds that relate to a possibility of demonstrating the truth of which is asserted to be known. Since Moore has excellent epistemological support in favor of the propositions like P due to his being most certain of them, he claims

to know these propositions But, Wittgenstein holds, for any evidence to be adduced as a support in favor of a claim to knowledge, that evidence or reason must be regarded as being more certain than the proposition claimed to be known; otherwise, the evidence or reason would not be able to play this supporting role the claimer's employment of it would represent a kind of senselessness It would be like the pointless activity of adding insubstantial packing to a box which, despite ones utmost effort to fill it up, will be remaining empty.

The problem with a proposition such as P is that in normal circumstances, P is as certain as anything that could be produced as evidence for it [4] So in case of a hinge proposition P, one can never offer grounds that would support his claim to know the proposition because he is claiming to know that which he is most certain of.

In entry 125 of On Certainty, Wittgenstein says:

If a blind man were to ask me "Have you got two hands?" I should not make sure by looking. If I were to have any doubt of it, then I don't know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn't I test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be tested by what?

The import of Wittgenstein's argument is that one cannot respond the doubt of something so certain as one has hands just by trusting the evidence of one's sight. If the former can be doubted in the normal circumstances, so can be the latter. Therefore, Moore's belief in P cannot be claimed to be grounded in the sight of his hands, since it is not possible to think that he is more certain of his sight than he is of the existence of his hands, since it is not possible to think that he is more certain of his sight than he is of the existence of his hand. Since the grounds one can give in favor of one's claim to know propositions like P are no surer than one's assertions, Wittgenstein argues that one cannot properly claim to know Moore-type propositions.

Wittgenstein says that the supporting reason for appropriate claim to know a proposition must be more certain than the proposition itself because knowledge claim is essentially tied to some dialectical purpose of resolving doubts in the mind of the subject who makes that claim. In entry 553 of On Certainty, Wittgenstein says that it is indeed a queer thing if someone, without any special occasion, says, "I know that I am now sitting in a chair"; the statement is 'unjustified and presumptuous'. But the same statement made by the same person is 'perfectly justified and every-day' if it is uttered to meet some need. And the need for such a knowledge claim, for Wittgenstein, is only to meet some contextually relevant challenge being raised regarding what one claims to know. Since claims to knowledge thus play their dialectical function of resolving doubts, the supporting reason must be surer than what is claimed as known. [5] Let us clarify the point by taking

an example If someone throws challenge to my recognition of a bird in my garden as tiya by posing the doubt that the bird could be a mayna, I may respond to him by saying that I know that that is a tiya in a tone of assertion. My assertion flows out from a definite reason From my long experience as an ornithologist, it is known to me that a tiya has distinctive markings which are lacking in mayna, and this markings are clearly observable in the bird standing before me. My claim to knowledge of the bird as tiya can resolve the doubt whether it is a tiya or a mayna only if the supporting reason that the present bird possesses the features of tiya, on the basis of which I make knowledge claim, is more certain than my claim to knowledge.

IV

From the fact that one is not entitled to make knowledge claims regarding propositions like P, it does not follow that one can coherently express doubt about such propositions on the ground that they lack sufficient evidential support. The pattern of argument Wittgenstein follows to meet knowledge claims applies to claims to doubt as well. Claims to doubt need to be supported by specific grounds more certain than the propositions doubted. Otherwise, one would have more reasons to doubt the ground for doubting than the doubt itself. But, as we have seen, nothing is more certain than these propositions. Hence these propositions are exempted from doubt also. The passage from On Certainty (entry 125) quoted before illustrates this point. A blind can doubt rationally whether I have two hands since he can offer relevant grounds in favor of his doubt. But if someone, in a perfectly normal situation and with perfectly normal eyesight asks me whether I have two hands, the doubt which his question expresses is improper since it is groundless. Whatever reason he may offer in support of his doubt, it will never be more certain than I have two hands. Suppose I myself try to formulate a doubt whether I have two hands and motivate that doubt on the ground that I cannot at this moment see my hands. Since it is a fact that I am less certain that my eyesight is functioning correctly than that I have two hands, on the Wittgensteinian picture of the structure of reason, the ground of doubt (I cannot see my hands just now) will become lesser certain than the doubt itself (whether or not I have two hands), and consequently, it will then be more rational for me to doubt the ground of the doubt than the doubt itself. So nothing can motivate a doubt about which one is optimally certain. Therefore, any claim to doubt that which one is most certain of is necessarily groundless and incoherent. Thus, both the Moorean claim to know propositions like P and the sceptic's claim to doubt such propositions find no ground; both are improper.

The traditional attitude, including Moore's, has been that the highest point to be reached

on the epistemic continuum is knowledge, which is at the opposite end of ignorance and expresses the greatest degree of certainty That is why Moore refers to the assurances which he is unable to prove and which appear to him yet as most indubitable of all as 'knowledge'. Wittgenstein does not question that the objects of Moore's assurances are the most imperturbable of our beliefs, he only disagrees with the view that Moore's certainty is of an epistemic nature, he only questions whether Moore and philosophical tradition are right to call this assurance 'knowledge'. Epistemic claims are by nature defeasible and often the product of reasoning And Moore's certainty about having two hands and the existence of external objects is neither grounded, nor defeasible.

According to Wittgenstein, then, our knowing something is not our ultimate way of being sure; it does not constitute our fundamental assurance about our world and ourselves. Underlying knowing is a more fundamental breed, a bedrock, a nonepistemic certainty. The type of certainy that Wittgenstein is after is objective certainty. The certainty is objective as in not based on grounds at all. For once grounds are adduced, we are in the realm of knowledge and justification.

In On Certainty, Wittgenstein is driving a wedge between the concepts of knowledge and certainty. They play different roles in human intercourse. Moore's lacuna lies in the fact that he has conflated these notions. Knowledge is an epistemic concept belonging to the language game. Certainty is non-epistemic and stands in a presuppositional, supportive relationship to the language game. Certainty grounds the language game and is a condition of its possibility. Knowledge is a part of conceptual scheme whose other members include guessing, hypothesizing, thinking, believing, and doubting. They together form a web of intertwined and related notions that play roles in everyday human intercourse and interaction. But certainty does not belong to this system; it stands outside of it. It makes the language game, that is, this set of activities, possible. That the earth exists is certain. We unreflectingly take the earth to be existing and to be of very great antiquity. Such certitude is a presupposition for the study of history. If the earth did not exist, or had just come into existence five minutes ago or even 200 years ago, history as a human activity would be incomprehensible. In that sense, the one is the condition for the other. The study of history takes place within the language game and involves such activities as forming hypotheses, gathering evidences, asserting conclusions, judging, doubting, believing, and knowing. The certitude that the earth is existing and is very old makes posible the game but does not belong to it. Scientist's estimation of the age of the world is possible only if it is assumed as a rule of enquiry, not as an object of enquiry, that 'the world exists and has existed for a long time'. Persons engaging in any historical, anthropological, geological or etymological enquiry presuppose this belief.

Moore-type propositions serve as the framework by which we can speak about the objects of the world. They are the scaffolding of our ordinary discourse. They are the 'substratum of all my enquiry and asserting'[6]. This substratum is a resting place; a place of no questions and no doubts, where our spade is turned, where we rest content Underlying the hurly-burly of our hesitations, investigations and measurements lies the rock bottom of our conviction. As Wittgenstein says in entry 146: "I may indeed calculate the dimension of a bridge, sometimes calculate that here things are more in favour of a bridge than a ferry, etc.etc., - but somewhere I must begin with an assumption or a decision". Wittgenstein uses two metaphors. These kinds of propositions are like the beds and banks of a river, down which the stream of ordinary discourse flows freely.[7] Varying the metaphor, these kinds of certainties are like hinges on a door, which must be fixed in order for the door of enquiry, of questions and answers, to function in any significant way.[8] In this sense the beliefs which scepticism attempts to challenge are not open to negotiation, which disposes of scepticism.

As we have discussed just now, in the Wittgensteinian model, a hinge proposition is indubitable because there is no rational support for the doubt All our thinking and acting in the world are hinged on a framework of basic certainties that are not grounded on reason. The peculiarities of hinge claims are that they are both groundless and immune to doubt. Wittgenstein himself admits that it is difficult to realize the groundlessness of our believing.[9] Wittgenstein does not believe that there could be an epistemic evaluation of all our beliefs as a whole. Any epistemic evaluation must turn on hinges which play the role of being exempt from needing epistemic support. It is not an option for us to question them:

As the term "hinge" itself indicates, our commitment to hinge propositions is essential to any epistemic evaluation—this commitment is the hinge on which any epistemic evaluation must turn.[10]

It is not an arbitrary choice that one believes hinge propositions. It belongs to the very nature of our scientific investigation that certain things are in deed exempt from epistemic evaluation. Our being objectively certain about some things is not a way of thought, not an intellectual stratagem; it is a way of life. Wittgenstein says: "My life consists in my being content to accept many things." [11] If we begin to doubt even those about which we are absolutely certain, our whole belief system will be plunged into chaos. We will not be certain of any facts then, and consequently will call into question the very meaning of words we use. Accordingly, we will loose our ability to understand the doubt itself. Absence of doubt belongs to the essence of the language- game:

If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty. [12]

A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt [13]

In giving his proof, Moore is assuming that he is meeting a cognitively significant objection raised by the sceptic, namely, that it is a possibility that no physical objects, including the sun, earth, moon, and so on, exist. But with respect to earth's existence, Wittgenstein says, we have reached the bedrock. There is no possible way in which one can be mistaken about the existence of earth. We cannot be mistaken about what stands fast for all of us; even the dream hypothesis cannot call that into question. If a mistake about the earth's existence is not possible, the sceptic supposition that we could discover we were mistaken about its existence is not a sensible conjecture; it is conceptually vacuous. But, if the conjecture of the sceptic is vacuous, Moore's attempt to prove that there is an external world is also misguided.

√

Wittgenstein refers to objective certainty as a sureness, a trust. This sureness is not prefaced by a precursory thought or hesitation. It is not a justified or pondered assurance. It is not the kind of assurance we come to from reasoning, observation or research. Hinge certainty is 'something animal'[14]. It is a nonraciocinated and unconscious trust that we share with neonates and animals. It is animal not in the sense of being brute impression, but in being unreflective. That physical objects exist needs no more justification than does the squirrel's instinctive gathering of nuts for the winter. This certainty is akin to instinctive or automatic behaviour, to a direct taking hold or thought-less grasp. This trust is not experienced as a trust, but rather shows itself in the absence of mistrust, in our directly 'taking hold' of something without any doubts, as when in ordinary circumstance we take hold of a towel without any preliminary hesitation and making sure that 'the towel is there'.

This unconscious trust shows itself in all our ordinary gestures and activities. When I rush for College in the morning, glancing repeatedly at my wrist-watch, enter into the college building, take the register and head for the scheduled class, my activities of these kinds, and also some accompanying questions like 'Is the writst-watch running in time?', 'Will the bus reach the College gate at the right moment?', etc. are poised on nonconscious and inarticulate certainties like ' A wrist-watch indicates time', 'We have conventions about being on time', 'The College building will not vanish suddenly nor the attendance register evaporate when I take hold of it', and so on. They require no cognitive attention, but constitute the eneffable background of thought. They manifest themselves as a flawless way of acting, as an expert and unhasitating grasp. If I say to the shoe-keeper outside a temple while giving him back the token against which he kept my

shoes. 'This is a token', he would get astonished at my unwarranted utterance What he requires is not the information that the object I am handing over to him is a token, but the number of the token which would help him to find out my shoes My handing over the token to the shoe-keeper, his looking at the number and searching out my shoes—this entire game revolves upon the hinge that 'this is a token' which goes without saying Our shared certainty that 'this is a token' can only show itself in our normal transaction with the token, i.e., in what we say about and do with the token in our normal life; it cannot qua certainty be meaningfully said. To say a hinge within the language-game intrudes the game, produces a hiatus in the game. As Wittgenstein says in entry 353:

If a forester goes into a wood with his men and says "This tree has got to be cut down, and this one and this one"? what if he then observes "I know that that's a tree"?

It is queer on the part of the forester to make this observation. His men would assume that he is insane. Articulating primitive certainties in the stream of language game is useless; rather than displaying certainty, it arrests the game.

VI

The concept of certainty that Wittgenstein is after in On Certainty is not only a nonepistemic concept. It is also nonpropositional. Wittgenstein throughout his works maintains that to be a proposition is to be bipolar, that is, to be susceptible of truth and falsity. A proposition must be capable of being true and of being false ? both possibilities must lie within the game. It means that a proposition is whatever can be denied. Since Moore-type propositions are not susceptible to doubt, and as such cannot turn out to be false, they are not propositions at all. Basic certainties lack the features of being true or false, known or not known, justified or unjustified etc that are the defining features of propositions. Basic certainties form a world-picture or weltbild which is 'the inherited background against which I distinguish between truth and false'[15]. This world-picture functions as a mythology that provides the structure within which the true false game is played. Basic certainties are, therefore, proposition-like, but not really propositions at all. Wittgestein thought of these as "grammatical rules", "logical insights", and uses the term " hinge " to indicate their peculiar status.

To say that something is unsayable or ineffable is not to say that it cannot be formulated. A hinge can be explicitly formulated only in a heuristic situation, as a grammatical rule. Hinges are grammatical rules ? stipulations or conditions that must be unquestionably accepted if one is to play the language game. The expression " Red is a color" is the expression of a rule. Since as an expression of a rule there is no proposition that negates it, it is not a proposition. Grammatical rules

are proposals to use linguistic terms in specific ways. Sentences making a reference to physical objects are pieces of instruction about the use of the word "physical object" Wittgenstein says in entry 36 of On Certainty .

"A is a physical object" is a piece of instruction which we give only to someone who doesn't understand either what "A" means, or what " physical object" means

Such grammatical rules are not about matters of fact or about the world. They help to define a practice: the sentence 'an external world exists' is simply a formulation of a rule that we implicitly learn and must adopt in order for us to take part in the language game of talking about physical objects. So Moore type propositions are expressions of grammatical rules.We can formulate grammatical rules in order to transmit them to a child or a foreign speaker for linguistic instruction, the kind of thing a parent does when, in order to teach his child, he says, 'This is a hand'; or as a philosopher, we put these animal certainties into words for philosophical analysis and conceptual investigation, the kind of thing that Moore and Wittgenstein were engaged into. But we cannot say them, that is, articulate them in a language-game as if they were informative or descriptive propositions. So the sentence 'There are physical objects' can be pronounced, although to pronounce or voice something is not always to say anything. Any word or cancatenation of words can be spoken, but only meaningful words or cancatenation of words can be said.

For a word or a string of words to be meaningful, it must have a use within a language game, a function or a point in the language game in which it is pronounced; it cannot be idle. Wittgestein remarks:

...the words 'I am here' have a meaning only in certain contexts, and not when I say them to someone who is sitting in fr nt of me and sees me clearly...[16]

If I say ' I am here' in an unmotivated or undetermined way, out of the blue, or 'out of all context'[17] to someone who is standing next to me and can see me clearly, the sentence has no use or does no work. It does not carry any sense and says nothing. Only what has sense is (technically) sayable. Wittgenstein's point is that what has use has sense and what has sense is sayable.What can be said are string of words that are not idle and do some work in a language-game, have a use or point there, whether that work be descriptive or expressive. What, on the other hand, does no work within a language-game does not bear saying. So although grammatical rules do some work, it is not work within the game, but work supporitve of the game. Grammatcal rules cannot be said in the language-game, for they support the language-game. They are its ladder or scaffolding. Grammatical rule like 'Red is darker than pink' makes sense posible, and as such, supports the

language game I am engaged in while asking a shopkeeper to bring a red coloured shirt, and he brings me one which I then purchase from him. In this entire game played with red colour, it is presupposed that both of us are aware of what red colour means. So if I say to the shopkeeper in the middle of the game "This is red colour darker than pink" by pointing out the shirt he brings, the shopkeeper for a moment will get perturbed, and the game played smoothly so far will get obstructed. Within the game the saying of the rule is not making any sense. Therefore, grammatical rules cannot be said. Sayability and having a use or sense are internally linked. Sentences like 'Here is a hand' bear saying in rare cases, where they function as empirical propositions and not as hinges. Suppose an earthquake has taken place, and a large number of animals and persons are lying trapped underneath the rabbles. While removing the rabbles, the rescuers suddenly see something exposed, although it could not be identified. As the digging process goes on and more of the object is uncovered, suddenly one of the rescuers, on the basis of his correct identification, shouts out 'Here is a hand'. In the circumstance described, the sentence is an informative description, does some work, makes sense, and bears saying. However, in Moore's circumstances, the sentence 'Here is a hand' was idle and doing no work. It did not describe anything that required description, did not persuade anyone of anything they were not previously certain of, did not prove anything that was previously unproved and required a proof. All that Moore's holding up his hand and saying 'Here is a hand' showed was something that was never hidden. It conveyed no certainty that was not already visible in his speaking about his hand, in his unselfconsciously using it. The sentence in Moorean scenario was useless and therefore senseless. Accordingly, it didn't bear any saying.

Our hinge certainties are, therefore, ineffable. Primitive certainty is a silent trust. This certainty is in the showing, not in the saying. Grammatical rules can only be said outside a language-game; within a language game, they can only show themselves. The only mode of the occurrence of objective certainty is, therefore, that of showing. It shows itself in the decisions and actions of human behaviour, in the 'give-and-take of human existence'[18]. Our hinge certainty that 'There are physical objects' shows itself in our reaching out to pick a flower. We show our certainty about 'This is a hand' in the way we act with and speak about this hand, for example, in our drawing a land-scape, or in our saying: ' I have cut my hand '. But Moore does not show his certainty about 'This is a hand' when he pronounces these words; his articulation of the sentence as a certainty is not an occurrence of certainty, but only a formulation of it. Moore's saying "I know that "here is a hand" conveyed no certainty that was not already visible in his speaking about his hand, in his ostensibly showing it to his audience.

Human beings do not normally think or act in the certainty that they might be dead or someone who died is now living. 'I am alive' is a bound of sense, that ineffably underpins our thinking and acting in the world. A transgression of such bounds of sense is a manifestation of madness. Our life, our deeds, show that we do not, cannot doubt some things if we are to make sense. Rejection of these bounds of sense is logically impossible, since without them we, human beings, drift into nonsense. Grammatical rules are rules for the use of words, in particular those rules that determine sense, which are settled antecedently to questions of truth and falsehood. All hinges functioning as grammatical rules condition our making sense. Grammar is not always verbalized or explicitly taught, it is often grasped unawares, and its rules often do not look like rules. The sentence "There exist people other than myself", though it may not look like a gram- matical rule, is one : it is the expression of one of the grammatical conditions necessary for the use and understanding of the sense of such descriptive or informative statements as : ' The world's population doubled between 1950 and 1990'. In the same way our speaking about a rod (e.g. 'Cut this rod in half!') is conditioned by the grammatical rule : 'A rod has length'.[19] There is no making sense in our world, no consonance with our fellow humans, without being poised on the same logical bedrock. To formulate grammatical rules within the language game - that is, in the flow of ordinary discourse - is to formulate bounds of sense as if they were descriptions or informative statements. This constitutes an intrusion in the game. When Moore attempted to say what can only be shown - for example, 'Here is a hand', he was articulating a bound of sense as if it it were an object of sense, as if it were a piece of information suceptible of being true or false. He was really articulating nonsense.

VII

In the course of our daily lives, by observation and instruction, we absorb such matters as the living and dying of human beings upon the earth, the spending of lives by most of us at or near the surface of the earth, the existence of objects in our environment, and so on. These do not need confirmation or checking. They are not the products of intellection, reflection, experimenta- tion. We do not learn them in some explicit manner. We become aware of them unreflectively and unself-consciously. As Rush Rhees writes "We are not simply taught 'how it works'; we are not simply taught grammar: we come to have certain convictions or beliefs."[20] One has not run an experiment to discover that the earth exists or that there are other people around or that one is male. We acquire communal practices, such as being a native speaker, by absorption rather than by explicit learning through trial and error. We absorb the foundations that make the language

game possible. Wittgenstein describes these foundations in various ways as " my picture of the world " or " the inherited backround" We inherit our picture of the world. Wittgenstein says, "But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness, nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false "[21] We have not sketched out our world picture consciously. Rather, our world picture we have implicitly assimilated, taken on as our own, "inherited as members of the human community from our parents and environment; from generations of human life."[22] Not like a science, but like a mythology, we have assimilated our world picture instinctively without reasoning.

As we have noted earlier, Wittgenstein calls our world picture " the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting". What embeds such activities as inquiring and asserting engaged in from infancy is the human community Certainty stems from one's immersion in a human community in which rote training and the inculcation of habits create the substratum upon which the language game rests. It is thus the community that stands fast for us. All of us are reared in a community. In this ambience we learn to recognize certain persons, our parents and others, learn to speak language, and eventually come to participate unself-consciously in a wide range of human interactions, practices, and institutions. Wittgenstein says that such an immersion in the community constitutes our inherited background. For Avrum Stroll, there are two different components to our inherited background [23]. There is the community, which includes both the organic and inorganic components. The other component is the world. Wittgenstein wishes to emphasize that the existence of the world is the starting point of belief for every human being. These two features taken together is what has been called by philosophers the external world. These two features stand fast - their intruding presence impinge upon human beings to which they must conform in diverse ways. This background is deeply ingrained - So deeply as to be inexpugnable.There is no possible way that one can reject or revise it. No sensible question can be raised with respect to these two aspects of inherited background. Yet the sceptic wishes to question its existence. But even the linguistic format to which the sceptic must conform so that another can understand his challenge presupposes the existence of that which he wishes to challenge- the existence of community and its linguistic practices and the world. The secptic's doubt is thus self-defeating. Moore presupposes that the sceptic's doubt makes sense and can be answered by asserting that he knows this or P with certainty. But Moore need not provide such counter-argument, since scepticism is not a possible position.

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