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
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THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE AND THE LOGIC OF TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS

D.N. TIWARI

The discussion here in the present paper is presented in two parts-part first comprises of the issues pertaining to the nature of language and the logic of translation and the last part is an argument on the possibility of analysis.

<center>I</center>

The language is aproached chiefly in three ways; firstly, it is defined as referring or designating tools, that is, verbal or written marks that stand by proxy for the things and thoughts. Secondly, it is taken as the representing tool of the objects that is representation that represents the represented (objects). In precise, the Essentialists of the West and the Indian Schools of Jainism. Sāmkhya - Yoga , Nyāya - Vais'e s ika , Mimānsā and Advaita Vedānta endorse the first and the representationists of the West and Indian Schools of the Cārvāka and the Buddhists supports to the second. Both of the theories believe that language and thought are different to each other and the language we learnt from the community for communication is secondary : it is employed only when we have to communicate the thought which is known by the contact of objects in the mind first. I, therefore, put the two together for the deliberation on the present topic. Thirdly, language is approached as the expresser that expresses the expressed non-differently. The theory takes language and thought as non-different. Pā n inian School of language and Grammar specifically, Bhart r hari and the cognitive holistic philosophy of language of the author of the present discussion occupy with the expressive nature of language. For the former theorists the language is material while it for the latter is a unit of awareness in nature.

Based on different theories on nature of language, the theorists approach the logical possibility of translation differently and sometimes they find impossibility of translation in the theory of the others . The controversy over the issue of translation attracted the philosophers after the hermeneutic philosophers of the West and refutation of their theory on translation by J.Derrida. This controversy forms the basis of the discussion in the present paper.

While working on the problem of translation I thought of following three models through which the problem under discussion can be approached.

i.   The model of Advaita Vedānta of *S'ankara* for which the Brahman, the Reality, is indeterminate (*nirgu$\underset{.}{n}$a*). The indeterminate can be grasped by mind only as determinate. The mind cannot grasp the indeterminate and what it grasps is only determinate. It is what the J. Derrida calls the absent or transcendental signified.

ii.   The model of value of currency. A hundred rupees note can be exchanged for hundred coins, fifty, twenty, ten, five and two each of a note of rupees one, two, five, ten, twenty and fifty respectively. Despite the variation of exchanging notes, the value is constant in each exchange. One may prefer the theory because the content of the text and that of the translations are the same. However it overlooks the fact that translation is not only computational equality but a cognitive activity. I have not pushed the model too far because translation for me is a cognitive problem to be approached as it is expressed by language in the mind.

iii.   Cognitive holistic model. This model accepts the autonomy of the language or text. According to it there is difference between the language- token or garb and the language. Language for it is unit of awareness that is inner and ubiquitously given unit that reveals its nature itself when manifested by the garbs and its meaning is expressed non-differently by it. The term 'garb' stands for the tools like verbal articulations, written marks, signs, symbols and gestures which may differ from community to community or even person to person in the same community. Sensual perception, perceptual data etc., are also instrumental in the manifestation of the language, the flash of awareness which flashes forth in the mind when manifested by garbs but is not exhausted by or in any flashing. For this theory, translation is a cognitive activity; it accepts that the content of the text is expressed in different garb. However, the knowledge in translating the text in different garbs is a new knowledge in all its occurrences. It is only the content of knowledge that remains constantly the same. The language reveals its own nature and its meaning non-differently and independently of physiological, psychological entities and our allegiance to them. Not only that but it requires garbs even for its manifestation only in cases one is habitual of accruing communica-

tion through the garbs used by the language community. In cases of yogins and persons gifted by wisdom garbs are not required and the language is revealed in their mind directly by which they know the meaning expressed non-differently by the language. However keeping the accomplishment of communication in consideration, I want to make it clear that my use of language comprises of the language and the garb as well by which the former is manifested because of the logic that without being manifested the language in our case will not be revealed and without garbs the language will not be manifested to those habitual of knowing and communicating through them. Language, if defined as references or as marks/designations (written or verbal) that stand by proxy for the things, is not self-operative and it requires a cognitive base for its own acceptance and for cognitive-operation made through them. It is transient material entity and varies from community to community, even, and from person to person in the same language community. It is a trivial way of taking language as confined to speaking and hearing or to writing tokens and reading them only and think-ing signified as that which is referred to or is represented by the tokens/ marks because it is a unit awareness by nature and communication is ac-complished by language independently without any commitment to physi-ological, psychological and metaphysical entities and our allegiances to them. I do not talk about the ontological commitment of language but prefer to talk about the ontology of language. Ontological commitment theory is an out-come of our infatuation with two misguiding ideas that are i. that thought is separate and independent from language and that ii. Language is confined to be a tool for representing or referring things that is thing-in itself. Con-trary to it, the cognitive holistic philosophy with which I occupy considers that the language infuses knowledge and that our knowledge is not only expressed but is confined to the intelligible beings expressed in the mind by language.

Language, if defined as that which is the expresser and the expressed or illuminator and the illuminated, that is, which reveals itself first and then its signified revealed non-differently then tokens, as defined in the former view, stand instru-mental only in revealing the language as defined in the latter view. In this view language is a revealing/expressing unit. It is a unit of awareness in nature which is

non-different from the language itself. In this latter sense it, as Bhartrhari says, is sphoṭa or *madhyamā - s'abda* which is not a representative of signified but a cognitive unity, a unit expressive of itself and of it's signified. Meaning in this view is the idea or thought-object which figures non-differently by language in the mind. For the purpose of this paper, I have used the terms signifier and language and the signified and meaning in the same sense. With this brief note on language and meaning let us come to the discussion on possibility of translation.

There are two different logics[1] on the basis of which the problem of translation is interpreted.(i) The logic of difference of content (of the text and of translations) and of their garbs[2]; and (ii) the logic of non-difference of content (of the text and of translations) and difference of their garbs. The first is a logic acceptable to realists according to which any kind of translation implies a transcendental signified as its substratum. It is pure signified as it is independent of language, the signifier, and the signified of translated expressions. B.K. Matilal writes, 'Language is often uncritically thought to be a vehicle of thought or meaning. And from this flows the pervasive idea that in a multilingual world, the same thought is or can be conceived by different expressions which are distinguishable parts of different languages. It is probably what a modern philosopher, Jacques Derrida, would call the metaphysician's old-age desire to search for a 'transcendental signified', that is, a concept independent of language, that forces upon us the duality and opposition of the signifier and the signified.[3] 'Transcendental signified remains constant, i.e., a content constant in its different translations.[4] This theory maintains a difference between the signified of the text or the transcendental signified and the signified of the translations. The transcendental signified is the constant content of the translations but the signified of the translations are not transcendental signified itself but it as conceived by the minds of the translators. The same logic is applied by idealists who accept that the goodness or badness of a translation depends on the level and capacity of ones mind in approaching the transcendental signified. This view if pushed too far ceases to be philosophical and leads to meditation and hence religion.

B.K. Matilal, applying the logic of difference of content/signified and of garb on Bhartr hari's philosophy of non-difference of the signifier and the signified observes, 'Since linguistic expressions are not regarded in this theory as conveyorbelts for thoughts, there cannot be any absolute transposition of virgin thoughts from one language to another. Each thought is already a part and parcel of its so-called

'verbal' cloak. They are not separable.'⁵ The very idea that meaning, thought or 'what is said', is isolatable from the speech or the text seems repugnant to Bhart r hari's holistic conception of language. Hence, the so-called translation in the sense of transfer of thought from one garb to another seems impossible in this theory.'⁶ In one line there is no possibility of translation if we view Bhart r hari from this logic because he, contrary to it, accepts the non-difference of the signifier and the signified of the text and that of those translated in garbs of different communities.

According to the second, namely the logic of non-difference of content (of the text and of translations) and different of their garbs, the content is indivisible object of cognition figured in the mind by language. As both the language, the signifier and its meaning, the signified revealed non-differently by the former are non-different content or object of cognition which is revealed in all occurrences in different garbs, it is original in all occurrences, and hence, as Matilal concludes there is no possibility of translation. All cognition in this theory is a new cognition and, thus, the concept of translation has no room in this theory. This argument supports the conclusion derived by Matilal. But if we view the problem of translation and the originality of content translated on the basis of the second logic, with which I am concerned here in this paper, we come to a totally different conclusion different from Matilal's.

Now on the content of knowledge, whether it is language-token, i.e., verbal noises/written language-tokens, transcendental signified or real language given ubiquitously in the mind as a flash of awareness in character and the signified revealed non-differently by it? There is no question of translation of fleeting material marks which are so different in nature that they vary in tone, shape in writing, inscription, diction, etc.; in each of its occurrences by the same person and even in the same language that there is no possibility of them being translated and the entities, being uniquely real individuals to which it refers, cannot be translated.

For me, translation is deeply a cognitive problem. All cognition is revealed and infused by language which is ubiquitously given and is the indivisible unit of awareness in nature. As translation requires a cognitive content and things are not only non-cognitive but are individuals or uniquely reals separate from, rather beyond, language, their translatability is unthinkable. It is accepted even by realists that what is revealed by the text in the mind, though it is independent from the language, is the content of translation. According to the theory discussed here in,

isolated from language nothing, no being can be revealed and known. As per this statement, the transcendental signified cannot be revealed without the language which is the only revealers. Language-token is instrumental only in manifestation of the language which reveals itself when manifested by them. The language revealed thus reveals it's signified non-differently and that is the constant content expressed through different kinds of language-tokens conventionally fixed in different language communities.

Transcendental signified, isolated from language-token or if it is not revealed by the language, is unthinkable as what is thought is revealed and infused by language.[8] If it is revealed, its cognitive character cannot be denied. A transcendental signified isolated from language is a metaphysical entity and cannot be the object of translation which is a cognitive being. In such a situation the question arises as to what is the cause of expectancy for translation. There is no cognitive possibility of translation and transformation of a transcendental signified isolated from the beings figured/revealed by language in the mind and, thus, the logic of transcendental signified goes against even the realist's view of translation.

Matilal is right in taking reading of a text as translational activity and the translation as a cognitive activity. He writes 'each "reading" is a creative formulation, and hence a translation based upon such a reading is a creative transformation. If we accept the logic of identity of content (of the text and of the translations) and difference of their garbs only then translational activity will be a philosophical activity and the reading of the writings of other philosophers, ancient or modern, will be a kind of translation as a cognitive activity. Reading and reading without being aware of the content is a trivial and purposeless activity having no cognitive sense, and hence, it will not be a creative transformation.[10] Reading as a cognitive activity may vary in content from reader to reader or for the same reader in different readings but the cause of such differences is not that the content is independent of the garb in which it is presented. The cause of such a difference is the difference of intention, physiological, psychological, metaphysical and cultural allegiances and the level of consciousness in reading and the competence in the observation of the garbs used in different communities. Accuracy and exactness of translation can well be observed if the translated content is identical to the original content figured by the text. The realist cannot deny to accept the difference of the English word 'dog' from ' gau ḥ ' in Sanskrit and its non-difference from its translated Sanskrit word

' śvāna ḥ 'on the basis of which identical cognition of the content (dog) expressed in a different garb of Sanskrit is known. Though the knowledge revealed by the original and that by the translating statements are different, identical cognition of the content by them is revealed in the mind. It is the identical cognition of the content in its several occurrences that on the basis of which not only translation is made possible but which serves as the criterion of goodness and badness of translations in different garbs also.

Now on the problem of good and bad translation. Tolerability and intolerability as Matilal observes are the criteria accepted by realists for deciding the goodness or badness of a translation. He writes, 'the goodness or badness of a translation, the distortion, falsity or correctness of it, would not be determined simply by the inter-linguistic or intra-linguistic semantic rules, but by the entire situation of each translation with all its uniqueness, that is, by the kind of total reactions, effects, motivations and preferences it generates on that occasion. We can decide that the translation is bad or distorted to the extent it becomes intolerable."[11] The question of deciding good or bad translation on the basis of logic of identity of content and difference of garbs is a cognitive problem and is different from realist's logic of intolerability and intolerability which are moreover subjective elements that need to be decided beforehand. The criterion of good translation, as per the second logic, is the identical cognition of the content revealed by the text and that by its occurrences in the same or in different garbs.

Indian Grammarians specifically, Bhart r hari [12] makes a difference between the knowledge and the object of knowledge. The knowledge of the original and that of the translated are different as it is new and fresh in each occurrence and instance but the figuring of object i.e. universal or individual, as the constant content is required to be the same for a good translation. It is to be kept in mind here that he accepts universal as the import of language.[13] Identical-cognition of the original / text and the translated is possible because of the universal revealed by the text and that by the expression of the translation as well. In other words, the constant-content is not the transcendental-signified but the cognitive signifier *(vācaka)* revealed in its several occurrences in different garbs and in the garb of the text as well. Revelation of the same content of the text in different translating garbs is the cognitive ground for a good translation and if the cognition is otherwise or deviated from that content it is a bad translation. Translating or rendering implies a constant con-

tent, universal in nature, which according to Bhart r hari , is *spho t a* i.e. the signifier
which reveals it's signified *(vācya)* non-differently.[14]The relation between the two
is eternal / natural-fitness of the signifier. Such a relation[15] between a $vācaka$ and
a *vācya* is not possible in case of transcendental signified and, hence, it may be the
signifier neither of the text, as it is accepted by realists as independently of lan-
guage, nor of the signifiers in translating garbs, as their difference is accepted by the
theorists. *The signifier, in cognitive holistic philosophy of language, is isolated
from our allegiances but not from the language as it is itself the language
having its own culture which expresses the signified non-differently.* Language-
tokens used in different communities are its garbs through which it is articulated. As
it is awareness in nature it can be expressed through different garbs of different
language communities. Tokens like *śvāna h* in Sanskrit, *kuttā* in Hindi, dog in Eng-
lish and in Dutch, doggie in German and so on in different regional and national,
natural and non-natural languages manifest the same signifier (*spho t a*) and the
identical cognition by the signifier is revealed in all instances. In this theory transla-
tion does not mean duplication of the original but revelation of cognition of non-
difference of signifier and the signified articulated through different garbs of the
observation of their uses familiar in different language communities. However, no
translatability of a transcendental-signified is possible as it ceases to be so isolated
from language, the signifer. As each garb is a fleeting unique particular, there is no
possibility of translating them and if some constant content of them is accepted for
making the possibility of translating them then that content will be the same in both
of the moments of object of translation and the translating object as well.

Concluding the discussion on the logic of translation, it can be said that Matilal,
in his paper, has primarily taken notice of the Realist's logic of translation on the
basis of transcendental signified as the constant content of translations which, in my
observation, is not only improper even for a consistent interpretation of realist's own
theory of translation but insufficient for a proper evaluation of Bhart r hari theory
also. A transcendental signified, isolated from language, can be the object neither of
the original nor of the translation. The idea of being as transcendental-signified of all
signifiers or any such idea of a transcendency of discourse, is a mirage, for the very
idea of signified is thinkable in terms of language. Even Jacques Derrida and his
interpreter, Paul Ricoeur, reject such concepts as that of transcendental-signified by
countering them as deferred and absent.[16] According to me, it is not a transcenden-

tal signified but the signifier that is not different from the signified it expresses non-differently, which is inner, indivisible and ubiquitously given unit that serves as the constant content of translations.[17] This content is non-different from the signified. It is *the non-difference of the signifier and the signified that serves as the basis of the logic of identity of content amidst difference of garbs.* As it is of awareness in nature which when manifested by language-token of ones observation., reveals itself and its signified non-differently, the manifestation of this content, constant in several occurrences and instances, from one garb to others, is what we call translation of the former in another garb. The knowledge of the text and that of its translations are different from one another. They vary in garbs also but the content/object does not change with their changes. Being awareness in nature it is expressed and, hence, original in each time and can be presented / translated in different garbs belonging to different language communities. Goodness or badness of a translation is known not by inference but on the basis of cognition of the translated content identical to or different from the cognition of the content of the text or original respectively. *This theory is justified if translation is taken as a cognitive activity in which translation is the expression of the content, cognized in the garb of the text and, in different garbs and if in each case the content, non-different from the former, is cognized the translation is good; if otherwise or deviated , it is bad up to the extent of intolerability.*

II

Based on the different nature of language as reference / representation and expression, I here in discuss two methods of analysis namely proxy analysis[18] and expression analysis[19]. The language, if defined as references representing things and thoughts or as marks / designations (written or verbal) standing by proxy for the things and, which for Bhartr̥ hari (a *sphoṭavādin*), is $Vaikhari$ - $s'abda$ that is not self-operative. It requires a cognitive base for its own acceptance and operation.

The theory that the language is representation of the meaning assumes that the analysis of language is, by proxy, an analysis of meaning but as the meaning, for them, is transcendental to language, how can they claim it to be the analysis of that which is independent and isolated from the language? The transcendental-signified will remain transcendental not only to the language but to the signified obtained by proxy-analysis also and, thus, analysis of the transcendental-signified is impossibility. Meaning, in this theory, is a transcendental unit and is not given for analysis and

to consider analysis of a transcendental signified through that which is analyzed (signifier) is not a sound assumption.

Cognitive holism that takes language as expression works out the idea of expression analysis. Isolated from the language, no meaning is possible and nothing can be revealed if the language is not revealed first and the meaning afterwards non-differently. That which are expressed by language are only intelligible and, hence, philosophic beings. Thus, the meaning is not a being ontic in nature but a cognitive being, a being revealed non-differently by the signifier in the mind. It is on the basis of non-difference of the signifier and it's signified that the analysis of the I signifier is the analysis of the meaning also.

As Analysis of language is made by language, the questions arise: Is language a transcendental-signifier? Is it different from the transcendental-signified or is it a transcendental -signified? Are the two non-different? If the two are independent, how can the analysis of the former be the analysis of the latter? What will, then, be the object and purpose of analysis? Can it be a philosophical activity if it is confined to the analysis of lanauge-taken? In the former case, the language is not transcendental meaning because the language, according to it, can never be the meaning. The theorists do not accept the concept of a transcendental-signifier. The transcendental signified, if any, is different, rather, independent from the signifer. The analysis of a signifier (if it is language -token or confined to garbs) void of the nature of a transcendental-signifier as its constant content, is not acceptable as per the logic of analysis they adopt. If the transcendental-signifier, for a moment, is accepted as the object of analysis, language can not be its object but it is a fact that, in an analysis, we analyze a language by taking it as the object. How can a transcendental-signified which is not assigned for analysis be the object of analysis of the language by the language? It is a philosophical to put a set of tokens in a set of different tokens and then to study them through their different components with which linguists occupy themselves.

The purpose of clarification of the meaning by the analysis of the language will be defeated if the meaning is taken independently from and transcendental to the language. Not only that, but both of the analysis of language by the language and that of the analysis of the meaning by the language will not be possible if the language is taken as fleeting material tokens and the meaning as independently from the former. No incentive of analysis is possible in the absence of the being figured in

the mind by the language and no being for analysis is possible in isolation from language because analysis is a reflective activity for which language infuses cognition. The objects of cognition are the being revealed non-differently by the language and those revealed by language in the mind serve as incentive for expressions : they are only objects of analysis.

In view of the second definition of the language, analysis of language by the language is possible only because of it as an idea or thought-object that is intelligible being and it as language -token is taken into consideration. In that case, the language as idea is analyzed through language-tokens. Not only that but as language, in a cognition by the language, reveals itself first, it stands as the expresser *(vācaka)* of the language expressed *(vācya)* non-differently by it. The expressed, the expresser reveals non-differently, stands as the object of the analysis and in cases of analysis of language, the signifier stands as the object (signified non-different from the former) of the analysis. As the two are non-different, we, as per expectancy, analyze the signified through its signifier and then the signified is revealed non-differently by the language through which we analyze it. This theory has a textual ground in kārikā 44 of the first part and in *kārikā* 6 of the *Jāti - samuddes'ah* of *Vākyapadīya* . According to the former, an expression comprises of the following two :

1. Tokens/garbs that are the cause of manifestation of the language as idea. They are tools helping expression and

2. The language which when manifested through garbs expresses itself and its meaning as well. The language and the meaning are only beings expressed in the mind that is intelligible beings.

According to the latter, the signifier's own nature *(svā - jāti)* that is universal because of being manifested by the garbs is known first and, then, it's signified (universal by nature) is expressed non-differently by it. This signified, in case of study and analysis of language by language, is not different from the signifier itself as it serves as the object of analysis. As these are beings cognitive in nature, the former, with the expectancyof analysis of the latter, stands as means and the latter as the object of analysis and the vice versa. This explanation does not provide only a logic for accepting the analysis of signifier by signifier but explains properly the analysis of the signified by language as well.

If language is confined to tokens (written or verbal) and if meaning is a transcendental- signified, a meaning independently of the language out of which none is in the capacity of figuring as both the language and the meaning, there is no possibility of change of their status and, thus, of analysis of any. Out of them, the former could not because it is only a tool and the latter would not because it is pure meaning, which can never change that status. The term 'pure-meaning' is used by Derrida for a transcendental signified.

Now coming to an examination of the latter view, a most critical and serious question can be labeled against the holistic theory that assumes indivisibility of the language and the meaning. If these beings are indivisible, how can they be analyzed? Even if it is accepted that they, as such, cannot be analyzed and due to the artificial device of analysis we are helped in understanding it through piecemeal scheme, the question that arises significantly in respect of the language and meaning acquired through analysis is that if the language is indivisible then the meaning acquired by analysis is also indivisible and, thus, they also require to be analyzed further for understanding in piecemeal scheme. Analysis will be a fruitless process and a pur- poseless process can achieve nothing. In reply to this question, it can be said that there is no doubt that not only the meaning but also the language (words, suffixes) acquired by analysis is also indivisible unit, for they are also units of awareness in character. They are not divided actually by analysis[21]. Analysis, for this view, is made through the divisions of tokens and is an artificial remedy for understanding the indivisible units through parts. Though the indivisible, as such, is not divided, the parts are taken as real for practical purposes because it is only through them that the indivisible is made clearly apprehended.[22] Philosophers and the wise analyze the indivisible, knowledge, for grammar and practical purposes based on the concepts as they are revealed in the mind in communication. Analysis helps in putting the indivisible into intellectually derived divisions and, thus, makes it understandable through artificially derived predicates of it. The cognition of it as a synthetic whole, through predicates, attributes or other parts, helps manifestation of the indivisible. Manifested so, its nature is revealed in its clarity and distinctness from which the meaning is revealed non-differently. Knowledge, even of and by a sentence, a word or a letter, is indivisible and can be analyzed by intellect for a clear understanding of those who can understand it only piecemeal. All predicates and attributes through which it is interpreted are intellectual device helping the understanding of the indi-

visible as a synthesis of the part and, thus, they are not useless.

Conclusively, it can be said that the meaning, in both of the theories, is a unit; a synthetic unit in the former while an indivisible unit in the latter. Both of the theories accept analysis as a process for understanding the indivisible signifier and signified. The meaning, in the former theory, is independent from and transcendental to the language while the language infuses it, in the latter. If the meaning is not taken as infused by the language the analysis of the language will not be the analysis of the meaning. Nonetheless, the analysis of the former will not be possible if it is not a cognitive-being because the mind can analyze only those beings which figure in it as the object of analysis and all that figure in the mind are beings revealed by and infused by the language.

If thought is taken different from the language, as the theorists of the former view accept, the language will not be a thought and then it will not be an object of analysis. The thought cannot be analyzed by the language being independent from it. The analysis of a signified transcendental to and independent from language, which in their view is analyzed, is a deviated logic.

Analysis can be a philosophical activity only if the object and the means of it are cognitive beings. Mind can analyze only those beings which figure in it. The language also figure in cognition by language and what figure in the mind are indivisible cognitive beings, that can be conceived as per expectancy of analyzing, as both the language and the meaning as well. As per expectancy of analyzing, cognitive being of the language serves, respectively, as the object of analysis of the language by the language and of the meaning by the language and the translation of the text is explained consistently well in the second theory for which a signifier infuses cognition, the intelligible beings are only those expressed in the mind and what is known or expressed can only be translated and analyzed.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. By the statement 'The logic of difference of content and of garbs' I refer to the view of the theorists for whom the signified of the text/original is a transcendental-signified and is different from the signified of the translations which are mere copies of the transcendental-signified or a s grasped by the minds of the translators by the statement, 'The logic of non-difference of content and difference of

their garbs' I refer to the theorists, specially to Bhart r hari , for whom the con-
tent of the translational express in is the same content of the text/original as in
each case it is revealed non-differently by the *sphot a* which is the only revealer
in his philosophy.

2. 'Garb' is the term used by B.K. Matilal for the language-tokens ; see, *The Word
and The World*, Oxford University Press, p. 122, 1990, which is Bhart r hari 's
terminology is *Vaikharī - s'abda* which is articulated differently by different lan-
guage communities for communicating the signified. Language-tokens are garbs
of the expression which differ from community to community even in different
occurrences of it by a person in the same community. A'content of a text' is the
object of verbal-knowledge which, in realist's logic, is a transcendental signified
and the 'contents of the translations' are the copies of the transcendental signi-
fied or the transcendental signified as appeared to the minds of the translators.

3. B.K. Matilal, *The Word and The World*, Chapter 11, entitled 'Translation and
Bhart r hari 's concept of language (*s'abda*)', which largely derives from a pa-
per presented by him at a conference organized by J. Derrida and his colleagues
in Paris during the festival of India in France, p. 122, 1990.

4. B.K. Matilal, *The Word and The World*, p. 122.

5. Ibid. p. 123.

6. Ibid. p. 122. Matilal is right in his finding that there is no possibility of translation
if this logic is applied on Bhart r hari 's philosophy. However, he has overlooked
the second logic which is, particularly, concerned with Bhart r hari .

7. In *Vākyapadīya* . 1/123 he clearly says that language infuses cognition, *'Na
so'sti pratyayo loke yah s'abdānugamād r te . Anuviddhamiva
jñānam sarvam s'abdena bhāsate.* There is no idea / cognition isolated from
language and all cognition is cognition shot through and through by language.

8. Unlike the senses in perception, the language is a verbal-cognition, when mani-
fested by the token, reveals it first and then its meaning is revealed non-differ-
ently by it. There is no possibility of a language-free cognitive-content.
Vākyapadīya . 1/55-56.

9. B.K. Matilal, *The Word and The World*, p. 122.

10. Ibid, p. 122. While defining translation Matilal has rightly observed reading as a

creative transformation and translation as a part of the accepted style of philosophizing. I have simply furthered some criteria for accepting translation as cognitive and, hence, philosophical activity. For my presentation, translation is the cognitionof the same content in several occurrences through different garbs of different language communities.

11. *The Word and the World,* 1990, p. 123.

1 2 . *Gha ṭ a jñānamiti jñānam ghaṭ ajñānavilak s a ṇ am ghaṭ a i t y a p i yajjñānam vi s ayopanipāti tat . Yato vi s ayarūpeṇ a jñānarūpam na g r̥ hyate svarūpam nāvadhāryate. Vākyapadīya* 3/1/105-6. This issue, in rather great detail, is discussed in a paper entitled, 'Cognition Being and Possibility of Expressions : A Bhart r hari an Approach', by the same author, *JICPR,* Vol. XIV, No.1, pp. 65-95, 1996.

13. Bhart r hari 's concept of universal as the import of words is discussed, in detail, in a paper by the same author entitled ' Bhart r hari 's reply to *Vais′e s ika′ s* arguments against universal as the import of words', *Darshana International,* Vol. XXXVII, No.4, pp. 22-24, 1997.

14. The *spho ṭ a* for Bhart r hari , is universal which is manifested by language-tokens differing from community to community. With the differences of tokens the *spho ṭ a* does not differ or change. He writes, *′s′abdasyordhvamabhivyaktervr̥ tti bhedam tu vaik r̥ tāh dhvanayah samupohante spho ṭ ātmā tairna bhidyate. Vākyapadī ya .* 1/77. *Mahābhā s yakāra* has also mentioned the same idea in his commentary of *TAPARA supra of Pā ṇ ini.*

15. See, Bhart r hari 's 'Philosophy of Relation Between the Word and the Meaning', by the same author, JICPR, Vol. XI, No.2, pp. 43-44, 1994.

16. See, the paper of Paul Ricoeur, 'Existence and Hermeneutics', in *Contemporary Hermeneutics,* edited by Josef Blender, pp. 242-3, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980.

17. *Jñānas′abdārthavi s ayā vis′e s ā ye vyavasthitāh . Te s ām duravadhāratvāj jñānādyekatvadars′anam . Vākyapadīya .* 3/1/101; also see, *Helaraja* on it. While discussing the same signified by the use of *Apabhrans′as* (language-tones belonging to different language communities other than Sanskrit) in the first part of *Vākyapadīya .* Bhart r hari theories that

the same real language is manifested by them. They are synonymous. *V r tti* on *Vākyapadīya* 1/ 149, The correct form of the word is manifested by them to a person versed in communication *Vākyapadīya*. 1/242 and from the correct form of the word the *spho t a* is revealed from which signified is revealed non-differently, *V r tti* on *Vākyapadīya* 1/ 150-51.

18. *Spho t a* in philosophy of Bhart r hari, is the real language, the language. It is an inner, indivisible and ubiquitously given being having awareness in nature which when manifested by tokens (Vaikharī = the language we speak, write, here and read) reveals itself by which its meaning is revealed non-differently.

19. The term *'proxy analysis'* means a process in which what is analyzed is language and what it stands for is a being transcendental and independent from language. For this theory, a transcendental being of a signified is required as a constant content to serve as the basis of analysis. If this is so there must be a transcendental-signifier and only in that case the analysis of language by language can be explained consistently. As the theorists do not accept the concept of transcendental language, there is no possibility of analyzing language by language. I have used the term 'proxy-analysis' for the view of those who take language as representative of the meaning and thus the analysis of language, for them, represents the analysis of meaning.

20. By the term *'expression -analysis'* I mean the analysis of the meaning as it figures in the mind non-differently by the language. It is the view of those for whom the language expresses and infuses cognition. The meaning is non-different from the language. As the two are non-different, the analysis of the former, for them, is the analysis of the latter. It is the view of those for whom the language expresses and infuses cognition. The meaning is non-different from the language. As the two are non-different, the analysis of the former, for them, is the analysis of the latter. It is analysis in terms of the language.

21. Indivisible *spho t a* and *pratibhā* are the units of awareness in nature and there is no possibility of any actual division of such units of awareness in character.

22. *Upāyāh s'ik s amā n ānām bālānāmapalāpanah. Astye vartamani sthitvā tatah satyam samīhate.* *Vākyapadīya* 2/ 238.

SĀM KHYA - YOGA PSYCHOLOGY OF COGNITION

PRABHAT MISRA

The Sāmkhya philosophers maintain that the phenomenon of the world is a transformation or modification (*pari n ā ma* or *vikāra*) of unconscious *prak r ti* . Worldly cognition is also modification, it is the mental modification, psychosis – technically called *anta h kara n av r tti* . '*Anta h karana*' is the whole mental apparatus including *buddhi, manas* and *ahamkāra* . These three inner organs are counted as one, because of the fact that they are very closely related to one another. The *anta h kara n av r tti* is sometimes called *buddhivr tti* , sometimes, *cittav r tti* and generally it is called *v r tti* . In the Sāmkhya , the term *v r tti* has been employed in both the senses of *pramā n a* – instrumental cause of cognition and *pramā* - cognition .

In the process of perceptual cognition, according to the Sāmkhya , the sense-object contact is necessary, but the modification of *anta h kara n a* into the shape of the sensible object is more necessary. It is only when *anta h kara n a* , the internal organ gets modified into the form of sense-given object, then on account of the predominance of *sattvagu n a* in the *buddhi,* the *tama h* (darkness) i.e. ignorance of the object is removed; and with the help of the illumination by ever conscious *puru s a* , there arises the cognition, technically speaking, *buddhivr tti* or *cittav r tti* .

The *Sāmkhyakārikā* defines   perception   as ' *prativi s ayādhyavasāyo d r s tam*' (Kārikā - 5). ' *Prativi s aya*' means objective reference. This objective reference has been understood as the sense-object contact by all the commentators. We do not find any mention of '*indriya*' or ' *indriyārtha*' in the Sāmkhyakārikā . But as we have said, the word ' *prativi s aya*' implies the sense-object contact ' *prativi s aya*' without which perception cannot be explained and consequently it cannot be distinguished from inference, remembrance etc. ' *Adhyavasāya*' is certainly the function of buddhi[1]. Thus for the ' *d r s tam*' or perceptual cognition, the sense-contact and the function of *buddhi (buddhivr tti)* are required along with the illumination by the ever conscious *puru s a* . According

to the *Sāṁkhya* , when the sense-organ comes into contact with the object, the organ acquires the *v r̥ tti* , named '*alocanā* '.

The *buddhi* comes in relation to the external object through the sense-organ and becomes modified into the shape of the object. If the modification or *v r̥ tti* be certain, there arises cognition. The *buddhi* is extremely pure (*svaccha*) and so can take up the reflection of *puru s a* . When *puru s a* is reflected on the *buddhivr̥ tti* in the shape of the object in concern, the unconscious *buddhi* appears to be conscious, and the non-attached *(asaṅga) puru s a* becomes related to the object. Thus the relation between *buddhivr̥ tti* and *puru s a* is established with the help of reflection. And in that case, it appears to the *buddhivr̥ tti* or the *puru s a* that "I am cognising."

In general, however, Sāṁkhya view of the psychological process in perceptual cognition is as follows.

First, the sense-organ receives an immediate impression of the object. Secondly, the impression enters into the manas through the organ. Thirdly, the manas reflects on the impression and gives it over to *ahaṁkāra* . Fourthly, *ahaṁkāra* . after appropriating the impression represents it to the buddhi. Finally, the buddhi ascertains it with the help of the illumination or reflection of *puru s a* . At this final stage, puru s a is reflected on the buddhiv r tti and possessed of the reflection of the latter; the reflection of *v r̥ tti* does not exclusively fall on the puru s a . This is the view of vācaspati . But according to Vijñānabhik s u , both the buddhiv r tti and puru s a are reflected on each other.

The Sāṁkhya speaks of the modifications of the sense-organs in the perceptual process.[2] For this, the eminent Sāṁkhya thinkers like the author of the Yuktidīpikā regard the sense-organs to be pervasive. The Yuktidīpikā Kāra has established his positions with the support of some ancient teacher of Sāṁkhya . The supporting view of the teacher is this : The sense-organs are products of *ahaṁkāra* and so, pervasive.[3] In fact, most of the Sāṁkhya teachers regard the sense-organs as the sāttvic modification of the *ahaṁkāra* - the organs are not mere visible parts of the body. The Sāṁkhya recognises the v r tti of the sense-organs, particularly with a view to solve the problem of visual and auditory perceptions, in which cases direct contact of the respective sense-organs is not always found. "According to this system", as Pulinbihari Chakraborty puts, "an organ of knowledge when explained in the Western light, is the sensory psycho-physical impulse that goes out of the body and like the photographic process receives an immediate

impression of the object. It is called $vr\d{t}ti$ of the sense-organ through whose instrumentality, direct contact with an external object becomes possible. All these can be explained if the sense-organs are regarded to be the products of *ahamkāra* with preponderance of *Sattva* therein".[4]

Besides the sense-organs and internal organ, the Sāmkhya also recognises five motor organs viz. – the organs of speech, prehension, movement, excretion and reproduction. The sense-organs, the motor organs and the internal organ – all these eleven organs have function in the cognitive process, most obviously in perceptual cognition. The function of these organs is to grasp, retain and illumine the object.[5] With regard to these functions there are different views among the different thinkers. After a good deal of consideration Pulinbihari Chakraborty opines that the view of the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* seems to be justified and in accordance with the view of the *SāmkhyaKārikā* . According to the Yuktidīpikā kāra , the motor organs are capable to seize the objects, so grasp them; retention is the function of the sense-organs - these sense - organs receive the objects which are in contact, take an immediate impression and are accordingly modified into the very shape of them. The function of illumination or manifestation of the objects belong to the internal organs viz. manas, *ahamkāra* and *buddhi*.[6]

However, the modification of the sense-organs and that of the antaḥkaraṇaḥ have nicely been illustrated by Vyoma s'ivacārya in his Vyomavatī . The Vais'esika thinker has quoted a *Kārika* from some ancient Sāmkhya text. In connection with the puruṣa's experiences and the cognition of buddhi he quotes it.[7] It is said that as a principle, the buddhi is different from the *puruṣa* . Coming into contact with the objects, the sense-organs are modified into the shape of them. The *buddhi* also assumes the very modified form of the sense-organs. Consequently there begins the flow of sattva in the *buddhi*, and it becomes transparent like the self-luminous *puruṣa* . At that time what happens is that the *puruṣa* is reflected on the *buddhi*. Just as the moon is reflected on the transparent water, not on polluted one, so the *puruṣa* is reflected on the *buddhi*. When sattva predominates in it. Indeed, as soon as the *buddhi* is so modified, the mass-stuff or tamas disappears from the *buddhi*. The illustration also reveals that though in the case of cognition, $puru\d{s}a$ comes in contact with the *buddhi*, it's distinctness and self-luminousity is not contradicted. *Puruṣa's* experience of cognition of buddhi ($buddhivr\d{t}ti$) is not one but always, in the Sāmkhya -Yoga: it

experiences the cognition through its reflection on the buddhi.

It is interesting to note that the Sāṁkhya view of the cognitive process bears some affinity with the Kantian theory of the origin of knowledge. In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant has clearly shown that knowledge is produced out of the two joint factors – one is the synthetic activity of mind and another, the manifold of sense impressions of things in themselves. To the Sāṁkhya also, knoledge is the joint product of *Puruṣa's* conciousness and impressions of the evolutes of prak r ti . Moreover Kant speaks of the three-fold synthesis in knoledge situation : (i) synthesis of simple apprehensions in intuition, (ii) synthesis of reproduction in imagination and (iii) synthesis of recognition in a concept. The first resembles to the functions sense-organs *(ālocanā)* in the Sāṁkhya . The second synthesis corresponds to the power of reproducing past impressions; this resembles to the Sāṁkhya principle that *v r tti* is originated from the mental traces – either *vāsana* or *saṁskāra* . And the third synthesis of recognition in a concept may be compared with the ascertaining function (*adhyavasāya*) of *buddhi*.

Again both the Sāṁkhya philosopher and Kant would believe in the ultimate unity of consciousness for Kant, it is the synthetic unity of apperception; to the Sāṁkhya thinker, it is the self-consciousness of the ego- *puru ṣ a* as influenced by the ever conscious transcendental self. In fact, Kant has established that in a knoledge-situation, both the subjective and objective conditions are essential. So also in the Sāṁkhya , *puruṣa's* transcendental consciousness constitutes the subjective condition of cognition and *prak r ti* alongwith its evolutes serves as the objective condition of the same.

The concept of *v r tti* has been more elaborately handled in the Yoga. K.C. Bhattacharya opines that in the Sāṁkhya *v r tti* is really not a presentation – not a real modification of the *buddhi* – it is a constructive mode. Because of the fact that the reality of the buddhi is dependent on its specific function. But according to the Yoga, *v r ttis* as the cognitive presentations are real modifications of the *Citta.*[8] ' ' *Yogascittav r ttinirodha ḥ*'[9] . That is why the Yoga thinkers have given a special emphasis on the *Cittav r tti* . It clearly stated that there are five kinds of *Cittav r tti* . – *pramā ṇ a* (valid cognition) *viparyaya,* (errorneous cognition), *vikalpa* (cognition through conventional expression) *nidrā* (sleep), which is devoid of any object and sm r ti (memory)[10]. K.C. Bhattacharya observes, "The classification of *v r ttis* is at once psychological and epistemological, psychological so far as presentation is itself a differentiated mental object and epistemological so far as presentation is of

an experienceable object."[11]

The Yoga like Sāṃkhya , however, holds that *pramā ṇa* or right cognition is of three kinds – *pratyak ṣa* (perception), *anumāna* and *āgama* . When citta comes into contact with the external objects through the medium of the sense-organs and assumes their form, then perceptual cognition arises. *Pratyak ṣa* is really such a *vṛtti* that have the shape of a real object relating more to its particularity alongwith than to its generality.[12] *Anumāna* is a *Cittavṛtti*, that arises as a cognition of the generic nature of the things. It is a *vṛtti* in connection with an external object with emphasis on the generality of it. And such an object is sign or *liṅga* of the inferable thing – that is present in the examples of its class and is absent in the examples of other class.[13] *Āgama* is that cittavṛtti which arises from heard words of the *āpta* (trustworthy person) – the words produce meaning of the objects in the form of *vṛtti* in *citta*.[14]

Viparyaya is the erroneous cognition. According to the Yoga, this *vṛtti* does not consist of the form of the object to which it refers.[15] In general, the Yoga contention is that cognition arises out of the presentation of form (*vṛtti*). But in the case of *viparyaya*, we do not really find any object - form. That the presented form of the *vṛtti* is contradicted by the subsequent right cognition is not granted the contradicted form of object (snake in a rope, e.g.) does never appear in the vṛtti. So it is said that *viparyaya* is the cittavṛtti of cittavṛtti disintegrated under the powerful pressure of the *vāsanā* or unconscious, loosely speaking, is the false impression or *mithyā saṃskāra* . *Viparyaya* or the erroneous cognition is a form of *avidyā* . According to Vyāsa, it can be characterised by the five degrees of it – *avidyā* . , *asmitā, rāga, dveṣa* and *abhinives'a* .[16]

The notion of *viparyaya* *vṛtti* reveals that there is a role of *vāsanā* or saṃskāra in the field of *vṛtti* . Of course, *vāsanā* and saṃskāra , though identified as non-different in the *Vyasa - bhaṣya* , are not the same. *Saṃskāras* are the sub-conscious states being generated by the experiences. *Vāsanās* are the innate saṃskāras - they are not acquired in this life. In the cognitive situation, saṃskāras and *Vāsanās* are revived under suitable associations. The *citta* has a collection of the past tendencies or *Vāsanās* . And the *saṃskāras* are the root impressions of a continuing life, these arise from the cognition or *vṛtti* ; again the *saṃskāras* give rise to the *vṛtti* . *Vāsanās* as the innate *saṃskāras* may be identified with the *saṃskāras* .All the saṃskāras (including vāsanās) or mental traces

are, however, created by the *vṛtti* and vice versa. The wheel of mental modifications and mental traces is ever revolving.[17] So that the Yoga point of view runs, all the *vṛttis* like perception, inference etc. requires of *saṁskāras* for their generation for example, an act of perceptual cognition depends some how on some sort of reproductive process that may characterise the memory - trace (*saṁskāras*)

Vikalpa or verbal cognition as imagination is that which implies the consciousness of a content, that is not real, yet verbally meant.[18] The content is known as unreal, yet verbally expressible. The content, however, is presented as unreal, but possible object. *Viparyaya* also consists of unreal content; but in that case, the content itself is not expressible and it is not the unreality of possible object. Thus *vikalpa* is neither *pramāṇa* ,nor *viparyaya* - it is a distinct *vṛtti* . It is found in our experience through the linguistic expressions like 'human horn'(*narasṛṅga*) etc.

Nidrā or sleep is the mental modification in terms of the cognition of just a withdrawal from the external world.[19] It is *vṛtti* or cognition as it is directly remembered in the form 'I slept well, my mind was peaceful and tranquil ... etc.' It is remembered, since *saṁskāra* was left by sleep; and as it is *saṁskāra*, there must arise *vṛtti* beforehand in the *citta*. The Nyāya does not recognise *nidrā* as a *vṛtti* , because to it, the absence of all types cognition is sleep (*nidrā* or *suṣupti*). To the Advaita Vedanta *nidrā* is a *vṛtti*, but not of *buddhi*. It is the *ajñānavṛtti* from the Sāmkhya - yoga point of view Vijñābhikṣu has reacted to such an Advaita position in his *Yogavārttika* . He states that if the Advaitin takes *ajñāna* in such an account, then the *ajñānavṛttis* might be appeared in dream and waking states also. And consequently, there would be no necessity of recognising any *vṛtti* of *buddhi*. *Nidrā* , however, is a derivative *vṛtti* – it is the recognition of past experience.

Smṛti (memory) is also a *cittavṛtti* . It is the retention of an object or event as cognised.[20] It is, in fact, an internally initiated cognition qualified by the recognition of its being of past experience. The object of primary apprehension (it may be any of the five *vṛttis* like *pramāṇa* , *viparyaya, vikalpa* etc.) and apprehension (recognitions) itself. So memory is the apprehension of apprehensions. It should be recognised as a separate *vṛtti*. Vācaspati , the author of *Tattvavaiśāradi* points out that all other *cittavṛttis* like *pramāṇa* etc. give rise to the knoledge of some unknown object (either general or particular); but memory would never surpass the limit of past apprehension would not the their face

sentation of same object. Sometimes it may not cover the whole presentations, but it would never transgress the same.[21]

Cittavrttis, as explained above, are, after all the works of self-conscious-ness. This self-consciousness is a consciousness for which there is an observer-entity observing for ever whatever is going on in the external world in its respect. But it is thoroughly detached from all the objectivities of the external world. It is the subject per-excellence. To the Sāṁkhya - yoga philosophers, it is the *puruṣa* conscient subject. And it seems to resemble to the *sākṣi - caitanya* of the Advaita Vedanta. However, this subjective principle of the Sāṁkhya - yoga observes its own objective being, but does not transform itself into objectivity.

Citta or *buddhi* is the product of *prakrti* and so, the pure matter per-excellence. It is capable of taking in the reflection of *puruṣa* appears to be *puruṣa*. It may be said to be the objective *puruṣa*. This objective *puruṣa* is the *ahaṁ* or ego. The subjective *puruṣa* is adjacent to and detached from the *citta*. It observes the objective ego-*puruṣa*, which is nothing but the objective reflection of the subjective *puruṣa* within *citta*. The observer subjective *puruṣa* is citi or *drk* ; and the objective ego-*puruṣa* is *citta* or *drsya*. The *drk puruṣa* is adjacent to the mental *drsya* -ego – it detachedly observes the latter as its own reality. This estimate of self-consciousness is the underlying logic of all the *Cittavrttis*.

But the *vrtti* theory of cognition as outlined above seems to be inconsistent. That the pervasive *citta* or *buddhi* assumes the object form is granted. But for the final cognition, whether the *puruṣa* is reflected on the *buddhi* qualified by *vrtti* or the latter is reflected on the former is not yet settled. This inconsistency, the scholars argue, is due to the recognition of *prakrti - puruṣa* dualism of the Sāṁkhya - yoga . If the subjective ever conscious *puruṣa* and the *prakrti* - product unconscious *antahkarana* (including the manas, *ahaṁkāra* and *buddhi*) be totally different and the two independent realities, then how can the subjective be really related to the objective *vrtti* ? Dr. Radhakrishnan puts this inconsistency with reference to the view of Yamunācārya, the author of *Ātmasiddhi*, "The mechanical modifications of buddhi become illumined as if by magic, with the light of consciousness. We have not here any explaination of conscious knoledge. The rise of consciousness on the occasion of a mechanical modification is a baffling mystery."[22]

Above all, the modification of *antahkarana*, which is the product of solely

independent inert *prakṛti* in every instance of cognition is somehow unintelligible, if it be not linked up with any conscious principle. The Advaita Vedānta is also in favour of the *vṛtti* theory of cognition. But in the Advaita, Brahman, the single conscious principle is pervaded in all the material principles like the *antaḥkaraṇa*. And so the modification of it has consistently been explained by that system of philosophy.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ* – Karikā 23.

2. *Svaṁ svaṁ pratipadyante paraspará - kūta - hetukaṁ vṛttiṁ* – Karika 31, Sāṁkhyakārika.

3. *Ahaṁkārikānāṁ tu teṣaṁ vyapakatvāt* - *Yuktidīpika* - P 123, quoted in *Origin and Development of the Saṁkhya System of Thought.*

4. *Origin and Development of the Sāṁkhya System of Thought* - P. 177.

5. *Āvaraṇa - dhāraṇa - prakāś'karam* – Karika 32, Sāṁkhyakārika.

6. *Origin and Development of the Sāṁkhya System Thought* – pp. 178-79.

7. *Viviktadṛkpāṇatan 'buddhau bhogo'sya kathyate pratibimbodayaḥ svaccha yatha candramaso'mbharsi* - found ibid.

8. *Studies in Philosophy* – Vol. I, P. 255 .

9. *Yogasūtra* - 1,2

10. *Pramāṇa- viparyana - vikalka - nidra - smṛtayaḥ* – *Yogasūtra* 1,6.

11. *Studies in Philosophy* - vol. 1, P. 255.

12. *Indriyapranalikayā cittasya bahyavastūparagat - tadviṣayā sāmānyaviṣes'ātmno'rthasya viseṣā – badharaṇa - pradhānā vrittiḥ pratyakṣaṁ pramaṇam - Vyāsbhaṣya of Yogasūtra* - 1,7.

13. *Anumānasya tulyajatiyaṣvanu - vṛtto bhinnajatiyebhyo vyavṛttaḥ sambandho yastadviṣayā sāmanyā - badharaṇapradhanavṛttiranumanam* – ibid.

14. *Āpten dṛsto'numito va arthaḥ pasatra svabodhasaṅkrantaye s'abdenopadis'yate , sabdat tadarthaviṣayavṛttiḥ sroturāgamaḥ* – ibid.

15. *Viparyayo mithyajñanamatadrūpapratiṣṭam* - *Yogasūtra* – 1,8.

16.   *Seyaṁ pancaparva   bhavati   avidyā,
avidyā - asmitaragadveṣā - bhinivesaḥ Kles'ā iti. – *Vyāsabhasya* of
Yogasūtra - 1,8.

17.   *Tathajatiyakah saṁskārāvrtti* - *bhireva kriyante, saṁskāraisca
Vrittayah, ityevaṁ Vritti - saṁskāra- cakramanis'amāvartate.* –
Vyasabhāsya of *Yogasūtra* - 1,5.

18. *S'abdajñānānupātī vastus'unyo vikalkah* – *Yogasūtra* - 1, 9.

19. *Abhāvapratyālambanā vr̥ttirnidra.* – *Yogasūtra* - 1, 10.

20. Anubhūtaviṣayāsampramoṣa smr̥ti - *Yogasūtra* - 1,11.

21. *Tattvavais'āradi,* Commentary to Vyāsabhāsya of *Yogasūtra* - 1,11.

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THE CONCEPT OF MOTHER GODDESS IN INDIAN TRADITION

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FEMINITY has occupied the field of religion also. In different religious texts the female deity has occupied a prominent role, after considering the role of female in our life in so far as the concept of fertility is concerned. Feminine qualities of godhead have always appealed and influenced the believer of God. In our country the female deity has been ascribed as super human powers of creation, mainte- nance and destruction. It is the quality of sacrificing motherhood that gets the most emphasis in the conception of female deity. The reason lies on the fact that mother captures the emotion, anxiety, fear, love etc. of the child more sincerely and deeply than father.

We find a close affinity between female god in religion and *Prak r ti* in Sāmkhya as described by *Īs'varak r s n a* . *Prak r ti* is compared to a dancer. Just as a dancer after exhibiting herself at some stage stops to dance, *Prak r ti* , after its complete manifestation in *Puru s a* , ceases to produce.[1] *Prak r ti* is said to have constituted with three *gu n as - sattva, raja h* and *tama h* . As each and every woman in *Prak r ti* , she also possesses such qualities, which generates pleasure (*pri ti*), pain (*vi s ā da*) and infatuation (*moha*). If the mind of the knower is influenced by the prominence of the *sattva*-quality, it becomes transparent and hence it apprehends the pleasant character of an object. If the mind of the knower retains the prominence of *raja h* -quality, it becomes agitated and grasps the un- pleasant character of an object. If the same mind is influenced by the prominence of *tama h* -quality, it attains the infatuative character of an object.

The above mentioned characteristics of the three *gu n as* remain in the woman who is also *Prak r ti* . It has been stated in the *Sāmkhya - tattva - kaumudi* that a woman has got these three characteristic features. A young beautiful married woman makes her own husband happy and hence her husband appprehends only her pleasant character. She makes other co- wives unhappy and hence her pleasant character is revealed to them. The same lady infatuates those who want to have her but fail. These lovers realize her only

infatuative nature. Hence, this example shows how a woman is constituted of *sattva*, *raja h* and *tama h* qualities (Ekaiva *stri rūpa - yauvana - kūla - s'īla - sampannā svāminam sukhākaroti . Tat kasya hetoh? Svāminam prati tasyā h sukharūpasamudbhāvāt . Saiva stri sapatni rdu h khākaroti tat kasya beto h ? Tā h prati tasyā maharūpasamudbhāvāt . Evam puru s ānataram tāmavindamānam saiva mohayati tat kasya heto h ? Tam prati tasyā moharūpasamudbhāvāt – Tattvakaumudī* on *Kārikā* ,13).

Though a woman is described as the cause of pleasure, misery and infatuation, she is, in fact, an embodiment of happiness, misery and infatuation. Something, which is the cause of happiness, is in the form of happiness, is in the form of happiness (*tatra yat sukhahetu tat sukhātmakam sattvam*). Each and every transformed object is in the form of happiness, misery and infatuation. The existence of *sattva, raja h* and *tama h* is inferred as the cause of such happiness, misery and infatuation (*Pari n āmī padārtha h sukh a- du h kha - mobātmaka - kāra n akā h sukbadu h kha - mohātmakatvāt)* . Following the same logic a woman is described as having such character.

The universal respect and worship shown to an ideal woman is the only reason, which prompts an individual to worship a Divine Mother. The female is either in the form of a loving mother or an angry mother. Both the forms are acceptable to the devotees. The icon of the goddess is found to bear sword (*K r pā n a*) on the one hand, the cause of fear, and at the same time giving assurance of making others fearless with another.[2] That is to say, a deity is found in both the forms – fearfulness and fearlessness. It may be asked why we should look at the hands of the icon, which symbolically harmonizes between two situations – fearlessness and fearfulness. In reply Rabindranath says that the man who knows the significance of the postures of the hands of the deity knows the real nature of the deity – '*ye tomār che d e tor hāt t i dekhe āsal jānā sei jāniche* '[3].

In the same way it can be said that the icon of goddess *Durgā* represents another type of harmony between two forms: goddess as the locus of immortality *(amr tādhi s t hātri)* and warrior-goddess *(ra n adevi)* . These two forms are available in ordinary female also. In ordinary woman there is motherliness as well as property of being a warrior. In fact, we love to think of having such qualities in our beloved deity. That is why; she is represented as both creator and destroyer. The following image of *Durgā* is found in the *Mārkan d eyapurā n a*, which bears

the same significance. It is said – "*Soumyāni yāni, rupā ni trailokye vicaranti te, yani cātyantaghorā ni taih rak s āsmānstathā* "' That is O goddess! your sober image, the creator and sustainers, and the terrific image, the destroyer, existing in the three worlds, may protect all persons residing in this world. Among the various manifestations of *s'akti* (Divine Power) the benign aspect deals with the creative faculty as found in *Durgā Mahālak s mi* , *Mahāsarasvatī* etc. The terrible aspect denotes the power of destruction of the same. In this aspect of Divine Power appears as *Kāli, Bhairavī,Chinnamastā* etc.

All the forms of benign goddess are working for the welfare of the world. *Mahālak s mi* is the most widely worshipped aspect of *S'akti* who is also called *s'rī* because she is associated with an individual's fertility, good luck, wealth and well being.

The *Prak r ti* of *Sāmkhya* is represented as a female principle. Basically it stands for mother earth, the fruit-bearing soil. The relation between *Puru s a* and *Prak r ti* is explained in the light of the relation between a man and a woman. *Prak r ti* attracts *Puru s a* just as a woman does. Hence, *Prak r ti* sometimes is described as a bride and sometimes as a beautiful dancing actress. Apart from this *Prak r ti* is endowed with feminine virtues like generous character (*Kārikā* ,60) etc.that normally belong to a thinking and self-conscious mind. *Prak r ti* is called generous by virtue of the fact that she works for the enjoyment of the *Puru s a* having no modes, activities etc. Hence, *Puru s a* cannot reciprocate or cannot give anything to *Prak r ti* in return. *Prak r ti* having exhibited herself retires from the scene as a "modest matron who may be surprised in dishabille by a strange man, but takes good heed that another shall not behold her off her guard".[5]

In the like manner it can be said that a man can have the creative power if he is associated with his wife or beloved etc. *Māyā* represents the feminine power in the activity of creation. Though *Māyā* is considered illusory after certain stage, it is necessary for our activities in the phenomenon level. Though there is falsity in *Māyā* , yet it is essential for ordinary behaviour. We know very clearly that self is completely different from the non-self. In other words, it is known to us that the properties of Self are completely different from the non-self. In other words, it is known to us that the properties of Self are completely different from those of non-self and the vice-versa. The concept of *Puru s a* , on the other hand, denotes the man or the male principle. "As the birth of a child proceeds from the union of male and female,

so the production and creation results from the union of *Prak r ti* and *Puru s a* .[6]

A notion of *Prak r ti* is called feminine which has primary role to play. It reflects an ancient agricultural matriarchal society. This concept of material *Prak r ti* is evolved from the concept of a material earth mother who provides forces stimulating generative power of nature.

It is known that *S'akti* or the feminine aspect of god did not get separate importance in *S'aivism*. *Umā, Ambikā, Pārvatī , Haimavatī, Kālī* etc. got only the status of wife of *Rudra S'iva* . *S'iva* and *S'akti* are not two separate realities, but two conceptual phases or aspects of the same reality. In *S'aivism S'akti* is described as the heart and the essence of *S'iva* .

According to the *Spanda,* a branch of Kashmir *S'aivism* (which is otherwise called *pratyabhijñ ā dars'ana*). *S'iva* is the cause of all distinctions. *Vasugupta,* an *ācārya* belonging to this school, is of the opinion – "*Spanda* (vibration) is a psychic energy. It is a divine power in the form of serpent power awakened by breath control and concentration on the Divine on it ... it ascends to the highest centre above the cerebrum and unite with *S'iva* .[7]

According to the followers of this school. *S'iva* is independent and involves in creation by his will-force all that comes into being. The Lord *S'iva* is both transcendent and immanent. The former is described as *S'iva* and the later part is called *S'akti* . The transcendent part of *S'iva* , which is not associated with *S'akti* , is called *S'iva* (dead body), In fact *Parama S'iva* is the perfect equilibrium between *S'iva* and *S'akti* . The Kashmir *S'aivism* does not give an independent reality to *Prak r ti* as the *Sāmkhya* gives. It is always associated with *Prak r ti* , *Siva* is considered as the Divine Physician (*Vaidyanātha*) and the Lord of dance (*Na t arāja*). His companion for all times is white bull and his consort is *Pārvatī* who is rather a part of himself.

S'iva is the symbolic representation of the union between male and female principles, which is represented as the image of *Ardhanāris'vara* . Here the God forms the two halves of one body. Philosophically it can be explained as a creative union of the active and passive principles. "The *Yogis'vara S'iva* together with his active (huntress) wife is a direct illustration of the inactive *Puru s a* and the active *Prak r ti* principles. *S'iva* and *Pārvatī* thus satisfied the religious cravings at all levels of consciousness".[8]

The idea of *Ardhanāris'vara* involves is two aspects of one Ultimate Being. In the inactive or negative aspect of all creative impulses remain dormant and the whole universe lies as a mere possibility. In the negative aspect *S'akti* remains perfectly absorbed in the Lord as if they are embraced deeply. The union of *S'akti* and *S'iva* is the basis of the concept of *Ardhanāris'vara*. As each and every human being is the temple of *Ardhanāris'vara*, this represents the dual personality of human being. In the concept of *Ardhanāris'vara*, the male and the female deity have got the equal status. "The male and female represent in the visible world the division which is present in the nature of the Absolute as *S'iva* and *S'akti*, and the perfect union of the *S'iva* and *S'akti* is the highest reality. In *Sahajiyā* Buddhism *S'unyatā* (void) and *Karunā* (compassion) transformed as the *Prajñā* and *Upāya* as the two aspects of ultimate reality, these aspects are similiar *S'akti* and *S'iva* concept".[9]

In *Vaisnavism* also the place of *S'akti* or the female power is very much prominent. Since Lord *Krsna* is described as *Saccidānanda*, his essential power *svarūpas'akti* has three attributes corresponding to three aspects. The *Sat* aspect contains *sandhinī s'akti*, the *cit* element bears the *samvit* s'akti and *ānanda* aspect has got *hlādinī s'akti*. Among these three powers the last one is the principal energy and it is the most important. The central idea of *Vaisanavism* is the bliss (*hlādinī*) aspect of *Krsna*. *Rādhā* is the embodiment of bliss and *Krsna* represents the idea of *S'akti* and *S'aktimat* (the possessor of the power).

In Bengal *Vaisnavism* *Rādhā* and *Krsna* are taken as one and the same. Before the origination of the universe *Visnu* was alone and he wanted to create. This creation is possible through his energy of *Prakrti*. *Rādhā* is treated as the 'transfiguration of the infinite potency of love contained in the very nature of *Krsna*. Both *Rādhā* and *Krsna* are taken as one and the same principle. The separation, which is apparent, is due to the self-realization of *Krsna*. Within himself *Krsna* has two aspects – the enjoyer and the enjoyed. In order to realize himself in the form of enjoyer he created *Rādhā*. Thus *Rādhā* represents herself as the eternal enjoyed while *Krsna* is the eternal enjoyer. This mutual relation of love gives rise to eternal Divine Sport (*līlā*) of *Vrindāban*.[10]

This mutual relation of enjoyer and the enjoyed is similar to that relation between *Purusa*, and *Prakrti*. *Prakrti* is described as enjoyed by *Purusa* in the *Sāmkhya* Philosophy. *Prakrti* wants to have the presence of *Purusa* for

being appreciated. *Puru s a* also requires the presence of *Prak r ti* in order to make himself free (*kaivalyātham*).[11] The *Sāmkhya* makes *Prak r ti* an integral part of *Puru s a* and she is conceived as the energy of *Puru s a*. The *Sāmkhya* Philosophers think that the two principles can be bound through some fundamental union.[12] In *Vaisnavism* such union in the relation of eternal love between *Rādhā* and *Kr s n a*. Which is a state of bliss, is found.

According to Rupa Goswami, *Rādhā* who is *hlādinī s'akti* of *Kr s n a* is inseparable from *Kr s n a*. In order to realize the intensity of the love of *Rādhā* towards *Kr s n a* had taken the form of *Caitanya*. So far as his appearance is concerned, he is *Kr s n a* being associated with the light or luster arising from the supreme emotion of *Rādhā* (*Rādhā - bhāva - dyuti - subalitak r s n arūpah*). That is why, the dual incarnation of *Rādhā* and *Kr s n a* is found in *Caitanya*.

The *Vaisnava* poets of Bengal expressed *sakhi bhāva* i.e., on attitude of the female companion to *Rādhā* and *Kr s n a*. Jaydeva, Vidyāpati, Can d idāsa etc. were absorbed in such *sakhi bhāva*, which is the best of way of realizing the Divine love. The phenomenon of *sakhi bhāva* is explained as follows : "The general *Vaisnava* view is that *Jīva* being *T a tastha s'akti* of *Kr s n a* is, after all, *Prak r ti*, and its pride being the *Puru s a* (*Puru s ābhimāna*)must be removed before it can be permitted to have its proper place in the eternal region of *svarūpas'akti*".[13]

To the *Sahajias Rādhā* and *Kr s n a* are not merely historical personality, rather each and every human being feels within him the spiritual essence of *Kr s n a* and *Rādhā*.

This history of holding man and woman as the physical manifestation of *Rādhā* and *Kr s n a* seems to have been inherited from the earlier *Tantric* philosophy. To the Hindu *Tantras* all men and women are incarnations of *S'iva* and *S'akti*, which are described as *upāya* (means of the attainment of *prajñā*) and *prajñā* (wisdom or intuition) is fundamental in *Tantric* Buddhism.[14]

As told earlier in *Vaisnavism Rādhā* has occupied a prominent or supreme position in the Divine Sports as occurred in Vrindaban. She is regarded as *hlādini s'akti* or the power of *Kr s n a*. The *hlādini s'akti* is an emanation from God's *svarūpas'akti* or sentiment power. In God *svarūpas'akti* resides in the

semblance of *Rasa* and makes him the transcendental *Rasika*. In the devotee this power is *Bhakti*. *Rādhā* is the personification of *bhaktirasa*,... the embodiment of Love Divine and, therefore, superior to the other milkmaids and even the queens of *Kṛṣṇa*. She is the greatest devotee of *Kṛṣṇa*, who regards himself as her disciple.[15]

In Indian religion ladies are compared to energy. Just as there is similarity between *Prakṛti - Puruṣa* and *Rādhā - Kṛṣṇa*, matter and its energy are treated as the dual manifestations of the same cause. "The *Puruṣa - Prakṛti* concepts are so closely united by the bond of love that the separation of one means the death of the other."[16] The scientific truth behind this is without energy matter becomes inactive and energy cannot manifest itself without matter. In the *Sāmkhya* system such an idea has been expressed very clearly. *Prakṛti* like a woman takes seat on the shoulder of a man making man subservient to her own desire. This has been explained with the help of *andha-pangu- nyāya* (Principle involved between blind and lame person). Just as a blind man and a lame man cooperates in order to get out from the forest, the non-intelligent *Prakṛti* and inactive *Puruṣa* cooperate with each other to serve their interests (*Sāmkhyakārika*, No, 21).

The worship of Divine feminine has been found in Indian from an early period of time. Afterwards different deities are combined into one great goddess (*Ādyā S'akti*), which is nothing but the *Prakṛti* or *Sāmkhya*. The concept of mother goddess emerges as a cosmic principle as the source of all creation. *S'akti* is called mother — the substratum of all beings. To *Sāyanācārya*, *Durgā* is none other than great *S'akti*. "The three Vedic deities - *Vāk* (*Saraswati*), *Rātrī* and *S'rī* give us a vivid picture of the three manifestations of *S'akti* as *Mahākalī* *Mahāsarasvatī* and *Mahālakṣmī*[17]. The same power is worshipped in various ways. In ancient India Nature was also worshipped as *Prakṛti*. The natural phenomenon or natural objects sometimes become the cause of a man's distress. As for example, the water of river is very much useful in our life, but sometimes it creates problems of the public by way of erosion or flood. In the same way, the lightning (*vidyut*) sometimes takes the life of human being. The social beings were scared of natural calamities and hence they always tried to pacify nature through its worship. In the Vedas we find some hymns composed in order to praise the deadly diseases like cholera etc and natural phenomena so that they do not bring misery of the people. In the same way the trees, mountains, rivers etc. are praised and wor-

shipped. In this matter Nature occupies a place of honour by the human beings.

It has already been mentioned that *Prak r ti* is compared to woman. We may understand the importance of woman in the metaphysical matter if we ponder on the function of *Prak r ti* , which is called *Prasavātmikā* i.e, capable of giving birth. As *Prak r ti* is the primordial cause from which other factors like *Buddhi* etc., evolutes in the metaphysical world, a woman is the primordial cause from which future generation comes into being. In fact, that which is *Prak r ti* is *Māyā* as evidenced by the *Upani s adic* statement — " *Māyām tu prak r tim vidyāt* ". Hence, *Māyā* is the factor, which is described as creative factor (*R tacit* as described by Sri Aurobindo) of the Ultimate Reality (Sachchidānanda). Without the feminine power or *Māyā* even God or *Is'vara* cannot attain its godliness. Because *Is'vara* is described as consciousness limited by such *Māyā* (*Māyāvacchinnam Caitanyam*).[18] Consciousness (*Caitanya*) without such power of *Māyā* cannot be *Is'vara* and hence cannot be the cause of the creation, maintenance and destruction of the world (*Jagajjanmādikāra n atva*).[19] Consciousness in the form of *Is'vara* has got the power of creadon etc. because it is associated -with *Māyā* or *Prak r ti* . Consciousness without such power or *Māyā* is Pure consciousness called Brahman of *nirgu n a* nature, which is inacdve, free from limidng adjuncts (*nirupādhīka*) etc. Such Brahman has no power to create, destroy or maintain. Another factor arises on the way of explaining this world. If Brahman is accepted as powerless, how is the originadon of this world explained? That is why; the *Advaitins* have admitted Brahman having some attributes (*sagu n a*) which is described as the creator etc. of the world. The *sagu n a* Brahman is always associated with *Māyā* .

Moreover, Brahman is to be understood in terms of two definitions, essential (*svarūpa*) and secondary (*ta t astha*). When it is said that Brahman is in the form of Truth, Knowledge and infinitude *(satyam jñānam anantam Brahma)*, this is called essential because it remains so long as the referendum remains.[20] Brahman being eternal will bear these characteristics like truth etc, forever. Such type of definition is very much difficult to understand by the ordinary human being. They might think that Brahman is an unreal entity Just as hare's horn etc- If they think so. Brahman is to be understood as an inconceivable object. Hence, it is to be taken as *asat* entity by the illiterate persons.

In order to prove that Brahman is not an unreal entity, the secondary charac-

teristic feature is prescribed. It runs as follows: *Jagajjanmādikāraṇatva* (i.e., the property of being cause of the creadon etc., of this world. Such a definition is called *taṭastha* (literally existing on the bank). Sometimes an object is known through its secondary character, though it is known as temporary. A *lakṣaṇa* is also a kind of *taṭastha* because it also temporarily serves the purpose of introducing an object. As for example, a house belonging to *Devadatta* is known through a crow who is sitting in front of the house (*kākairdevedattagrham*).[21] Brahman known through secondary character is not a pure one, but associated with *Māyā* . Brahman known through essential characteristic is called *nirguṇa* Brahman while Brahman known through secondary character is called *saguṇa* Brahman. The former is free from *Māyā* while the latter is associated with *Māyā* . In fact. Brahman itself cannot be the cause of the origination etc., of this universe because it is of *nirguṇa* and *nirupādhika* nature. If Brahman were taken as a cause of the origination of this world, the *upādhi* called *kāraṇatva* would have applied to the *nirguṇa* Brahman destroying its *nirupādhika* nature. That is why; it would be taken as pure Brahman.

For this reason the *saguṇa* Brahman, who is otherwise called *Īs'vara* and known through the secondary characteristic feature is admitted for explaining the different activities of the universe. Brahman can be a cause of creating etc., this world if and only if he is associated with *Māyā* . Herein lies the importance of *Māyā* in the phenomenon of creation of this world. We very often impose the properties of non-self on self and in this way the ordinary behaviour in the phenomenon level becomes possible (*naisargiko' yam lokavyavahā raḥ*).[22] Following the same line of thinking it can be said that *Māyā* has got a constructive role in self-realization which needs *s'ravaṇa* (hearing) *manana* (reflection) and *nididhyāsana* (meditation). For this hearing etc. the super-imposition of non-self on self is essential. When it is said — 'I am blind' or 'I am fat', the properties of the sense organ or body are superimposed on self.[23] Any type of phenomenal experience presupposes such super-imposition or illusion or *Māyā* .

From this it can easily be said that *Māyā* occupies the role of woman. Woman like *Māyā* has got a constructive in accomplishing phenomenal Jobs. Women may actively help in accomplishing the job or remain as source of inspiration behind this. Whatever may be, she has got a very positive role in man's success.

In fact, other functions of *Māyā* can easily be compared to those of women.

Māyā is the feminine power, which was highly honoured in ancient India. Even *Īs'vara* involves *Māyā*. So without admitting feminine power no epistemological or metaphysical entity is possible in *Vedānta*.

According to the *S'aivasiddhānta* such *Māyā* is the *S'akti* of Brahman from which the world is originated. That is why, *Māyā* is taken as synonymous with *Prakrti* in the *Bhagavadgītā* also, which is also matter giving rise to all delusions of duality. Though *Māyā* is treated as the creative power of Brahman, it has occupied a derogatory position in *Advaita Vedānta*. *S'ankara* has described it as indescribable or *anirvacanīya* which is different from existent as well as non-existent (*sadasadvilaksana*). It has some negative activities like veiling Brahman and creating delusions. To him an individual should overcome this veil of *Māyā* and see the nature of reality.

In spite of having such negative aspects of *Māyā* it is essential for leading a normal life and to realize Brahman. As *Māyā* is equated with *Prakrti* which has got a feminine flavour everywhere, it is equated with the female. It is said - "*Vedānta* could not get rid of the expanding influence of *S'aktism*. Even in its *Advaita* form, in which Brahman is one without the second, the conception of *Māyā* as a female principle gradually-evolved. Thus, Brahman could become the creator only when he was associated with *Māyā* which was subsequently called the eternal energy (*nitya s'akti*)"[24]

The Mother Goddess in the form of *Māyā* or *Prakrti* or power is admitted with each and every male god. As we find Mother goddess *Annapurnā* with *S'iva* in *Vārānasi*, *Bhadrakālī* in *Kuruksetra*, *Gayes'varī* in *Gayā*, *Kālikā* in Bengal, *Mahes'vari* in *Ayodhyā*, *Kātyāyanī* in *Vrndāvana* etc. [25]

In the *Kenopanisad* the power of Brahman through which the gods become victorious is nothing the goddess *Umā*, a female god called *Haimavati*. In this context also even the godliness of god does not remain if he is not graced by the power or energy in the form of *Umā*. In this section woman power is' always appreciated and treated as inevitable in attaining success. The story goes like this. In the fight between gods and demons Brahman with its power defeated demons that destroyed or tried to destroy the moral order established by them. The gods attained victory and forgot the secret of their success i.e., the energy or power existing in them. Without thinking of the Omnipotent Brahman they thought that their mortal bodies are me causes of their victory,[26] which is completely a mistaken

notion. Brahman knew this wrong notion of the gods by virtue of being omniscient. Hence, the power of Brahman assumed the form of a certain Yakṣa and appeared before them to destroy their misconception.[ ] Due to its peculiar form of Yakṣa the gods fail to understand him. When Agni tried to know this, he was asked who was he. Agni identified himself as Agni and also *Jātaveda* i.e., as knower of everything. Yakṣa enquired of Agni about his power and learn from him that Agni could burn everything. Yakṣa said — "I put here a dried up grass and please try to burn it". Agni approached to the grass and tried to burn the same with all his might and force, but all his efforts were in vain.[28].

Vāyu also had made an abortive attempt to blow a piece of dried grass, which was presented to him as a challenge to his vanity of blowing off anything of this. But it remained in tact in spite of best efforts of *Vāyu*. He like *Agni* came back with shame and admitted his inability to understand the exact nature of Yakṣa.[29]

Under these circumstances the other gods-appealed *Indra* the king of gods, to know what Yakṣa is. Honouring the request of the gods *Indra* approached the Yakṣa. As soon as *Indra* approached, it vanished, which proves the existence of power of Brahman in *Indra,* but not in *Agni* and *Vāyu*. This *Brahmas'akti* herself appeared in the form of *Umā*, the most beautiful lady being overwhelmed by the extreme devodon of *Indra. Indra* proceeded to the lady of exquisite beauty. Brahman, the light of all lights, shined with an abnormal beauty just a beautiful lady (*vahus'obhamānā*).[30] She possesses the charms of a woman wearing gold ornaments i.e., *Haimavatī*. In other words, the daughter of *Haimavat* Mountain is called *Haimavatī* i.e., *Pārvatī*, the wife of *S'iva*. The power of all gods is called *Brahmas'akti*. *Umā, Ambikā, Durgā, Kātyāyani* etc. are the different names of one single goddess who is identical with Brahman. *Umā* is the power of *S'iva* and these two have their separate entities through the influence of *Māyā*. *Umā* always praised as the repository of all knowledge.[31]

Before going to the battlefield to fight against the *Pāndavas Arjuna* being advised by *Kṛṣṇa* prayed for the blessings of *Durgā*, the Mother Goddess by praising with two beautiful verses, which are as follows:

" *Iyam Brahmavidyā vidyānāṁ mabānidrā ca debīnāṁ* ।

Skandamātarbhagavati durge kāntāravāsini ॥

Svāhākāra ḥ svadhā caiva kalā kā ṣthā sarasvati ।

Sāvitrī vedamātā ca tathā Vedānta *ucyate* ॥"

(*Mahābhārata* - Bhismaparva,23/11-12).

That is, you are the *Brahmavidyā* among all types of learning and great sleep (*Mahānidrā*) of all persons having body. You are the Mother goddess *Durgā* residing in a deserted place. You are in the forms of *svādhā* and *svadhā* in the form of art, *Sarasvatī* , *Sāvitrī,Vedamātā* and *Vedānta* .Such type of description is also found in the *Ānandama t ha* of Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, which is as follows:

"*Tvam hi durgā das'aprahara n adhāri n ī, Kamalādalavihāri n ī Va n ī*

Vidyādāyinī namāmī tvām " etc.

That is, you are *Durgā* , the bearer of ten weapons. I bow down to *Lak s mī* (*Kamalā*) roaming in the petals of lotus and *Sarasvatī* the form of speech (*Vā n ī*) the conveyer of knowledge.[32] From the story narrated in the *Kenopani s ad* it is known the *Brahmas'akti* in the form of *Umā* is the root of all our activities and success. But this difficult concept can hardly be apprehended by the illiterate persons. They may think that anything, which is beyond the range of our knowledge, is an illusory thing or an absurd entity. In order to remove this misconception the *S'ruti* has shown that Brahman is not at all absurd, rather it governs the whole world. *Brahmas'akti* is behind the victory of the gods and the defeat of the demons.

All supremacy is dependent on the power of Brahman, because the supremacy of the gods —

Agni, *Vāyu* and *Indra* rested on this power and *Indra* has achieved the foremost position due to realizing this power for the first time.

Though the meditation on unqualified Brahman (*nirgu n a* Brahman) is said to be totally impossible, still meditation on qualified Brahman (*sagu n abrahman*) is prescribed for the persons having no proper intellectual platform.

An ordinary human being nourishes the idea that he is the performer of all actions, and the enjoyer of the good fortune. Through the story it is shown that even the vigour of the gods is dependent on Brahman-power, They are unable to exercise their power even upon a straw.

The victory of the gods is obviously a result of the power of Brahman,

which is in the form of Uma.

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CRITIQUING ANTHROPOCENTRISM AND CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

SANTOSH KUMAR PAL

I GEDE SUWANTANA

"Here people have seen themselves as placed, not just at the relative centre of a particular life, but at the absolute, objective centre of everything. The centrality of MAN (sic) has been pretty steadily conceived, both in the West and in many other traditions, not as an illusion of perspective imposed on us by our starting-point, but as an objective fact, and indeed an essential fact, about the whole universe."(Mary Midgley)[1]

Contemporary environmental ethics develops by critiquing moral anthropocentrism. Based on this critical outlook, many human practices, like cruelty to animals, destruction of natural habitats, endangering species, and disturbing ecosystemic balances are now being criticised. Majority of environmentalists regard anthropocentricity as sheer speciesism, or as human chauvinism, with narrowness of vision, comparable to sexual, racial or national chauvinism. Present-day environmentalism seriously tends to rise above this traditional moral view-point, and this means, among other things, focusing on *loci* of values other than humans. This tendency has been steeped up by contemporary scientific, ecological findings, which undermine man's narcissism as the centre of the universe, showing them instead a product of ongoing natural evolutionary process, having considerable affinities with other creatures, and to have vulnerable dependence on ecological conditions of natural existence. The human populace is seen as occupying no special position on this planet, and this naturally calls into question his prerogative to use non-human 'resources' in whatever way they like. This also draws widespread moral intuition that at least some higher animals are closer to humans, and that the both the biotic and the abiotic parts of Nature deserve value in itself, that is, it has intrinsic/inherent value, irrespective of its usefulness to any other species, say, to human race.

We take this opportunity to understand the meaning and significance of critiquing the traditional anthropocentric discourse and the resultant burgeoning of contemporary environmental ethics. We wish to do this in three parts: In Part-I we want to take note on the meaning, nature and development of moral anthropocentrism.

In **Part-II** we shall record the views of some thinkers, including philosophers, supporting anthropocentric stance. But our emphasis will be on examining the arguments generally adduced against anthropocentric spiciesism. In concluding **Part-III** we wish to assert that, though it may sound odd, anthropocentrism appears to be unavoidable in some respects. But that does not, however, mean that we should be speciesist or chauvinist in our behaviour to the non-human world.

I

Let us first be clear what anthropocentrism really means. The term 'anthropocentrism' comes from the Greek words '*anthropos*' (Üíèñùðïò) and '*kentron*'(êÝíôñïí). '*Anthropos*' means 'human being' and '*kentron*' means 'center'. So, literally, anthropocentrism means human-centredness. As a matter of fact, it refers to the traditional belief that humans are at the center of the universe. As a moral norm, anthropocentrism takes human interests to be intrinsically valuable, and upholds that (only) human interests deserve moral consideration. According to the view-point embedded in it, the non-human animals or Nature in general acquire value only in so-far-as it serves human purposes. It thus makes morality and ethics solely a human enterprise. In environmental philosophy anthropocentrism actually stands for the attitudes, values or practices which promote human interests, even at the expense of the basic, crucial needs and interests of non-human species or the Nature in general. To illustrate, if I hit a man or woman without sufficient provocation, my conduct would be judged as morally bad or wrong. But my behavior would not likewise be condemned wrong if I hit and kill an animal, say, a goat, in order to satisfy my palate (non-basic need!).

There are a number of important implications of the anthropocentric view, which strongly influence the ways in which humans have interpreted their relationships with other species and with the Nature and ecosystems. Some of these are noted below:[2]

1. The anthropocentric view suggests that humans have greater intrinsic value than other species. A result of this attitude is that any species that are of potential use to humans can be a 'resource' to be exploited. This use often occurs in an unsustainable fashion that results in degradation, sometimes to the point of extinction of the biological resource, as has occurred with the dodo, great auk, and other animals.

2. The view that humans have greater intrinsic value than other species also influences ethical judgments about interactions with other organisms. These ethics are often used to legitimize treating other species in ways that would be considered morally unacceptable if humans were similarly treated. For example, animals are often treated very cruelly during the normal course of events in medical research and agriculture. This prejudiced treatment of other species has been labeled 'speciesism' by ethicists.

3. Another implication of the anthropocentric view is the belief that humans rank at the acme of the natural evolutionary progression of species and of life. This belief is in contrast to the modern biological interpretation of evolution, which suggests that no species is 'higher' than any others, although some clearly have a more ancient evolutionary lineage, or may occur as relatively simple life forms.

Some environmentalists, however, point out that maintenance of a healthy and sustainable environment is necessary for human well-being *vis-à-vis* for its own sake. They contend that the problem with such a view-point is not that it is human centered, but that we often fail to consider on a broader spectrum in what that well-being really consists. According to this view, we need to develop an enriched, fortified anthropocentric notion of human interest to replace the dominant short-sighted and merely self-regarding conception of the same. One of the first extended philosophical essays, addressing environmental ethics, John Passmore's *Man's Responsibility for Nature,* has been repeatedly criticised by contemporary environmentalists because of its anthropocentric stance, often claimed to be constitutive of traditional western moral thought.

We may, however, distinguish between two versions of anthropocentrism: *absolute* anthropocentrism and *relative* anthropocentrism. Many traditional western ethical perspectives are anthropocentric or human-centered in the sense that they assign intrinsic value only to human beings, which are expressions of *absolute* anthropocentrism. Some other ethical perspectives assign a significantly greater amount of intrinsic value to human beings than to any non-human beings or things such that the protection or promotion of human interests at the expense of non-human beings or things turns out to be nearly always justified, and we might call these positions as *relative* anthropocentrism. The anthropocentric perspective, be it absolute or relative, influences ethical judgments about our interactions with other organisms, be they animals or plants. This view-point is often used to legitimize

treating other species in ways that would be considered morally unacceptable if humans were similarly treated. For example, animals are often treated very cruelly during the normal course of events in medical research and agriculture. We cannot give such type of treatment to the members of *homo sapiens*.

Traditional justifications for anthropocentrism are associated with emphasizing some distinctive characteristics of humans—such as, having an immortal soul or mind, rationality, or sophisticated language—that set them apart from the rest of Nature including animals, and thus making ethics exclusively an human affair. In other words, traditional thinkers have emphasized upon some distinctive characteristics of humans which set them apart from non-human Nature.

If we take a historical look, we would find that we are habituated to think in anthropocentric terms. One enduring source of support for this view is the great Chain of Being, which can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle through Plotinus to Aquinas, which ordered types of being according to their degree of perfection, descending from God, through the angels to humans, with animals and plants below them. The ethical corollary of such a thought has been that less perfect beings may be subordinated to more perfect ones. And from the very ancient period (Western) moral thinkers have been thinking that humans have a prerogative to use or rule over other creatures and the rest of the nature as they see fit for their own purpose.

Side by side, religious sources underpinned this anthropocentric standpoint. In particular, the Judaic-Christian doctrine of creation has fostered the belief that humans are made in the image of God and they share in God's transcendence of Nature and that the whole natural order is created for their sake only. Such religious view has tended to emphasise upon the uniqueness of human beings as they believe in that image of God theory. The story of *Genesis* 1:27-8 of the *Bible* clearly states: "God created man in his own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over fish of the sea, and over fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth."

However, even in granting human dominion over other creatures, it is sometimes argued, God did not intend to disregard the attendant obligation of responsible stewardship. But the environmental philosophers, like Stephen Schwarzchild, observed that the Christian theory of creation does not teach us to love and care for

the Nature, rather indirectly encourages us to hate and dominate over the non-human world. Historian Lynn White, Jr., while searching for the historical roots of our ecological crisis, observes that our culture, including science and technology, has grown out of such a non-sensitive Christian attitude towards Nature. This attitude—'We are superior to nature, contemptuous of it, willing to use it for our slightest whim.'— is 'almost universally held not only by Christians and neo-Christians but also by those who fondly regard themselves as post-Christians.'[3] We have to 'reject the Christian axiom that nature has no reason for existence save to serve man.'[4]

Anyhow, if we try to put the matter in thematic terms, we would find more or less five 'modern' strands of thought that have facilitated such a view-point.[5] These are: (i) the distinction between the mental and the physical, reinforced by the substance-dualism of the father of modern philosophy, Rene Descartes;(ii) the individual nature of existence, reiterated by the 'enlightened' liberals;(iii) the dichotomy between humanity and Nature, propagated by modern science; (iv) the use and value of Nature by social scientists, like Karl Marx; and (v) the domination over Nature perpetuated *via* the philosophy of science of the modernists, like Bacon.

Anyhow, Tim Hayward sees this anthropocentric view from a little different perspective. He considers anthropocentrism to be a misunderstood problem.[6] He holds that the attempt to overcome anthropocentrism surfaces from the Enlightenment era. The basic idea of Enlightenment points to the direction that the right way to live is to seek progress, through the development of greater insights, from a narrow, self-absorbed perspective to a wider and more inclusive perspective.

II

Let us now see what really goes wrong with anthropocentrism. A serious reflection will show what actually is wrong with moral anthropocentricity is speciesism and human chauvinism embedded in it. Although the terms 'speciesism' and 'chauvinism' are sometimes treated as equivalents of 'anthropocentrism' in environmental literature, it is important to distinguish between them, since they are not univocal, and are sometimes misleading.[7] 'Speciesism' is a term coined on analogy with sexism and racism. It means arbitrary discrimination on the basis of species-membership. It is possible to discriminate between human and non-human without being speciesist. One can take a legitimate interest in other members of one's own species without necessarily being detrimental to members of other species. But it would

be morally wrong if one gives preference to interests of member of one's own species over the interests of members of other species for morally arbitrary reasons. It is wrong in the human context to inflict avoidable physical pain because humans are sentient beings. In the same way, cruel and degrading treatment of animals should also be condemned as speciesist. In fact, as long as they are considered in terms of their instrumental value to humans, and not 'for their own sake' – that is, in terms of their own good or interests—the situation would never change. It is worth noting here that the problem lies not with the giving of instrumental consideration to nonhuman beings as such, but in according them only instrumental value. Instrumental considerations of other beings need not *per se* be opposed to their well-being.

Let us now take *human chauvinism*. Human chauvinism is appropriately predicated of attempts to specify relevant differences in ways that invariably favour humans. A human chauvinist could quite consistently accept that the moral arbitrariness of speciesism as always wrong and yet persists in denying claims of relevant similarities between humans and other species. Other animals may not be deemed 'worthy of respect', as they allegedly lack certain features, like rationality, language and subjectivity, which we define as essential of being worthy of respect. But here for our purpose we would ignore this distinction between them, and propose to analyze the wrongness of anthropocentrism in terms of speciesism.

As Donald A. Graft puts it, 'Speciesism is discrimination, prejudice, or differential treatment justified by consideration of species membership.'[8] It supposes that moral status of an entity derives from consideration of species membership only. Jeremy Bentham in his *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Oxford, 1789) first argued against speciesism, though he did not use the term. He writes: "The question is not, Can they *reason*? Nor, Can they *talk*? But, Can they *suffer*?"[9] He expressed the view that interests of every sentient being that has interest are to be taken into account and treated equally with the like interests of any other being. However, the term 'speciesism' has been coined by British psychologist Richard D. Ryder in 1973 to denote a prejudice based on physical differences. "I use the word 'speciesism'," he explained two years later, "to describe the widespread discrimination that is practised by man against other species. Speciesism and racism both overlook or underestimate the similarities between the discriminator and those discriminated against."[10] As we see, this attitude of speciesism is under-

stood on an analogy with racism and sexism. Racism is a prejudice based on race membership while sexism is prejudice based in sex-identity.

It is interesting to note here that some thinkers, including scientists and philosophers, argue in favour of anthropocentric speciesism. Carl Cohen, a Professor of Philosophy at the Residential College of the University of Michigan, does not hesitate to write: "I am a speciesist. Speciesism is not merely plausible; it is essential for right conduct, because those who will not make the morally relevant distinctions among species are almost certain, in consequence, to misapprehend their true obligations."[11] Jeffrey Alan Gray, British psychologist at Oxford, follows him and writes: "I would guess that the view that human beings matter to other human beings more than animals do is, to say the least, widespread. At any rate, I wish to defend speciesism..."[12]

In his defense Cohen holds that both rights and utilitarian arguments against the use of animals in research fail as they 'refuse to recognize the moral differences among species'. If we appreciate the profound differences between humans and non-human animals, he says, we would understand why animals do not and could not have rights and why animal pain does not have as much moral weight as human pain. Carl Cohen argued that racism and sexism are wrong because there are no relevant differences between the sexes or races. Between people and animals however, there are significant differences, and they do not qualify for Kantian personhood, and as such have no rights. Animal rights advocates point out that because many humans do not qualify for Kantian personhood, and yet have rights, this cannot be a morally relevant difference.

However, Cohen and other speciesists think species differences are more fundamental than racial and sexual ones. To the query as to why this should be so, Stephen Post has answered that speciesism is grounded in 'species loyalty'. Species loyalty is "the outgrowth of millennia of human evolution shaped by natural selection. This 'kin selection' or 'kin altruism' is deeply ingrained in the human 'biogram'".[13] In short, speciesism accoding to them, is morally justified as it is biologically natural to favour one's kin.

The term 'speciesism' is used mostly by advocates of animal rights. who believe that it is irrational or morally incorrect to regard animals (which are sentient beings) as mere objects or property to be manipulated. The view is motivated by an acceptance of Darwinism, and its logical corollary which suggests that humans as

they are today would be just as speciesist towards their lesser evolved forms. Some philosophers and scientists, as we have already noted, disagree with moral condemnation of speciesism, arguing that it is an acceptable position and behaviour, as an expression of human supremacy.

Philosophers, like Tom Regan and Peter Singer, have argued against this speciesism. Regan believes that all animals have inherent value or rights and that we cannot assign them a lesser value because of a perceived lack of rationality, while assigning a higher value to infants and the mentally impaired solely on the grounds of their being members of the supposedly superior human species.[14] Singer's philosophical arguments against speciesism are based on the principle of equal consideration of interests. Singer has two key ideas of justification for equality of consideration: First, he adopted Bentham's *pleasure and pain* principle to argue for sentience, the capacity to suffer, in extending the moral domain. Animals feel pain, and this fact makes them moral subjects. Animals who can suffer have an interest in avoiding pain. And pain in a non-human animal is no different in moral significance from pain in a human. Second, he has his principle 'the principle of equal consideration of like interests'. All entities which have a capacity to suffer have an interest in avoiding pain and suffering (of equal moral standing in each case) each such entity has a claim to equality. This does not, of course, mean equal treatment, or egalitarianism. Interests are not identical across living beings. And so equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment.[15]

Anyhow, the excuses generally adduced to justify speciesist practices are varied as they are numerous. These are as it follows:

Animals cannot talk;

Animals cannot make claims;

Animals are not rational;

Only humans can have right;

Morals are exclusively human construction, and so to try to apply morality to non-human world is meaningless; etc.

Given the diverse range of possible differences of treatment that might be part of a speciesist regime, one might naturally be cautious in accepting one single overriding reason in justification of all speciesist practices. A speciesist asserting the moral significance of reasoning must then offer both a relevant threshold for

reasoning ability at which moral consideration comes into play, and an also an objective measurement scheme by which performance to the threshold can be determined. John Tuohey asserts that the logic behind charges of speciesism fails to hold up, and that, although it has been popularly appealing, it is philosophically flawed.[16] Tuohey claims that, even though the animal rights movement has got a significant progress, no one has offered a clear and compelling argument for the equality of species.

Some people who work for racial or sexual equality have said that comparisons between speciesism and racism or sexism are insulting. The universal civil rights movement and the women's movement—both of those social movements are initiated and driven by members of the dispossessed and excluded groups themselves, not by benevolent men or white people acting on their behalf. Both movements were built precisely around the idea of reclaiming and reasserting a shared humanity in the face of a society that had deprived it and denied it. No civil rights activist or feminist ever argued, "We're sentient beings too!" They argued, "We're fully human too!" Animal liberation doctrine, far from extending this humanist impulse, directly undermines it.

Anyhow, Nel Noddings has criticized Peter Singer's analysis of speciesism for being too simplistic, and failing to take into account the context of species preference as concepts of racism and sexism have taken in to account the context of discrimination against humans.[17] Another thinker Camilla Kronqvist sympathizes with Singer's aims, but does not accept his arguments. She writes "To say that our morality rests on attending to somebody's pleasure and pain, also seems to be a pretty crude description of what it is to be a moral being." And concludes "I also find it highly unlikely that a polar bear would care for my interests of leading a long, healthy life if it decided to have me for lunch, and I wonder if I would have time to present it with Singer's arguments when it started to carry out this intention."[18] Singer responds that that fact that animals are not moral agents does not prevent them from being moral patients, just as humans who are not moral agents remain moral patients, so that their ability to be harmed remains the characteristic taken into consideration.

Anyhow, we may, distinguish among *three major* forms of speciesism based on justifying reasons adduced: raw speciesism, strong speciesism and weak speciesism.[19]

Raw speciesism appeals simply to species membership, and nothing else. Its supporters just contend: whether one views human as animals or not, the fact remains that non-humans ˜˜ ˸, in fact, non-human. They declare, 'They just animals and animals are animal   ˌns are human!' Due to total lack of plausible justifying reasons, it may safeiy ʋe said, the raw speciesist doctrine does not carry any rational or moral weight to be explored into. Raw speciesism is not rationally or morally defensible.

Strong speciesism, on the other hand, makes appeal to species membership, but it supplies additional considerations with the intent to show why the species boundary is so relevant in discriminating between humans and non-humans. There are, more or less, four arguments that are generally adduced in favour of strong speciesism.

First, the *biological argument*, which supports the strong speciesim by adding additional considerations related to biological competition between species or genes. For example, someone may argue that human species has an inherent right to compete with and exploit other species to preserve and protect the human species. Moral status then becomes limited to the members of human species only. If someone contends to generalize the scope of moral status, that should be no problem; but that would be limited within that species only!

The main criticism against such argument concerns the absence of unanimity on the concept of species. Species is generally defined in some such language as that, if two animals cannot interbreed to produce viable off-spring, then they are different species. But it may be mentioned as a counter example that lion and tiger are regarded as two separate species, even though they can interbreed. On the other hand, a species of owl- monkey can not interbreed, with they are regarded as a single speciesism. Now, if the concept of species is itself problematic, how can it bear the great moral weight of such a crucial discrimination?

Second, the *importance argument,* that comes to the effect that humans are much more important than non-humans. Such dogmatic assumption sometimes has religious and cultural roots. Third is the *special relation argument,* which goes in this direction that a mother, e.g., being faced with the choice of saving one of two children from a fire, one of whom is her own child, chooses her own child. Gray in *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* argues that no one would find it morally repugnant if the mother chooses her own child to save.[20] And the fourth argument is related to

the *Divine Command* theory. It simply declares that the practice of speciesism is morally acceptable as God approves of this.

Weak speciesism, on the other hand, involves ' peal to contingent facts regarding traits of the parties concerned for its justif: . A supporter may argue that a certain level of rationality is necessary for claiming moral status, and as animals do not have such a level of rationality, they do not merit moral status. The traits that have been used to ground weak speciesist doctrine are varied. For example, it has been contended that in order to merit moral status a being must have desires and preferences, be self-aware, be rational, be sentient, have a soul, and so on.

If we take a look at contemporary environmental philosophy, we would find many moral positions, such as Singer's utilitarianism, Regan's rights theory, and Ryder's sentientism rejects anthropocentric or speciesist view-point. Anthropocentric assumptions are challenged also by modern science, which casts a less exalted light on the human place within nature. Darwin's *Origin of Species* has provided evidence to refute the idea that non-human nature exists to serve man, arguing that natural selection cannot possibly produce any modification in a species exclusively for the good of another species.

A way to overcome anthropocentrism is the recognition of moral value of life. This has resulted in *biocentrism*, which widens the scope of concern to include not only animate creatures, but all living entities including plants. Paul Taylor, who is the champion of this biocentrism, claims that all living things have inherent value and so merit moral respect. Respect for nature, according to him, signifies a life-centered world-view of environmental philosophy. This ethics of 'respect for Nature' has three basic elements: a belief system, an ultimate moral outlook, and a set rules of duty and standards of character. These elements are connected with each other in the following manner: the belief system provides a certain outlook on Nature which supports and makes intelligible an autonomous agent's adopting, as an ultimate moral attitude, the attitude of respect for Nature. Living things and beings are viewed as the appropriate objects of the attitude of respect, and are, accordingly, regarded as entities possessing inherent worth. One then places intrinsic value on the promotion and protection of their good. *Sentientism,* propagated mainly by the animal welfarists, like Peter Singer, Tom Regan, is a variant of biocentrism.

The admission of inherent value of ecosystems is another antidote to

anthropocentrism. This has culminated in *ecocentricism* that casts the ethical net more widely, extending moral consideration to ecosystemic balances as a whole. Ecocentrism is that holistic environmental theory, according to which not only living beings, but the whole ecosystem, including the abiotic parts of Nature, is worthy of moral consideration. The supporters of ecocentrism tend to resist the biocentrist's exclusive concern for living individual organisms. Ecocentrism maintains that adequate eco-ethic must include our relations with ecological systems, processes, along with non-living natural objects. The environmentalists who subscribe to ecocentrism contend that these things have inherent and not mere instrumental value.[21] And so they owe a direct moral obligations from us! An early version of the ecocentric view is found in Aldo Leopold's 'Land Ethic'. Aldo Leopold is an American forester who is regarded as the single most influential figure in the development of an ecocentric environmental philosophy. He feels as early as in 1949 the need for a new ethic, an 'ethic dealing with man's relation to the land and to the animals and plants.'[22] He christened it as 'Land Ethic', which aims at the boundaries of the community to include in its fold soil, water, plants, and animals, or collectively, the land.[23] Arne Naess's Deep Ecology is the most popular form of ecocentrism now a days. Deep Ecology is a radical and holistic environmental theory that brings thinking, feeling, spirituality and action together in tackling imminent eco-catastrophe. As the name 'Deep Ecology' suggests, it goes beyond speciesist anthropocentrism.

III

Finally, a concluding word. Although it may sound odd, anthropocentricity appears to be unavoidable in some respects. Anyone's view of the world is shaped by and limited to his position and way of being within it. From the perspective of any particular being or a particular species there are real respects in which he or his species *is* positioned. Humans have no choice but to think as human, to see through their own eyes. This is what Frederick Ferre calls 'perspectival anthropocentrism' and it is inescapable.[24] Not only that, human-centeredness may in some respects be positively desirable. Just as the term 'self-centered' has been used figuratively in the past to describe well-organized, balanced people, so being human-centered may mean having a well-balanced conception of what it means to be human and of how humans take their place in the world. Human-centeredness may in this sense be positively desirable. As various philosophers and psychologists have pointed out, self-love, properly understood, can be considered a precondition of loving others. It

could be maintained that only if humans know how to treat their fellow humans decently, they would begin to be able to treat members of other species decently.[25] But we should never forget that dogmatic speciesism is morally problematic, and as such, to transcend speciesist anthropocentrism signifies a forward step toward moral perfectionism. On the practical plain, it means that we should stop overriding basic needs and interests of non-human beings in order to serve our cosmetic needs and whims!

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BUDDHISM AND SOCIETY: POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

AMAL KUMAR HARH

Dharma, for Buddhism, is-a means of enlightenment. The Buddha himself compares it to a raft. Just as a raft serves to cross over great stretches of water and then abandoned, so the *Dharma,* by means of which we ferry over the waters of birth and death to the other shore, *Nirvana*, is not something to be taken with us but something to be left behind[1]. In short, it is not an end in itself, but only a means to an end. In modern terminology, its function is purely instrumental and therefore its value only relative. This of course does not mean that it can be dispensed with. So long as we remain on this shore, or are still paddling across the stream, it is indispensable. The pragmatic nature *of Dharma* is emphasized in many a discourse of the Buddha.

The relation between Buddhism and politics is not quite simple. Buddhism comprises, from the institutional point of view, two groups, one large and one small, the first being the community of lay believers, both male and female, and the second, the noble Order of monks. These two groups need not have the same kind of relation to politics. In order to understand clearly the relation between Buddhism, both personal and institutional, on the one hand, and politics in the various senses of the term, on the other, it would be necessary to investigate the relations between (a) the Buddhist doctrine and political theories, (b) Buddhism and the State; (c) the laity and the government, (d) the *Sangha* and the government, (e) the layman and practical politics, and (f) the monk and practical politics.

(a) As far as our knowledge goes, the Buddha confined his attention to questions of spiritual discipline, and refrained from making any pronouncement upon the relative merits of rival political theories and systems. During his time two types of government prevailed in north-eastern India, the monarchical and the republican, but the Buddha did not praise or condemn either. His statement that so long as the Vaijans, a conferacy of republican tribes would assemble repeatedly and in large numbers, just so long their property might be looked for and not their decay, cannot be regarded as favouring republicanism[2]. He merely stated facts of the case without passing any ethical judgment. On one point, however,

the Buddha, and after him the entire Buddhist tradition was quite explicit: the government must uphold the moral and spiritual law being the means to enlightenment. Buddhism naturally demands that the state should recognize the fact that the true goal of life was to attain *nirvāna*. and that, therefore, it has the duty of providing for its citizens a political and social organization within which both monks and the laity can live according to *Dharma*. Between Buddhism, on the one hand, and any political theory which recognizes, either implicitly or explicitly, the supremacy of the moral and spiritual law and makes provision for its individual and collective application, on the other, there can be no disagreement. From the Buddha's social egalitarianism, as well as from his deliberate decentralization of authority in the *Sangha*, it may be inferred that a form of government, in theory democratic, in effect aristocratic (for an intelligent electorate would naturally elect the best man), would be in accordance with his teaching. Buddhism has no objection to either a socialistic or to a capitalistic state provided it makes provision not only for the material, but also for the moral and spiritual well-being of its subjects.

(b) The nature of the relation between Buddhism and the State will vary in accordance with two factors, one being, of course, the nature of the State itself, the other, the relative strength of the Buddhist population. In a predominantly non-Buddhist state, Buddhism would expect to enjoy the same rights as other religious minorities. That is to say, it would demand complete freedom to practise and propagate its tenets, whether persecuted or tolerated, however, Buddhist citizens would always remain loyal to the State to which they belonged. In a predominantly Buddhist State, Buddhism would naturally expect official recognition as the state religion. Under democracy, the State is the people, and the government is only the agency through which the will of the people is carried out. If in their individual capacity the citizens support Buddhism it is only logical that they should do so in their collective capacity, too. Also, Buddhism being divided not into sects but schools, its recognition as the state religion is attended by no difficulty. In Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Kampuchia and Laos only Theravada exists. In Mahayana lands, such as China and Japan, the laity general respect and support all schools, and the state would do the same. Buddhist schools are tolerant, in fact, not only of each other, but also of non-Buddhist traditions.

(c) Not much indeed be said about the relation between the individual citizen and the government, because Buddhism has no means of enforcing among its adher-

ents uniformity of action in the affairs of secular life. It is true that Buddhism does not only inculcate certain principles but also indicates the main lines of their application; the details of the application are left to be worked out by the individual Buddhist, each for himself. Buddhism exhorts, it does not command. It tells us, for example, that to take life is morally wrong; but it leaves us free to determine for ourselves whether the acceptance of this teaching obliges us to be a vegetarian or a conscientious objector. A Buddhist, however, should take an active interest in whatever concerns the material, moral and spiritual well-being of his fellows-citizens. In short, it should be his endeavour to live his social and political life in accordance with the *Dharma.*

(d) The relation of the Government to the *Sangha* is the same as that of the individual by Buddhist to the individual *bhik s u* . The relation of the *Sangha* to the Government corresponds to the relation between the *bhik s u* and the layman. Just as the monk, in. his capacity of guide,'philosopher and friend, indicates to the lay devotee the path of righteousness, so it is the right and duty of the *Sangha,* in the person of its senior most members, to advise the government not only on the propagation of *Dharma* but also on its application to the social and political life of the nation. The *Sangha* must also be able to draw attention to and freely criticize deviations from the *Dharma* on the part of the government, the people, and the political leaders. Unless the *Dharma* is applied to the national life, it will loose its hold over domestic life. Being concerned with the preservation of the *Dharma,* the *Sangha* is inevitably concerned with its application also, whether, to politics or any other sphere of life. Needless to add that the advice of the *Sangha* should never tend to the promotion of anything but peace and prosperity, both at home and abroad. Whoever the *Sangha* spoke to, it would have but one message: "Never in this world does hatred cease by hatred: it ceases only by love. This is the Law Eternal."[3]

The individual monk should have no relation with the government as government except through the Sangha, or with the consent of the *Sangha.* Unless there happens to be a separate portfolio for religious affairs, or a special provision for ecclesiastical councillors, as there is in Thailand, he should not accept any office in the government, and even in such cases as these he should not accept any remuneration. A monk cannot be required to undertake any form of national service; neither is he liable to conscription. In a Buddhist State these

rights would be recognized automatically.

(e) Since the Buddhist layman is connected with the government, he is obviously to take part in practical politics, and all that can usefully be said in this connection is that here, too, he should act in accordance with the *Dharma.*

(f) The monk, however, is under no such obligation. On the contrary, by virtue of the rules which, at the time of his ordination, he undertakes faithfully to observe, he is obliged to refrain from participation in practical politics. The monk should not support or join or even vote for, any political organization. Neither should he participate in meetings or any other public functions of a political or quasi-political nature. For those members of the *Sangha* who feel, as some of Myanmar and Sri Lanka have felt in recent times, that their duties as citizens have a stronger claim on them than their obligations as monk, the only honourable course is to leave the *Sangha.* Enlightenment and elections cannot be won together.

Hardly less striking is the almost invariable association of Buddhism with peace. Not a single page of Buddhist history has even been lurid with the light of inquisitional fires, or darkened with the smoke of heretic cities ablaze, or red with the blood of the guiltless victims of religious hatred. Like the Bodhisattva Manjusri, Buddhism weilds only the sword, of wisdom, and recognizes only one enemy, Ignorance. This is the testimony of history, and is not to the gainsaid.

But even admitting the close, association of Buddhism with peace in Asia it may be questioned whether Buddhism was really the cause and peace the effect. Perhaps their association was fortuitous. Buddhism has a bloodless and Christianity a bloody record, it might be argued, not so much because of any difference between their teachings but because one has propagated among the warlike tribes of Western Europe and the other among the peaceable nations of Asia. The contention is unfounded. Tibet before the introduction of Buddhism, was the greatest military power in Asia. The early history of Myanmar, Cambodia and Thailand shows that the people of those countries were originally of an extremely warlike, even aggressive in disposition. The Mongol hordes at one time overran not only the whole of Central Asia, but also India, China, Persia and Afganistan, and thundered even at the gates of Europe. China exhibited at various periods of her history considerable military activity. The material spirit of Japan is far from being subdued after nearly fifteen centuries of Buddhism. With the possible exceptions of India and China, the nations of Asia were originally no less pugnacious and predatory than those of Europe-. Their subsequent peacefulness was due very largely to the pacific teach-

ings of Buddhism. But one may be aspects to ... be ... mainly to ... tensions among hostile nations by preaching to them a God of Battles. It may therefore be concluded that the association between Buddhism and peace is not fortuitous but inevitable. Buddhism has been in the past, is at present, and will continue to be in future, a factor contributing to the establishment of universal peace.

From what has been said above, it should already be clear that in the present, no less than in the past, Buddhism implies peace. But this peace is not a condition of unstable political equilibrium but rather a state of mind purified from all feelings of antagonism and thoroughly permeated by that impersonal and universal love, which the Buddhists call, *maitri*. Buddhism works from within outwards. Its hierarchy enjoys no international diplomatic status, and chooses to act not by means of behind - the - scenes political wire - pulling but by the open practice end propagation of the pacific teachings of the Buddha. On the political plane. Buddhism does not take sides. Love, in the sense *of maitri*, is the most powerful force in the world; but it is a natural force. Whether one's love be directed towards concrete persons and things, or whether it be directed towards abstract conceptions and ideals, if it causes one to feel hatred towards some other object, of a different kind, it is of a limited extent, and therefore, not true love but only a species of attachment. Similarly, if peace, which is a form of love, is not universal it is not peace at all. The conclusion of a private peace between two or more nations, to the exclusion of the remainder, is in reality impossible. Should such a "peace" in any way threaten the security of any other state, even its observance would be on no higher a moral plane than the honesty that is popularly supposed to exist among thieves. India having accepted Asoka's great ideal of *dharmavijaya or* conquest by Righteousness, it was inevitable that this very Buddhist *maitri,* or love and goodwill towards all, should form the ultimate spiritual basis of her policy of dynamic neutrality in world affairs. It is the *raison d'etre* of the fact that, while working unremittingly for world peace, the Government of India consistently refuses to align itself with any power bloc. Such an attitude has naturally drawn her closer to the Buddhist countries of South-East Asia, whose respective policies are naturally inspired by one and the same ideal. But by its very nature, such a relationship does not and cannot imply hostility or even indifference towards any other country or group of countries. In fact, it is not one political group among other groups, with its own exclusive preferences and limited loyalties, but rather a slowly expanding centre radiating to the world the impersonal, universal and neutral power of *maitri.* It is in this light that one must view the

Government of India's attempts to renew her ancient ties with the countries of Asia. It is because Buddhism alone can provide,the necessary basis for these attempts that its political implications for Asia, and through Asia for the whole world, are so enormous and so important.

Buddhism has remained a cultural force in Europe, and Russell has gone so far as to declare that if he were compelled to choose between the religions of the world he would choose Buddhism. We may recall that Schopenhauer, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, had declared himself a Buddhist, and following him Nietzsche, and still later Wittgenstein have become intellectual forces looking back to Buddhism, and motivating what now goes under the banner of postmodernism.

But more importantly, let us not forget that the Buddha aimed at the development of a new type of freemen, free from prejudices, intent on working out his own future, with reliance on one's own self, *attadipa*. As Radhakrishnan has pointed out that the Buddha is an outstanding representative of our religious tradition, and his teachings have become integral part of our culture. In. a sense, says Radhakrishnan, the Buddha is a maker of modem Hinduism[4].

The Buddha's humanism had crossed racial and national barriers. Yet the chaotic condition of world affairs reflects the chaos in man's souls. History has become universal in spirit. Its subject matter is neither Europe nor Asia, neither East nor West, but humanity in all lands and ages. In spite of political divisions, the world is one, whether we like it or not. The fortunes of everyone are linked up with those of others. But we are suffering from an exhaustion of spirit, an increase of egoism, individual and collective, which seem to make the ideal of a world society too difficult to desire. What we need today is a spiritual view of the universe. We must recover the lost ideal of spiritual freedom *atma labhan na param vidyate*. If we wish to achieve peace we must maintain that inner harmony, that poise of soul, which are the essential elements of peace. We must possess ourselves even though all else is lost. The free spirit sets no bounds to its love, recognizes in all human beings a spark of holiness, and offers itself up as a willing victim to the cause of mankind. It casts off all fear except that of wrong doing, passes the bounds of time and death and finds inexhaustible power in life eternal. Let us not forget that Buddhism is a religion of kindness, humanity and equality.

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DHARAMAKĪRTI'S ATTACK ON "*MATĀNUJÑĀ*" :
SOME POSSIBLE ANSWERS

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Dharmakīrti, the author of *Vādanyāya*, is one of the most eminent Buddhist philosophers and logician of the seventh century A.D. He has criticized the *Prācina* · Nyāya philosophers, mainly Uddyotakara. In Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāya we get his criticisms against the *Prācina* Nyāya view of *nigrahasthānas* or points of defeat. The pillars of *Prācina* Nyāya tradition are Maharṣi Gautama — the writer of *Nyāyasūtra*, Vātsyāyana— the author of *Nyāyabhāṣya* and Uddyotakara—the writer of *Nyāyavārttika*. Here, all criticisms are not my object of discussion. Our present discussion will be restricted to the issue that how Dharmakīrti attacked the *Prācina* Nyāya view of *nigrahasthāna* or point of defeat named "*Matānujñā*" and then I will try to give some possible answers in favour of Nyāya philosophy. Hence, Dharmakīrti's logic and criticism can be better understood on the background of *Prācina* Nyāya discussion of this *nigrahasthāna* or point of defeat.

But before we arrive at our main discussion, first we have to be acquainted with what *nigrahasthāna* generally is, according to the Nyāya point of view and how their concept differs from the account of Dharmakīrti in this matter.

A.The nature of *Nigrahasthāna* in general according to *Prācina* Nyāya and Buddhist point of view.

Nigrahasthāna is the last *padārtha* among the sixteen *padārthas* accepted by the *Nyāyasāstra*. Maharṣhi Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra* has expressed the definition of *nigrahasthāna* thus:"*Vipratipattirapratipattis ca nigrahasthānam.*" ||19||60|| i.e. misapprehension and non-apprehension are *nigrahasthānas*.[1] Bhāsyakāra Vātsyāyana has accepted *viparīta jñāna* and *kutsita jñāna* as the meaning of the term "*Vipratipatti*" occurred in the *sūtra*.[2] On the contrary, the term "*Apratipatti*" generally means lack of knowledge about the actual subject. But, by this term Bhāsyakāra has understood the non-performance of the duties of the *vādin* and *prativādin* participated in the debate.[3] There are five types of duties of a person involved in argumentation. Such as :

1. Establishment of one's own position.

2. Realisation of others view.

3. Refutation of the alternative position.

4. Refutation of the charge raised by the other.

                                and

5. Any one among the four subjects.

Bhāsyakāra holds that the meaning of the word "*Nigraha*" is defeat. Therefore, the term "*Nigrahasthāna*" means the cause (*hetu*) or the ground of defeat in the course of debate. Hence, this *nigrahasthāna* is relevant to the place where debate is going on. Nyāya philosophers have equated *kathā* or discussion with debate. Vātsyāyana has explicitly stated that *kathā* is of three types i.e. "*Vāda*" "*Jalpa*" and "*Vitaṇḍā* ".[4] Therefore, it is seen that the relevance of *nigrahasthāna* presents in the context of these three varieties of *kathā*. Among these three types of discussions "*Vāda*" is a friendly discussion between a teacher and his disciple or between two co-disciples where the question of victory and defeat does not arise. It is a form of *kathā* which is guided solely by the motive of ascertaining the truth. "*Jalpa*" stands for a debate between two parties where both the parties try to justify their own position against each other. Hence, the question of victory and defeat here is most important. "*Vitaṇḍā*" stands for a debate similar to "*Jalpa*" but it's difference from "*Jalpa*" is that in "*Vitaṇḍā*" one of the parties does not attempt to establish his own position but he only attempts to refute the position of the other party.

Vātsyāyana also holds that *nigrahasthānas* are the determinatives or locus of the real faults of *vādin* and *prativādin*. Hence, *nigrahasthāna* is not itself a defeat situation. The ultimate consequence or effect of *nigrahasthāna* is defeat. This is the significance of the statement of *Bhāsyakāra.* He also concedes that most of the *nigrahasthānas* e.g. "*Pratijñāhān i*" etc. arises depending on *pratijñā* or any one of the *avayavas* accepted by the *Naiyāyikas*.[5]

Contradicting Bhāsyakāra's view Uddyotakara opines that *avayava* as *pratijñā* etc. tends to be defective due to non-apprehension or misapprehension of the person involved in argumentation. Hence, whether by the tool or determinant or by the proposition, the person involved in argumentation is being defeated.[6] Uddyotakara has also stated about the nature of *nigrahasthāna* in general that

these *nigrahasthānas* or the points of defeat are the real causes of defeat and the determinants of the real faults.[7]

Nyāyasūtrakāra Maharṣi Gautama generally divided *nigrahasthānas* on two grounds i.e. *apratipatti* or non-apprehension and *vipratipatti* or misapprehension. But since the causes of defeat i.e. *apratipatti* and *vipratipatti* are enormous, Maharṣi has mentioned twenty two kinds of *nigrahasthānas* in particular. Bhāṣyakāra Vātsyāyana is in total agreement with this opinion of Maharṣi Gautama.

Uddyotakara holds that though *nigrahasthāna* in general is of two kinds, if we classify these two types of points of defeat, there can be twenty two kinds of *nigrahasthānas*.[8] But this does not mean that *nigrahasthānas* are restricted to these twenty two kinds. Basically, Maharṣi Gautama has mentioned about these twenty two kinds of *nigrahasthānas* as an example. In reality, *nigrahasthānas* are enormous.

Twenty two *nigrahasthānas* mentioned by Maharṣi are respectively – *Pratijñāhāni, Pratijñāntara, Pratijñāvirodha, Pratijñāsamnyāsa, Hetvantara, Arthāntara, Nirarthaka, Avijñātārtha, Apārthaka, Apraptakala, Nyūna, Adhika, Punarukta, Ananubhāsana, Ajñāna, Apratibhā, Vikṣepa, Matānujñā, Paryanuyojyopekṣana, Niranuyojyānuyoga, Apasiddhānta, Hetvābhāsa.*[9]

The meaning of *nigrahasthāna* for Naiyāyikas and Dharmakīrti appears to be not the same. *Nigrahasthāna* as explained by Dharmakīrti does not mean *Parājayavastu* as defined by Bhāṣyakāra and *Vārttikakāra*, rather he accepts *nigrahasthāna* to be *nigrahādhikarana*.[10] His commentator Śāntarakṣita in his *Vipañcitārtha* also stated that *nigrahasthāna* means *parājaya-adhikarana*.[11]

The so called *avayava* acknowledged by the Naiyāyikas can not be considered by Dharmakīrti to be necessary constituents of an argument. Hence, in Nyāya *anumāna avayavatva* has nothing to do with *nigrahasthānatva*.

It is important to mention that Dharmakīrti's account of the nature of debate differs significantly from Nyāya account. What Naiyāyikas call *Vāda* resembles what Dharmakīrti calls *prapañcakathā* or *vistarakathā*. *Prapañcakathā* is a diffuse discussion which is not governed by any rules concerning victory or defeat. But it differs from the Naiyāyikas' *vāda* in this matter that it is not restricted to the discussion between teacher and his disciple or between two co-disciples. It can

take place between any two persons interested in a subject.

What the Naiyāyika's call *Jalpa* resembles what Dharmakīrti calls *Vāda*. *Vāda* of Dharmakīrti is a debate between two parties trying to argue in support of their own cases and refute the cases of each other. The question of victory and defeat does arise in the case of Dharmakīrti's *Vāda*. But, it is different from Naiyāyika's *Jalpa* in at least two important ways. Firstly, the purpose behind *Jalpa* is a protection of one's own philosophical determination.[12] On the contrary, the purpose behind Dharmakīrti's *Vāda* is to persuade the other debater rationally, to help him achieve the knowledge of truth and to remove his misconceptions. Naiyāyikas and Dharmakīrti associate their concepts of victory and defeat with their goal of *Jalpa* and *Vāda* respectively. Secondly, since *Jalpa* is to be used as a weapon of self defence and for winning over others, the use of both rational as well as irrational devices was permitted in the course of debate by the Naiyāyikas. On the contrary, Dharmakīrti condemned the use of any irrational means (such as *chala*) in the course of debate.[13]

The third type of *kathā* "*Vitaṇḍā*" which was accepted by the Naiyāiyikas as a means to self defence was totally disapproved by Dharmakīrti.

Moreover, Dharmakīrti does not accept twenty two kinds of *nigrahasthānas*. He accepts only two kinds of *nigrahasthānas* i.e. *asādhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*. The former arises from *vādin's* side and the later from *prativādin's* side. Dharmakīrti also states that any other occasion of defeat apart from these two, however, is not just. Hence, we do not accept it.[14]

Asādhanāṅgavacana as a *nigrahasthāna* arising from *vādin's* side need to be understood broadly. It includes failure to mention any *sādhanāṅga*, failure to justify such an incorporation, failure to justify omission of it. On the contrary, *adoṣodbhāvana* or not pointing out the fault of the disputant is the occasion of opponent's defeat. When the disputant presents the proof, but the opponent who has accepted the opposite view, does not point out any fault in the opponent's argument, then the opponent is to be called defeated.[15] This occasion of defeat takes place either because the proof given by the disputant is without any fault or because the proof is fallacious but the opponent does not realise the fault or he is incapable of indicating that fault.[16] It is important to note that even if the disputant states an inadequate proof, he is to be called non-defeated if the inadequateness of the proof is not indicated by his opponent. For, the ascertainment of victory and defeat is

relative to vitiating each other's capacity.

The second meaning of *adoṣodbhāvana* is pointing out a fault which is not the real fault in the proof. It is a ground of opponent's defeat because it is a case of giving a false answer and infact here he has a false understanding.[17]

B. Nature of *"Matānujñā"* from Nyāya point of view and Dharmakīrti's criticism of it.

The author of Nyāyasūtra Maharṣi Gautama has expressed the definition of *"Matānujñā"* by saying that : *"Svapakṣe doṣābhyupagamāt parapakṣe doṣaprasaṅgo Matānujñā"* ||20||524||[18] i.e. *Matānujñā* or "permitting opponent's view" means implicating the same fault in the opponent's position while accepting the fault pointed out by his opponent in one's own position. Vātsyāyana, the writer of Nyāyabhāṣya has explained the significance of this *sūtra* by saying that --- if the proponent without ruling out the fault in his own position indicated by his opponent says thus; "This fault is committed by you too" i.e. if he tries to show that the argument of his adversary is infected by the same objection, then the proponent concerned must be defeated by the point of defeat named *"Matānujñā"*. For, he implicitly admits defectiveness of his own position by permitting the opponent's view. Vātsyāyana also concedes that this *nigrahasthāna* arises out of the fact that one not only concedes defectiveness of one's argument but also seeks to certify it on the basis of opponent's argument being beset with similar defectiveness. Hence, here the proponent concerned deserves to be defeated.[19]

Uddyotakara has explained this point of defeat by help of an example. Let, the opponent raises the objection against the proponent by saying that---'You are a thief because you are a human being'. Now, if the proponent or disputant without trying to rule out the fault indicated by his opponent says that : "You too" i.e. if he raises the same objection against his opponent then the proponent concerned must be defeated by the point of defeat named *"Matānujñā"*. [20]

Advancing one step forward Uddyotakara also holds that this *nigrahasthāna* stems from one's ignorance of the proper answer that is called for against the charges raised by his opponent. [21]

Dharmakīrti opens his criticism of the view of Nyāya regarding this *nigrahasthāna* showing that the illustrative example of *Prācina* Nyāya regarding *Matānujñā* is erroneous. For, no sensible person ever tries to prove someone to be

a thief on the ground of his being a human being. Hence, Dharmakīrti holds that the example on the basis of which Uddyotakara has tried to establish *Matānujñā* as a separate *nigrahasthāna* is simply defective and misleading.[22] Moreover, Dharmakīrti argues that even if one said to another that he is a thief when he is not so, there is neither a question of accepting it nor a question of defeat. According to Dharmakīrti the people who argues in such a loose way, cannot be made determinant of for feiture.[23] Finding faults in persons rather than in argument advanced cannot be the basis of one's success or failure of argument.[24] If the original argument given by the disputant does not involve *asādhanāṅga* then no arguments of this type can disapprove it. But here, since arguments employed by both sides are defective then success or failure cannot be attributed to the either sides. Therefore, in Dharmakīrti's opinion employment of such kind of arguments is not a methodologically proper way of determining one's success or failure in the course of argumentation. And hence, "*Matānujñā*" can not be regarded as a *nigrahasthāna*.

C. Some possible answers in response to Dharmakīrti's criticism

Now I will try to give some possible answers in favour of Nyāya philosophy.

I have already mentioned that when an opponent of a disputant raises some charges against the proponent after establising his (the proponent's) own view, then the duty of the disputant is to answer the criticism or refute the charges brought against him by his opponent. There are two ways to answer the charges being raised by the opponent. Either (1) the proponent can show that the charge raised by his opponent is fallacious or (2) the proponent can answer the criticism of his opponent by reconstructing his own position.

In the above case there may be two situations. Either (1) the proponent could not able to show that the charge raised by the opponent is fallacious or (2) he could not able to get rid of his own fault by reconstructing his own position i.e. the proponent is completely unable to give answer to the charges brought against him by his opponent. Even in the course of debate in order to conceal his incapability and to divert the concentration of the council or the audiance on other side, he (the proponent) raised against his opponent the same charges.

The question now is : can the above situation be regarded as the case of *nigrahasthāna*, named "*Matānujñā*"? In answer to this question it can be said that the above situation is the case of *nigrahasthāna* named "*Matānujñā*" and it is

caused by non-apprehension or *apratipatti* in order to refute the objection raised by the others.

When, according to Nyāya philosophy, in the *kathās* or discussions e.g. in *"Jalpa"* and *"Vitaṇḍā"* the aim of the two parties involved in argumentation is to win over the other, there can take place such a separate *nigrahasthāna* named *"Matānujñā."*

The Naiyāyikas also hold that generally there are two reasons of loosing a debate or committing a *nigrahasthāna*. The first is *vipratipatti* or misapprehension and the second one is *apratipatti* or non-apprehension. And in accordance with nyāya philosophy *"Matānujñā"* is a point of defeat or *nigrahasthāna* arises out of one's non-apprehension.

The question naturally occurs : what is the cause behind the non-apprehension to refute the objection raised by the other?

In answer to this question we can say that if the charge raised by the opponent is fallacious then the proponent's non-apprehension to refute the charge of his opponent may be due to his incapability to realise that the charge raised by his opponent is fallacious. In that case, *"Matānujñā"* can be regarded as an *apratipattimūlak nigrahasthāna* caused by non-apprehension of the other's charge which is fallacious.

Again, the charge raised by the opponent whether right or wrong, in such a case the proponent's reason of non-apprehension to refute the charge of his opponent may be his incapability to refute the criticism of his opponent i.e. either the proponent does not know the method to refute the opponent's objection or he does not know the application of the method to refute his opponent's view.

Hence, in the above situation *"Matānujñā"* also can be regarded as an *apratipattimūlak nigrahasthāna* which is caused either by his non-apprehension of the method to refute the other's objection or by the non-apprehension of the application of the method to refute the other's objection.

Finally, we can conclude that there is no doubt in saying that from the point of view of Nyāya *"Matānujñā"* can achieve the status of a separate *nigrahasthāna* or point of defeat. Since, according to Dharmakīrti the aim of *Vāda* is to give right knowledge by removing the misconception of the person involved in argumentation and to discuss rationally not to achieve success by any hook or crook. *"Matānujñā"*

has been disapproved by him as a separate *nigrahasthāna* . But if we judge this matter within the framework of Nyāya philosophy we can unhesitatingly say that "*Matānujñā*" can extract the right of its being a separate *nigrahasthāna* or point of defeat.

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(b) Phanibhūsan Tarkavāgis — *Nyāyadars an*, Nyāya Sūtra —1.2.19, Gautama, 1981, P- 467.

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(a) Vātsyāyana Bhāsya, Nyāya Sūtra —1.2.19, *Nyāyadars an*,

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3. "*Apratipattistvārambhavisaye anārambhah .*"

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4. "*Tisrah kathā bhavanti vādo jalpo vitandā ceti.... .*"

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5. "*Nigrahasthānāni khalu parājayavasfūnyaparādhādhikaranāni prāyena pratijñā dyavayavās rayā ni.*"

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7."...*nigrahasthānāni tu parājaya vastūni aparādhādhikaranāni."*

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8."...*samānyatadhikritya nigrahasthāne dve, bhedavistaravivaksˊāyāṁ tu dvārviṁsˊatidhā bhedah."*

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9."*Pratijñāhanih , Pratijñāntaraṁ, Pratijñāvirodhah , Pratijñāsaṁ nyāso, Hetvantaramarthāntaraṁ, Nirarthakamavijñā tā rthamapā rthakama praptakālaṁ,* Nyūnamadhikaṁ, *Punaruktamananubhāsanamajñānamapratibhā, Viks epo, Matānujñā, Paryanuyojyopeksˊaṇaṁ, Niranuyojyānuyoga'pasiddhānto Hetvābhāsāsˊ ca nigrahasthānāni."* ||1||505||

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10."...*nigrahādhikaranaṁ ; ...*" —Dharmakīrti —*Vādanyāya,* 1972, P-5.

11."...*nigrahasthānaṁ parājayādhikaranaṁ.*" —Vipañcitārtha on *Vādanyāya,* 1972, P-4.

12."...*jalpavitaṇḍe tattvadhyavasāyasaṁraksˊaṇārthamityuktaṁ.*" —Phaṇibhūsan Tarkavāgisˊ —Vātsyāyana Bhāsya, Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.1--- *Nyāyadarsˊ* an, Gautama, 1981, P-46.

13."*Vāde chalavyavahāranisedhah.*" —Dharmakīrti ---*Vādanyāya,* 1972, P-68.

14."*Asādhanāngavacanamadosodbhāvanaṁ dvayoh . Nigrahasthānaṁ, anyattu na yuktamiti nesyate."* —Dharmakīrti —*Vādanyāya,* 1972, P- 4-5.

15."*Adosodbhāvanaṁ prativādino nigrahasthānaṁ . Vādinā sādhane prayukte'bhyupagatottarapaks o yatra visaye prativādī yadā na dosamudbhāvayati, tadā parājito vaktavyah."* —Dharmakīrti —*Vādanyāya,* 1972, P- 67.

16."*Tatah punah sādhanasya nirdosatvāt, sadosatve'pi prativādino'jñānāt,*

pratipādanāsāmarthyād va."—Dharmakīrti —*Vādanyāya*, 1972, P- 68.

17."*Athavā -yo na doṣaḥ sādhanasya, tadabhāve'pi vādinā tadasādhayitumiṣṭasyārthasyasiddhervidhātabhāvāt, tasyodbhāvanaṁ prativādino nigrahādhikaraṇaṁ , mithyottrābhidhānāt*."—Dharmakīrti —*Vādanyāya*, 1972, P- 69.

18."*Svapakṣe doṣābhyupagamāt parapakṣe doṣaprasaṅgo Matānujñā"* ||20||524||---Gautama,Nyāya Sūtra-5.2.20, *Nyāyadars an,* 1985, P-1193.

19."*Yaḥ pareṇa codinaṁ doṣaṁ svapakṣe'bhyupagamyānuddhritya vadati-bhavatpakṣe'pi samāno doṣa iti, sa svapakṣe doṣābhyupagamāt parapakṣe doṣam prasañjayan* paramatamanujānātīti Matānujñā nāma nigrahasthānamāpadyata *iti"* ---Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya, Nyāya Sūtra-5.2.20, *Nyāyadars an,* Gautama, 1985, P-1193-1194.

20."*Udāharaṇaṁ — bhavāṁ s caurah puruṣatvāditi, sa taṁ pratibrūyāt bhavānapīti, s'o bhupagamya doṣaṁ parapakṣe'bhynujānātīti nigrihito veditavyaḥ ."*

Uddyotakara —Nyāyavārttika — *Nyāyadars an ,* Nyāya Sūtra —5.2.20, Gautama, 1985, P- 1193.

21."*Etaktu nāta eva, — yata evāyamuttare vaktavye prasaṅgaṁ karoti, tata evottaraparijñānānnigrihyata* iti."

Uddyotakara —Nyāyavārttika —*'Nyāyadars an ,* Nyāya Sūtra —5.2.20, Gautama, 1985, P- 1194.

22."*Atrāpi yadi puruṣatvāccauro bhavānapi syāt na ca bhavatā naiyamiṣṭastasmānnāyaṁ cauryaheturiti yadyayamabhiprāyaḥ , tadā na kas ciddoṣaḥ anabhimate tadātmani cauratvena hetudars ane dūṣaṇāt*." -—Dharmakīrti —Vādanyāya, 1972, P-121.

23."*Santi hyevamprakārā api vyavahārā loka iti*." —Dharmakīrti —Vādanyāya, 1972, P-122.

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THE SEARCH FOR A PERFECT LANGUAGE: A STUDY IN RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

TAPAN KUMAR DE

The discovery of language, no doubt is the turning point of the development of human society. The functions of language in our daily-life have a profound influence. It plays the dominant role in the field of communications, to exchange and express our thoughts. It is the language that helps us to understand other's thoughts, as well as to make understandable the speaker to the hearers. In a nutshell, the idea of developed society, excluding the development of language will disappear. So, it is true that language plays a dominant and useful role in various aspects in our society.

Bertrand Russell, the eminent British philosopher of twentieth century deals with language with much care and seriousness. Like other linguistic philosophers, Russell also was interested to deal with language to explain the world properly. Because, to uncover the world, one must analyse the basis of the world. And undoubtedly, it can be said that nothing, but language is an important tool for representing the world. So, Russell, in his philosophy of language deals with language in a different and unique manner. He fully realises the importance and influence of language in our daily life and wants to disclose the philosophical problems with the help of language. When he engages himself to explain the philosophical problems that appear to him, he realises the inadequacy and limitations of ordinary language that we use in our everyday life to communicate with others or to exchange our ideas. So he is in search of a philosophical or logical or perfect language. The idea of logical language or perfect language plays a key role in Russell's philosophy of language. If we take discerning at the development of Russell's philosophy of language, we will see that Russell wants to transform the ordinary language to a perfect language to explain the world perfectly. Russell thinks that the ordinary language or the natural language incorporates some limitations by nature. And for this reason it is unable to explain the world properly. There is no doubt that some deficiencies are there in ordinary language and they should be carefully eliminated to make it a perfect one to serve the philosophical purpose.

In this exposition, I just want to deal with the idea of language of Russell

in an expository manner. I will show in the first part of this discussion the idea of ordinary language and its usefulness. The deficiencies of ordinary language will also be discussed in this part to show the ground for its transformation into a perfect language. In the second part, I will convey the idea of perfect language and also the criteria of it as expressed by Russell. In the concluding part, I will show that there is no hostility between the idea of ordinary language and the perfect language. Russell has no intention to exterminate the ordinary language, on the contrary, he just wants to show that ordinary language has a useful part to play in our daily life, but it must have some special characteristics to be a perfect one to express the world in a logical sense.

<div align="center">Part-I</div>

Ordinary language and our daily life

Language is a useful and integral part of our daily life. Three purposes are served by language. Language is used to indicate facts, to express the state of mind of speakers and to understand the state of hearers. When a person says something about the world, he indicates a fact. Suppose, a person says that the present president of India is a woman, by uttering this sentence, he is indicating a fact. One may use language to express his or her mental state. 'I am angry', 'I am feeling guilty', - such types of sentences are used to express the present state of mind of a speaker. Another purpose, perhaps, the most important purpose of language is to mould the hearers. Imperative sentences are the best examples of that purpose.

Russell says in his famous book, '*Human knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*' that language has two primary purposes, expressions and communications. A person may express his joy and sorrow through language or he may express his ideas that occur in his mind. On the other hand language may be used to communicate with others by pointing or by uttering the word 'look'! [1]

According to Russell, expressions and communications are not always separated. Uttering a word one can serve two purposes simultaneously. [2] As for example, the utterance of the word 'look' serves the both purposes of communication and expression at the same time. Uttering the word 'look', one may express horror after seeing a bear coming out of the forest and at the same time he communicates with others. According to Russell, this applies not only to elementary forms of language, but also in poetry, songs etc. Music is also considered as a form of

language in which emotions and informations are conveyed simultaneously. Again, it is said by Russell that communication does not mean to give only information, it includes also commands, questions, requests etc.[3] Suppose, one says to a child pointing out an ox that it is an ox. Here he gives an information to the child, as well as he alerts the child not to go to the ox.

Again Russell says about the interconnected merits of ordinary language. According to him, there are two interconnected merits of ordinary language; first, that it is social and second, that it supplies public expressions for thought.[4] It is language which helps us to understand others' thoughts and make understandable the speaker's thoughts to others. In this way language plays its social role, as well as helps us to exchange our thoughts. The utility of ordinary language, says Russell, depends on the distinction between public and private expressions. This distinction depends partly on psychology, partly on the persistence of sound waves and light quanta, which makes possible the two forms of language i.e. in the form of speech and in the form of writing.[5] Language, to Russell, is a way to externalise and to make public our expressions. Possible thoughts, which are not actual, are also expressed through language. Russell says, in this connection that there can be thought without language, but if you want to express it, to make it a public one, you must have to use language.[6]

So if we go through the philosophy of language of Russell, we will see that he does not deny or reject the utility of ordinary language in ordinary discourse. Rather he appreciates its multifunctional attitude. But Russell does not want to confine himself in the area of ordinary language at the time of doing philosophy. Rather, he wants to transform our ordinary language in to a logical or perfect one. A question may arise in this connection. Why does Russell want to transform ordinary language in to a logical or perfect language? The simple and more general answer to this question is that though ordinary language has some special characteristics and it serves various purposes in our daily life, it has some deficiencies too. And Russell thinks that such deficiencies should be bracketed or eliminated to make it a perfect language. Without the elimination of that defects of ordinary language, it will not be able to serve the purpose of logic or philosophy. So, at the time of doing philosophy we should have to overcome those deficiencies of ordinary language. For this reason, Russell is in search for a perfect language and he wants to transform our ordinary language into a perfect language.

Defects of ordinary language

Russell has detected some defects or demerits of ordinary language. According to him, to get the real or true meaning of the world these defects should be eliminated carefully. It is also argued by Russell that this elimination is necessary to make it a perfect language to serve the philosophical purposes. The whole process i.e. the elimination of the defects of ordinary language detected by Russell and to make it a perfect one is nothing but the transformation. I call it transformation, because, ordinary language is not annulled by Russell, rather he admits the usefulness of ordinary language in our daily life. But as ordinary language is pregnant with some unwanted defects, it is incapable of representing the world in a proper way. So, by eliminating those defects Russell wants to enter into the world of perfect language from the realm of ordinary language. The deficiencies of ordinary language detected by Russell are as follows :

1.   Vagueness

It is said that various demerits of ordinary language are detected by Russell. Vagueness is one of them. Russell, in his famous essay 'Vagueness' shows that – "language has many properties which are not shared by things in general."[7] In this essay he is concerned particularly about the vagueness of language. According to the Cambridge Dictionary of philosophy. "Vagueness is a property of expressions in virtue of which it can give rise to a 'borderline case."[8] A borderline case is a situation in which the application of a particular expression to a particular object does not generate an expression with a definite truth-value; i.e. the piece of language in question neither unequivocally applies to the object nor fails to apply.[9]

Russell defines vagueness by contrasting it with the idea of accuracy. According to Russell, a presentation is vague, when the relation between the representing system and the represented system is not accurate,[10] i.e. when it is not one – one relation, but one – many relation. For example, a photograph which is so smudged that it might equally represent Brown or Jones or Robinson is vague. A small scale map is usually more vague than a large – scale map, because it does not show all the turns and twists of the roads, rivers, etc, so that various slightly different courses are with the representation that it gives. Russell holds that all ordinary languages lack accuracy and is therefore vague.[11]

According to Russell, vagueness is a property of words only. Suppose,

one says to his friend that Jones is bald. Here the word 'bald' is vague, as there is no accurate criterion of the word 'bald'. There are two separate classes being bald and not bald. The person having no hair on his head is being called bald, and on the other hand who has hairs on his head is not bald. But what about those persons who have a little hair on their heads? It may not be permissible to designate them as bald, as we are habituated to use the word 'bald' to indicate those persons who have little hairs on their heads. So, it can be said that the world 'bald' is vague.[12]

Now, it should be clear why vagueness is the property of words only, not the world? If we go through Russell's discussion, we will see that Russell has some clarifications regarding this matter. He opines that things, such as tables, chairs etc. are not vague. They are in the world with their properties. What is vague is their representation. So, it can be deduced in regard to vagueness that Russell's view concerns with the relation between the representation and the thing represented.

Vagueness to Russell appears in degrees. That means some concepts are more vague than others. The word 'religion' is more vague than the word 'food'. Because, it is too much difficult to determine whether one kind of ritual is religion or not. There are so many characteristics of religion and for this reason it is not as clear as daylight to designate it as a religion. On the other hand, the word 'food' is less vague than the word 'religion.' Because the meaning of the word 'food' is clear to all of us. Foods are nothing but one kind of things to be taken for energy, to be taken for survival.[13]

Now, come to the point. Why vagueness is being called a demerit of ordinary language? A vague word is unable to explain the world accurately. It will bring various meanings of a particular situation to various persons. Suppose, one may say that the bull is dangerous. Here the intention of the speaker is not clear. He may utter this sentence to describe a fact or to alert the hearer to keep safe distance from that furious creature. But simply following this sentence no one can get clear idea of the speaker's intention. Because it is vague. In this way vagueness stands against the actual meaning of a sentence. So, it is necessary to avoid vagueness to capture the real meaning of a sentence. Following Russell, it can be said that to avoid vagueness the accuracy of correspondence between the representation and the represented thing should be maintained always.

2. Ambiguity

Ambiguity, as exhibited by Russell, is the other major defect of ordinary language. Ambiguity refers to the multiple meaning or sense or semantic representation of a word. That means, a word having multiple sense is an ambiguous word. According to the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. "A lexical ambiguity occurs when a lexical item (word) assigned multiple meaning by the language."[14] There are two types of ambiguity occurs when a lexical item (word) two types of ambiguity according to this Dictionary – (i) homonymy and (ii) polysemy. Homonymy refers to the different words having the same sound, but different sense, as for example 'knight' and 'night'. On the other hand, polysemy refers to the words having multiple sense. The word 'lamb' is an appropriate example in this regard. It refers to both, the animal and as well as flesh.[15]

In Russell's point of view, there are two types of ambiguity in our ordinary language, i.e. (i) syntactic ambiguity and (ii) semantic ambiguity, Russell holds. "A sentence is syntactically ambiguous if it is ambiguous and there is no way of accounting for the ambiguity by holding that one or more words in the sentence is ambiguous".[16] 'Every one loves someone' is an example of this sort. The semantic ambiguity of a word is also explained by Russell. According to him, some words of ordinary language are ambiguous in a way that tempts us to a faulty account as they work. The word 'is' is the most useful example of this sort.[17] There is no doubt that the word 'is' plays different types of semantic roles.

So, ambiguity is also an another demerits of ordinary language. Ambiguous words are so common in ordinary language that with the help of it no one can get the real meaning of the world. So, ordinary language is not capable of uncovering the world truly. For this reason Russell wants to eliminate these demerits of ordinary language to make it a perfect one.

3. Inclusion of Meaningless Sentences

Ordinary language includes meaningless sentences and counts them as meaningful. This is one of the major deficiency of ordinary language. Sometimes meaningless sentences are counted as meaningful in ordinary language and make it unfaithful in the field of philosophy. Suppose, one says, 'I am now speaking falsely.' The traditional grammarians would count this sentence as a meaningful sentence. But if the person, who utters this sentence in a particular occasion, speaks truly,

then he speaks falsely. On the other hand, if the speaker utters this sentence falsely, then he speaks truly. So, the sentence, as uttered in a given occasion, is true if it is false, from which it follows in classical logic, that it is both true and false at the same time. In this situation contradiction arises and ordinary language shows its demerits again by this situation. So, it can be said that if any one wants to make a metaphysical conclusion with the help of ordinary language, his or her conclusion may be wrong, as ordinary language has so many defects.

4. Influence of bad grammar

Influence of bad grammar makes ordinary language more and more defective. In his doctrine of Logical Atomism, Russell shows that in the early years he was particularly exercised by the influence of the subject – predicate grammatical form. Being influenced by this influence traditional logic held that every proposition has this form, which made it impossible to admit that there are several entities, since a proposition to this effect would not itself be of the required form.[19] Inferences, based on ordinary language, from the nature of language to the nature of the world are fallacious, because ordinary language is not perfect, rather, it incorporates various types of defects. These defects are the main causes to make such inferences fallacious.

5. Ordinary language contains redundant expressions

In ordinary language, redundant expressions occur occasionally and make it an imperfect one. Russell may well have thought that adverbs and their modifier, attributive adjectives, and the like, are redundant categories in English, as well as in ordinary languages. There is no place for them in perfect language.[20]

Part - II

So, Russell wants to enter into the realm of perfect language or logical language from the realm of ordinary language by eliminating these defects of ordinary language to do philosophy properly. In a word Russell is in search of a perfect language. In this way he transforms ordinary language in to a perfect one. In the second lecture of the "*Philosophy of Logical Atomism*" Russell says that Principia Mathematica is an ideal language. In this book he formulates the criteria that any such language must satisfy. In his version, " I propose now to consider what sort of language a logically perfect language would be. In a logically perfect language the words in a proposition would correspond one by one with the components of the

corresponding fact, with the exception of such words as 'or', 'not', 'if', 'then', which have a different function. In a logically perfect language there will be one word and no more for every simple object, and everything that is not simple will be expressed by a combination of words, by a combination derived, of course, from the words for the simple things that enter in, one word for each simple component. A language of that sort will be completely analytic, and will show at a glance the logical structure of the facts asserted or denied. The language which is set forth in *Principia Mathematica* is intended to be a language of that sort."[21] This clearly gives us the criteria of perfect language of Russell. Anyone, who wants to deal with the philosophical problems, have to follow the criteria of perfect language pictured by Russell. Following Russell, here we can give a list of criteria of perfect language or logical language.

a) In a perfect language, the words in a proposition would correspond one by one with the component of the corresponding fact.

b)   There will be one word and no more for every simple object.

c)   There must be a combination of words in a complex expression.

d)   Perfect language or logical language should be completely analytic and

e)   Logical structure of the fact should be expressed distinctly in perfect language.[22]

      Now the question may arise; why ordinary language is not perfect? The simple and straightforward answer to this question is that the ordinary language does not satisfy such criteria. Ordinary language has some special features of ambiguity, vagueness etc. that stand against its perfection. It is vagueness or ambiguity that helps ordinary language to be used in different senses in different contexts. These demerits of ordinary language are always inseparably associated with it. So Russell wants to transform ordinary language into philosophical language through elimination. In other words, we can say that ordinary language can be reduced into perfect language by eliminating those demerits associated with it.

      The idea of perfect language or philosophical language is perfectly depicted in *Principia Mathematica*. In this book, Whitehead and Russell want to show that Mathematics is nothing but a branch of logic and Mathematical logic is nothing but an ideal language that is able to capture, in a purely formal way, the large variety of inference patterns and idioms, including different types of sentences, that

are found in ordinary discourse.[23]

Not only that, in this book they also wish to show how vague expression could be made more precise and how sentences susceptible to double readings could be disambiguated in such a way as clearly to expose the basis for the equivocation.[24]

The idea of perfect language or ideal language is explained brilliantly in the theory of description. The famous example given by Russell in this regard is 'The present King of France is not bald.' This sentence will help us to realise the idea of prefect language by using Russell's theory of description. This sentence could be explained in two ways i.e. 'There exists at present a King of France who is not bald' or it is false that there at present exists a King of France who is bald. The first one should be symbolised as ($x)~Fx and the second one should be symbolised as~($x)Fx. The former is false, because it claims that the present King of France exists and he is not bald. Whereas the second sentence is true as it denies both the existence of the King of France and bald. This analysis is a landmark in the field of philosophy of language and also in the field of modal logic. In this way the language of Principia Mathematica becomes an ideal language.

There is also an excellent discussion of perfect language in Russell's philosophy of Logical Atomism. Logical Atomism is a metaphysical theory and it seeks to give a synoptic account of reality. Russell, in this theory, tries to show the relation between the world and the language by which the world is described. He begins his enquiry into "what there is" by drawing distinction between an objective world of fact and the human capacities to describe it by means of language and think about it. In other words, Logical Atomism is nothing but a theory about the objective world of facts and the capacity of human beings, via language and thought, to access it. Logical Atomism is thus a metaphysical view that claims that mathematical logic mirrors the structure of reality and the theory of description is the basic component of logical atomism when one translates a sentence of English into the perspicuous notation of *Principia Mathematica*, he can get easily its basic structure and real meaning through this translation.[25]

Let us give some examples to prove our demand of a perfect language. According to Russell, logical atoms are the sentences that could be used to report a single observation, such as, 'this is red' or 'this book is on the top of the table'. These types of expressions are called by Russell 'Logical Atoms' and these

are the ideal examples of perfect language.

Part-III

In the conclusion, it can be said that Russell famously attacks ordinary language philosophy and offers a more sober and moderate assessment of the relation between the world and language. According to Russell, language is the only one way to understand the structure of the world. But ordinary language is not capable of doing this particular job due to some limitations caused by its demerits. On the other hand, perfect language can be able to show the logical structure of the facts at a glance. Because, it does not incorporate any kind of redundant expressions like ordinary language and is totally free from the influence of bad grammar. No space is provided in perfect language for meaningless sentences, vagueness and ambiguity. In this way Russell establishes the concept of perfect language. Perfect language is totally free from any kind of defects detected in ordinary language. So, it is only perfect language, which is purely philosophical and capable of doing philosophy properly.

There are some objections against Russell's idea of perfect language. Though ordinary language has some demerits, it has some useful functions too. It plays a vital role in the field of communication. Russell claims that the world, more specifically, the ultimate constituents of the world must be represented through perfect language. If that is the case, then ideal or perfect language will appear only as arbitrary noises and such noises should be uttered in the absence of objects of the world. So, the world of perfect language invented by Russell will be totally devoid of objects and it will be composed entirely with some words, like 'this', 'that' etc. So, the communication between speaker and hearer may be harmed. Because, what a speaker intends to utter with the help of such words, may not be understandable to the hearer. Communication would be possible only by the grace of some kind of pre-established speaker-hearer relation and such types of relation depends upon ordinary language which is used to designate the world with full of objects. Such a system, that is offered by Russell, containing no words that we can understand at present would be so remote from our present means of expression and so unsuited to perform the functions of unambiguous and logically accurate communication which may be desired of on efficient language. So, Russell's idea of perfect language is unable to play the communicative role and therefore cannot be recognised as a language in our present customary sense.

J.L. Austin, one of the famous linguistic philosopher of twentieth century shows the functions of language from a different perspective. According to Austin, language not only plays the constative role, but also plays the performative role. The initial characterisation of performative utterances seems to be partly negative and partly positive. They are supposed to be neither descriptive nor susceptible of being true or false.[26] The utterances like, 'I promise', 'I apologise,' 'I bet' etc are called by Austin performative utterances. These types of utterances are totally ignored in Russell's idea of perfect language. But in our daily life such types of utterances play a profound role. In this respect, it can be said that Russell's doctrine of perfect language is narrower than ordinary language.

But I think that such objections against Russell's doctrine of perfect language are not fully justified. It is presupposed here that Russell wants to reject ordinary language in order to get into the realm of perfect or ideal language. But this is not true. It should be kept in mind that Russell does not reject ordinary language, rather he wants to transform it into a perfect one to deal with the philosophical problems. He admits that the ordinary language has a key role to play in our ordinary discourse. But it is not capable of dealing with philosophical problems properly. So, when a philosopher is engaged himself to deal with philosophical problems, he should avoid ordinary language and must be a follower of perfect language.

I also agree with Russell in this regard. Philosophical or perfect language has some special characteristics. These characteristics help us to do philosophy or to solve philosophical problems properly. On the other hand, ordinary language is also desirable in our ordinary discourse. The ordinary language helps us to communicate with others, to convey our message to the audience, etc. No one can deny the importance and usefulness of metaphorical use of ordinary language. Vagueness, ambiguity etc. are the inseparable properties of ordinary language. Such properties make ordinary language more simple and more effective. Perfect language wants to eliminate all the associate properties of ordinary language, viz., emotions, tones, etc. But there is no doubt that these properties are the essential part of ordinary language. They help us to express our mental disposition in a right situation. Suppose, a house is fully burnt and destroyed by an unwanted incident of fire. All persons, present there must have a feeling for this unfortunate incident, but the expression of the owner of the house would be stronger than those of others.

Afterall, ordinary language serves as the basic elements of the perfect

language. Russell also gets in to the realm of perfect language from the realm of ordinary language. So, ordinary language should not be rejected and Russell, in his philosophy of language carefully and truly accepts the importance of ordinary language. Russell, here wants only to transform ordinary language into a perfect language to do philosophy. Following Russell, it can be conclude that there are two types of language in Russell's account, one is ordinary language and the other is perfect or philosophical language. Ordinary language plays its role perfectly in ordinary discourse and perfect language should be applied at the time of doing philosophy. There is no contradiction between ordinary and perfect language, rather there is a co-operative attitude between them.

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BOOK REVIEW

G.C. NAYAK: *REFLECTIONS ON INDIAN WISDOM:*
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (FIRST EDITION)
BIJAYANANDA KAR (Ed.)
Pages: I-XVI+1-193, Aryan Books International,
New Delhi, 2007; Price Rs. 550/-

INDIAN AND WESTERN WISDOM

BHUPENDRA CHANDRA DAS

Professor G.C. Nayak, Ex-Prof. And Head, P.G. Department of Philosophy, Utkal University, former Vice-chancellor, Sri Jagannath Sanskrit University, Puri; UGC Emeritus Fellow, B.H.U is a great scholar from Orissa, India. The title of the book is '*Reflections of Indian Wisdom*' but the book contains Western wisdom also because there are essays in it on the views of Wittgenstein, Kant, Plotinus etc. The above felicitation volume contains seventeen essays in honour of Prof. G.C. Nayak, written by scholars from all over the world and is edited by Professor Bijayananda Kar, Ex-Prof. of the same Department. In the introduction of this book the editior has presented very good summary of each one of the seventeen essays. Four essays have been previously published in reputed journals. Thirteen essays have been specifically written for this book. There are a great variety of topics discussed in it. Of the seventeen essays, five of them are on Advaita Philosophy of *S'ankara*, one of them on Vaisnavism, four on contemporary Indian philosophy, one on contemporary western philosophy, two on Metaphysics, one on *Mimāṁsā* and one on Buddhism.

The first essay '*S'ankara on Human Embodiment*' is by Professor John M. Koller who made a deep study on the problem of human embodiment in the philosophy of Sankara. In this paper he lucidly and beautifully explains the necessity of admitting *sūkṣmas'arira* which is the seed of *sthūla s'arira*. According to Koller, the similarity shown by Sankara of relating dirty form (P.4) and pure water to explicate the difficulty of embodiment cannot be accepted because the water with dirty foam is also dirty. Therefore, the purity of $\overline{A}$tman does not remain beyond question.

The second essay entitled *"The Sprituality of Lilā* ' by K.R. Sundarajajan is concerned with the Vaiṣnava doctrine of play (*Lilā*) with its charcteristic of spirituality. Sudararajan points out that the Vaisnava theology has scope for delightful participation of *Lilā* in the world. *Lilā* or divine sport describes the process of creation, its origin, maintenance and destruction. Being a divine sportive action, referring to Rāmānuja Sundararajan assertcs, creation is not purposive and it could be described as "purposeless purpose." Sundararjan's viewpoint is very interesting and informative.

The third essay is John Brockington's *"Early Mīmāṁsā on Language"*. In the *Mīmāṁsā* , we find that there is the theoretical background for specific forms of rites and rituals on the basis of certain passages of the Vedas. But the *Mīmāṁsā* performs a greater role in respect of the relation between word and its meaning in the background of the study of language. So *Mīmāṁsā* has an important role in the field of philosophy of language. In this paper Brockington shows that the *Mīmāṁsā* system began not as a school leading to *mokṣa* but as a direct successor to the ritual *sūtra* literature, whose aim was to ensure the correct interpretation of the Vedas. Here he raises the philosophical questions regarding the authenticity of Vedic scripture and that of the Vedic i.e. Sanskrit language. According to him, any word is constructed by the eternal fundamental sounds and the basic meaning of any such word is the *ākṛti* (form) or the generality indicated by that word. The combination of the eternal sound and the eternal *ākṛti* leads to the eternality of the relation between words and their meanings. Bockington shows the reasons for this eternality. Brockington's presentation is very important and informative and requires further indepth study.

Professor Rabinandra Raj Singh's essay *"Plotinus and the Contemplative Life"* is an interpretation of the philosophical thinking of Plotinus on the basis of Plato's metaphysics . It is a very nice and short paper on the profound knowledge gained by experience of Plotinus, an ancient classical philosopher.

The fifth essay *"Humanism in Swami Vivekananda's Philosophy: Some Critical Observations "* is written by S.B.P Sinha. He has attemped to present his view on the typical feature of Indian philosophy. According to him, in some cases philosophy is not formal and detached from life. But it should be concerned with the practical problems and issues of life. For example, the contemporary Indian

philosophers- Ramakrishna,, Vivekananda, Gandhi etc. have far reaching philosophi-
cal insights of practical issue. According to Sinha, Vivekananda's humanistic ap-
proach has greatly influenced his practical Vedanta. But the technical formalistic
outlook in the present philosophy has eschewed itself from life and as a result, the
present value-crisis and other disorder are found in society. Sinha asserts that
Vivekananda's humanism with spirituality is very relevant in this respect.
Vivekananda's humanism is not entirely opposed to mundane formulation. His view
speaks of a synthesis between spiritual approach and material necessity in life.
Sinha's paper is very encouraging and incentive for solving the problem of value-
crisis in society.

The next essay *"The Buddhist Theory of Two-Faceted Knowledge"*
is by Professor S.R. Bhatt. He deals with the theory of *dvairupya jñāna* of Dignaga
in his *Pramā ṇavārtika*. According to Dignāga, every knowledge has two-fold
form– subject form (*svākara* or *svābhāsa*) and objec-form (*vi ṣayākāra* or
vi ṣayābhāsa). According to Dignāga, the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra ex-
plicate the Buddhist theory of two-faceted knowledge in different way. The
Santrantika admits the external objects. According to the Yogācāra, the cognition
itself seems to be subject and object. He interprets the same nicely through dia-
gram. In this short essay Bhatt's presentation is very informative, clear and impres-
sive.

In the essay *"A Note on Contemporary Indian Philosophy"* Pro-
fessor R.P. Srivastava points out that the expression "Contemporary Trends in Phi-
losophy in India" is more appropriate than the expression "Contemporary Indian
Philosophy". Srivastava speaks of two major trends (Karl H. Potter's division)-(1)
Progress philosophy and (2) Leap philosophy. The second preaches theistic spiritu-
alism with least regard for free rational enquiry. In the progress philosophy, the
philosophical searching can be continued harmoniously with scientific development
and social development also. Srivastava avers that a man of today is confronted
with three predicaments – (1) Alienation (2) Futility of human endeavour and (3)
Pangs of mediocrity. Philosophical investigation has to solve this problems sincerely.
His suggestions are valuable and need our special attention.

The next essay *"On the Very Idea of Metaphysics"* is by Professor
R.C. Pradhan. He advocates that Metaphysics is a vision of reality. In the beginning
of his essay he mentions what metaphysics is not. He mentions clearly Aristotle's

view of Metaphysics and Quine's criticism of it. Here he is critical about Quine's concept of philosophy. Perhaps he agreed to Heideggar's view that metaphysics deals with "why-question" R.C. Pradhan opines that metaphysics is not a science because it leaves everything as it is and trancends the limits of all description. Strawson distinguishes between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics. But Pradhan prefers to regard metaphysics as something deeper and more fundamental than the two types mentioned by Strawson. R.C. Pradhan has interpreted the metaphysics of the transcendent and that of the inmanent. In conclusion he points out that metaphysics is a higher-order activity that takes us back to the ultimate nature of things. Pradhan expresses his original thinking in this essay which may inspire great scholars of the world.

In the essay *"Writtgenstein and Kant"* Professor S. Shyamkishore Singh has made a beautiful comparative study between the two most important thinkers of twentieth century and the later part of eighteenth century respectively. Wittgenstein is regarded as the most original revolutionary thinker to bring to focus the importance of linguistic and conceptual analysis in the field of philosophising. Kant is held as most important thinker (of the eighteenth century) who brought a "Copernican revolution" in the theory of knowledge or in the philosophical thinking. Their philosophical methodologies and the conclusions they arrive at are mostly different. But Prof. Singh has very nicely presented that these two great philosophers have shared similar views on certain fundamental issues of philosophical inquiry. According to him, a "critique of thought" is in essence a "critique of language" and in that way we find an analogy between Kant and Wittgenstein. Prof. Singh points out that Western writers, e.g. Max Black, Quinton, Maslow too have made good comparative studies between Kant and Wittgenstein. Professor Singh's presentation is attractive and praiseworthy.

"Reason and Revolution in S'ankara " is the essay by Professor R.L. Singh. According to Professor Singh, reasoning is the unfolding of a vision in the medium of intellectual understanding but it cannot lead to the vision. On the other hand, revelation is seeing or direct perception of reality. After acquiring the direct perception, we can apply it to reasoning. Thus there is no antagonism between revelation and reason in the Advaita concept of Sankara. Brahman is realised through intuition and it cannot be the object of thought- knowledge. But according to Sankara, reasoning is *apratis t hita* , Brahman is beyond logic. *S'ruti* is the

direct expression in words of Brahman but *S'ruti* itself does not give knowledge of Brahman. Prof Singh points out that Brahman is an insight into our being. Then he interprets the topic regarding whether *S'ankara* can be held as a mystic or a theologian or a philosopher. Professor Singh's paper is very informative, analytical and interesting.

The essay entitled *"Logical Positivism and the Advaita Metaphysics"* is by Professor S. Mishra. In this essay Prof. Mishra deals with Logical Positivism, Hegelianism, Phenomenology and Existentialism. After interpreting all these at the background of Kantian Philosophy, Mishra has remarked that Kant has cancelled dogmatic metaphysics but not genuine metaphysics. To Prof. Mishra, attitude is of two types : 1) reflective and 2) unreflective. In course of discussing their distinction he points out that *mahāvakyas* e.g., *Tattvamasi* etc. are significant for a man who seeks knowledge and freedom. Professor Mishra concludes that the Advaitic metaphysical knowledge may be mysterious, unclear and inarticulate but in it lies a hope for a happy, harmonious and peaceful world. Professor Mishra's discussion is encouraging, laudable and interesting and it would have been much beneficial for the scholars on this field if further research are continued on the study.

The next essay *"Two Competing Interpretations of S'ankara : G. Misra and G.C. Nayak"* is by Professor Kalyan Kumar Bagchi. This essay directly deals with certain views advocated by Professor Nayak himself. Professor Bagchi compared and contrasted Nayak's view on Sankara Advaita with Professor Mishra's view on the same subject. The difference between Professor Mishra and Professor Nayak is as follows : Prof. Mishra points out that Sankara's philosophy is only linguistic analysis. Professor Nayak avers that Sankara has some metaphysical axis to grind in addition to linguistic analysis *(vākyārtha vicāraṇa)* that directs specially to a vision. Here Professor Bagchi's point is that Advaita Vedanta is not only conceptual analysis or it is not a vision only but it is a phenomenology of one's experience of Brahman. Professor Bagchi remarks that it is not linguistic clarity or analysis of concepts but stratification or elaboration or spelling out of the consciousness of Brahman that *S'ankara* has in mind as a philosopher. Prof. Bagchi's contribution is very important, valuable and informative and it requires critical study.

The essay " *S'ankara and Vākyārthavicāraṇa : A Study of Prof. G.C. Nayak's Understanding of Advaita"* is by Prof. S. Panneerselvam. His presentation is very interesting and attractive. But in some points we cannot share

his view. In this article he says, "The identity of Brahman with the individual self can be known if one knows the correct understanding of the *mahavakyas*" and he also says, "all understanding is interpretation". But we know that "understanding" is actually intellectual and highest knowledge (*paramā jñāna*), realisation *(bodha),* vision *(anubhuti* or *anubhava)* of Brahman is never intellectual. Brahman cannot be understood, it can be known.

S.S. Rama Rao Pappu has presented a nice, novel and well-equiped paper called *"Dharma, Rules, Virtues and Paradigmatic Individuals."* He starts his discussion with the concept of *puruṣārthas –dharma, artha, kāma* and *mokṣa.* Pappu says, "Thought for purposes of classification, *dharma* looks like other *puruṣārthas*, it is in fact given a much higher status than the rest." (P. 143) But an Advaita Vedāntin cannot accept this view because it is *moksa* which is given highest status among the *puruṣārthas.* This view is justified by the statement of *Vedānta - Paribhāṣā*. According to *Vedānta - Paribhāṣā* , among the four kinds of human ends called righteousness *(dharma),* Wealth *(artha),* objects of desire (*kāma)* and liberation *(mokṣa)* , it is liberation (*mokṣa)* which is the supreme end *(parama puruṣārtha)* for that alone is known to be eternal from such *S'ruti* texts as, "(And) he (the qualified aspirant) does not return *("na sa " punarāvartate"- Chā* VII. XV.I), while the other three are known to be transitory by perception or from such *S'ruti* texts as, "As in this world the comforts gained through one's labours are exhausted, so in the other world the happiness achieved through one's good deeds come to an end (*Tadyathā iha puṇyacito lokaḥ kṣiyate-* Chā . 8.1.6). Then he gives a systematic account of five conceptions of *Dharma* and *dharma* as virtue following the views of *Bhagavadgītā* , The *Rāmāyana* , Manu and Mahatma Gandhi.

The next essay, *"Rethinking the Two Faces of Svarāja : Pre-Independence and Post-Independence"* is by Professor Rajendra Prasad. In it he has elaborated and reconstructed Gandhi's conception of *Svarāja* in the Post-Independent India and indicates the role of intellectuals in this great duty. Professor Prasad's paper is well-composed, analytically clear and it shows his deep insight.

The next essay is *"Equality : Slogan and Utopia"* by Prof. Arun K. Mookherjee. Prof. Mokherjee asserts as to how far equality becomes a mere slogan. He points out that "inequality" is a socio-political fact dependent on the feeling of inequality. He advocates that only a felt inequality makes individuals and groups

to socio-political action for equality. He refers Bernard William's view which is found to be somewhat close to the sense of tolerance and fraternity. Prof. Mookherjee's essay is analytically clear, interesting and short, nevertheless it inspires the sclolars for further and indepth study.

The last essay *"Commonism : An Analytical Review "* is by Professor Bijayananda Kar. It is on the philosophy of commonism advocated by Professor Nayak. His presentation of this view will encourage general people, scholars, aspirants to raise popular questions on the topic and discussion in certain philosophical world. Professor Kar's essay is a critical review of Professor Nayak's philosophical thesis. Professor Nayak noticed commonistic elements in *Hindudharma* and according to him, if that is properly realised and appropriately implemented in the practical field, then it can actually solve the present religious problems.

Professor Kar has presented his (Prof. Nayak's) view in detail and he has seen his attempt of reviewing religious framework at the background of human and secular perspectives to be in the right direction. Solution of religious problems is possible if religion is viewed essentially as of human concern than of any trans-human and trans-mundane source. The religion possesses dharmic sense of morality and it is conceivable and workable by men in this world and now and for this end in view, the sense of divinity and spirituality has to be accommodated. According to Professor Kar, the sense of commonism is of great significance with the basis of humanism. The issue of commonism advocated by Professor Nayak, and analytically reviewed by Professor Kar, according to me, has a great national importance and value also for countering the challenge of the present religious crisis . So it should have wide circulation.

In my opinion, scholars interested in both Indian and Western philosophy and the subject other than philosophy must collect and go through this valuable volume. Undoubtedly, all the papers of this volume are qualitatively laudable.

We find some printing errors in this book. For example, "Religional" college of Education (P.XXVIII) and in the sentence, 'Is there "antagoism" between revelation and reason?'(p.98). Last end note number 11 is not found in the end note but it is in the text at page 114. Much care should be taken for binding of the book and to avoid some printing mistakes in the forthcoming edition. But the overall print quality of the book including the gate up is fine.