Philosophy and
the Life-world

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
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OBITUARY

Dr. Rajendra Nath Mukerji, a freedom fighter, a philosopher and a professor of philosophy left his non-eternal body on 16.07.2005. Nine months after his death, his wife Smt. Pratima Mukerji also died.

Born on 16.6.1925 Dr. Mukerji was a resident of Bhelupura, Varanasi, U.P. His father Raibahadur Manmotha Nath Mukerji was a surgeon and family Doctor of the Ruler of Narsinghgarh State of Madhya Pradesh under British India.

Dr.Mukerji was a versatile genius and was a very popular teacher and researcher in his teaching life in the Department of Philosophy and Religion, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi. His students are working in the capacity of Readers and Professors all over the India and abroad.

After retirement, he was very serious to complete a scholarly monograph on the Brahmasūtra in the light of commentaries and the glosses like Citsukhī which he wanted to complete before death, the date, month and year of which were clearly known to him.

In 60's, he started a center for studies of Art and Life and edited a Journal on the Life and Art the publication of which continued up to the early half of 80's. He has more than forty research papers published to his credit. Most of them were related to philosophy of Art, Aesthetics, and Philosophy of Science and Vedānta. His paper on Future of Indian philosophy presented and published later on in the proceeding of the National seminar in the year 2000 held at Thiruvanantapuram College was highly appreciated by the scholars. In the year 1999, he told Professor D.N.Tiwari, his son in law that he had to send his unpublished research papers to Professor Daya Krishna for publication. After communication from Professor Daya Krishna, he was so fervent that he sent his paper entitled 'Ontological Argument and Indian Religious Thinking' which was published in JICPR, Vol. XVIII, No.3, 2001,pp.185-191, commented on 'Metaphysics of Unobservable in Metaphysics'

by Saurabha Sanatani, which was published in JICPR, Vol. XX, No.2, 2002, pp. 173-183, and a research paper entitled 'Russell on Negation JICPR, Vol. XX, No.2, 2003,pp. 113-127. He was ready with second instalment on 'Russell on Negation'. Professor Dayakrishna highly applauded his brilliance and originality of his papers.

Till death, except one month he was in hospital in a state of coma, he was seriously involved in writing research papers for JICPR.

He visited U.S.A. in 1998 and delivered three lectures in New Jercy on philosophy of Art and Architecture of the temples in India. Dr. Mukerji was a saint by nature and was utterly detached from the mundane mentality. He believed a life that is rational and good. The loss of such a distinguished personality will never be compensated. The sad demise of such a philosopher saint has aggrieved the working researchers and teachers of philosophy in India. Let us dedicate ourselves to the ideal of Dr. Mukerji to better philosophy and life and, thus, to show him the right tribute.

Professor Dilip Kumar Mohanta

ON VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS - THE BOOK OF JOB AND IMMANUEL KANT

GOPAL CHANDRA KHAN

Hundreds of years ago an unknown poet brooding over problems which every man in his life-time must face created one of the most eloquent dialogues between man and God . This dialogue, known as *The Book of Job,* eventually found a place of honour in the *Old Testament* as an inspired writing. In the dialogue the poet creates a story of punishment and reward, and thereupon constructs a philosophic debate on the meaning of suffering and the mystery of good and evil. Why so much pain exists in a world created by an all-wise and all-merciful God? How is it that the wicked seem so often to prosper while the pious live in misery and die in squalor ? Is there no divine reward for goodness in the world, no punishment for evil? These are the poet's themes.

The story opens simply. "There was a man in the land of Uz whose name was Job; and that man was perfect and upright, and one that feared God, and es-chewed evil" (Job. 1.1.). But captan, doubting the goodness of Job, suggests to the Lord that if Job were shorn of all his possessions, he would "curse thee to thy face"(I:II). To prove Job's worth, God allows Satan to put him to the test. Soon afterwards Job receives the astounding news that "the fire of God is fallen from Heaven" (1:16) - all his sheep have been struck by lightening, all his camels have been slaughtered by enemies, and all his children have been killed by a great wind from the wilderness. Job laments bitterly but continues to bless the name of the Lord. "Naked came I out of my mother's womb, and naked shall I return thither; the Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord" (1:21). In all this job sins not nor does he charge God foolishly. Still the Satan persists, "Touch his bone and his flesh", he says to the Lord, "and he will curse thee to thy face" (2:15). Job's trial is continued. He is afflicted with "sore boils from the sole of his foot upto his crown"(2:7). His distraught wife urges him to curse the name of the Lord, but he rebukes her gently and refuses.

Here comes three of Job's friends - Eliphaz, Bildad and Zopher to com-miserate with him. They, however, cannot believe that Job is not guilty of some sin, for they think that there is a connection under divine ordinance between virtue and happiness, and between vice or sin and suffering. One after another they argue that job must be deficient in piety, because his afflictions are divine punishment for sin. "It could not happen", says Bildad, "if thou wert pure and upright" (8:6), for "God will not cast away a perfect man, neither will he help evil-doers" (8:20). Job denied this and gives way to bitter lamentations. Bereft of his worldly goods, covered with sores from head to foot, and being accused of a sinner by his friends, Job in a fury denounces the day he was born and the night he was conceived. He describes the passage of his days as "swifter than a weaver's shuttle" (7:6), and stresses the emptiness of his life asking, "Is there any taste in the white of an egg ?" (6:6). His is the eternal question of a man tried beyond endurance - "Why was I born?" (2:11). Thus while Satan wants Job to curse the Lord, Job, on the other hand, starts growing philosophical. He raises questions about the meaning of life and death. He even wishes he could stand face to face before the Lord, give an account of himself, and ask for justice - "Surely I would speak to the Almighty, and I desire to reason with God", "I would order my cause before him, and fill my mouth with arguments." (23:3-4)

At this point of time Elihu, younger than the three friends, joins them and makes his own submission with great fervour. He chides job for doubting that God is just in his ways, as well as for thinking that man can comprehend his unsearchable wisdom. Astonished at the ferour of Elihu, neither job nor any one of the three friends makes answer, but neither are they convinced by him.

As Elihu concludes the sky begins to darken, then a whirlwind turns the sky to a terrible brightness and the whirlwind becomes a voice." Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge. Gird up thy loins like a man; for I will demand of thee, and answers thou me. Where was thou when I laid the foundation of the Earth?" (38:2-4). The voice thunders on, filling the little knot of men with an overpowering sense of their ignorance. They have been trying to

fathom the mystery of pain and suffering, but what do they know of God's creation? How can his friends pronounce a judgement on Job, when they can not explain the mystery of the origins of the Earth ?

The Lord also rebukes Job for the folly of imagining that he could fathom his mysteries; nevertheless he finds Job's honest questioning more pleasing than the servile adoration of the counselors, who imagine they glorify God by claiming to observe the pattern of divine judgement from the facts of human life. In the end Job is rewarded for his unflinching faith.

The Book of Job of whose summary we have just given was written at a time when no easy distinction could be drawn between religion, theology and philosophy, and within philosophy, between dogmatism and criticism. However, the elements of these different kinds of understanding are there in *The Book of Job,* and a tension between philosophy and theology almost surfaced, though in the end, philosophy is silenced by religion. In the Book, Job's is the voice of critical philosophy, his three friends, namely, Bildad, Eliphaz and Zopher are dogmatists, Elihu's is the voice of theology, and God Himself explains the essence of religion that contains a personalistic information of God such as we have in the religion of the Israelis, the religion of the Christians and the religion of the Mohammedans, for example. Let us discuss.

In the first place, a good man as Job is, he is yet an ordinary mortal, a man of flesh and blood, of both reason and senses, and not such a holy being as can receive both worldly pleasures and worldly pains with equal indifference. For him both virtue and worldly pleasures are desirable. He is sure that he has not deviated from the path of virtue, and yet "the fire of God' is fallen on him. He laments over his unexpected misfortunes and writhes in pain. He questions the meaning of life and death. Initially, of course, Job had no philosophical question. He was a God-fearing man, and he simply presumed that God is good and benevolent. Faith in God and obedience to duties enjoyed upon man by God are the causes of peace, prosperity and happiness in his life. But being struck with calamities he gets bewildered, for he does not any longer find any connection between being virtuous and

being happy. But is man born for pleasures and pains alone ? Are pleasures and pains the only values and disvalues of life ? Is not man a self-conscious, rational being? Has not he got to realize the meaning of his life, his own self? As the Sāṁkhya system of philosophy pronounces that in so far as a man is struck by three different kinds of pain he may be awaken from his slumber and prompted to enquire into the secrets of the world and life-in-the-world. Tagore says that his own life is like an incense stick which requires to be burnt to get fragrance around. It is not absolutely necessary that virtue and pain do not go together in the life of a man. Job does not subscribe to any such theory as salvation through sufferings, but he sincerely believes that God is the giver of both pleasures and pains of life, and he should accept whatever comes his way. And yet he likes to argue why a virtuous man like him should be subjected to terrible miseries of life. In the midst of all his sufferings he has taken a great leap, from pre-reflective life he has switched over to reflective life, though, of course, philosophically speaking he does not offer any real answer to the question he himself raises. However, the question has been raised, and there lies philosophy.

Three of Job's friends, Eliphaz, Bildad and Zopher, stand for dogmatic thinking. They give a dogmatic answer to Job's philosophical question. They simply presume that God gives pleasures to those who are pious and sufferings to those who lack in piety. Therefore, according to their mind, Job must be lacking in piety for he has been subjected to unthinkable suferings. These friends of Job do not find counter-examples of their simple theory because they are unwilling to consider them as counter-examples. Such is the force of their dogmatic belief in the truth of their theory that virtue accompanies happiness and vice accompanies pain in this very life. But Job is prepared to critically assess the meaning of the situations. He looks inside and is sure that he is not lacking in virtue, that he has not committed sinful acts. He also looks around and finds that there are numerous examples of good and pious men suffering misfortunes and great pains, and devils enjoying the pleasures of life. Therefore, he wonders if there is a real connection between virtue and happiness. Since Job subscribes to the theory that God is the absolute authority, the creator of the world and man's life-in-the-world, that the

laws regulating man's conduct, or what we call moral laws, are divine command-ments, that God is infinitely just and that He cares for men's well-being and happiness towards which end the moral laws are prescribe, he draws the further conclusion tht there is a connection between virtue and happiness, and between vice and pain. But since the examples gives before him and his own personal situations seem to say otherwise, he grows skeptical about the truth of the theory.

As we have said earlier, Elihu's is the voice of theology. Unlike philosophy theology is invariably related to a particular religion. It explains the logic of belief or the logic of faith of a particular religion. Thus we talk of Christian theology, Mohammedan theology, and so on. In Elihu's case it is the religion of the *Old Testament,* the *New Testament* and the *Quran* being its two different interpretations. All these three are Prophet-based or Book-basked religions. According to a Prophet-based religion, excepting the prophet no ordinary human mortal has any comprehension of divine mystery. God speaks to the Prophet, and the Prophet explains to the people the messages sent down to people by God. These messages include God's commandments or the Holy laws. The Holy Laws are outside the purview of philosophical deliberations. To be a religious man or to be good man one must follow the Holy Laws or else he stands condemned by God. Elihy's point of view as a theologian may best be illustrated by the following oft-quoted passage from the Mohammedan theologian, Al-Ghazali :

> Let us imagine a child and a grown-up
> in Heaven who both died in the True-faith,
> but the grown-up has a higher place than
> the child. And the child will ask God, "Why
> did you give that man a higher place?" And
> God will answer, "He has done many good works".
> Then the child will say, "Why did you let me
> die so soon so that I was prevented from doing
> good?". God will answer, "I knew that you
> would grow up a sinner, therefore it was

better that you should die a child." Then
a cry goes up from the damned in the depths
of hel, "Why, O Lord, did you not let
us die before we became sinners ?"

Ghazali adds to this : "The imponderable decisions of God cannot be weighed by the scales of reason and Mutazilism". (Quoted by Simon van Den Bergh in his Introduction to the English translation of Ibn Rushd's work, *The Incoherence of Inchoerence* (Tahafut Al-Tahafut, OUP, 1954, p.x).

Finally God explains what the essence of religion is. As God says, a man needs be good; he needs virtue. To be virtuous is to have faith in the absolute authority of the Lord and inviolability of the Holy Laws or the Divine Command-ments. A man who thus lives in Faith both in agreeable and in adverse situations of life deserves God's reward. The infinitely wise Lord knows best whom to reward and whom to punish, when to reward and when to punish. Nobody can question God's wisdom, for none can fathom his mystery. 'Lord, thy wilt be served' - is the final submission of the religious heart.

As we thus see. *The Book of Job* is religiously conclusive but philosophi-cally inconclusive. One possible reason why Job could not progress further in his philosophical enterprise is that Israelis had no adequate notion of life after death, nor they ever raised the question - Who am I ? As Immanuel Kant much later said, there are four fundamental questions of philosophy, and they are : (I) What may I know? (II) What ought I to do ? (III) What may I hope for? and (IV) Who am I? he built up his philosophical system around these four questions of philosophy, and to our judgement, the question of the relation between virtue and happiness is best treated in his system, let us see.

For Kant, the question of the relation between virtue and happiness is primarily a moral question, and in so far as morality is the ground for the possibility of, and the gateway to, religion, it is also secondarily a question of religion. Religionists may, of course, claim that morality based on reason alone has no real blood in its veins, it is only God-fear that infuses real blood in the veins of moral

imperatives. Kant, on the other hand, would argue that we have no theoretical means of knowing that God exists, and if we are not sure of God's existence, how can God-fear be effective in our psyche ? However, in so far as we experience moral conscience we feel sure that God exists, and the awe and inspiration of moral experience get transformed into God-fear. Thus the prophet that speaks of God's authority and God's commandments to us is nothing other than the moral reason that gives sense to our moral intuitions. And moral reason is something that is equally possessed by all human persons. Obviously, the question of the connection between virtue and happiness should be judged in the moral perspective.

The *Critique of Practical Reason* (1785) and the somewhat earlier *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) contain Kant's description of the essential characteristics of morality and its account of the inferences to God, freedom and immortality. The basis of Kant's theory of morality is man's moral experience. Kant describes this experience as an immediate intuition of the value and importance of moral goodness, as a spontaneous feeling of respect for the moral law, and an innate sense of duty. Reason interprets man's innate sense of duty as an obligation to obey the moral law, and, thereby, the immediate moral intuition is turned into moral experience. In describing the moral law, Kant gives it two distinct but complementary formulations. The first is the law of impartial justice: "Act only on that maxim (or principle fo conduct) whereby thou canst at the same time will that it shall become a universal law". The second formulation defines the law's social setting: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thy own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only." These formulae lead to the important concept of men as citizens of Kingdom of Ends", that is, a union of rational beings each of whom is a free and responsible moral agent, yet all subject to the moral law.

The moral law, as Kant formulates, possesses four characteristics. (I) It is distinguished from the law of nature in defining what ought to be, not what is. The voice of duty, accordingly, is a "categorical imperative" which men cannot ignore.

(2) It is dictated to each individual by his own moral reason. Thus man, as a moral agent, is autonomous and his reason is self-legislative. (3) Since the moral law is the law of reason it is universally binding upon all rational beings alike, finite and infinite. It is the same law for all men because the normal faculty is, in essence (though not in strength), the same in all, and it is God's law because He is a righteous God (4) The moral law can only be known *a priori* and cannot be derived from experience.

The prime condition of moral obligation is freedom to act in accordance with its requirement. Now, man, regarded merely as a physical being is subject to the mechanical laws of nature. As part of the phenomenal world, therefore, he is not free. However, speculative reason conceives of a possible noumenal world underlying the phenomenal wold as a non-spatial land non-temporal ground, and suggests that man may the possessed of a dual nature, "sensible" and "intelligible", thus enabling him to participate in both realms and to achieve "intelligible" freedom while still subject to "sensible" determinations. What speculative reason could only advance merely as an hypothesis practical reason now asserts to be morally certain. If moral obligation is not illusory but supremely real and significant, and obligation implies faith which is possible only if man is more than a merely phenomenal being, then there must be a noumenal being and he must possess a noumenal nature by virtue of which he is free. Freedom is the ratio essendi of the obligation to obey the moral law, our respect for and duty towards the moral law, in turn, is the ratio *cognoscendi* of freedom.

Kant next bases upon the moral experience two further inferences which are developed in the doctrine of the Summum Bonum. The Summum Bonum is the morally rational ideal of the complete and perfect goal of human life. Its two ingredients are virtue, that is, moral worth attained by obedience to the moral law, and happiness exactly proportioned to virtue. The observation of the state of affairs on earth, however, at once reveals a difficulty. Virtue does not invariably bring with in this life, a proportionate quota of happiness. So far as the present life is concerned,

as Kant observes, the connection between virtue and happiness sinks below zero. But, thereby to have to believe that the moral law is false it would be the greatest of calamity that could overtake us. It is by virtue of the 'moral law within'that man stands as man, as an independent reality, or else he is so tiny and insignificant an element of nature. As an element of nature, or a prt of the phenomenal world, man is not free but is subject to mechanical determination. Nature's laws are inexorably necessary, and no element of it has any creativity. Nature in its totality is a collection of matter and energy, which is absolutely fixed forever. Its laws, i.e., laws of extension and laws of motion, only govern change in forms of existences and displacements of existents, but do not ensure either gain or loss. The 'within[9] of man's life, on the other hand, is autonomous. As a moral agent working 'within' man can determine his conduct by the laws of his own making, and thereby, can either gain or lose moral virtue. The moral law proposes a reward of happiness proportioned to virtue. But there is no guarantee that the reward will be available in the present life. Therefore, the law commands that the moral being obeys the moral law without any thought of reward. However, the promise made by the law does not go in vain either. The law implies that man's soul is immortal. The immortal soul has, besides the present life, many more lives to live, in this earth or in some other earth. And he is destined to achieve the Summum Bonum proposed by the moral law in the long run. Thus the unavailability of happiness proportioned to virtue in the present life is no disappointment; it is doubly compensated, as it creates *Hope* and ensures *Immortality*. It also ensures that the Supreme Authority or the Lord is a moral being. He creates such a world as is governed by moral order and is hospitable to man's moral aspirations. Thus the connection between virtue and happiness is an article of moral faith which relieves man of his natural littleness and gets him to the truly big. As the seers of the Upanishads declare *nālpe sukham asti, bhūmaiva sukham.* Virtue is connected, not so immediately to mundane pleasures, but to the happiness of overcoming littleness and getting big.

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SECULARISM, SCIENTIFIC TEMPER, AND RATIONALITY IN NEHRU, AND THE IDEAL OF GLOBAL PEACE.

G. C. NAYAK

In this paper, I am going to examine the implications of certain key-concepts in Nehru's thought and see if these ideas could be helpful in some way for the realization of the ideal of global peace in the present day world. Nehru, as is well known, was a multi-dimensional personality and had significant contributions to make not only in the political field but also in the world of thought. Amongst his numerous contributions, he is well known for his advocacy of scientific temper. He was certainly not a machine, but possessed a loving heart alongside a highly rational mind emphazing the necessity of developing a scientific attitude in almost all matters of Importance. His typical views on secularism, Indian culture, radicalism etc. were guided and influenced by a rational and critical attitude, which is the very essence of scientific temper. He was against dogmas, superstitions, and blind belief of all sorts, while he advocated an open-minded approach to problems. With all his love for Gandhi and Gandhian thought, he never tired of differing from and criticising some or the Gandhian principles; for such an open-minded approach towards even his mentor, he was highly appreciated by the Mahatma himself who also, in his turn, seemed to have an open mind in this respect. And yet Nehru was at times moved by the deepest and the finest of feelings that made him go beyond mere rationality. And that, according to me, made him more lovable as a man. In his own way.

Let us first of all take for examination Nehru's approach to secularism, and see to what extent it could be regarded as scientific. 'Secularism' is a tern which has aroused a lot or controversy and confusion among scholars because of us diverse implications and different meanings attached to the tern in different contexts. The tern 'secular' has been used primarily in a sense opposed to 'religious', 'other worldly', 'spiritual' and 'sacred'. It has been taken to mean not only some thing "non-spiritual, having no concern with religious or spiritual matters"(l), but

also "a movement, intentionally ethical, negatively religious with political and philosophical antecedents"(2). It has also been taken to be "an attempt to establish an autonomous sphere of knowledge purged of supernatural, fideistic presuppositions" (3). From this point of view certain point of contact between secularism and scientific temper Is quite discernible, "The true secularism has been taken to refer to a system of belief or an attitude which in principle denies the existence or the significance of realities other than those» which can be measured by the methods of natural sclence"(4) Scientific temper stands for an attitude of mind that does not take into account any thing other than chat which Is conducive to the search of knowledge. As early as 1933. Nehru had spoken of his preference for scientific approach in these words: "Personally" have no faith in or use for the ways of magic and religion, I can only consider the question on scientific grounds"(5). In a letter to his daughter in the same year, he wrote "Science has a very different: way of looking at things. It takes nothing for granted and has, or ought to have, no dogmas. It seeks to encourage an open mind to reach truth by repeated experiment This outlook Is obviously very different from the religious outlook, and IC Is not surprising that there was a frequent conflict between the two"(6). In Mysticism and Logic Russell remarked, "The scientific attitude of mind involves a sweeping away of all other desires in the interests of the desires to know"(7). "The kernel of the scientific outlook", according to him, is "the refusal to regard our own desires. Castes and interests as affording a key to the understanding of the world"(8). Religion, is so far as it promotes an anthropomorphic ' way of looking at things and in so far as it takes into account the longings and the yearnings of our heart, seems to be unscientific, at least non-scientific, and secularism. In so far as it revolts against or deliberately dissociates itself from religion may be regarded as scientific in its temper. Religion and secularism, If not antagonistic to each other, would in that case be regarded as two different approaches in no way concerned with each other.

But this Is not all that Is there to It. Secularism has also been taken as "a materialistic and rationalistic movement"(9) and as an "atheistic and materialistic movement"(10). This approach towards secularism may be taken in a crude, unsophisticated sense, and secularism in that case may also be unscientific. Material-

ism, atheism, or even rationalism in its crude Variety could be unscientific to the extent to which they lay stress on metaphysical dogma at the cost of genuine search for knowledge or truth, and if secularism identifies itself with any such outlook it can also be unscientific in its temper. I do not think however, that one with a secular outlook must be an atheist or materialist in this crude sense; one may simply have no concern for religion or spiritual matters.

There is a further problem here. Supposing that religious or spiritual matters need to be properly understood in the course of our search for knowledge or truth, supposing that they are really matters of importance in our search for knowledge of the world as a whole. It may so transpire that by ignoring these matters our genuine search for knowledge would be vitiated or misguided to that extent. At least a religious person would think it to be so and that is why the term 'secular' is used in a pejorative sense in the religious circle. If religion is ignored, or if there is a deliberately anti-religious trend associated with secularism. Is It not itself unscientific? Are we doing justice to all aspects of life if in our search for truth or knowledge we ignore one of the most vital aspects, viz. the religious one? In the words of Tillich, "religion opens up the depth of man's spiritual life which is usually covered by the dust of our daily life and noise of our secular work. It gives us the experience of the Holy, of something, which is untouchable, awe-inspiring, an ultimate meaning, and the source of ultimate courage. This is the glory of what we call religion "(11), Here one should be very careful. A secular man, though not himself-religious, need not ignore religion altogether. He may be a respector of different religions and may try to understand them, try to see different forms of religious life with a detached look. On the other hand, even if he in his own private life subscribes to one of the various religious forms, he may. in so far as he has a secular outlook, develop respect for the other forms and have a detached and impartial outlook towards all religions. In that case, can we blame him to be unscientific? He may study different forms of religion with a scientific temper, and a secular man In that sense need not be unscientific. Though not subscribing to any religious faith personally, Nehru, with his scientific temper, advocated a form of secularism that "does not mean irreligious", "It means," according to him," equal respect for

all faiths and equal opportunities for those who profess any faith"(12).

Now coming to Nehru's views on and assessment of Indian culture, it is first of all to be noted that he was undoubtedly a greet lover of his own country i,e, India as were Tagore, Vivekananda and others of the similar category. Wittgenstein, a renowned Philosopher of the 20th century, when told by M.O.C. Drury about one of his acquaintances working on a thesis as Co why the League of Nations had failed, remarked "Tell him to find out first why solves eat lambs"(13). Wolves and lambs cannot and do not live together; it is neither unnatural nor is it unexpected.

But what If something like this becomes a reality in the life of a nation? In Indian culture atleast It seems as If 'wolves' and 'lambs' have not only been living together somehow for centuries; there has been a curious blending a sort of amalgamation of Varieties of cultures including even what may be regarded as 'culture of wolves' and 'culture of lambs'. Is it not a strange phenomenon?

Tagore sang his song of Ei Bhārater Mahāmānaver Sāgaratire (Bhārata tirtha) where he pointed out that there has been an amalgamation of various Cultures, such as those of Aryans, Non-Aryans, Dravidian, Chinese, Sakas, Huns, Pathans and Moghuls, into a single unity in India (14). Nehru expressed the same Idea in his own inimitable style while referring to the uniqueness of India and Its culture; "She (India) was like some ancient palimpsest on which layer upon layer of thought and reverie had been inscribed, and yet no succeeding layer had completely hidden or erased what had been written previously. All these existed in our conscious or sub-conscious selves, though we may not have been aware of them and they had gone to build up the complex and mysterious personality of indIa. That sphinx-like face with its elusive and sometimes mocking smile was to be seen throughout the length and breadth of the land. Though outwardly there was diversity and infinite variety among our peoples, every where there was that tremendous Impress of oneness, which had held all of us together for ages past, whatever political fate or misfortune had befallen us"(15). Is this a fact or a delusion? Are all these talks of co-existence of different strands, even those that are antagonistic to each other, and the Impression of oneness of culture amidst diversity merely an

account of the exuberance of the patriotic feeling of a Tagore or a Nehru or Is there any basis in reality by which such talks can be corroborated? Are we to understand that Tagore and Nehru on account of their patriotic spirit were simply blind to all the fightings and cultural clashes to which this land of ours has been subjected through out ages?

I think that neither Tagore nor Nehru was unaware of cultural conflicts and clashes in India and yet they saw a typical unity in Indian culture amidst all diversities and conflicts. If it is a question of pinpointing certain elements to the exclusion of others, it may not be that simple to isolate an element or elements fundamental to our unity. As far as Nehru is concerned, it was an emotional experience. In his own words, "the unity of India was no longer merely an intellectual conception for me? It was an emotional experience which overpowered me" (16). Does it mean that this was merely subjective as far as Nehru was concerned? I do not think so. Nehru has something significant to say regarding that unity: "Foreign influences poured in and often influenced that (indIan) culture and were absorbed. Disruptive tendencies gave rise immediately to an attempt to find a synthesis. Some kind of a dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilisation. That unity was not conceived as something Imposed from outside, a standardisation of externals or even of beliefs. It was something deeper and, within its fold, the widest tolerance of belief and custom was practised and every variety acknowledged and even encouraged."(17)

And yet Nehru was not a blind lover of all that India stood for. His scientific temper could not come to terms with the prevalent custom of casteism that was simply obnoxious for him. Now let us examine Nehru's views regarding re-claims in the global context and casteism in the Indian context. Nehru says in *The Discovery of india*, "The ultimate weakness and falling of the Caste system and the indian social structure were that they degraded a mass of human beings and gave them no opportunities to get out of that condition - educationally, culturally, or economically. That degradation brought deterioration, all along the line including in its scope even the upper Classes. It had to the petrification which became a dominant feature of India's economy and life"(18). Since the Issue is not only not

a dead one, but has a contemporary relevance also. It needs to be examined at some length. It points to the overwhelming power of myth on the minds of men; some myths die a natural course of death, may be, with the passage of time or are made ineffective in a changing society while others continue to hold sway for a very long time over the minds even of a so-called civilised race, not to speak of primitive minds. The myth that the whites are intrinsically superior to the blacks Is very much alive even now among white men, at least some of them, and that males are intrinsically superior to females is also no less deep-rooted in he minds of some; similarly caste superiority Is even now considered to be a matter of pride for some of the "upper-caste" Hindus, This leads to racial segregation and conflict on the one hand and caste-wars on the other causing a menace to the progress of humanity in general and society in particular,

It is no doubt true that men are endowed with different capacities and aptitudes; but how and why should birth in a particular caste be taken to determine their capacities and aptitudes, and consequently also the direction of their development to understand. If heredity is to be taken into account so also we should not lose signt of variations, and it is smiley inhuman to block the free development of a human personality on the basis of his birth.

Human beings are not equal in their endowments, It Is true, but each human being Is entitled to equal opportunity according to Nehru for the development of his personality and It Is the duty of the society to provide the individual with such opportunities and get the best out of him in return. Social stratification in that case may be inevitable, but one can be made to see that there is no rational justification for allowing the social positions to be Immutably fixed by birth. So long as caste remains a fad with some people, the society at large would continue to be a victim of what I would call the scourge of casteism and consequently an all round progress would simply be a will O' the wisp in such a society. Growth of a particular section of the society at the cost of others, be they males or females, "upper caste" or "lower caste", so called privileged or the underlings, It Is Important to remember, cannot be regarded as progress; it is a disease, a case of social malignancy which unfortunately is the fate of ours inspite of plenty of liberating forces

of a Buddha, Nanak or Gandhi or Nehru being at work here from time to time. Evil forces are no less powerful and only a few handfuls of faddists and dogmatists can be a sufficient check to the progress of any society unless they in their turn are deliberately checked with greater intensity by a greater force. Sane Guruji's observations are quite pertinent here, "You who worship Indian civilization and culture" exhorts Guruji, and "you have sinned enough. Now get up and embrace the Harijan and all down trodden and neglected to your heart"(19). Nehru, thus, with all his genuine and deep love for his own country, was not a blind worshipper of Indian culture and was painfully aware of the degradation of a mass of human beings brought about by the caste system,

Nehru lamented over the sad plight of Indians under the rule of the British, who considered them selves to be a master race. Nehru writes; "Biologists tell us that recialism is a myth and there is no such thing as a master race. But we in India have known racialism in all its forms ever since the commencement of British rule. The whole Ideology, of this rule was that of the herenvolk and the master race, and the structure of government was based upon it; indeed the Idea of a master race is inherent in Imperialism"(20). "The English were an imperial race, we were told," says Nehru, " with the God-given right to govern us and keep us in subjection; if we protested we were reminded of the "tiger qualities of an Imperial race". As an Indian, I am ashamed to write all this, for the memory of it hurts, and what hurts still more is the fact that we submitted for so long to this degradation"(21). But If the memory of "racial supremacy" proclaimed by a so-called imperial race "hurts" Nehru's sensitive mind and if the concept of racial supremacy is a mere myth for him, he is no less sensitive about the question of "caste supremacy where birth in a particular caste is taken as the only criterion for judgement, Nehru is not in favour of retaining 'the basic Idea of caste' while eradicating its 'harmful rainiflcation' only. "If merit is the only criterion and opportunity is thrown open to everybody, then, says Nehru, "caste loses all its present-day distinguishing features and. in fact, ends"(22).

Nehru's spiritual and political mentor, Mahatma Gandhi, was of the view that untouchability was the real evil, not the Varna–system on which casteism is

based. Once untouchability is eradicated, caste-system will s ise in i istie glory as it were and will be reduced to Varna system, is determi y one's na (qualities) and Karma (action) which in their turn are determined by birth, Varnasrama, according to Gandhi, is the most essential feature of Hinduism, and what is required, therefore. Is that caste system which is based on the concept of Varna should not be eradicated altogether, but it needs to be reformed (23), Nehru, on the other hand, has a radical view on the matter, K. Satchidananda Murty has brought out this contrast nicely as follows:

"They (some of the best minds of Modern India) admit that as it exists today, the caste system has many evils, but they are not prepared to destroy it; they propose to reform it and restore it to its pristine purity. On the other hand, are men such as Tagore and Nehru who have totally rejected it and want to see the end of it as early as possible, Nehru has many times indicated that the salvation of India is impossible without the destruction of the Caste system. And I may add that none knows what is good for India better than Nehru" (24). While agreeing with the above view of the eminent thinker, I would only add that it is not merely a question of Nehru's knowledge or Ignorance of what is better for India (regarding which there • may be difference of opinion, of course); Nehru has his reasons and has advanced certain convincing arguments as to why he thinks that caste-system in any form can not be sustained in the present context, Nehru clearly points out, "It is sometimes said that the basic Idea of caste might remain, but its subsequent harmful development and ramifications should go; that it should not depend on birth but on merit. This approach is irrelevant and merely confuses the Issue, in a historical context a study of the growth of caste has some value, but we cannot obviously go back to the period when caste began; in the social organisation of today it has no place left" (25). Nehru's argument is that we cannot go back in time and revive caste system in its pristine form. One may of course go further and ask if it may not be possible to have old wine in new bottle, so that we may have a novel brand of caste as it were, but that is another question, One thing is clear, however, and It is that Nehru was normally allergic to anything which does not stand to reason, whether it is found in his own culture, e.g. casteism or in an alien culture, viz. racialism. To

my mind, therefore, what appears to be of utmost significance about Nehru is that he, with all his love for India and antagonism to imperialism or casteism, was and continued to remain a rationalist in temper, Russell pointed out, "A man Is rational in proportion as his intelligence informs and controls his desires"(26), and popper was right in saying that "there Is no better synonym for retlonal than 'critical"(27). This rational or critical attitude Is the very kernel of scientific temper, and, whether one agrees with his conclusions or not, Nehru had this rational or critical attitude towards everything of Indian culture which was so dear to his heart.

And yet on certain occasions, being a man of flesh and blood, he was also swayed away by his passionate longings, beyond any consideration of rationality. This of course made him all the more lovable, no doubt, but to that extent he was not merely rationale For example, his love for India was so very deep that he wanted a handful of his ashes to be thrown into the Ganges at Allahabad after his death and the major portion of the same to be scattered all over India. It was Indeed a strange wish on the part of one who claimed that he was not bound to any religious dogma or bias; it was of course a case of intense love for one's own country, Nehru's own words In this connection are worth noting from his Last Will and Testament. "When I die I should like my body to be cremated, if I die in a foreign country, my body should be cremated there and my ashes sent to Allahabad, A small handful of these ashes be thrown Into the Ganga... My desire to have a handful of my ashes thrown Into the Ganga at Allahabad has no religious significance, so far as I am concerned. I have no religious sentiment in the matter, I have been attached to the Ganga and the Jamuna rivers in Allahabad ever since my childhood and as I have grown older, this attachment has also grown... And though I have discarded much of past tradition and custom, and am conscious that India should rid herself of all shackles that bind and contain her and divide her people... yet I do not wish to cut myself off from the past completely... I am proud of that great inheritance that has been and is ours, and I am conscious that I too, like all of us, am a link in that unbroken chain which goes back to the dawn of history in the immemorial past of India. That chain I would not like to break, for I treasure it and seek inspiration from it. As a witness of this desire of mine, and my last homage to

India's cultural inheritance, I am making this request that a handful of my ashes be thrown into the Ganga at Allahabad to be carried to the great ocean that washes India's shores.... The major portion of my ashes should, however, be disposed of otherwise, I want these to be carried high up into the air in an aeroplane and scattered from that height over the fields where the peasants of India toil, so that these might mingle with the dust and soil of India and become an indistInquishable part of India".

A splendid example indeed of deep love for one's own country. As an expression of patriotism and the finest of sentiments of love for one's own country, these lines can have few parallels in the world literature. But when these lines are taken literally and when the idea Is expressed In the form of a definite wish to be actually fulfilled after death, one usually tends to forget that there could be a sort of self-deception Involved In such a wish, And It could be a self-deception of the most Intransigent type. In which even staunch rationalists may indulge at times, unwittingly of course, because of their sentimental attachment or Involvement otherwise.

I have. certain general observations to make on such wishes meant to be fulfilled after death. If the body belonging to me when I am alive is cremated after death, the ashes that remain cannot be referred to from my present point of view as my ashes' at a time when I am no longer there after my innihilation. At least if one is guided strictly by sheer consideration of rationality, he or she cannot avoid taking into account this possibility seriously. There can be meaningful reference of course such as the ashes of the cremated body belonging to one Nayak when he was alive. But it only shows that the body and the ashes that continue for some time after the death of a particular person are described with reference to a person of the past who is no more. Expressions such as 'my body' or 'my ashes', though otherwise innocuous and perhaps natural on our part, create an illusion in this context to the effect that the ashes and body belong to me also after my death in the same way or In the same sense in which my body or my burnt finger belongs to me at present. This delusion makes me anxious or indulgent about the fate of my ashes after my death, as I am anxious or Indulgent about my body at present, I may

presume on the one hand that I am a progressivist, while on the other hand I may also continue to cherish desires about what should happen to my body or my ashes after my death. It seems to be an unconscious longing on the part of a man to be distinguished even after death as he might have been during his life time, a longing which Is doomed to be futile .If there is nothing left in death. After death, of course, a name and the characteristics that were associated with that name earlier may become famous, but there is no possibility of the man himself becoming immortal In any case. Why is it that my ashes should be so very dear to me after my annihilation, as if the fate of those ashes is going to determine my fate after annihilation? Am I not getting a vicarious satisfaction as it were? In imagining that when I will be no more, those ashes, which are the products of the burning of a body, which belonged to me during my life time, could perhaps be claimed to be my own even after my annihilation and that those very ashes would be worshipped or be blessed through immersion in the holy river or by mingling with the soil of my father or motherland? This entire exercise in imagination of the future post-mortem happening which is being referred to as mine from my present position seems to be vitiated by an error of thinking that things or happenings would be mine or continue to belong to me even when I cease to exist. No wonder, therefore. If on the one hand in order to be identified as a progressivilst, one may fight shy of all sentiments, while on the other hand he may be sentimental about the fate of what would happen to his body when he would be no more, the idea being that the body would continue to be his own as usual even after his final and ultimate cessation,

The above observations are meant to be and are applicable to all such cases where the use of 'my' or 'our' is extended beyond one's own life time even if one does not, on strictly rational/scientific grounds, subscribe to a belief In continuity after death which is usually a part of some religious weltanschauung or the other. Such usages are neither rare nor are they uncommon; they are rather so much with us, here and every where, that we take them for granted. These reflections, however, do not nor are they meant to affect our general assessment and appreciation of Nehru both as a patriot and a rationalist.

But a question might be put here. Why at all one should be rational or critical in his approach? This Indeed Is a serious question for debate. Philosophers like Feyerabend have a strong apathy for both rationality and science, Feyerabend has drawn our attention to the vagaries of the so-called rationality, to the errors-cum-deceptions behind the phrase of "the objectivity of a rational debate"(28). "Rationality", according to him, "is not an arbiter of traditions. It is itself a tradition or an aspect of a tradition. It is therefore neither good or bad, it simply is"(29). Feyerabend goes to the extent of making violently paradoxical remarks in his statement that "It is always reasonable to Introduce and try to keep alive unreasonable views"(30). According to him, "reason, at least In the form In which it is defended by logicians, philosophers of science and some scientists does not fit science and could not have contributed to its growth. This is a good argument against those who admire science and are also slaves of reason. But science is not sacrosant, the mere fact that it exists. Is admired has results is not sufficient for making it a measure of excellence"(31). It is a question of value preference, as I see it, for "with every value proposed", as Popper would say, "arises the problem; is it true that this is a value? And is it true that it has its proper standing in the hierachy of Values; Is it true that kindness is a higher value than justice or even comparable with justice" (32). Popper has no doubt raised a significant issue here, but no straightforward answer to the question of value can be given unless we commit ourselves to a particular scheme of values. When we have to choose among different systems or schemes we cannot avoid choice on the basis of our respective commitments which themselves, in their turn, can be subject to further value judgements, and so on. Our deliberations here show that there is no escape from the domain of value, which is autonomous in this sense, One thing, however, which can be said In favour of secularism, scientific temper, rationality, etc. Is that they all leave open the possibility of a free debate and discussion about their values whereas religion, in the sense of religious dogma, tends to promote a deliberately different approach by closing all such discussion on the subject at the very outset, As Russell points out, "The world needs open hearts and open minds, and it is not through rigid systems, whether old or new, that these can be derived" (33). Far

from being superior to rationality, the irrational cannot be at a par with rationality, because It Is opposed, and antagonistic to the Intrinsic goal of human beings, viz. the goal of knowledge. And Jnana, as Sankara pointed out long back. Is *Vastu tantra* not purusavyāparatantra and is therefore to be approached, not through one's sentiments, but through a sort of philosophic detachment, But this love for knowledge, and for reason or rationality leading to knowledge, need not land us in a sort of pan-scientism,

In this contex, it is of seminal importance to have a proper understanding of what rationality, which is the essence of scientific temper really stands for and how it is different from a blind adherence to science and technology and is not to be confused with a sort of pan-scientism, Scientific temper should make us open-minded and unprejudiced In our approach to problems,including the problem of peace in 21st century, instead of being dogmatic in our adherence to any blind faith. Including faith in the invincibility of science of course. Scientific spirit in itself does not permit us to entertain such a faith. One need not replace one dogma or superstitution by another.

In this sense, rationality and scientific temper come close to what is known as philosophic detachment, which is expected to keep one's head cool where one is likely to be passionately involved in petty prejudices and bias of one's own, Jnana or knowledge is not any nation's private property or exclusive possession. With all its obvious differences from science and the typical scientific method, philosophic pursuit of knowledge or dirsanika jijnasa, with its prerequisite of a detached and unbiased outlook, coincides more or less with scientific temper, and Nehru was an advocate of scientific temper in this sense, while at the same time promoting the utilization of science, and scientific learning for cause of peace.

What I would regard as a sort of pan-scientism, assuming a somewhat dogmatic proportion, seems to have a field day in our day-to-day life at present, both academic and otherwise. The reason behind this lies, not so much in any genuine love of ours for what is called scientific temper or spirit, which in itself is of course sacrosanct so long as it is not allowed to cross its legimate limits, but in

somewhat blind adoration of the well-known achievements of science with its obviously tangible results in different areas, where scientific advancement is considered synonymous with wielding of some sort of miraculous power almost equivalent to that associated earlier with spiritualism, magic, or religiosity of a particular order. And yet, evidently there is nothing especially Infallible about science, at least in its theoretical framework, even if in the practical plane, where nothing succeeds like crude success, it seems to exercise a sort of monstrous authority with its attendant charisma, because of which, perhaps, we with an the naivete of a child, listen with rapt attention to and expect the final verdict from a scientist (who Is otherwise supposed to confine himself to his specific field of research unless of course he goes for an outing) regarding evidence, if any, for the existence of a soul or a spirit or even of a universal spirit governing the entire universe, regarding the actual situation obtaining in science, however, D.P. Chattopadhyaya has rightly pointed out in one of his recent article, "the final up shot appeared to be chat scientific statements are not specially privileged and that like other factual statements, they can never be free from possibility of error. In other words, the consensus emerged around the fablibilistic character of all types of sciences-factual even formal. The time-honoured form-fact, analytic/synthetic distinction started crumbling. The strong defenders of the special respectability thesis of scientific knowledge felt disappointed. The very aristocracy of the cognitive claim of science was at staked "(34).

With the dawning of this grim realisation that even science cannot be the ultimate saviour, that it also is fallible like other types of putative knowledge, along with frustrating realisation that we cannot look back to the old order either, which has been under perlstent attack from time to time with changing conditions, we are confronted with a threat of complete chaos, confusion, instability and unpredictability with the consequent erosion of values in our day-to-day life. Overexposure of sex and violence everywhere along with a morbid rush for making instant money and power at any cost could be clearly traced to this vacuum, a void, confronting us on all sides. So-called Post-modernist ideas have only rubbed salt into this gaping wound, thus worsening the present situation, that is all.

Instead of being lost in this maza-where we "look before and after and pine for what is not and where we are likely to end merely as "half-hearted believers in our casual creed", we are to take positive and definite steps in the direction of peace with a philosophically detached outlook that coincides with scientific temper, not with par-scientism.

Progress in the direction of peace can be ensured in the global context to the extent and in so far as we are prepared to give up our petty dogmas and are goaded by scientific spirit in this sense while dealing with problems confronting us in the 21st century both on the national and the international levels it should, however, be pointed out that peace can be regarded only as a regulative idea, In human affairs, confronted with sociopolitical and economic issues that vitally concern us, peace is likely to remain an ideal to be approximated more or less. instead of being a finally accomplished goal at any point of time.

Inaugurating a conference of Scientists and Educationists in New Delhi on August 4,1963, Nehru declared that "our real Ideal must be peace and peaceful settlement of problems and peaceful co-operation in the world because there is no other hope for the world or for our country"(35). He added, "we are in a kind of watershed in history and even in science, the advances that are being made are intended ultimately for the good of humanity or will they lead to complicts on a tremendous scale and disaster? It is difficult to propesy. The human being is said to have advanced greatly in many ways, but In some way he remains very much of a devil, and the brute in him is coming out",

Inaugurating *Apsara,* the Swimming Pool Reactor at Trombay, on January 20,1957, he declared, "No man can prophess the future. But I should like to say on behalf of my Govt. and I think I can say with some assurance on behalf of any future Govt. of India–that whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we shall never use this atomic energy for evil purposes. There is no condition attached to this assurance, because once a condition is attached, the value of such an assurance does not go very far"(36).

We can only talk of peace as an ideal not as something already accomplished by us even now. Sri Aurobindo's observations seem to be quite pertinent here when he in very clear terms points out to us as follows. "Teachers of the law of love and oneness there must be" says Sri Aurobindo, "for by that way must come the ultimate salvation. But not till the time-spirit in man is ready, can the inner and ultimate prevail over the outer and immediate reality. Christ and Buddha have come and gone, but it is Buddha who still holds the world in the hollow of his hand" (37). Whether the time-spirit in man is at all ready for the 21st century, it would be possible to assess the same by the end of the century. Now we can only look forward to and hope for the best, that is all.

Nehru also, befitting his scientific temper, did not want to take resort to any prophesy about the future; he only gave an assurance on behalf of his Govt. and even on behalf of any future Govt. of India, that there will be always sincere efforts at peaceful settlement of problems, and there will never be any use of atomic energy by the Govt. of India for evil purposes,

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"If untouchabllity and caste are convertible terms, the sooner caste perishes, the better for all concerned. But I am satisfied that caste. If it is another word for Varna, is a healthy Institution",

Cf. also Ibid.pp.22-23" I do regard Varnäshrama as a healthy division of work based on birth.The present Ideas of caste are a perversion of the original," and also Ibld.p.2." It is the abuse of Varnäshrama that should be combated, not the thing itself,"

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KRIPKE ON CONTINGENT *A PRIORI* TRUTH

TAFAJOL HOSSAIN

Traditionally the notions 'necessity' and *'a priority'* are held to be invariably connected with one another; it is held that they can be used interchangeably. Kripke rejects this traditional view. He shows that they are not co-extensive, the notion of necessity being a metaphysical notion, and the notion of *a priority* being an epistemological one. In order to reject the traditional view about the interchange-ability of the notions of 'necessity' and *'a priority'*, Kripke provides some counter-examples. Some such counter-examples are contingent *a priori* truths. In *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke shows that some propositions are known to be true *a priori*, for example, propositions like 'Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great' though they are not necessarily true. Thus, the proposition 'Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great' is an example of contingent *a priori* truth. In section I of this paper, I shall explain Kripke's views about *a priori* truths, necessary propositions, the notion of possible worlds, rigid and non-rigid designators; and also his account of contingent *a priori* truth. In section II of this paper, I have examined Kripke's account of contingent *a priori* truth in the light of the comments made by Dummett and Donnellan on the topic.

I

Two important points in Kripke's account of *a priority* are, firstly that this is a *concept of epistemology*, and secondly that they *can* be known independently of experience. For Kripke, the notion *'a priori'* is a concept of epistemology. Instead of using the expression *'a priori'* as connected with 'truth', as in 'a *priori* truth', Kripke prefers to use the expression 'a *priori'* in the following way:

'...a particular person or knower knows something *a priori* or believes it true on the basis of *a priori* evidence.'[1]

Kripke points out that *a priori* truths in the traditional sense are those that *can* be known independently of experience. This means, according to *him*, that ... in some sense it's *possible* (whether we do or do not in fact know it independently

of any experience) to know this independently of any experience. From the fact that some persons can know a particular proposition *a priori*, it does not follow that others cannot know it on the basis of experience. The example provided by Kripke in this connection is as follows. With regard to the question whether a particular number is prime, a person may get an answer from a computer. His knowledge, then, that the number is prime is *a posteriori*, because it depends on the knowledge of what is a computer, how does it work etc. But a person who knows that number as prime by making requisite calculations, knows it *a priori*.

Kripke deals with the notion of necessity as a notion of metaphysics and it has 'nothing to do with anyone's knowledge of anything". What we are concerned with in connection with the necessity of a proposition is whether something might have been true or might have been false. A proposition is not necessary if the world could have been different from the way it is described by the proposition, but if the world could not have been otherwise, the proposition is a necessary one.

Kripke explains the notion of necessity as a metaphysical one with the help of the notion of possible world. He points out that possible worlds are not real worlds. For him, a possible world is a possible state of the world. Possible worlds are defined as relative to the actual world, since they are the descriptions of *how the world could have been*. Kripke writes,

'A *possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it* '[3]. We may explain this point in the following way. When we say that in some other possible world Aristotle might not have been the teacher of Alexander the Great, we mean just that we can *describe a possible situation* in which Aristotle was not at all a teacher or did not teach Alexander the Great. Of course, we may not be able to imagine and we need not imagine everything that could have happened to Aristotle, only those things which are relevant to his being the teacher of Alexander the Great are to be described in this connection. Though theoretically it is necessary for giving a total description of a possible world that every individual be described clearly.

According to Kripke, ' Possible worlds are *stipulated*, not discovered by

powerful telescopes'.[4] When we describe a possible world, the descriptions that we associate with the name of a particular individual are mere stipulations, they are descriptions of certain supposed or hypothetical situations about entities of the actual world. Possible worlds are not actually existing real 'parallel worlds' as is sometimes supposed.

We may here point out that, for Leibniz, 'possible' means the same as distinctly 'intelligible'. Things of a certain sort are distinctly intelligible does not suffice to guarantee that there is, has been or will be things of this kind. This is particularly obvious when Leibniz speaks of 'possible worlds' as alternatives to the actual one, for these 'possibilities' cannot conceivably be realized (at any moment in time).[5]

Though we stipulate and so also can change a description associated with a name in the description of a possible world, we cannot do this according to our wish without any constraint. Kripke speaks of some such *constraints in constructing a possible world.* Firstly, we cannot change a description regarding the origin of an individual. Any individual, for example, Elizabeth II, must *have the same origin* in all possible worlds. Hence, in describing a possible world after Kripke, we cannot change the names of the ancestors of an individual as Chisholm thinks. Secondly, *the make-up of a thing must remain the same* in all possible worlds. For example, the table, which is made of a particular piece of wood in the actual world, cannot be made of ice in some other possible world. Thirdly, according to Kripke, a *thing* in all possible worlds must *remain the same kind of things* as it is in the actual world. For example, we cannot have a description of a possible world in which Julius Caesar is an artifact and not a man.

Kripke holds that proper names unlike definite descriptions are 'rigid designators'. That means, they have the same reference in all possible worlds. According to Kripke, *the function of a proper name is simply to designate a specific individual.* It designates an individual not by virtue of its being the individual, which possesses certain properties, but simply *qua that specific individual.* If the individual that a proper name designates possessed some properties different from

the properties it actually has, the proper name would still designate that individual. For Kripke, a proper name is a *rigid designator* in the sense that its reference in all possible worlds is determined via its reference in the actual world, or that it designates the same individual in all possible worlds. If an expression designates different individuals in different possible worlds, the expression is *non-rigid*.

Most of the definite descriptions are non-rigid in the sense that they do not have the same reference in all possible worlds. For example, the definite description 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' is a non-rigid designator, for though it designates Aristotle in the actual world; it may designate some other individuals in other possible worlds. If in describing a possible world, one associates the property of being the teacher of Alexander the Great with some other individual other than Aristotle, the referent of the definite description 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' in that possible world would be some other person different from Aristotle. Some definite descriptions, for example, 'the square root of 25', however, are rigid designators, since they describe the same thing (in the case of this example, the number 5) in all possible worlds.[6] Kripke also points out that it is not necessary for a rigid designator that its referent must exist in all possible worlds. What is necessary is that if its referent exists at all in any possible world, it must be the same individual, which is the referent of that designator in the actual world. But there are things, he admits, for example, mathematical entities like positive integers, which are such that if they exist at all, necessarily exist. The designators, which designate necessary existents, are *strongly rigid*.

In order to reject the traditional view about the notions 'necessity' and 'a priority', Kripke provides some counter-examples to the traditional thesis. He shows that there are contingent truths, which can be known *a priori*. Kripke explains this with the help of the example of the length of the standard meter stick taken from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. According to Kripke, it is true that the standard meter stick is one meter long. Traditionally, such truths are called contingent *a posteriori* truths. Kripke explains that since the stick serves as a standard of one meter, we may regard the description 'the length of S at t0' (i.e., the

length of the stick S at time to) as giving the definition of 'one meter' in the proposition 'one meter is the length of the stick S at to'. One who fixes the reference of the term 'one meter' by this definition knows automatically, independently of any experience that the stick S is one meter long at to. Therefore, epistemologically the proposition 'one meter is the length of the stick S at to' is *a priori*. This proposition, for Kripke, is also an example of contingent truth.

According to Kripke, a definite description may be associated to a name (rigid designator) in the sense that it may be used to fix the reference of that name but for that reason it should not be taken as giving the meaning of the name. In the example of the stick S, though the description 'the length of the stick S at to ' is used to define 'one meter', it does not give the meaning of 'one meter', it merely serves to 'fix the reference' of one meter in the actual world. Hence, though the proposition 'one meter is the length of the stick S at to' is known *a priori,* it is a contingent truth. For it is a contingent fact that the length of S at to is one meter. The stick might have a different length at to from the length it actually has at to. If various stresses or strains have been applied to it at to, the length of S at to might have been longer or shorter than one meter. For Kripke, there is no incompatibility between these counterfactual situations and the fact of fixing the reference of 'one meter' by the description ' the length of the stick S at to'. For the term 'one meter' is not *synonymous* or *definitionally equivalent* to the descriptive phrase 'the length of the stick S at to'. This definition merely serves to determine the reference of the term 'one meter'. Kripke holds that 'uniquely identifying properties' can coincide contingently.[7] Hence, for Kripke, the proposition 'one meter is the length of the stick S at to' is a contingent truth though it is known *a priori.*

II

We may point out now that though according to Kripke some of the descriptions associated to the proper names(which may also be used to fix their reference)describe only the contingent properties of the designated objects, some descriptions may describe their essential properties also. For example, in the proposition 'Elizabeth II is the daughter of George VI'

'the description the daughter of George VI ' describes the essential property of Elizabeth II. In this connection, we may point out Dummett's comment.

Dummett has pointed out that on Kripke's account of properties of objects we cannot understand what it is for a thing to have some properties essentially, necessarily or contingently, by concentrating on the linguistic forms like 'it is necessary that...', 'it is possible that ..', where the gap is to be filled up by a complete sentence. On the contrary, we have to concentrate on the linguistic forms like 'it is necessarily (or contingently) true of x that x is../. [8] For example, to say that it is a contingent property of Fido that he is the first dog to go to sea, we would not express this by a sentence of the form 'It is contingently true that Fido is the first dog to go to sea'. We have instead to understand what it is for the predicate 'x is the first dog to go to sea' to be contingently true *of that dog.* Similarly, for Kripke, the fact that though the standard meter stick is one meter long, it might not have been one meter long should not be expressed as 'It is possible that the standard meter stick is not one meter long', but as 'It is true of the standard meter stick that it is possibly not one meter long'. The proposition 'It is necessarily true that Hesperus is Phosphorus' is also to be interpreted as the property of being identical with Phosphorus is a necessary property of Hesperus'. The point of Dummett here is that in order to be able to speak about the object which is the referent of the subject expression of the sentence, for example 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' the name 'Hesperus' must be construed as not being within the scope of the modal operator and this is the case also with sentences containing definite descriptions as their subjects. If in a modal sentence a proper name or a definite description is construed as being within the scope of the modal operator, we would not succeed in speaking about the object which is the referent of the name or the description. For example, the sentence The teacher of Aristotle might not have been a teacher" is about the person who is the teacher of Aristotle and so it should be interpreted as 'It is true of the teacher of Aristotle that he was possibly not a teacher'. In symbols:

$(\exists x)[Txa.(y)(Tya. \supset .y = x).\Diamond(z) \sim Txz]$

[Txy : x taught y]

which is a true sentence.

The sentence 'The teacher of Aristotle might not have been a teacher' should not be interpreted as "It is possible that the teacher of Aristotle was not a teacher". In symbols:

$\Diamond (\exists x)[Txa.(y)(Tya.\supset.y = x). (z)\sim Txz]$

For that would be to allow the possibility of a contradictory statement. In other words, in Kripke's theory the sentences about individuals which ascribe them having or lacking certain properties contingently or necessarily are to be interpreted as the names of individuals must be construed as being ¹out side the scope of modal operator. Explained in this manner, *the only* difference between a rigid and a non-rigid designator out side the scope of a modal operator is that the non-rigid designator points to some uniquely identifying properties possessed by its referent *in the actual world* which a rigid designator does not. This is also suggested by Kripke's view that the definite description 'the square root of 25' is a rigid designator. If the property described by the definite description is an essential property of the object concerned, the definite description would designate the object rigidly, i.e., it would designate the same object *in all possible worlds.*

Donnellan also shows, in his paper The Contingent A *priori* and Rigid Designators', that a name may be introduced as a *rigid designator,* as well as an *abbreviation for description.* When a name is introduced as a rigid designator, it may be associated to a definite description, but in such a case the description only serves to fix the reference of the name, it does not give the meaning of the name. While if a name is introduced as an *abbreviation/or a definite description,* the definite description may be regarded as giving the meaning of the name. Donnellan writes, "... we should not, of course, suppose that names *cannot* be introduced as abbreviations; it is obvious that we can do that if we want to'.⁹ He explains his point with the help of the example of the name 'Neptune' and the definite description 'the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus'. Kripke thinks that Leverrier who introduced the name 'Neptune' as a rigid designator might quite

consistently believe the proposition:

(A) 'Neptune might have existed and not have been the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus'

even if he used the description 'the cause of perturbations in the orbit of Uranus', to fix the reference of the name 'Neptune'. The proposition expressed by the sentence:

(B) If Neptune exists, Neptune is the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus.

Would therefore be both *a priori* and contingent for Leverrier. Here the proposition (A) is to be understood as one with the modal operator having a narrow scope. Donnellan holds that when someone introduces a name as a rigid designator, he can do this by pointing out the scope of modal operator. When a name is introduced as a rigid designator, the name always has a wide scope and the modal operator has a narrow scope. Now, for Donnellan, one could also use the name 'Neptune' as an abbreviation for the description "the cause of perturbations in the orbit of Uranus'. In that case substituting the description (which is definitionally equivalent to 'Neptune') for the name in (A), he would have obtained:

(C) The cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus might have existed and not have been the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. This proposition may be interpreted in two different ways depending on the scope of the modal operator. If the modal operator has a wide scope, we have:

(D) It might have been the case that (the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus did not cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus). If the proposition is interpreted with the modal operator having a narrow scope, we have:

(E) The cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus might have been such that it did not cause the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus.

Of these two interpretations, (D) is obviously false. But (E) expresses something that one can consistently believe and hence Leverrier could believe it too. Donnellan writes, 'Leverrier probably did not say anything that would disclose an intension

that the name should function one way rather than the other. Kripke tells us that
this is an example of the introduction of a name as a rigid designator, but why is he
so confident that it is not an example of a name introduced as an abbreviation'.[10]
Here Donnellan's point is that, when person introduces a name by using a descrip-
tion, he can introduce the name either as a rigid designator or as an abbreviation
for the description. On the contrary, Kripke holds that a name can only be intro-
duced as a rigid designator. Donnellan's examples show that unless it is explicitly
stipulated that the name should be used as a rigid designator, we cannot take it for
granted that a name has to be used as a rigid designator. One may use a name as a
rigid designator on one occasion and also as an abbreviation for a description on
some other. The properties of a sentence would vary depending on whether the
name occurring in it is used as a rigid designator or as an abbreviation for a de-
scription. For example, the sentence (F) 'If N exists then N is the ϕ'

would express a contingent truth if the name W is used as a rigid designator. But
the same sentence would express a necessary truth if the name W is used as an
abbreviation for the description the ϕ'. We may also point out here that (F) would
express a necessary truth if the description 'the ϕ describe an essential property of N.

Donnellan also shows that if it is stipulated that a name is to be used as a
rigid designator, the consequence would be that such stipulations would not give
rise to any knowledge other than of linguistic matters and so not to any knowledge
a priori. In this connection, Donnellan distinguishes between *knowing that a certain
sentence expresses a truth* and *knowing the truth of what is expressed by a sen-
tence.* A person, for example, may know from his German speaking friend that a
certain German sentence expresses a truth, but unless he can know what the sen-
tence means he would not be able to know the truth that the sentence expresses.
For Donnellan, when we stipulate that a name is introduced as a rigid designator
and associate it with a description, which fixes its reference, we can know *a priori*
that the sentence expressing the relation of identity between them expresses a truth,
but cannot know *a priori* the truth of what the sentence expresses. From the stipu-
lation, for example, that 'Neptune' is introduced as the name (a rigid designator)

of the planet which is the cause of perturbations in the orbit of Uranus, one can know *a priori* that the proposition 'Neptune is the cause of perturbations in the orbit of Uranus' expresses a truth. But in order to know the truth expressed by the sentence, one would have to know whether Neptune is actually the cause of perturbations in the orbit of Uranus or one must have knowledge about the object, which is the planet Neptune. Unless we have any such knowledge, we do not know any truth at all. One's stipulative introduction of a name as a rigid designator does not give us any extra-linguistic knowledge, nor he can know anything of any extra-linguistic state of affairs.

Kripke rejects the positivist doctrine that logical necessity is the only type of necessity and emphasizes on the notion of metaphysical necessity. The notion of metaphysical necessity concerns the metaphysical structure of the world. The things or the substances rigidly designated by the names also has a rigid metaphysical structure, and therefore, for Kripke, some of the attributes are possessed by them essentially, while some other possessed by them contingently. This is the doctrine called essentialism. Such a doctrine has to face two major difficulties among others; (i) whether the notion of rigid metaphysical structure (or essence) make any sense, and (ii) even if it makes any sense at all how can it be recognized.

REFERENCES

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2. Ibid, p.34.

3. Ibid, p.44.

4. Ibid, p.44.

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6. Cf. S.A.Kripke, Identity and Necessity', in M.K.Munitz (ed.), *Identity and Indiuiduation,* p. 145.

7. Cf. S.A. Kripke, *Naming and Necessity,* pp. 4-5.

8. M. Dummett, *Frege: Philosophy of Language,* p. 124ff.

9. K.S.Donnellan, The Contingent *Apriori* and Rigid Designator` in P.A. French et al (eds.), *Contemporary perspectives in the Philosophy of Language.* p.47.

10. Ibid, p. 47.

# LANGUAGE: NATURE AND FUNCTION - INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

MAHESHWAR MISHRA

Before elucidating nature and function of language in Indian Perspective, I would like to say something about language in nutshell. Language is a mode of communication through speech. It is that human expression, which is uttered by speech organ. It is the best means of self-expression. It is through language that human beings express their thoughts, desires, emotions, feelings, store (their) knowledge, transmit their message, transport knowledge and experience from one person to another, from one generation to another. It is through language that human beings interact. It is language again that yokes present, past and future.

Language reveals itself like a living and well adorned wife to her husband.[1] Language is an important tool, which not only distinguishes man from the animals but also mediates human knowledge. Each and every knowledge about anything comes to us only and only through language. In the west, it was Aristotle who established the classical view of man as a being who has language. Nowadays, the western scholars have begun to study the conception of language. Language is essential to study language from within. A new name or term has been coined by the western scholars as 'metalanguage', which studies about the nature of language.[2] J.G. Herder and W.V. Humboldt are regarded as the founders of modern western linguistic science. The theory propounded by them is known as idealistic conception of language. Eminent philosophers like Kant and Hegel also made critical study of language. According to Hegel language is the medium through which the subjective spirit mediates with the beings of objects.[3] In the 20th century it is Ernest Cassirer who expanded the concept of language which includes the natural sciences, the humanities and all cultural activities of human being. He opines that the main feature of language is that it finds within itself its own criterion for truth and meaning. But his view is narrow- because he presupposes that language, art and religion are parallel forms of representation[4]. The difficulty occurs due to the fact that all-human knowledge is encompassed within language, hence art and religion can't be

a separate form of language, rather its existence is due to within language. So, Cassirer's view is not tenable.

The contemporary conception of linguistic thought has restricted the meaning of language to the printed word or material only and then it analyses for one to one correspondence with objective reality. It has reduced the language to the uttered word only against the concept of idealistic thinkers. K. Klostermaier rightly observes that the approach of linguistic thought sees the word only as a carrier of information and basically studies those aspects of language that a computer can store and retrieve... The Spoken word contains many dimensions that are inaccessible to the computer: dimensions we perceive when we labour to produce the right words for a thought; when we find ourselves struck by the appropriateness of a great poet's language; or when we rejoice in coining a word that seems to express uniquely what we feel[5]. These days the computer like function of language is highly regarded but modern linguists prefer to consign all other dimensions of the word to the unreality of a mystic silence[6]. They say that either the word is factual and scientific in its referent or it is mystical and it has not real function in life. If we bifurcate and divide language into such a division then the modern man is deprived of its fullness and this of reality is such aspect which language in all its dimensions can manifest in its fullness.

If we come across to the study of language in Indian perspective then it is found that Indian linguistic speculations started by the Hindus before the advent of recorded history, beginning, with the Vedic hymns, which is said to be 3000 yrs old[7]. Indian thinking about the language was never restrictive. Indian sages and seers accept that all aspects of the world and human experiences were thought of as illuminated and manifested only by language. Indian tradition postulates and presupposes that language contains both phenomenal and metaphysical dimensions. It is interesting to note here that in a hymn of Rg-veda a semi technical vocabulary is seen to be developed to deal with such linguistic matters like language composition, inspiration, illumination etc[8]. Indian thinkers paid equal care and attention to the inner (metaphysical) and the outer (phenomenal) aspects of

language. Indian thinkers did not commit any mistake, which the western thinkers had done about the language speculation. Indians did not accept or reduce language only to the factual referents, neither had they devaluated the meanings of human words that language ends up as obscure mysticism[9]. The great Grammarians like Panini and Maharshi Patanjali along with the etymologists like Yāska were main who were and clearly concerned with human speech in the everyday empirical world. But apart from the empirical world they also studied language from metaphysical point of view. The great Indian exponent and father of linguistic trend, Bhartrihari, starts his book Vākyapadīya with a metaphysical question about the nature and origin of language in relation to Brahaman but after a quarry he explored technical grammatical points involved in the day to day use of language[10].

The potentiality of language lies in dealing with common human things along with the metaphysical ground of creativity. It is clear and distinct perspective of Indian thinkers in comparison to the western counterparts that the Indian are more insightful and more encompassing than them. It can be seen or observed here in the saying of Mr. Klostermairer:

'The great creative geniuses of India, men like Gautam Buddha or Shankara, took care to explain their thought not as creation but as a retracing of forgotten eternal earth. They compared their activity to the clearing an overgrown ancient path in the jungle, not to the making of a new path'[11].

The term 'creative efforts' that the seer on composer of the word is not to bring out of his won imagination but on the contrary forgotten eternal earth and it is in this specific Indian perspective both the philosophical analysis of language are taken as intellectual activities which eternal truth in relation to day to day objects and events.

Language has got important place in the ancient literature of human civilization, the Vedas, it is described as the support of gods. The composer of the Vedas first of all established the first inception of language by setting up names[12]. They traced the course of language through ritual. In the Vedic hymns the power of language is found in its two forms:

i.   Language and meaning are manifested and widely distributed by the seers and sages. They saw and heard with clear understanding that the self-revealing language provides deep intuitions.

ii.   The man who does not see language due to his ignorance and obstruction for him it is hidden, mysterious and looked at and listened to wrongly and without any clear understanding[13]. The particular hymn of the Veda says that the nature and function of language is to manifest the meaning of things. The language has been identified here with Brahman. It has been accepted that there are as many words as there are manifestation of the divine[14]. This type of view continued in the later Granthas of the Hindus. In the Upanishad speech has been termed as Brahman[15].

Suprisingly, a good sense of equality is seen in the Brahmanical scriptures and that of the Christians where both accept that in the beginning the word itself was god which was with him. It is supposed here that speech and the divine co-exist. But there is a note of significant difference also that Christianity conceives an absolute beginning of order when God speaks and through His speaking creates[16] but the Brahmanical view accepts in a cyclic concept of creation with not absolute beginning. It asserts on the cyclic view of creation and dissolution and after each dissolution a seed is left out of which the next cycle originates. The nature of the seed is described as divine word. Different symbols are used to indicate the divine nature of speech. The Vedas take language as daivik vak.

According to Maharshi Aurobindo Ghosh the language of the Veda is rhythm not composed by the intellect but heard, a divine word that came vibration out of the infinite to the inner audience of the man who had previously made himself it for the impersonal knowledge[17].

Indian concept of language was contained in seed form in the Vedas but it was developed in its full form and entirety in the Pratisakhyas, which mention rules for language. In old Indian tradition language is thought to be truly and most fully experienced and received in its verbal or oral form. The written word has been accepted as a secondary thing, which was developed for heuristic teaching pur-

pose. It is said that written words are tools for the people who can not remember the texts by heart. The Pratisakhyas are important for preserving the oral of verbal form in its pure form of presentation. Indian tradition accepts that language is alive only when it is spoken. The Vedic texts require the ability and potentiality to speak. Indian view lays stress on the spoken form of language. It has been said that thinking is internal speaking; writing is a coded recording, which does not perfectly represent all the nuances of the spoken word. Writing is always secondary. Indian and modern western views about the relationship between written and spoken language is quite contrast. In modern context the earliest available manuscript is searched out and then it is used as the criterion to verify the text of today. It is done so because due to human failings, errors which may not be present in the old and earlier manuscript. The modern critic points out that the old texts were preserved and conveyed to one generation to another in oral transmission form and it is modified by the people of the day keeping in mind the time, space and requirements. The method and process of oral transmission is unreliable due to incompleteness and inability to carry forward the original texts in its pure and unchanged form[18].

But, contrary to western view in India Pratisakhyas maintained pure oral presentation of the Vedas through many years from generation to generation, under the strict supervision of learned and wise teachers in unbroken oral tradition. This custom was not dead. It makes clear, distinct and correct speaking of the word a living language. Western magnum opium on Indians scriptures does not represent true language. It can be said that books in written forms can not be termed as true knowledge in strict sense of the word. From Indian point of view such type of knowledge represents only for uneducated persons. The Pratisakhyas are training rules for the oral learning of languages, which preserves the Vedic word in its pure form.

The study of grammar and the concept of language occupy pivotal place in Indian thought continues tradition from the Vedic age to the present one. The first postulates and formation of Sanskrit grammar is found in the earliest Pratisakhyas. Sanskrit occupied a dominant and prominent place as a language from the early age upto 1000 A.D. A regular grammar was evolved and developed during this

period. This was the natural and developed outcome of the spoken language[19]. In Indian literature the Nirukta of Yāska is the oldest etymology. Panini came after Yāska and known as a great grammarian. Patanjali wrote important commentary on Panini's sutras. The main aim of the grammarians was to bring out the intended meaning. In the words of Yāska, it is to get the real meaning of an uttered word [2]. The work of these grammarians put forward an attempt to discipline and explain the behaviour of a spoken language so that the intended and inner meaning may come out clearly without any obstruction.

The Indian speculation of language started with the intended meaning of language. The prominent figures of Indian galaxy about the language are Mandan Mishra, Kumarila, Kaundabhatta, Abhinava Gupta, etc. But undoubtedly Bhartrihari occupies the apex position among all. Bhartrihari in his book Vākyapadīya has conceived the outer word form to be united with the inner meaning. He propounded the Sphota theory of language. The term Sphota originates from the word 'Sphuta' meaning to burst forth. Sphota is the idea that bursts out or flashes on the mind when a sound is uttered[21].

The germ of Sphota theory of language can be traced out in the early Vedic period, where speech was taken as a manifestation of the all pervading Brahman. The mantra AUM is regarded as the primordial speech sound form and it is from this all forms of vak are said to have evolved. At the very outset of Vākyapadīya, Bhartrihari restates these very teachings as the foundation for his own thinking[22]. The unitary Sphota is manifested as a series of uttered sounds, which are the tools of expression and communication. The manifestation may vary in form and style from man to man, place to place and time to time, but it is a truth that it is expressed throughout. Bhartrihari's treatment of language is quite different based on Sphota. According to his theory of language, the Sphota the meaning whole, is something over and above the uttered or written letters[23]. It is clear that the individual letter sounds vary with the speaker but there lies a feature which is common to all speakers that letters are uttered only for the purpose of manifesting the changeless Sphota which resides within the speaker and it is present within

the consciousness of every hearer in potential form. The exressions are simply various outer manifestations of the one internal Sphota. The process of communication has been clearly explained in the following way-

At first the word exists in the mind of the speaker as a Sphota when he utters it, he produces a sequence of different sounds so that it appears to have differentiation. The hearer, although first hearing a series of sounds, ultimately perceives the utterance as a unity - the light bulb coming on image of the cartoon. Experience of the hearer is his mental perception of the same Sphota with which the speaker began, and it is then that the meaning of the word first seen by the speaker is also known by the hearer. Contrary to the other theories, Bhartrihari's view is that meaning is not conveyed from the speaker to the hearer, rather, the spoken words serve only as the stimulus to reveal the meaning which was already, present in the mind of the hearer[24].

The essential idea of the speech is a given something which is inherently present in the speaker's consciousness and in the consciousness of each and every person. The speaker at first moment of its revealation is completely nabbed into the unitary idea. But when the speaker starts to evaluate the idea with an eye to its communication he has withdrawn himself from the first intimate unity with the idea and now experiences it in a two fold ways. On the one way it contains objective meaning, which the speaker seeks to communicate and on second way it has words and phrases that will be utterd. These two aspects are known as word-sound and word-meaning, i.e. Dhvani and artha. According to Bhartrihari these two aspects are differentiated in the mind but are integrated part, which constitutes the Sphota. Bhartrihari gives emphasis on revealatory function of this two aspects unity. In his opinion the Sphota is eternal and inherent in consciousness[25]. At once it cannot be grasped, but when repeatedly uttered or used different words in attempting to communicate the same idea then clear and distinct cognition of Sphota is cognized. Ultimately, the hearer has complete and clear cognition of the entire Sphota and its two aspects. It has been described by Bhartihari as an example of special perception. In a specific sense Sphota may be defined as the transcendent ground in

which spoken syllables and the conveyed meanings are united. Mandana Mishra also illustrates Bhartirihai's theory of Sphota with the analogy of a jeweler who examines the genuineness of precious stone.

Now, it is clear from the above discussion that according to Bhartrihari language functions on at least two levels. The first level is the intuitive flashlike understanding of the meaning of the sentence as a whole and the second level is the uttered sounds which go together to constitute the sentence. The latter is known as outer speech (vaikhari vak) and the former is known as inner speech (pasyanti vak). In between two levels there lies a middle speech know as madhyama vak. It represents the level of thought. Bhartrihari opines that language passes through these three levels wherever the speaker speaks. Bhartrihari says that the whole is prior to the parts and it results in an ascending hierarchy of speech levels, which ultimately is identified wdth Brahman.

Language is a distinctive feature of human consciousness and a medium of all human knowledge and communication. Modern western trend of scientific study concentrates its attention on the outer words but Indian speculation of language asserts that the nature of the language may be more complex and powerful. The oral base tradition and custom of language is significant to pave the way for further examination of language in Indian perspective. Now, it can be concluded that the primary unit of language is the meaning - whole and its physical manifestation as a series of uttered words is secondary. The uttered word has no independent entity apart from the sentence. The two aspects of dhvani and artha are only differentiated in the buddhi and yet they are integrated like two sides of a same coin constitute the Sphota. Meaning is communicated by the progressive revealation of the inherent vakya-Sphota as the padas are uttered. Thus, it is clear and evident that the oral emphasis on the Indian approach to language has remarkably shaped the kind of grammar and philosophy of language that has developed.

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TOWARDS A SEARCH FOR HUMAN UNITY

BHASWATI BHATTACHARYA CHAKRABARTI

The problem of 'human unity' has been considered from different perspectives, religious, cultural and political. Religious leaders who are worried about the problem often think of a religious unity of mankind; sociologists being anxious over the problem of human unity talk of a cultural unity; politicians, when they feel tired of political whirlwind speak of a political unity of all human beings. If, however, we look back at the past, we find that the problem of human unity is not at all an altogether new problem and since from the Greek age till the modem period a number of European philosophers have considered this problem from a philosophical standpoint. The present paper is a humble attempt to analyze the notion of human unity from the viewpoint of some of these thinkers.

By 'human unity' is not meant obviously the physical unity, viz., the unity of existence of individuals belonging to different groups with different habits as well as different language and genes. It means the 'unity' of essence-the essence by which each individual is called a human being in spite of their innumerable differences. And the main point of concern is: how can this 'unity' be achieved? For a man is not perfect by nature and each and every individual mind is full of many deficiencies. So by which process is it possible to unite all these individual minds and thus to develop a group mind? An analysis of the long history of Greco-Christian thought shows that this goal can be achieved through perfection since man is perfectible though he is not perfect by nature. According to the Greeks, individual perfection leads ultimately to social perfection and thus human unity can be made possible by a lull exercise of rationality, a characteristic which distinguishes a human being from other animals. The rationality of a man becomes manifest in his speculative activity. So a man devoted to speculative activity most fully realizes the nature of man since the intellect more than anything else is the man' And a man can live a speculative life only in so far as he can live like Gods. This type of perfection might be described as metaphysical perfection. And those

who think that an individual can achieve such sort of metaphysical perfection be-lieve also that a perfect individual can have union with the one. It is to be noted that by 'perfection' Aristotle and the early Stoics meant this sort of metaphysical perfection only. It has been emphasized by Aristotle that to perfect oneself is to achieve a specific end. And there must be such an end for man as such which is called by him, 'Eudemonia'or happiness. This good can be attained only by an exercise of man's speculative activity. By 'speculative activity', however, Aristo-tle meant contemplation and not theorizing. Activity, according to him, does not imply actually doing anything; there is an activity of immobility also like that of thought. Now though in Aristotle we first find the idea of the perfectibility of human being yet he mentioned nothing about social perfection and human unity. It was in fact the early Stoics who started to think of a single society throughout the world and it were they who tried to show how individual perfection leads to social perfection. It is highly surprising to find out that Stoicism was in its early stage a doctrine, which had revolutionary import, a movement towards perfection in hu-man individual. The early Stoics thought of themselves as members of a single society, which is united by its conformity to reason. Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism (336b.c.-265b.c.) himself wrote a Politica (Republic) in which we find an emphasis on Universality. Zeno's 'Republic' was a "world-state" which would govern all men without any distinction. It was supposed to be a completion of the ideal state, which Alexander had failed to complete because of his untimely death. It revealed a world-wide state, whose citizens were not of any particular country but of the universe. It was patterned not after local traditions but after universal nature; it had no laws since there was no crime, no class system and no hatred; love was the master of this 'world-state'. Zeno's 'Republic' contained nothing corre-sponding to the Platonic classes; all its members had an equal responsibility of being fully rational. Merely in virtue of his perfect rationality, a stoic was a mem-ber of such an ideal state, a community of Sages as much as, for Plato, a philoso-pher governed his life by the law of the ideal republic.

From 16th Century A.D., onwards, however, the outlook of the philosophers regarding the perfectibility of man had begun to change. From this period, we can

observe two characteristics in their attitude. Firstly, emphasis has been given on moral perfection and not on metaphysical perfection; and secondly, it has been held from 16th Century A.D that perfecting of the 'whole of mankind- rather than the perfection of the individual ought to be the objective. Pietro Pomponazzi (16th Century A.D) in his book 'On the Immortality of the Soul' did not deny that in so far as men can become god-like this can only be through the cultivation of their speculative reason. What he did deny is that men can properly be described as 'perfect only in so far as they are wholly devoted to the contemplative life. To be a philosopher-king or a Stoic sage, to make oneself worthy of eternal happiness, to achieve union with the one are regarded as too ambitious objectives. It has been pointed out by Pomponazzi that all men should develop the practical intellect to its full perfection. By "practical intellect' is meant that intellect by which one is capable of making or moral or political decisions. And perfection has been identified by Pomponazzi with moral or 'practical perfection'. 'As to the practical intellect, he wrote, 'which is proper to man, every man should possess it perfectly... For the whole would be most perfectly preserved if all men were righteous and good, but not if all were philosophers or smiths or builders.' By the 'whole' is meant 'mankind' or human race. What is novel in his approach is the emphasis given by him on the perfecting of the 'whole'- of mankind- rather than the perfecting of the individual. The individual is to be perfected only as part of the perfection of mankind. And if mankind as a whole is to be perfected then the ideal of perfection has to be set at a level which men can hope to achieve. To be god-like should not be the ambition of man.

"The bliss of man is not to think or act beyond mankind."

[Alexander Pope: "Essay on Man": Epistle I lines 189-90]

A human being should recognize the fact that he is neither god nor beast and, therefore, he should remain satisfied with the perfection proper to him. All men can and ought to be of good character and this should be the objective of all human beings. Gradually bringing happiness to the fellow-beings has become the ideal of perfection. Perfection has been identified henceforth with disinterested

benevolence and usefulness to others. This ideal of perfect suggests that man can be brought gradually and to an unlimited degree to care for their fellow men and thus it is possible for all human beings to be united.

Now the question is: How this perfecting is to be brought about? It has been pointed out by John Locke and thinkers like David Hartley (1279 A.D) that all men can be perfected morally by education. Locke has argued, first, that there is nothing in an individual to prevent him from being morally improved. Secondly, there are secular processes like the process of Education, by which the moral improvement of their fellow men can be brought about. Thirdly, it is possible for the secular reformers to perfect people by manipulating pleasure and pain, viz., the pleasure of reputation and pain of blame. We get a fully developed form of Locke-based perfectibilism in Hartley.

"If beings of the same nature but whose affections and passions are, at present, in different proportions to each other, be exposed for an indefinite time to the same impressions and associations, all their particular differences will, at last, be overruled, and they will become perfectly similar, in a finite time, by a proper adjustment of the impressions and associations". [David Hartley: Observations on Man: Pt.LChap.1. 2 Prop.xiv.Car.6, in the 5thEd.Voll.pp.85-5]

Association tends to make us all ultimately similar. Thus given only that association is in good hands, human or supernatural, the operations of association can, and will, make all men happy. "If one is happy, all must.'

It might be objected, however, that it is an absurd idea that by moral education all men can be perfected and, ultimately, a 'group mind' can be developed. For it is one thing to admit that by education human situation regarding knowledge or aesthetic achievement can be improved and it is quite another thing to admit that mankind as a whole can be perfected-net only in respect of some particular field but universally. So how can it be that only by education men could be perfected in such a way that once 'a time must come when the common parent of mankind will cause wars to cease to the ends of the earth, when men shall beat their swords into ploughshares'? The mere fact of human inventiveness rather shows that it is very

difficult to retain an optimistic attitude regarding human unity.

Now, if education is found to be ineffective in practice to develop a 'world-state' or 'group-mind', then, is there no other process to perfect all human beings and thus to achieve 'human unity' as desired? It is to be emphasized here that this sort of human unity which ensues from moral perfection can be attained through an exercise of our rational will. This is not an impossible task for us though to practice it, one must admit, is highly difficult. And perhaps this can be done within a consistent Kantian framework. To explain. According to Kant, pure reason has two aspects viz., theoretical and practical. As concerning knowledge the a priori principles of reason e.g., substance and attribute, cause and effect etc. are valid only within the world of phenomena. This world of phenomena is a purely mechanical system. But in order to understand fully the phenomenal world; the pure theoretical reason must postulate certain ideas (viz., the ideas of the immortality of soul, freedom and of God) the objects of which transcend sense-experience. These ideas are not theoretically valid but their validity is practically established by pure practical reason. This pure practical reason does not yield speculative truth, but prescribes its principles dogmatically in the form of imperatives to the will. The will is itself practical reason, and thus it imposes its imperatives to the will, And our sense of duty springs from this rational will. It is morally necessary that we should believe otherwise would weaken our moral efforts. The perfectibility of society is a 'regulative idea' which must govern our conduct. On Kant's view, human beings as individual must content themselves with the reflection that mankind, although not themselves as individuals, will be perfected as a result of their efforts. For it is their moral duty to content themselves. According to Kant, perfection implies much more than mere conformity to law. To be perfect means not only to do right things but also to act out of respect for moral law. A man must not do what is right or must not be benevolent to his fellow men out of his own interest but he must do it from a sense of duty. If thus the rational will of a man determines his action then the end of an action will be nothing but humanity itself. An individual should use by no means the humanity of his own or any other fellow being for any interest other than promoting of humanity itself. And if the development of

humanity itself becomes the objective of the rational will of each and every man then in this way it is possible ultimately to form a 'Kingdom of Ends'. The 'Kingdom of Ends' has been explained by him as 'the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws'. It has been emphasized that in this kingdom such a community will be constituted by different rational beings in which the humanity of every other member will be realized and honoured. The 'Kingdom of Ends' is, to some extent, analogous to the kingdom of nature. By the 'Kingdom of Nature' is meant the whole system of natural beings forming a unity in virtue of the laws of mutual action and reactions. The 'Kingdom of Ends' is like a 'Kingdom of Nature' in respect of being a unity, and a unity constituted by the presence of m oral laws. But the latter is different from the former to the extent that its members are not things but persons and that its laws are not like those of the former uniformities of sequence but imperatives enjoining mutual consideration and respect. And in such an ideal realm men would behave as if they are individuals having a single mind and thus a 'group mind' could be developed. The realization of this unity and interconnectedness of all the human beings would become manifest in reverence for life, compassion and in a sense of universal brotherhood and thus there would prevail perpetual peace internally and externally.

But is it not a Utopian idea? Is it at all possible to form such a society as conceived by Kant? The answer would be that though Kant was not so optimist to fancy that such a kingdom is an ideal which could easily be realized yet he was not pessimistic enough to believe that this is a dream unrealizable forever. According to him, perpetual peace as the goal of humanity is an ideal not merely as a speculative Utopian idea or a daydream but as a moral principle, which ought to be, and therefore, can be realized by all beings who want to proclaim themselves to be rational. If perpetual peace is a duty it must be necessarily deduced from the Categorical Imperative, viz., 'Act according to that maxim which can at the same time be regarded as a universal law.' And to Kant it is a duty. This end of humanity is the evolution of man from the stage of mere self-satisfied animalism to a high state of civilization. Nature has given man reason and freedom of will and she has determined that with the help of these powers and without the aid of instinct man shall

win for himself a complete development of his capacity and natural endowments. The natural capacities of human beings reach full development only in the race and not in the individual. "Justice will reign, not only in this state, but in the whole human race when perpetual peace exists between the nations of the world. But external perpetual peace pre supposes internal peace— peace civil. social. economic, religious. If men become perfect, how can there be war? And Kant demands to a certain extent, the moral regeneration of man".

[Perpetual Peace: Immanuel Kant: Translated by M. Campbell Smith: Translator's Introduction.]

As it is hoped by the illustrious sage of Konigsberg the ultimate result of man's moral regeneration will surely be the development of a 'group mind'.

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MRINAL KANTI BHADRA

SANTOSH KUMAR PAL

Professor Mrinal Kanti Bhadra (1929-2002) was one of the leading philosophers of our time. Prof. Bhadra, who is generally referred to as promoter of Phenomenology and Existentialism in India, was an academician of versatile genius. He was expert in continental philosophy, and studied and taught Phenomenology, Existentialism, and Hermeneutics. He was also interested in Logical Positivism, Marxism, Contemporary Indian Philosophy and Psychology. Another thing, which was very characteristic of him, is that he was well-conversed in literatures. He was a serious reader especially of Bengali, English and French literatures. As a teacher. Prof. Bhadra was very popular and inspiring. In what follows we shall make a very humble attempt to appreciate some of his philosophical thoughts.

Born in a critical phase of history Prof. Bhadra witnessed some of the epoch-making events at the global and national levels that have been instrumental in moulding his sensitive mind and intellect. He witnessed the rise and fall of Nazism, the Russian Revolution (and also its fall in the ninth decade of twentieth century), the victory of socialism in China, Vietnam, and Cuba and in other east European countries, and the freedom struggle of India, and the first and second phase experiments of communist movement in India. He saw the horrors of World Wars, was deeply perturbed at the crisis of civilization. He began to think of meaning and significance of our *existence.* And at that critical juncture he got a copy of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness.* The descriptive-phenomenological analysis of human existence of the text determined the journey of Prof. Bhadra's thought.

From his student-life he was influenced by the socialist constructions in different countries. He believed that both Marxism and Existentialism are concerned with the problems of alienation. Like Sartre, Prof. Bhadra was convinced that Marxism

is the only philosophy of hope for the toiling humanity. But the totalitarian approach of the Communist parties was cause of concern for both of them. Both argued that individual autonomy and choice must somehow be preserved in building a sound socialist society.

Another aspect of Bhadra's philosophy is that he did not like mere intellectual abstractions; he always tried to base philosophy on concrete lived experiences. And here we find the influence of life-world phenomenology. It is evident from his endeavour to culture philosophy in mother tongue. He practised philosophy from a neutral, presuppositionless position. However, if we consider his vision of existentialism, we would find that Prof. Bhadra presented apparently complex and somewhat elusive notions in a lucid manner maintaining accuracy of thought. He dedicated himself to remove the difficulties often felt in grasping the ideas and principles of phenomenology and existentialism. He has been instrumental in narrowing the gap between analytic philosophy and phenomenologico-existentialism. And this is amply evident in his writings, especially in his books *A Critical Study of Sartre's Ontology of Consciousness* and *A Critical Survey of Phenomenology and Existentialism.*

Prof. Bhadra's first book on Sartre's ontology of consciousness is based on his PhD dissertation submitted at the University of Oklahoma, USA. This book has been highly appreciated by the intellectual circle (and it may be mentioned here that Simon de Beauvoir has also applauded Prof. Bhadra's analysis *vide* a correspondence). In this work he successfully refuted the allegation that Sartre's ontology *of being-for-itself (pour soi)* and being-in-itself *(en-soi)* commits the age-old fallacy of Cartesian dualism. Prof. Bhadra persuasively argues that Sartre recognizes being-for-itself and being-in-itself for what they are, namely abstraction from the fundamental reality, which is, accordingly, being-in- the- world. Man, on Sartre's ontology, is a being-in-the world. He contended that the charge that Sartre is a rationalist of the Cartesian type as he interprets all aspects of life with the help of an *a priori* dualistic ontology is utterly false. Sartre never accepts being-for-itself and being-in-itself as innate ideas. And we should remember that Prof. Bhadra has shown that the basic category is being-in-the-world.

hi this book on ontology of consciousness Prof. Bhadra has made an attempt to clear the ambiguities of Sartre's notion of consciousness as nothingness. The logical positivists, like Ayer, goes far to declare that Sartre misused the word 'not', which is actually a logical sign of indicating the absence of something, by transforming it into some sort of entity. But any sympathetic commentator could see that Sartre's characterization of consciousness as nothingness is nothing wrong. To reveal the exact meaning of the word Prof. Bhadra considers five meanings of 'nothingness':

(i)   Consciousness is not an object.

(ii)   Consciousness is empty.

(iii)   Consciousness is not a substantial entity.

(iv)   Consciousness is the nihilation of its objects.

(v)   Consciousness is not what it is.

As Prof. Bhadra explains, *the first* sense, as noted above, of "nothingness[9] reminds us of the fact that consciousness is not an object, it is different from object which is self-complete in itself, like an. ink-well. Consciousness being a project or possibility is always in the making, going to be something. As we all agree, difference is also a kind of negation, to refer to this phenomenon we could very well make an emphatic use of "not". When in the *second* sense consciousness is characterized as nothingness, Sartre intends to say that it has nothing in it, and it is the direct illumination of things. In the *third* sense Sartre has reminded us that consciousness is not substantial, it is non-substantial absolute. In the *fourth* sense it is implied that consciousness by nature is nihilation, and in turn creates the lack of an object. As counted by Prof. Bhadra, *the fifth* sense of "negation[9] points to the fact that consciousness is the desire of something to be realized, which is also its own possibility. And to say that consciousness is a possibility is to indicate that it is free, capable of negating the present state to bring about its future.

Thus we find how nicely Prof. Bhadra makes sense of the apparently bizarre notions of existentialism. He rightly points out that all the above senses finally coalesce in the idea of consciousness as *lack*, infected with unending possibilities. It may be added here that there is some ambiguity in the very nature of consciousness

itself, and as such it is hardly possible to describe it in so called "logical" language.

Similarly, the book, *A Critical Survey of Phenomenology and Existentialism* (published by ICPR in association with Allied Publishers) is another evidence of Bhadra's depth of understanding. Although the book is expository, meant for the students and general readers, the author has made an honest attempt to clear off some criticisms made from the analytic camp. With a view to narrowing the gap between the analytic camp and the continental camp, he, in the chapter on critical appraisal of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, compares some concepts with that of Wittgenstein. Husseri is accused of being solipsist in his theory of transcendentalism. To make sense of this notion Prof. Bhadra refers to Wittgenstein, who upheld that "I" in "I think" does not denote any object. "I" is never an observable object any more than the eye is a visual object. One may wonder whether such comparison could truly represent the situation. But it could be seen that such attempts help analytic philosophers to tone down their voice and showed some sympathy onto continental philosophy.

Again, Bhadra's analysis of human ontology reveals a brilliant analysis of the modes of our existence. According to him, our existence can be understood in terms of four basic categories, and these are being-in-the-world, being-with-others, being-for-oneself and being-towards-a-goal. That means, man is a being-in-the-world-with-others-with-being-for-oneself-having-a-being-towards-a-goal. Needless to say, this is undoubtedly an excellent delineation of the modes of human existence. As already hinted, there is a sphere where Prof. Bhadra has affinity with Sartre's viewpoint: Both were sympathetic to Marxism. but are equally critical of its Stalinist face.

As we see, Sartre in his *Being and Nothingness* advocated for complete autonomy of man. But such advocacy seems to go against any collective constructions. And Sartre was vehemently criticized for his too much emphasis on individual autonomy. He responded to those criticisms in his lectures *Existentialism and Humanism*, later in his book *Critique of Dialectical Reason* and through periodicals. Anyhow,

he had faith in Marxism, and even in his last interview he restates that Marxism is *and mil remains* the philosophy of human emancipation. But he always cautioned against our attempt to reduce it to mere dogma. Like Sartre, Prof. Bhadra was worried of the inhuman totalitarian face Communist movements. Both of them held that some kind of individual autonomy must be admitted so that a balanced ideal society could be established. While discussing Sartre's evaluation of Marxism, Prof. Bhadra reiterated that Marxism has to take into account the mediations, which are directed to supplement the economic base with concrete actions, it has to study the structures of each level in different societies and at different times before reducing all of them to the formula of base and superstructure. Notwithstanding, he does not hesitate to declare that Sartre has not been fully successful in reconciling the individual with the society, even in *Critique of Dialectical Reason.*

Besides, Prof. Bhadra's versatile genius is evident in his supervision of M.Phil. and Ph.D. dissertations. Although he moved in and around western philosophy, he never underestimated the rich heritage of Indian Philosophy and culture. He was particularly interested in the philosophies of Sri Aurobindo and Rabindranath. It seems that he was interested in looking at Indian philosophy through the eyes of Enlightenment.

Life and Works of Prof. Mrinal Kanti Bhadra

Bom in 1929 at Siddhipasa village in Jessore (now in Bangladesh), Mrinal Kanti Bhadra had his school education in village and Calcutta.

■ **Education:**

1. Passed Matriculation from Lohagorah Judunath Academy, Jessore.
2. Passed the B.A. with Honours in Philosophy from Scottish Church College, Calcutta in 1949.
3. Obtained the M.A. in Philosophy from Calcutta University in 1959.
4. Made his Ph.D.,on the Philosophy of Sartre from the University of Oklahoma, USA in 1971.

■ Teaching:

1. Taught at Bankura Christian College as Lecturer in Philosophy from 1952 to 1957.

2. Then at Bangabasi College, Calcutta from 1957 to 1968.

3. Joined the University ofBurdwan as one of the founder-teachers in 1962, served its Dept. of Philosophy till retirement in1994. In the last phase of his service-tenure he became Vivekananda Professor (1978-94).

4. Served the State University College at Buffalo, New York (1970-71) as Asst. Professor while he was in USA for research study on leave (1969-71).

5   Served Rabindra Bharati University and Calcutta University as Part-time Guest Faculty.

■ Visiting Assignments:

1. Visited different universities of East Germany on an exchange programme in 1981.

2. Visited different universities of India as National Lecturer during 1985-86.

3. Visited University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh on invitation to Philosophy Seminar of Bangladesh.

4. Worked as the President, Metaphysics and Epistemology Section of the 56th session of IPC.

■ Research Supervision:

Supervised research activities of a number of M.Phil. and PhD scholars.

■ Publications:
■ Books:

1. A Critical Study of Sartre's Ontology of Consciousness, B.U. Publication, 1976

2. Astivād: Jean-Paul Sārtrer Jivan O Sāhitya, B.U. Pub.,1988

3. A Critical Survey of Phenomenology and Existentialism, ICPR-Allied, 1990

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7. Satta O Sunyata (Tran. of Sartre's *L'Être et le Neant* in two volumes), Bijnapanparva, 2000

8. Vivamiṣā (Tran. of Sartre's novel *La Nausee* Bijñāpanparva

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Professor Bhadra breathed his last on 8th June 2002, leaving behind a galaxy of successful students, researchers and admirers.

SECULARISM AND SPIRITUALISM: AN APPRAISAL

BI JAYANANDA KAR

The term 'secular' stands for the involvement with the affairs of this world, as against conveying any thing: sacred or spiritual. It is not concerned with religion. It has, accordingly, no interest with ecclesiastical or monastic order. Thus, by being secular, one is committed at least neither to have belief on a particular religion as against other religion/religions nor having any affective attitude with religion as such. A secularist's interest becomes confined to the worldly phenomena and no visionary speculation concerning supra-empirical transcendental sense of divinity or hell is ever included in his framework. He remains bound to look into the world-affairs and to contribute his role within that frame of reference with his own ability as far as possible. The welfare of others is, of course, looked into by him along with his own betterment. In this sense, within secular trend, morality is compre-hended and is also operated. Any transcendental and spiritual coating of moral sense is not needed for a secularists This is the manner in which secularism has its sanctioned use.

From this point of view, a secularist is clearly different from a spiritualist. who opts for spiritual realisation or attainment that is far remote from worldly existential status. Such a move for pure transcendence is rated as not simply higher than the worldly states but that is solely considered as value par excellence and the worldly mortal existence is graded as considerably low in valuational scale.

However, some moderate spiritualists, in this context, offer a stand which, prima facie, appears to be not belittling the value of this worldliness. According to them, the role of one' s duty, obligation and other noble virtuous thought and action are not neglected and set aside in the socio-inlividual set-up. The concern about human welfare at the worldly sphere is, of course, important. Moral thoughts as well as actions in the worldly plane are, however, construed as means for the ultimate goal, i.e. spiritual elevation or attainment. Spirituality is accepted as the final end; but that never discards the material prosperity, bodily comfort and socio-moral

dealings at the phenomenal level. All such steps are considered as suitable means for the ultimate goal.

Conceding to this approach, attempt has been made in certain quarters to formulate a via media between cue opposite views like secularism and sacerdotalism. That may be designated as a modified or liberal form of spiritualism. It does not outright reject secular morality, but keeps a space for it within its belief-structure.

But, conceptually this so-called reconciliatory move is not that clear as it appears to be at the outset. The term 'secular' has its origin in the western European tradition as diametrically opposed to both religion and theology on account of their spiritual leanings. The primacy of spiritual transcendence even to the neglect of morality at the socio-individual plane has caused considerable impediment for the free, open-textured investigation indifferent intellectual disciplines. Not only it has arrested intellectual growth, but it also has turned out to be grossly immoral and inhuman. In the name of religious supremacy, there has been persecution of many free and open-minded thinkers in course of the dark chapters of human history. Crusade war, forcible religious conversion (either overtly or covertly), forcible killing of men and animals on the pretext of attaining religious success and reward are some of the gruesome instances which are noticed both in east and west. Philosophy, science and any variety of free enquiry have not been accepted, if those are found to move in different directions without acknowledging the higher status of the set raligio-spiritual foundation. Even the neutral outlook towards religion and theology is not tolearted in certain quarters.

So, during the period of enlightenment and reason, secularism is found to have been originated in west as a strong antidote against sacerdotal dogmas, prejudices and anti-social superstitions, With this background, it can be seen that there is virtually no scope for any sort of concilliation between the two standpoints. Religion is, more or less, bound by faith in the closed circuit and therein reason is at best admitted as its obsequious auxiliary. Secularism, on the other hand, is committed to free flow of dispassionate rational inquiry. It has stoad for independent functioning of morality at the socio-human frame within the empiric worldly plane.

It docs not find any justification for linking morality with Spirituality. The vary move of making morality as a means for spiritual and is self-defeating. Because thereby moral autonomy gets adverely affected. In this way, the theological over lordship over Social morality is not found to be rationally defensible.

Secularism, despite its strong different stand from that of religion and spiritualism, is not in favour of a radical materialistic outlook either. It does not subscribe to the metaphysical position that matter alone is real (ultimately). It is held that the socio-individual needs and necessities have not to be ground by foundational materialistic Weltanschauung. The socio-individual harmony, mutual co-operation, understanding, peaceful co-existence and above all human concern arc not mere practical, prudential requirement; it has a deep-seated moral dimension. Moral awareness is not visionary in the sense of transcending humanity in the secular forum, that is why secularism has been viewed as a logical neighbour of humanism, meaning thereby that It implies the concern for humanity.

It is notable that secularism is also not committed to embrace atheism. Because both theism and atheism arc prone to hold either positive or negative assertion concerning the supra-empirical realm of divinity. But a secularist, in order to be consistent to his stand, is not under any obligation to make any pronouncement about the transcendental, either positive or negative. Its concern is only with thisworldliness welfare or prosperity within that framework alone, without by-passing the socio-moral requirement. There may be change of a specific criterion in a changing situation or circumstance; but that does not dismantle the socio-moral fabric altogether and for any transcendental spiritual or material ontologization is, indispensable.

There is another important facet of the theory of secularism. It stands not simply as opposed to religious dogmatism/ theological transcendentalism; it is meant to be relevant on various transactions made in the empirical plane. Socio- individual relationship varied types, inclusive of cultural, economic and political relevance are viewed in terms of secular perspective. the problems and issues that crop up in any such field arc dealt with a secular background. Particularly, in the western

world, almost after the downfall of monastic rule and adoption of constitutional fora of governance based on democratization, in some form or other secularism has become well established in the political circle. Religious institutions, its core beliefs and age-old traditions are not, however, rooted out; but their interference in matters of socio-political concern is least entertained. The decision made in that level is, by and large, determined by the secular outlook.

After independence, India has made its political identity in terms of a democratic sovereign republic, with the formation of a constitution in which there is later the clear acceptance of secularism (vide 42 Amendment). Pandit Nehru, the first Primne Minister of India has opted for secularism with full earnest. India is declared as a secular state, as distinctly opposed to a theocratic form of government. Indian democratic set-up, it is held, is not to entertain any religious interference in matters of socio-political decision. Secularism thus stands, in the context of India, for equi-disfance from any religious formulation - a stand not very much different from the adoption of secularism that is found in currency in the western front. The implication of 'equi-distance' from religion does not suggest that the government is to suppress all religions and to advocate a strong negative, policy towards them. Rather, a secular government only insists that its socio-political decision must be free from religious interference. Politicfll functioning must not be supervened by any religious authoriality A citizen is to be equally treated irrespective of his affinity Co any religion or to no religion.

But, so far as the use and application of the theory of secularism at the practical front is concerned, there is found to be glaring incoherent move in the Indian political scenario. For instance, though secularism is adopted in the theoretical structure of the constitution, actually during the present age, any elected political party or its leader does not hesitate to join hands with other party or its leader in order to retain or capture power. Not only from the ideological point of view such parties have nothing in common, but also it is noticed that while one overtly professes secularism, the other openly supports for the cause of a particular group or community. For unprincipled political expediency, alliances are formed to have the

government by coalition. The implicit aim for such coalition is to gain power.

The stability of the coalition government is not necessarily due to its efficiency or popularity. In moat cases it enjoys the full term because each party therein and members therein do not want to loose power and other advantages. On many instances the secular principle of non-subordination to matters concerning religion theological authority are found to have been set aside for a parochial political gain and the adherence to secular is only a lip-service. It only functions at the outer level and there is no genuine support for secular thought. Consequently the noble aim of democratic form of governance to ensure social justice and solidarity becomes self-defeated. It is ridiculous that the political parties of either having distinct pro or con attitude towards religion now claim themselves, with almost of equal force, as truly secular.

Besides the rival, political groups, some commoners including educationists and other professionals have found it difficult to adopt secularism in Indian context. Some of them have become critical about the adoption of secularism, as advanced by Pandit Nehru. They do not mind to pass a castigatory remark that Nehruvian secular model is fully unwarranted and outmoded in the Indian socio-political scenario, mainly because of India's age-old traditional religio-cultural root. India is based by people of different religions with their specific belief-structures and dogmatic foundation. To inject into their psyche, a non-religious secular temper is neither easy nor practicable. There has to be 9 according to them, some sort of syncretic move to have a blend or harmonious compound between religion and secularism. Instead of sticking to the cleaning of secularism as 'equi-distance from religions', another version is proposed and that is known as equal respect to all religions (sarvadharma-samabhāva).

The plea that is advanced is that the multi-religious phenomenon is prone to mutal conflict and hostility. State, in order to maintain peace and stability should not adopt coercive measures like fully banning all religious activities in the social sector. Through the passage of tine, religious beliefs and faiths have already been turned into part and parcel of social reality and, accordingly, the Indian Republic

cannot bypass the sociality of diverse religious scene. It has, therefore, to follow a policy of equal treatment to all religions in which the spirit of accommodation and tolerance need to be emphasized, instead of authoritative regimentation. It is with that background, the propagation of secularism in India can be meaningful. The essence of secular thought can be adopted taking due regard to the typical Indian situation and its age-old social status. In this way, an alternative use of the concept of secularism has been introduced, by way of attempting a harmony between religion and secularism.

Now, whether such device is pragmatically effective is not the main issue so far as the present conceptual probing is concerned. What is primarily sought hero is to see whether the alternative use of 'secularism' gives rise to conceptual clarity or its adoption is indispensable and logically valid. Firstly, what is the ground of such combination of religion and secularism? In what way, does such combination exhibit and preserve the essence of secularism? If secularism has been built up with a distinct non-religious background, and that is the only standard use of the concept of secularism, then any attempt of Imputing religion within Its meaning-content would be surely Incongruous, To change the basic meaning virtually amounts to non-use of the concept of secularism itself. If one is to safeguard the interest of religion by way of insisting on its privacy, then that by itself is not unacceptable. Anybody as a citizen is free to have his personal attitude, belief and freedom of choice. Secularism also approves that. It least Interferes with the personal element.

But, there has been some misuse and misreading of freedom of religion. In the name of privacy, certain moves are taken up by different religious groups, which are found to be not only mutually conflicting, but those create definite occasion for social unrest and indiscipline. On such occasion, political interference cannot be ruled out. Viewing this, secularism is kept apart from religion. So far as socio-political decisions and their implementations are concerned, the non-interference of religion/religions is insisted by a secularist .It is plainly because, the political move depends upon different factors concerning people or citizen in a wider frame. It is the religious authoriality over state that is critically dealt with. It

is the theocratic state that goes counter to the secular state. Any religious stand cannot be the determining factor for the state-policy to be implemented.

It seems that any kind of blending of the two concepts virtually points to both eating the cake and also to have it. It is at least palpably improper to use a concept completely in a different sense other than its in-built well-established sense. Thus the very idea of religious secularism turns out to be self-discrepant and conceptually muddling. Such a move is not the use but rather abuse of secularism.

Secularism, as hinted before, does not move for rooting out religion from the society with an iconoclast attitude. All that it insists for is the non-interference of religion in the affairs of state-politics. In the name of having religious freedom, in certain quarters, there is the propagandist movement leading to upgrading one's own religion and downgrading others in public. quite often, this gives rise to social disruption. A state cannot remain silent over this. In the name of equal respect to all religions, the so-called secular state cannot opt for non-interference over the issue. It may be noted, in this connection that both 'respect' and 'hatred' are emotionally charged value-loaded expressions. Secularism, as a state-policy, has been designed to treat varied social issues and problems objectively as far as possible, probing those both in their strength and weakness. The emotional overtone on either side is undesirable for free and open enquiry, so far as the functioning of state is taken into account.

The pretext that, in Indian context, religious factor cannot be so ignored, seems to be not that binding. It is true that India today consists of citizens who are multi-religious, multi-racial, multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and so on. But, it is almost equally the case that there are many other countries that have opted for democratic form of governance are also found to have citizens of multi-farious groups. If the state-laws, its mode of operation are manageably well in order and the people therein are by and large disciplined, well conscious of social morality and civic duties/responsibilities, then the adoption of secular trend becomes not only effective in political affairs, it also becomes well tuned with other walks of socio-individual transactions. The very insistence of having a religious coating of secularism only

reveals that one is not prone to openness and freethinking.

Moreover, it is worthy to note that in the present state-of-affairs, at least, the citizen of a country (India included) is not bound to adhere to a religion. He, without being irreligious, does not cling to any religion at all. He is, at the same time, a good citizen, being loyal to its different norms and objectives. This is not mere possibility but is true as a matter of fact. Many youngsters of our generation do not feel shy of overtly identifying them-selves as secular and not seriously having any sort of religious affinity. They do not insist to observe and practise any prescribed religious rules and regulations. In their case, secular outlook does not seem to have any necessary compromise with religious bent of mind. Among them, quite often one gets the response to the question concerning religion as follows: "Well, we are born to a family being grouped and identified as of 'X' religion. But we left to ourselves, are free from any religious beliefs whatsoever, we are just secular in our outlook and that is all".

Hence, the argument that in Indian context secularism has to make adjustment with religion in some way or other does not appear to be that well-grounded. Such a supposition seems to be neither reasonable nor is shown to be that compelling as a matter of fact. But the irony is that, in the present Indian context, under the plea of accepting equal treatment to all religions, the political leaders have, either in power or aspiring to get power, come forward eagerly to make themselves associated with festivals and functions organised by differed religious communities to gain cheap popularity. Here appeasement with them is made solely with selfish motive and evil design to capture the vote-bank and to be in power, sacrificing the socio-political Justice. That means, under the garb of religious tolerance, religious groupism/communalism is politicized and is utilized for political gain and that, in turn, jeopardizes the prospect of social justice and also equilibrium of the state.

Sometimes, in this regard, the issues concerning tradition as well as cultural heritage are raised. It is pointed out that Indian civilization has a rich legacy. At the event of collapse of different ancient civilizations, the Indian civilization some-

how or other has persisted amidst all sorts of obstacles and remonstrance. The spiritual and moral edifice has sustained the process of civilization down the ages. History has witnessed number of foreign invasions and there has been noticeable collision as well as fusion of diverse cultures. But, nevertheless, there has been in someway or other a soft but solid tune of continuity representing the Indian identity. In this sense, the people at large have imbibed here a long established heritage of religious mode of life. On the plea of welcoming the new conceptual tool of secularism, it is not wise, perhaps, to relinquish the time-honoured traditional linkage. The sense of modernity has to be mingled with tradition on harmonious footings.

This Sort of appeal appears to be Initially impressive at least from the national perspective. The sense of being an Indian seems to have been boosted up at the background. True, there is long-standing traditional set-up in India with an exceptional cultural continuity. The ceremonial rites and rituals are being performed today on the bank of river Gangā at Banaras, which is as old as the time of epics. The galaxy of living temples, mosques, churches and other shrines, scattered throughout the country testify the profundity of religio-spiritual psyche among the Indian mass; and to bypass the importance of those in socio-political level is not, it is thought, feasible. All that can be fruitfully carried on at the socio-political sector is to retain the spiritual character of the Indian psyche and introduction of novelty oust be in and through that mental make-up.

But, in that case, what is the need of blending religionism with secularism that is looted in an altogether on a different (almost diametrically opposite) connotation? Let there be, if one insists, the exploration for other political device that can accommodate the religio-spiritual element. To preserve and to boost up the So-called traditional Indian heritage, let a new conceptual formulation at the socio-political sector be explored. There is neither moral nor legal justification of using a concept without its set and established meaning and introducing a sense that does not logically found to be suitable to that concept at all. But this only brings confusions and impractical consequences.

Further, is it the case that in the Indian tradition, down the ages, there is no

change, no modification of a considerable strength and magnitude? Is it purely static and immobile? Is it not the fact that cross-cultural blending has notably contributed for enrichment of culture itself and also for a peaceful co-existence of a strong amicable foundation? So far as the age-old Hindu dharmic tradition is concerned, it has plausibly housed within itself theism, non-theism and even atheism. The Bauddha and the Jaina trends have been acknowledged as alternative dharmic trend despite their clear non-theistic stand. The Hindus, the Muslims, the Christians and others live together without any clash and conflict not because of their respective religious dogmatic rigidity but because of the socio-political exigencies. That means, the demand of religious authority is found to have been softly liquidated and a socially prattle device has been fruitfully adopted by the general intelligentsia, sidetracking the rigid theological approach and accommodating a move of secular modernism. This appears to be the growing tendency, specially among the younger generations, barring a few exceptions. Not only that. If one carefully reflects over the past, one can notice that throughout the Indian socio-cultural history, amidst conflicts and doubts at the initial stage, there has been changes and reforms in the tradition because of both rational and the then social pressure. Rigidity and unflexibility are not found to be the identifying mark of dhama la its theoretical structure. So also, it is never noticed In the general Indian psyche throughout the ages. Social needs and requirements seem to have clearly paved the way for mean-ingful religious transformations, of course not transgressing practical reason and having due cognizance of spatio-temporal situation.

Keeping these things in view, it seems that in the Indian context, if one is to enter-tain secularism, it is reasonable to stick to its original use than to move for some-thing that is found to be nothing other than abuse. Indian tradition and cultural legacy Is not damaged, simply because if there is necessary change over it on certain aspect, out of necessity. Reshaping or restructuring tradition is not abnegat-ing and loosing one's traditional identity.

"প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ : উদ্দ্যোতকরের মতের স্বাতন্ত্র্য

অন্নপূর্ণা ব্যানার্জী

''বাত্তিককার উদ্দ্যোতকর'' প্রাচীন ন্যায়শাস্ত্রের জগতের এক অবিস্মরণীয় ব্যক্তিত্ব। ভাষ্যকার বাৎস্যায়নের ন্যায়ভাষ্যের উপর উদ্দ্যোতকরের যে বিস্তারিত ব্যাখ্যা তা ন্যায়বার্ত্তিক নামে পরিচিত। শ্রীমৎ বাচস্পতি মিশ্র তাঁর তাৎপর্যটীক-এ প্রায়শঃ উদ্দ্যোতকরের বার্ত্তিক রচনার প্রয়োজন ব্যাখ্যা করেছেন। তিনি বলেছেন—যাদৃচ্ছ ভাষ্যকার বাৎস্যায়ন ন্যায়শাস্ত্র বুঝিয়ে গেছেন, তথাপি পরবর্তীকালে নব্যবৌদ্ধ দিঙ্নাগ প্রভৃতি প্রমাণসমূহসহ প্রভৃতি স্তরের দ্বারা ন্যায়সূত্র এবং ভাষ্যের স্থূল প্রতিবাদ করেন। তাঁর কুতর্কিকদের দ্বারা ন্যায়শাস্ত্র আচ্ছাদিত হয়ে যায়। এই অন্ধকার অপনয়ন করতেই উদ্দ্যোতকরের বার্ত্তিক রচনা।

এই বাত্তিকের করণীয় বিষয়গুলি হল নিম্নরূপ :

প্রথমতঃ সূত্র এবং ভাষ্য যা ত্রুটি রয়েছে বার্ত্তিকে তার ব্যাখ্যা প্রদান করা হয়।

দ্বিতীয়তঃ, সূত্রে এবং ভাষ্যে যা বলতে চাওয়া হয়েছে কিছু বলা হয় নি, বার্ত্তিকে তাও ব্যাখ্যা করা হয়।

তৃতীয়তঃ, সূত্র এবং ভাষ্য অপেক্ষা ভিন্ন মত পোষণ বা নিজস্ব মত স্বাধীনতাও বার্ত্তিককারের রয়েছে। উদ্দ্যোতকর বহুস্থলে ভাষ্যকার বাৎস্যায়নের ব্যাখ্যার প্রতিবাদ করে স্বাধীনভাবে অন্যরূপ ব্যাখ্যা প্রদান করেছেন। তাছাড়া, ভাষ্যে উল্লিখিত কোন শব্দের যে ব্যাখ্যা এবং তৈয়াসিকীকরণ প্রদান করেন, বার্ত্তিকে সেই ব্যাখ্যারও সমালোচনা করা হয়ে থাকে।' ভাষ্য এবং বার্ত্তিকের ব্যাখ্যার মধ্যে যে প্রভেদ বর্তমান বাচস্পতি মিশ্রও তা পোষণ করেননি। বিভিন্নস্থলে ভাষ্যকারের ব্যাখ্যা বার্ত্তিককার কর্তৃক যে পরিত্যক্ত হয়েছে সম্বন্ধে "বাদন্যায়" নামক গ্রন্থে তার উল্লেখ করেছেন।''

সুতরাং, ন্যায়সূত্রকার মহর্ষি গৌতম এবং ভাষ্যকার বাৎস্যায়নের সঙ্গে বার্ত্তিককারের ব্যাখ্যার যেমন সাদৃশ্য পরিলক্ষিত হয়, সেরূপ কোন কোন স্থলে বৈসাদৃশ্যও ঘটেছে ঠেই। বৌদ্ধ সমালোচনার উত্তর প্রদান করতে গিয়ে বার্ত্তিকের উদ্দ্যোতকর, সূত্রকার মহর্ষি গৌতম এবং ভাষ্যকার বাৎস্যায়নের মতকে পরিবর্তিত এবং পরিবর্ধিত করেছেন। অতএব, বার্ত্তিকের ব্যাখ্যার পরিসর অনেকখানি বেশি। উদ্দ্যোতকরের মতের নতুনত্বের প্রকাশ পরিলক্ষিত হয় তাঁর অনুসরণের ছায়ায় অনুবের বিষয়-সংক্রান্ত মত, অনুমানের বিভাগ সম্পর্কীয় মত, নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ বিষয়ক মত ইত্যাদি নানান ক্ষেত্রে। একরূপ সমগ্র বার্ত্তিককালী বিভিন্ন অংশে পরিবাপ্ত হয়ে রয়েছে উদ্দ্যোতকরের স্বরূপ স্বাতন্ত্র্য তথা নিজস্বতা। তাছাড়া বার্ত্তিক "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ উদ্দ্যোতকরের মতের যে স্বাতন্ত্র্য পরিস্ফুট হয়ে উঠেছে সেটিই এই প্রবন্ধের আলোচ্য বিষয়। কারণ যে নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ বিষয়ে উদ্দ্যোতকরের মতের স্বাতন্ত্র্য স্পষ্টতই দৃঢ় আকর্ষণের দাবি রাখে যা তন্মধ্যে

"প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' নামক নিগ্রহস্থানটি হল অন্যতম। কিন্তু মূল আলোচনায় উপনীত হওয়ার পূর্বে সামান্যতঃ নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ বিষয়ে অবগত হওয়া আবশ্যক।

১. সামান্যতঃ নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ—

ন্যায়শাস্ত্রে স্বীকৃত ষোড়শ পদার্থের মধ্যে সর্বশেষ পদার্থ হল নিগ্রহস্থান। মহর্ষি গৌতম তাঁর ন্যায়সূত্রে নিগ্রহস্থানের লক্ষণ প্রকাশ করে বলেছেন— ''বিপ্রতিপত্তিরপ্রতিপত্তিশ্চ নিগ্রহস্থানম্''।।১৯। ।৬০।। বিপ্রতিপত্তি অর্থাৎ বিপরীত জ্ঞান ও কুৎসিত জ্ঞান এবং অ প্রতিপত্তি অর্থাৎ অজ্ঞতাবিশেষ হল নিগ্রহস্থান।[৪] অর্থাৎ, যার দ্বারা বাদী বা প্রতিবাদীর বিপ্রতিপত্তি অথবা অপ্রতিপত্তি বোঝা যায়, তাকে ''নিগ্রহস্থান'' রূপে অভিহিত করা হয়।

ভাষ্যকার বাৎস্যায়ন মহর্ষির সূত্রোক্ত ''বিপ্রতিপত্তি'' শব্দের অর্থরূপে বিপরীত জ্ঞান এবং কুৎসিত জ্ঞানকে গ্রহণ করেছেন।[৫] বাচস্পতি মিশ্র ''বিপ্রতিপত্তি''শব্দের অর্থ ব্যাখ্যা করে বলেছেন — ''সূক্ষ্মবিষয়া প্রতিপত্তির্বিপরীতা, স্থূলবিষয়া চ কুৎসিতা'' বাচস্পতি মিশ্রর মতে ভাষ্যকারও সূক্ষ্ম বিষয়ে বিপরীত নিশ্চয়রূপ ভ্রমকে বিপরীত প্রতিপত্তি এবং স্থূলবিষয়ে ঐরূপ বিপরীত নিশ্চয়রূপ ভ্রমকে কুৎসিত প্রতিপত্তি বলে সূত্রোক্ত 'বিপ্রতিপত্তি' শব্দের দ্বারা উক্ত দ্বিবিধ বিপ্রতিপত্তিকেই গ্রহণ করেছেন। অপরপক্ষে, 'অপ্রতিপত্তি' বলতে বোঝায় প্রকৃত বিষয়ে জ্ঞানের অভাব। ভাষ্যকার সূত্রোক্ত ''অপ্রতিপত্তি'' শব্দের দ্বারা আরব্ধ বিষয়ে অনারব্ধ অর্থাৎ বাদী ও প্রতিবাদীর নিজ কর্তব্যের অকারণকে বুঝিয়েছেন। বিচারস্থলে বাদী এবং প্রতিবাদীর কর্তব্য হল পঞ্চবিধ। যথা —

১) নিজ মত স্থাপন বা স্বপক্ষ স্থাপন

২) পরমত উপলব্ধি

৩) পরমত খণ্ডন

৪) অপরের উত্থাপিত আপত্তি খণ্ডন এবং

৫) চতুর্বিধ বিষয়ের যে কোনটি।

সুতরাং, বিচারস্থলে বাদী বা প্রতিবাদী এই পঞ্চবিধ কর্তব্যসমূহের মধ্যে যেরূপ কর্তব্যবিষয়ক অকারণবশতঃ পরাজয় প্রাপ্ত হন তাদৃশ অজ্ঞতাই ভাষ্যকারের মতে সূত্রোক্ত ''অপ্রতিপত্তি'' শব্দের অর্থ।

ভাষ্যকারের মতে — ''নিগ্রহ'' শব্দের অর্থ হল পরাজয়। বিচারস্থলে নিগ্রহের হেতু বা কারণ অথবা পরাজয়ের হেতুই হল নিগ্রহস্থান। সুতরাং, বিচারস্থলেই এই নিগ্রহস্থান প্রাসঙ্গিক হয়। কথা হল বিচার বিশেষ। ভাষ্যকারের মতে কথা হল ত্রিবিধ। যথা — ''বাদ'', ''জল্প'' এবং ''বিতণ্ডা''।[৬] এই ত্রিবিধ কথাস্থলেই নিগ্রহস্থানের প্রাসঙ্গিকতা বর্তমান।

প্রসঙ্গতঃ উল্লেখযোগ্য যে — ''জল্প'' এবং ''বিতণ্ডা'' নামক কথাস্থলে জিগীষু বাদী বা প্রতিবাদীর পরাজয়রূপ নিগ্রহই হয় এবং জল্প ও বিতণ্ডায় পরাজয় সূচনার জন্য সম্ভব হলে সর্ববিধ

নিগ্রহস্থানেরই উদ্ভাবন করা যায় এবং করতে হয়। কারণ ''জল্প'' এবং ''বিতণ্ডা'' নামক কথায় অংশগ্রহণকারী বাদী বা প্রতিবাদীর জয়লাভই হল মুখ্য উদ্দেশ্য, যদিও এক্ষেত্রে অনেকসময় মধ্যস্থগণের তত্ত্বনির্ণয়ও হয়ে থাকে। কিন্তু ''বাদ'' রূপ কথায় তত্ত্বনির্ণয়ই হল একমাত্র উদ্দেশ্য। সুতরাং, স্বাভাবিকভাবেই প্রশ্ন উত্থাপিত হয় যে — জিগীষাশূন্য শিষ্য ও গুরুর কেবলমাত্র তত্ত্বনির্ণয়ের উদ্দেশ্যে যে ''বাদ'' নামক কথা, তাতে বাদী ও প্রতিবাদী কারোরই অহঙ্কার না থাকায়, এক্ষেত্রে অহঙ্কার খণ্ডনরূপ পরাজয় বা নিগ্রহ কিরূপে সম্ভবপর ?

উক্ত প্রশ্নের উত্তর প্রদান করে উদ্দ্যোতকর স্বয়ং বলেছেন যে ''বাদ'' রূপ কথাতে শিষ্য বা আচার্যের বিবক্ষিত অর্থের অপ্রতিপাদকত্ব অর্থাৎ বিবক্ষিত বিষয় প্রতিপাদন করার অক্ষমতাই নিগ্রহ। অর্থাৎ ''বাদ'' রূপ বিচারে গুরু ও শিষ্য তত্ত্বনির্ণয়ের উদ্দেশ্যে নিজমত স্থাপনের চেষ্টা করলেও যদি তাঁরা তাঁদের অভিপ্রেত অর্থটি প্রতিপাদন করতে অক্ষম হন, তবে সেক্ষেত্রে অভিপ্রেত অর্থটি প্রতিপন্ন করতে না পারাই তাঁদের পক্ষে নিগ্রহস্থানরূপে গণ্য হবে। বাদবিচারে সর্ববিধ নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভাবন নিষিদ্ধ। তবে কতগুলি নিগ্রহস্থান বাদে উদ্ভাবনীয়, সে বিষয়ে মতপার্থক্য বর্তমান।

নিগ্রহস্থানের লক্ষণ আলোচনা প্রসঙ্গে ভাষ্যকার বলেছেন যে বাদী বা প্রতিবাদীর পরাজয় যাতে বাস করে অর্থাৎ যা পরাজয়ের বাস্তব স্থান বা কারণ, তাই নিগ্রহস্থান। সুতরাং, পরাজয় লাভই নিগ্রহস্থান নয়। নিগ্রহস্থানের চরম ফল হল পরাজয় লাভ, এটিই ভাষ্যকারের বক্তব্যের তাৎপর্য। নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ সম্পর্কে বার্তিককার উদ্দ্যোতকরও বলেছেন যে — নিগ্রহস্থানগুলি বাদী বা প্রতিবাদীর পরাজয়ের বাস্তব স্থান বা কারণ এবং বাস্তব অপরাধের নির্ণায়ক। সূত্রকার, ভাষ্যকার এবং বার্তিককার এবিষয়ে ঐকমত্য যে বাদী বা প্রতিবাদী পুরুষের বিপ্রতিপত্তি অর্থাৎ ভ্রমজ্ঞান এবং অপ্রতিপত্তি অর্থাৎ অজ্ঞানই বিচারস্থলে তাঁদের নিগ্রহের হেতু।

ন্যায়সূত্রকার মহর্ষি গৌতম বাদী বা প্রতিবাদীর অপ্রতিপত্তি বা অজ্ঞান এবং বিপ্রতিপত্তি বা ভ্রমজ্ঞানের ভিত্তিতে নিগ্রহস্থানগুলিকে সামান্যতঃ দুইভাগে বিভক্ত করেছেন। যথা— অপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক নিগ্রহস্থান এবং বিপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক নিগ্রহস্থান। কিন্তু সামান্যতঃ নিগ্রহস্থান দ্বিবধ হলেও অপ্রতিপত্তি এবং বিপ্রতিপত্তিরূপ নিগ্রহের কারণসমূহ বহুবিধ হওয়ায় মহর্ষি তাঁর প্রথম সূত্রের দ্বারা দ্বাবিংশতিপ্রকার নিগ্রহস্থানের বিশেষ নামকীর্তনরূপ বিশেষ উদ্দেশ করেছেন। অনেকের মতে সূত্রোক্ত ''চ'' শব্দের দ্বারা আরও অনেক নিগ্রহস্থান সমুচ্চয় সূচিত হয়েছে। মহর্ষির উক্ত বাইশটি নিগ্রহস্থান হল যথাক্রমে— প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি, প্রতিজ্ঞান্তর, প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ, প্রতিজ্ঞাসন্ন্যাস, হেত্বন্তর, অর্থান্তর, নিরর্থক, অবিজ্ঞাতার্থ, অপার্থক, অপ্রাপ্তকাল, ন্যূন, অধিক, পুনরুক্ত, অননুভাষণ, অজ্ঞান, অপ্রতিভা, বিক্ষেপ, মতানুজ্ঞা, পর্যনুযোজ্যোপেক্ষণ, নিরনুযোজ্যানুযোগ, অপসিদ্ধান্ত এবং হেত্বাভাস। ভাষাকার বাৎস্যায়ন ও মহর্ষি গৌতমের মতকেই সমর্থন করেছেন। বার্তিককারও অনুরূপ মত পোষণ করে বলেন যে — বিপ্রতিপত্তি এবং অপ্রতিপত্তি এই বিকল্পভেদে নিগ্রহস্থান সামান্যতঃ দ্বিবিধ হলেও তাদের ভেদবিবক্ষা করলে নানাপ্রকার অপ্রতিপত্তি এবং বিপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক নিগ্রহস্থান হতে পারে বলে নিগ্রহস্থানগুলি সংখ্যায় বহু। উদ্দ্যোতকর বলেন সামান্যতঃ নিগ্রহস্থান দ্বিবিধ হলেও তাদের ভেদবিবক্ষা করলে দ্বাবিংশতিপ্রকার নিগ্রহস্থান সম্ভবপর। কিন্তু এর অর্থ এই নয় যে — এই নিগ্রহস্থান হল বাইশটি। বস্তুতঃপক্ষে মহর্ষি

গৌতম উদাহরণস্বরূপ এই বাইশপ্রকার নিগ্রহস্থানের কথা উল্লেখ করেছেন মাত্র। বাস্তবে এই নিগ্রহস্থান হল অসংখ্য।

প্রসঙ্গতঃ উল্লেখযোগ্য যে — বার্তিককার উদ্দ্যোতকরের মতে "প্রতিজ্ঞান্তর" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানটি বিপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক এবং অপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক উভয়ই হয়ে থাকে।[৩] কিন্তু কোন একটি নিগ্রহস্থান যদি বিপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক ও অপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক উভয়ই হয় তবে স্বাভাবিকভাবেই এই প্রশ্ন উত্থাপিত হয় যে নিগ্রহস্থানের বিভাগটিকে বিপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক এবং অপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক এরূপে দ্বিকোটিক বলা সম্ভবপর হবে কি ? সেক্ষেত্রে 'অপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক এবং বিপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক নিগ্রহস্থান' এরূপে নিগ্রহস্থানের তৃতীয় কোন বিভাগ গৃহীত হবে কিনা অর্থাৎ সামান্যতঃ নিগ্রহস্থানগুলিকে ত্রিবিধভাগে বিভক্ত করা সমীচীন হবে কিনা, তা ভেবে দেখার যথেষ্ট অবকাশ আছে।

"প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানটির স্বরূপ বিষয়ে বার্তিককার উদ্দ্যোতকরের মতের স্বাতন্ত্র্য অনুধাবন করতে গেলে উক্ত বিষয়ে ন্যায়সূত্রকার মহর্ষি গৌতম এবং ভাষ্যকার বাৎস্যায়নের মতের পরিপ্রেক্ষিতে উদ্দ্যোতকরের মতের অভিনবত্ব এবং স্বাতন্ত্র্য পর্যালোচনা করতে হবে।

২. "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানটির স্বরূপ বিষয়ে সূত্রকার এবং ভাষ্যকারের মতের সঙ্গে বার্তিককারের মতের তুলনামূলক আলোচনা

"প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানটিকে বিপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক নিগ্রহস্থানরূপে অভিহিত করা হয়। কারণ ভাষ্যকারের মতে উক্ত নিগ্রহস্থানটি বাদী বা প্রতিবাদীর বিরুদ্ধজ্ঞানরূপ বিপ্রতিপত্তি বা ভ্রমজ্ঞানের অনুমাপক হয়ে থাকে। এই "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের ক্ষেত্রে বিপ্রতিপত্তি বা ভ্রমজ্ঞানের বিষয়টি কি তা জানার জন্য তৎপূর্বে উক্ত নিগ্রহস্থানটির স্বরূপ জানা প্রয়োজন।

ন্যায়সূত্রকার মহর্ষি গৌতম "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের লক্ষণ প্রকাশ করে বলেছেন — "প্রতিজ্ঞাহেত্বোর্বিরোধঃ প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধঃ" ।।৪।।৫০৮।। অর্থাৎ প্রতিজ্ঞা ও হেতুর বিরোধ "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থান। অন্যভাবে বলা যায় যে — বাদীর প্রতিজ্ঞা বাক্যের সঙ্গে হেতু বাক্যের বিরোধ হলে অথবা হেতু বাক্যের সঙ্গে প্রতিজ্ঞা বাক্যের বিরোধ হলে তৎপ্রযুক্ত বাদীর "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানে হয়।[৪]

ভাষ্যকার বাৎস্যায়ন "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের একটি উদাহরণ প্রদান করে তার দ্বারা সূত্রার্থ ব্যাখ্যা করেছেন। তিনি বলেন — ধরা যাক, কোন বাদী প্রথমে প্রতিজ্ঞাবাক্যবললেন — "গুণব্যতিরিক্তং দ্রব্যম্"। অর্থাৎ ঘটাদি দ্রব্য তার রূপরসাদি গুণ থেকে ভিন্ন অর্থাৎ গুণ ও গুণী ভিন্ন পদার্থ। পরে ঐ বাদী হেতুবাক্য বললেন — "রূপাদিতোহর্থান্তরস্যানুপলব্ধে।" অর্থাৎ, যেহেতু রূপাদিগুণ থেকে ভিন্ন পদার্থের উপলব্ধি হয় না। এক্ষেত্রে বাদীর প্রতিজ্ঞাবাক্য এবং হেতুবাক্য পরস্পর বিরুদ্ধ হওয়ায় বাদীর "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থান হয়।[৫] কারণ, এক্ষেত্রে যদি দ্রব্য গুণ ব্যতিরিক্ত হয় অর্থাৎ রূপাদিগুণ থেকে ভিন্ন হয়, তবে রূপাদিগুণ থেকে ভিন্ন পদার্থে অনুপলব্ধি হয় একথা বলা যায় না। আবার, যদি রূপাদিগুণ থেকে ভিন্ন পদার্থের অনুপলব্ধি হয় একথা বলা যায়, তবে দ্রব্য গুণব্যতিরিক্ত অর্থাৎ রূপাদিগুণ থেকে ভিন্ন একথা বলা যায় না। পরন্তু দ্রব্য এবং গুণকে অভিন্নই বলতে হয়। সুতরাং,

দ্রব্য গুণব্যতিরিক্ত এবং রূপাদিগুণ থেকে ভিন্ন দ্রব্যের অনুপলব্ধি, এরা পরস্পর ব্যাহত অর্থাৎ কখনোই সম্ভবপর নয়। সুতরাং, উক্তস্থলে বাদীর হেতুবাক্যের সাথে প্রতিজ্ঞাবাক্যের বিরোধবশতঃ ''প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' নামক নিগ্রহস্থান হয়।[১৬]

প্রশ্ন উত্থাপিত হতে পারে যে— স্বপক্ষস্থাপনকালে বাদী ও প্রতিবাদীর পরস্পর বিরুদ্ধ প্রতিজ্ঞা এবং হেতু প্রয়োগের পশ্চাতে কি কারণ বর্তমান থাকতে পারে ? প্রত্যুত্তরে বলা যায়, এমন হতে পারে যে বাদী ও প্রতিবাদীর প্রকৃত সাধ্য বা অভিপ্রেত অর্থ সাধন করা কিরূপে সম্ভব সে সম্পর্কে ভ্রমজ্ঞান রয়েছে। এই ভ্রমজ্ঞানের বশবর্তী হয়ে তিনি পরস্পর বিরুদ্ধ প্রতিজ্ঞা এবং হেতুবাক্যের প্রয়োগ করেছেন। এক্ষেত্রে ''প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' নামক যে নিগ্রহস্থান তা স্বপক্ষ স্থাপন বিষয়ে বিপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক এবং এক্ষেত্রে স্বপক্ষস্থাপন বিষয়ে বিপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক নিগ্রহস্থানরূপে অভিহিত করা যায়।

বার্ত্তিককার উদ্দ্যোতকর ''প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' নামক নিগ্রহস্থানটির স্বরূপ সম্পর্কে বলেন যে— যেখানে প্রতিজ্ঞার দ্বারা হেতু বিরুদ্ধ হচ্ছে অথবা হেতুর দ্বারা প্রতিজ্ঞা বিরুদ্ধ হচ্ছে তাকে ''প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' নামক নিগ্রহস্থানরূপে অভিহিত করা হয়।[১৭] এই ''প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদাহরণ প্রদর্শন করে উদ্দ্যোতকর বলেন— 'গুণব্যতিরিক্তং দ্রব্যং ভেদেনাগৃহণাৎ' অর্থাৎ তাঁর মতে দ্রব্য গুণব্যতিরিক্ত যেহেতু তাদের ভেদ গৃহীত হয় না— একটি ''প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের দৃষ্টান্ত। এক্ষেত্রে হেতু প্রতিজ্ঞার দ্বারা বিরুদ্ধ হচ্ছে। অপরপক্ষে, বার্ত্তিককারের মতে 'সর্বপৃথকসমূহে ভাবশব্দ প্রয়োগাৎ' অর্থাৎ সবকিছুই পৃথক যেহেতু তাতে ভাবশব্দের প্রয়োগ হয়, এটিও ''প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের দৃষ্টান্ত। এক্ষেত্রে হেতুর দ্বারা প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরুদ্ধ হচ্ছে। তাঁর মতে ভাষ্যকারোক্ত উদাহরণও ''হেতুবিরোধ''। অর্থাৎ দ্রব্যগুণ অতিরিক্ত যেহেতু রূপাদিগুণ থেকে অতিরিক্ত কোন পদার্থের উপলব্ধি হয় না— এক্ষেত্রে হেতুর দ্বারা প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরুদ্ধ হচ্ছে।

এক্ষেত্রে স্বাভাবিকভাবেই প্রশ্ন উত্থাপিত হয় যে পূর্বোক্ত দুটি উদাহরণের ক্ষেত্রেই প্রতিজ্ঞা এবং হেতু পরস্পর বিরুদ্ধ। তাহলে বার্ত্তিককার কেন ''প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের প্রথমোক্ত উদাহরণটিতে প্রতিজ্ঞার দ্বারা হেতু বিরুদ্ধ হচ্ছে এবং দ্বিতীয় উদাহরণটিতে হেতুর দ্বারা প্রতিজ্ঞা বিরুদ্ধ হচ্ছে একটা বলেছেন ?

প্রশ্ন ওঠে ঃ এরূপ একমুখী বিরোধ কি সম্ভবপর ? অর্থাৎ এরূপ কি সম্ভবপর যে কোন স্থলে প্রতিজ্ঞার দ্বারা হেতু বিরুদ্ধ হচ্ছে অথচ সেখানে হেতুর দ্বারা প্রতিজ্ঞা বিরুদ্ধ হয় নি ? অথবা কোন স্থলে হেতুর দ্বারা প্রতিজ্ঞা বিরুদ্ধ হয়েছে কিন্তু সেখানে প্রতিজ্ঞার দ্বারা হেতু বিরুদ্ধ হয় নি ? এবং প্রতিজ্ঞার সঙ্গে হেতুর বিরোধ না হেতুর সঙ্গে প্রতিজ্ঞার বিরোধ তা নির্ণয় করার নীতিটিই বা কি ?

এই প্রশ্নের উত্তরে বার্ত্তিককারের স্বপক্ষে বলা যায় যে প্রতিজ্ঞা এবং হেতুর মধ্যে যেটি অধিক বলবান তার দ্বারাই অপরটি বিরুদ্ধ হয় — এরূপ নীতিই হয়তো বার্ত্তিককারের অভিপ্রেত। অর্থাৎ যেক্ষেত্রে প্রতিজ্ঞা হেতু অপেক্ষা বলবান সেক্ষেত্রে প্রতিজ্ঞার দ্বারা হেতু বিরুদ্ধ হচ্ছে একথা বলা হয় এবং যেক্ষেত্রে হেতু প্রতিজ্ঞা অপেক্ষা বলবান সেক্ষেত্রে হেতুর দ্বারা প্রতিজ্ঞা বিরুদ্ধ হচ্ছে একথা বলা হয়। কিন্তু প্রতিজ্ঞা এবং হেতুর মধ্যে কোনটি বলবান সেটি নির্ণয় করার মানদণ্ডটি কি ? — এই প্রশ্নের

অবকাশ থেকেই যায়।

বার্তিককারের মতে — প্রতিজ্ঞা স্ববচনবিরুদ্ধ হলে অর্থাৎ প্রতিজ্ঞাবাক্যের অন্তর্গত পদদ্বয় পরস্পর বিরুদ্ধ হলে সেক্ষেত্রেও "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থান হয়। এরূপ "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" এর উদাহরণ প্রদর্শন করে উদ্দ্যোতকর বললেন — "শ্রমণা গর্ভিনী"। অর্থাৎ, কোন বাদী "শ্রমণা গর্ভিনী" এরূপ প্রতিজ্ঞাবাক্য প্রয়োগ করলে এই প্রতিজ্ঞাবাক্যের অন্তর্গত পদদ্বয় পরস্পর বিরুদ্ধ হয়। কারণ, শ্রমণা বললে তাকে গর্ভিনী বলা যায় না। আবার, গর্ভিনী বললে তাকে শ্রমনা বলা যায় না এবং এই প্রতিজ্ঞাবাক্যের অন্তর্গত পদদ্বয় পরস্পর বিরুদ্ধ হওয়ায় তৎপ্রযুক্ত বাদীর "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থান হয়।[১৮]

বার্তিককার আরও বলেন যে — "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" বলতে প্রতিজ্ঞাবাক্যের সঙ্গে দৃষ্টান্তের বিরোধ, হেতুর সঙ্গে দৃষ্টান্তের বিরোধ এবং প্রতিজ্ঞা ও হেতুর প্রমাণবিরোধকেও বুঝতে হবে।[১৯]

বাদী যদি এমন প্রতিজ্ঞাবাক্য বা হেতুবাক্যের প্রয়োগ করেন যার বিপরীতটি প্রমাণান্তরের দ্বারা সিদ্ধ, তবে ঐ প্রতিজ্ঞাবাক্য বা হেতুবাক্যটি প্রমাণের দ্বারা বিরুদ্ধ হয়েছে একথা বলা যায়। এই প্রমাণবিরোধও একপ্রকার "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ"। বার্তিককার আরও বলেন যে – ধরা যাক, বাদী 'অনিত্যঃ শব্দ ঐন্দ্রিয়কত্বাৎ' এই ন্যায়বাক্য প্রয়োগ করলেন। প্রতিবাদী উক্ত ক্ষেত্রে সাধ্যাভাব অর্থাৎ অনিত্যত্বাভাব বা নিত্যত্বের অধিকরণ গোত্বাদি সামান্য বা জাতিতে ঐন্দ্রিয়কত্বরূপ হেতুটি বর্তমান এটি প্রদর্শন করে, বাদীর কথিত ঐন্দ্রিয়কত্ব হেতুটির বিরুদ্ধে ব্যভিচার বা অনৈকান্তিক দোষের আপত্তি উত্থাপন করলেন। কিন্তু প্রতিবাদী বাদীর মত খণ্ডনের জন্য প্রতিদৃষ্টান্ত রূপে যে গোত্বাদি সামান্যকে গ্রহণ করলেন তা পরপক্ষসিদ্ধ, প্রতিবাদীর স্বমত সিদ্ধ নয়। কিন্তু প্রতিবাদী স্বয়ং জাতি স্বীকার না করে পরপক্ষসিদ্ধ জাতিতে বাদীর কথিত ঐন্দ্রিয়কত্ব হেতুর অনৈকান্তিকত্ব বা ব্যভিচার প্রদর্শন করতে পারেন না। সুতরাং, প্রতিবাদী এরূপে বাদীর মত খণ্ডনের উদ্দেশ্যে পরমতসিদ্ধ জাতি স্বীকার করলে তৎকালে তিনি পরমত গ্রহণ করায় তাঁর "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থান হয়।[২০]

আবার, বাদী এবং প্রতিবাদীর মত যখন পরস্পর বিরুদ্ধ তখন বাদী বা প্রতিবাদী যদি এমন কোন বক্তব্য উপস্থাপিত করেন বা এমন কোন পূর্বানুমান গ্রহণ করেন যা বাদী এবং প্রতিবাদী এই উভয়পক্ষসম্মত, যা তাঁর নিজপক্ষে ঐকান্তিক নয় অর্থাৎ দুটি বিরোধীপক্ষের সাথেই সামঞ্জস্যপূর্ণ, তবে বক্তব্যটি অনৈকান্তিক দোষে দুষ্ট হবে এবং বক্তব্যটি বিরুদ্ধ হবে। বার্তিককারের মতে এটিও "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" এর দৃষ্টান্ত।[২১] পরবর্তীকালে অনেকে এটিকে উক্তিবিরোধ রূপে উল্লেখ করেছেন।

সুতরাং দেখা যাচ্ছে যে — বার্তিককার "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের ক্ষেত্রে 'প্রতিজ্ঞা' কথাটিকে আক্ষরিক অর্থে গ্রহণ করেননি। পরন্তু, 'প্রতিজ্ঞা' কথাটিকে তিনি উপলক্ষণ অর্থেই ব্যবহার করেছেন। যুক্তির অন্তর্গত যে কোন দুটি অংশ বিরুদ্ধ হলেই "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থান হয় — এরূপ বক্তব্যই বার্তিককারের অভিপ্রেত।

"প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানটির স্বরূপ সম্পর্কে পূর্বোক্ত আলোচনার ভিত্তিতে বলা যায় যে উক্ত নিগ্রহস্থানটির স্বরূপ বিষয়ে বার্তিককার উদ্দ্যোতকরের মত বিভিন্ন ক্ষেত্রে স্বতন্ত্র।

প্রথমতঃ, ভায্যকার বাৎসায়ন "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" বলতে কেবলমাত্র প্রতিজ্ঞার সাথে হেতুর বিরোধ অথবা হেতুর সাথে প্রতিজ্ঞার বিরোধকেই বুঝেছেন। কিন্তু বার্তিককার উদ্দ্যোতকর এই দ্বিবিধ প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ ব্যতীতও প্রতিজ্ঞার স্ববচন বিরুদ্ধ হওয়া, প্রতিজ্ঞার সাথে দৃষ্টান্তের বিরোধ, হেতুর সঙ্গে দৃষ্টান্তের বিরোধ, প্রতিজ্ঞা বা হেতুর প্রমাণান্তরের দ্বারা বিরুদ্ধ হওয়া, পরমতসিদ্ধ দৃষ্টান্তকে গ্রহণ করে বাদীর কথিত হেতুকে ব্যভিচার দোষ প্রদর্শন করা, উভয়পক্ষ সম্মত বা পরস্পর বিরোধী বক্তব্যকে উপস্থাপিত করা প্রভৃতিকেও "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের অন্তর্গত করেছেন।

দ্বিতীয়তঃ, ভায্যকার প্রতিজ্ঞার দ্বারা হেতু বিরুদ্ধ হওয়া এবং হেতুর দ্বারা প্রতিজ্ঞা বিরুদ্ধ হওয়া এই দ্বিবিধ "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ"-এর উল্লেখ করলেও পৃথকরূপে তাদের কোন উদাহরণ প্রদান করেননি। কিন্তু বার্তিককার এই দ্বিবিধ "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ"-এর উদাহরণ স্পষ্টভাবে প্রদর্শন করেছেন।

তৃতীয়তঃ, "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের ক্ষেত্রে ভায্যকার বাৎস্যায়ন 'প্রতিজ্ঞা' এবং 'হেতু' কথাটিকে আক্ষরিক অর্থে বা মুখ্য অর্থে গ্রহণ করেছেন। কিন্তু বার্তিককার 'প্রতিজ্ঞা' এবং 'হেতু' এই শব্দদ্বয়কে উপলক্ষণ রূপে ব্যবহার করেছেন।

চতুর্থতঃ, বার্তিককার উদ্দ্যোতকরের মতানুসারে—আপত্তি উত্থাপনের ক্ষেত্রেও এই দোষ হয়। কারণ তাঁর মতে— বাদীর মত খণ্ডনের উদ্দেশ্যে বা বাদীর প্রযুক্ত হেতুতে ব্যভিচারাদি দোষ প্রদর্শনের জন্য প্রতিবাদী যদি প্রতিদৃষ্টান্তরূপে এমন কোন বিষয়কে গ্রহণ করেন যা ঐ প্রতিবাদীর স্বমতসিদ্ধ নয়, পরমতসিদ্ধ ; তবে তৎকালে তিনি পরমত গ্রহণ করায় উক্তস্থলে ঐ প্রতিবাদীর "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানটিকে কেবলমাত্র স্বপক্ষস্থাপন বিষয়ে বিপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক নিগ্রহস্থানরূপে অভিহিত করা যায়, বার্তিককার উদ্দ্যোতকরের দৃষ্টিভঙ্গী অনুসারে বিচার করলে আপত্তি উত্থাপনের ক্ষেত্রেও এই দোষা হওয়ায় এটিকে কেবলমাত্র স্বপক্ষস্থাপন বিষয়ে বিপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক নিগ্রহস্থানরূপে নয়, পরমতখণ্ডন বিষয়ে বিপ্রতিপত্তিমূলক নিগ্রহস্থানরূপেও অভিহিত করা যায়।

উপরিউক্ত আলোচনার পরিপ্রেক্ষিতে বলা যায় যে "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানটির স্বরূপ বিষয়ে বার্তিককার উদ্দ্যোতকরের ব্যাখ্যা শুধুমাত্র যে সূত্রকার মহর্ষি গৌতম এবং ভায্যকার বাৎসায়নের ব্যাখ্যা অপেক্ষা বিস্তারিত তাই নয়, এই স্বাতন্ত্র্য এবং অভিনবত্বের দাবী রাখে। তাৎপর্যটীকাকার বাচস্পতি মিশ্র "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের ক্ষেত্রে বার্তিককারের উপরিউক্ত বক্তব্যটিকেই সমর্থন করেছেন। উক্ত নিগ্রহস্থানটির স্বরূপ বিষয়ে বার্তিককার উদ্দ্যোতকরের স্বতন্ত্র মতের প্রতিফলন পরিলক্ষিত হয় পরবর্তী পরবর্তী নব্যনৈয়ায়িকগণের "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ সংক্রান্ত আলোচনার মধ্যে।

নব্যনৈয়ায়িক উদয়নাচার্যের 'ন্যায়পরিশিষ্ট' নামক গ্রন্থে আমরা "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ বিষয়ে বার্তিককার উদ্দ্যোতকরের স্বতন্ত্র মতের ন্যায় তাঁর অভিনব মতের সন্ধান পাই। তিনিও উদ্দ্যোতকরের মত প্রতিজ্ঞাবাক্য এবং হেতুবাক্যের মধ্যে বিরোধ, প্রতিজ্ঞা ও দৃষ্টান্তের বিরোধ, হেতু ও দৃষ্টান্তাদির বিরোধ ইত্যাদি সকল প্রকার বিরোধকেই "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের প্রকারভেদ রূপে গ্রহণ করেছেন। অর্থাৎ, তাঁর মতেও নয়তো প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ অর্থে বিচারস্থলে বাদী বা প্রতিবাদীরা প্রযুক্ত যে কোন কাব্যদ্বয়ের বিরোধকেই বোঝানো যেতে পারে।[২২]

অনন্যা ব্যানার্জী

ন্যায়-নৈয়ায়িক বৃত্তিকার বিশ্বনাথও মহর্ষির সুব্রোক্ত "প্রতিজ্ঞা" এবং "হেতু" এর ব্যাখ্যাকে উপলক্ষ্যস্বরূপে গ্রহণ করেছেন। অর্থাৎ তাঁর মতেও বাদী বা প্রতিবাদীর কথাকালীন প্রযুক্ত যে কোন নিজ বাক্যকেই মধ্যে নিগ্রহস্থান "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থান। বৃত্তিকার বিশ্বনাথের এই মতটি গ্রহণ করলে উপলক্ষ্যস্বরূপে ন্যায় একস্থায় স্বীকার করতে হবে যে অসম্বকোব্রোক প্রতিজ্ঞাবাক্য এবং হেতুবাক্যের যে বিরোধ প্রদর্শন করা হয়েছে, তা কেবল একটি নির্দশন মাত্র। বস্তুতঃ এই প্রকারের অসম্বদ্ধ বিরোধের উদ্ভাবন হতে পারে।

ন্যায়ের প্রমাণ এবং বৈশেষিক পদার্থ উভয়ই আলোচিত হয়েছে এমন একটি উল্লেখযোগ্য গ্রন্থ হল বংসরাজের "তার্কিক-রক্ষা"। বংসরাজও তাঁর গ্রন্থে "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নাম নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ ব্যাখ্যা প্রসঙ্গে বলেন যে— বিচারে অংশগ্রহণকারী বাদী বা প্রতিবাদী যে কোন সুস্পষ্ট স্থাপন বা নিজ মত স্থাপন করতে গিয়ে যদি এমন কোন বাক্যের বা পদধরর ব্যবহার করেন যারা পরস্পরের বিরোধী বা পরস্পরকে ব্যাহত করে, তবে উক্ত ক্ষেত্রে ঐ পুরুষের "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থান হয়।[২৮]

বহু পরবর্তী যুগের নৈয়ায়িক জয়রামের "ন্যায়সিদ্ধান্তমালা" নামক গ্রন্থে এবং মণিকণ্ঠ মিশ্রের "ন্যায়রত্ন" নামক গ্রন্থে "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ বিষয়ে প্রাচীন ন্যায়াচার্য উপলক্ষ্যস্বরূপের অতিরেকে মতের প্রতিফলিত হয়।

জয়রাম তাঁর "ন্যায়সিদ্ধান্তমালা" নামক গ্রন্থে উক্ত নিগ্রহস্থানের ব্যাখ্যা প্রসঙ্গে বলেন যে বিরুদ্ধার্থক পদ এবং বাক্য হল বিরুদ্ধ। সুতরাং একরূপ বিরুদ্ধার্থক পদ বা বাক্য প্রয়োগের ফলেই বিচারকূলে বাদী বা প্রতিবাদী "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের দ্বারা নিগৃহীত হন। তিনি বলেন— দৃষ্টান্তস্থলে যে কেবলমাত্র 'বক্রাপুরুষ' এরূপ পদ বা দুইটিধের ঘটক পদস্বয়ই যে কেবলমাত্র পরস্পর বিরুদ্ধ হবে তা নয়, বাক্যের ঘটক যে কোন পদদ্বয়ই পরস্পর বিরুদ্ধ হতে পারে।

উক্তহেতু পূর্বাক্তিনণ আশঙ্কা আশঙ্কা করতে পারেন যে— তাহলে উক্ত ক্ষেত্রে প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের লক্ষণটি অলাক্ষে চলে যাওয়ার অতিব্যাপ্তি দোষে দুষ্ট হয়। কিন্তু উক্ত আশঙ্কার প্রত্যুত্তরে জয়রাম বলেন যে— 'প্রতিজ্ঞা' এবং 'হেতু' এই পদদ্বয়কে ব্যাপক অর্থে গ্রহণ করা হয়েছে। সুতরাং, উক্তক্ষেত্রে লক্ষ্যহেতুতেই লক্ষণ থাকার অতিব্যাপ্তি দোষের কোন আশঙ্কা থাকে না। অতএব, জয়রামের মতে— 'প্রতিজ্ঞা' এবং 'হেতু' পদের দ্বারা উক্তিমাত্রকেই বোঝানো হয়েছে।[৩২]

এই "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ আলোচনা প্রসঙ্গে মণিকণ্ঠ মিশ্র বলেন নিগ্রহস্থানের লক্ষণটি উল্লেখ করেন "প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ" যে— যাদের একত্ব সমাবস্থান সম্ভবপর নয়, বাক্যো তাদের একত্ব উল্লেখ করলে নামক নিগ্রহস্থান হয়। মণিকণ্ঠ মিশ্র চার প্রকার বিরোধের কথা উল্লেখ করেছেন। যথা— (১) একক্ষণে যাদের সমাবস্থান সম্ভবপর নয়, (২) এক দেশে যাদের সমাবস্থান সম্ভব নয়, (৩) যাদের এক প্রকারের সমাবস্থান সম্ভবপর নয় এবং (৪) যাদের প্রতিযোগিনিতাবচ্ছেদক ধর্মের একত্ব সমাবস্থান সম্ভব নয়।[৩৩] তিনি আরও বলেন যে— বিরোধ এত প্রকার হলেও বিরোধের লক্ষণে অনন্বয়ন দোষ হয় না।[৩৪]

সুতরাং উপরিউক্ত আলোচনা থেকে দেখা যাচ্ছে যে— উদ্যোতকরের ন্যায় বাচস্পতি মিশ্র,

উদয়নাচার্য, বিশ্বনাথ, বরদরাজ, জয়রাম, মণিকণ্ঠ মিশ্র প্রমুখ সকলেই 'প্রতিজ্ঞা' এবং 'হেতু' এই পদদ্বয়কে উপলক্ষণ পদরূপে গ্রহণ করেছেন। অর্থাৎ, ''প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' অর্থে উদ্দ্যোতকরের পরবর্তী নৈয়ায়িকগণও কেবলমাত্র প্রতিজ্ঞা এবং হেতুর বিরোধকে বোঝেননি। বরং তাঁরা বিচারে অংশগ্রহণকারী বাদী বা প্রতিবাদীর বিচারে প্রযুক্ত ন্যায়ের অন্তর্গত যেকোন বাক্যদ্বয় বা যেকোন অবয়ব বাক্যের অন্তর্গত যে কোন পদদ্বয়ের বিরোধকেই ''প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' রূপে উল্লেখ করেছেন।

''প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ আলোচনা প্রসঙ্গে পূর্বোক্ত পর্যালোচনার ভিত্তিতে এটি স্পষ্টরূপে প্রতিফলিত হয় যে প্রাচীন ন্যায়ের ঐতিহ্যের মধ্যে থেকেও বার্ত্তিককার উদ্দ্যোতকরের মত কতখানি স্বতন্ত্র এবং অভিনব। এই স্বাতন্ত্র্য এবং অভিনবত্বের ধারাই প্রবাহিত হয়েছে পরবর্তী নৈয়ায়িকগণের মধ্যে। এই স্বাতন্ত্র্য এবং স্বকীয়তার প্রকাশই তাই পরিস্ফুট হয়েছে পরবর্তীকালে নৈয়ায়িকগণের রচনায়। কেবলমাত্র ''প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের ক্ষেত্রেই নয়, প্রতিটি নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ ব্যাখ্যা এবং দূষকতাবীজ অনুসন্ধানের ক্ষেত্রে প্রাচীন ন্যায়ের ঐতিহ্যের মধ্যে থেকেও বার্ত্তিকার উদ্দ্যোতকরের আলোচনায় অপেক্ষাকৃত আধুনিক নৈয়ায়িকগণের প্রবণতা উল্লেখ করার মত ঘটনা। তাই ''প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ বিষয়ে বহুযুগ পরবর্তী নৈয়ায়িক জয়রাম এবং মণিকণ্ঠ মিশ্রের রচনায় উদ্দ্যোতকরের অনুরূপ মতের যে প্রকাশ পরিলক্ষিত হয় তা এই সাক্ষেরই বাহক। সুতরাং, এই প্রবন্ধের অন্তিমে উপনীত হয়ে একথা নির্দ্বিধায় বলা যায় যে ''প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ'' নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ বিষয়ে পরবর্তীকালে নৈয়ায়িকগণের মতের যে পরিবর্তন এবং পরিবর্ধন তার উৎস নিহিত রয়েছে প্রাচীন ন্যায়াচার্য উদ্দ্যোতকরের রচিত ন্যায়বার্ত্তিকের মধ্যে।

নির্দেশিকা

১। ''উক্তন্যুক্তদুরুক্তানাং চিন্তা যত্র প্রবর্ততে তং গ্রন্থং বার্ত্তিকং প্রাহুর্বার্ত্তিকজ্ঞা মনীষিণঃ।''—ভীমাচার্য্য ঝলকীকশ্বর— ন্যায়কোশঃ, সনঃ১৯৭৮, পৃঃ-৭৪১।

২। ন্যায়দর্শন, অ.১, অ.১, গৌতম, সন—১৯১২-১৯১৯, পৃঃ-৭।

৩। ''তত্র ভাষ্যকারমতং দূষয়িত্বা বার্ত্তিকারো যং স্থিতিপক্ষমাহ তত্রৈবং ক্রমঃ...।''—ধর্ম্মকীর্ত্তি—বাদন্যায়, সন—১৯৭২, পৃঃ-৭৩।

৪। ''বিপ্রতিপত্তিরপ্রতিপত্তিশ্চ নিগ্রহস্থানম্।'' ।।১৯।।৬০।।—ক) ন্যায়দর্শন, অ.১, আ.২, গৌতম, সন—১৯৬৭, পৃঃ ৬৯৩। খ) ফণিভূষণ তর্কবাগীশ—ন্যায়দর্শন, অ.১, আ.২, গৌতম, সন—১৯৮১, পৃঃ-৪৬৭।

৫। ''বিপরীতা বা কুৎসিতা বা প্রতিপত্তির্বিপ্রতিপত্তিঃ।''—
ক) বাৎস্যায়ন ভাষ্য, অ.১, আ.২, সূত্র—১৯, ন্যায়দর্শন, সন—১৯৬৭, পৃঃ-৬৮৩।
খ) ফণিভূষণ তর্কবাগীশ—বাৎস্যায়ন ভাষ্য, অ.১, আ.২, সূঃ-১৯, ন্যায়দর্শন, সন—১৯৮১, পৃঃ-৪৬৭।

৬। ''তিস্রঃ কথা ভবন্তি বাদো জল্পো বিতণ্ডা চেতি...।''—

ক) বাৎস্যায়ন ভায্য, অ.১,আ.২, সূঃ-১ এর উপর ভূমিকা ভায্য, ন্যায়দর্শন, সন—১৯৬৭, পৃঃ-
৫৯৮।

খ) ফণিভূষণ তর্কবাগীশ— বাৎস্যায়ন ভায্য, অ.১,আ.২, সূঃ-১ এর উপর ভূমিকা ভায্য, ন্যায়দর্শন,
সন— ১৯৮১, পৃঃ-৩৬৭।

৭। "কঃ পুনঃ শিষ্যাচার্য়্যোর্নিগ্রহঃ ? বিবক্ষিতার্থাপ্রতিপাদকত্বম্।"—উদ্দ্যোতকর— ন্যায়বার্ত্তিক—
ন্যায়দর্শন, অ.১, আ.২, সূঃ—১, গৌতম সেন, সন—১৯৬৭, পৃঃ—২০।

৮। "নিগ্রহস্থানানি খলু পরাজয়বস্তূন্যপরাধাধিকরণানি ....।"
ক) বাৎস্যায়ন ভায্য, অ.৫,আ.২, সূঃ-১ এর উপর ভূমিকা ভায্য, ন্যায়দর্শন, সন—১৯৮৫, পৃঃ—
১১৬০।

খ) ফণিভূষণ তর্কবাগীশ—বাৎস্যায়ন ভায্য, অ.৫,আ.২, সূঃ—১ এর উপর ভূমিকা ভায্য, ন্যায়
দর্শন, সন—১৯৮৯, পৃঃ—৪৮৮।

৯। "...নিগ্রহস্থানানি তু পরাজয়বস্তূনি অপরাধানিধরণানি।" উদ্দ্যোতকর— ন্যায়বার্ত্তিক — ন্যায়দর্শন,
অ.৫, আ.২, সূঃ-১ এর ভূমিকা ভায্যের উপর বার্ত্তিক, গৌতম, সন— ১৯৮৫, পৃঃ—১১৬০।

১০।"প্রতিজ্ঞাহানিঃ, প্রতিজ্ঞান্তরং, প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধঃ, প্রতিজ্ঞাসন্ন্যাসো, হেত্বন্তরমর্থান্তরং,
নিরর্থকমবিজ্ঞাতার্থমপার্থকমপ্রাপ্তকালং, ন্যূনমধিকং, পুনরুক্তমননুভাষণমজ্ঞানমপ্রতিভা, বিক্ষেপো,
মতানুজ্ঞা, পর্য়্যনুয়োজ্যোপেক্ষণং, নিরনুয়োজ্যানুয়োগোহপসিদ্ধান্তো হেত্বাভাসাশ্চ নিগ্রহস্থানানি"।
।১।।৫০৫।।— ক) ন্যায়দর্শন, অ.৫, আ.২, গৌতম, সন—১৯৮৫, পৃঃ— ১১৬২।

খ) ফণিভূষণ তর্কবাগীশ— ন্যায়দর্শন, অ.৫,আ.২, গৌতম, সন—১৯৮৯, পৃঃ—৪৯১-৪৯২।

১১।"বিপ্রতিপত্ত্যপ্রতিপত্ত্যোর্বিকল্পান্নিগ্রহস্থান বহুত্বমিতি সংক্ষেপেণোক্তম্।"— উদ্দ্যোতক —
ন্যায়বর্ত্তিক— ন্যায়দর্শন, অ.৫, আ.২, সূঃ—১ এর ভূমিকা ভায্যের উপর বার্ত্তিক, গৌতম, সন—
১৯৮৫, পৃঃ—১১৬০।

১২।"...সামান্যতধিকৃত্য নিগ্রহস্থানে দ্বে, ভেদবিস্তরবিবক্ষায়াং তু দ্বার্বিংশতিধা ভেদঃ।"—উদ্দ্যোতকর—
ন্যায়বার্ত্তিক— ন্যায়দর্শন, অ.৫, আ.২, সূঃ—১ এর ভূমিকা ভায্যের উপর বার্ত্তিক, গৌতম, সন—
১৯৮৫, পৃঃ—১১৬১।

১৩।"তদিদমপ্রতিপত্তিতৌ বিপ্রতিপত্তিতো বা নিগ্রহস্থানমিতি।"— উদ্দ্যোতকর — ন্যায়বার্ত্তিক —
ন্যায়দর্শন, অ.৫, আ.২, সূঃ—৩, গৌতম, সন—১৯৮৫, পৃঃ— ১১৬৮।

১৪।"প্রতিজ্ঞাহেত্বোর্বিরোধঃ প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধঃ।।৪।।৫০৮।।—ন্যায়দর্শন, অ.৫, আ.২, গৌতম, সন—
১৯৮৫, পৃঃ—১১৬৯।

১৫। "গুণব্যতিরিক্তং দ্রব্য" মিতি প্রতিজ্ঞা। "রূপদিতোহর্থান্তরস্যানুপলব্ধে" রিতি হেতুঃ। সোহয়ং
প্রতিজ্ঞাহেত্বোর্বিরোধঃ।" —বাৎস্যায়নভায্য, অ.৫,আ.২, সূঃ —৪, ন্যায়দর্শন, সন — ১৯৮৫,
পৃঃ - ১১৬৯-৭০ ।

১৬। "গুণব্যতিরিক্তং চ দ্রব্যং রূপাদিভ্যশ্চার্থান্তরস্যানুপলব্ধিরিতি বিরুদ্ধতে ব্যাহত্যতে ন সম্ভবতীতি"

১৭। "যত্র প্রতিজ্ঞা হেতুনা বিরুধ্যতে হেতুশ্চ প্রতিজ্ঞয়া, স প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধো নাম নিগ্রহস্থানম্।" — উদ্দ্যোতকর — ন্যায়বার্তিক, অ. ৫, আ. ২, সূ. ২২, গৌতম, সন — ২৭৯৫, পৃঃ — ১১৭৯।

১৮। "এতেষাং প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধেহপ্যুক্তঃ যত্র প্রতিজ্ঞা স্ববচনেন বিরুধ্যতে, যথা — ত্রাসন গতিনী।" — উদ্দ্যোতকর — ন্যায়বার্তিক, অ. ৫, আ. ২, সূ. ২২, গৌতম, সন — ২৭৯৫, পৃঃ — ১১৭৯।

১৯। "এতেন প্রতিজ্ঞা দৃষ্টান্তবিরোধেন বক্তব্যঃ — হেত্বংশ দৃষ্টান্তবিরোধঃ, প্রমাণবিরোধঃ প্রতিজ্ঞা হেত্বর্থকঃ।" — উদ্দ্যোতকর — ন্যায়বার্তিক, অ. ৫, আ. ২, সূ. ২২, গৌতম, সন — ২৭৯৫, পৃঃ — ১১৮১।

২০। "পরস্পরবিরুদ্ধৌ গোষ্ঠিনির্হেতুকার্থবিরোধঃ" যত্র পরস্পরসিদ্ধেন গোষ্ঠাদিনা ব্যাভিচারতি তদ্বিরুদ্ধমুত্তরং বদিলে।" — উদ্দ্যোতকর — ন্যায়বার্তিক, অ. ৫, আ. ২, সূ. ২২, গৌতম, সন — ২৭৯৫, পৃঃ — ১১৮১-২।

২১। "উভয়সম্প্রতিপন্নস্তুহেতুকাত্তিকঃ..." — উদ্দ্যোতকর — ন্যায়বার্তিক, অ. ৫, আ. ২, সূ. ২২, গৌতম, সন — ২৭৯৫, পৃঃ — ১১৮১।

২২। "যত্র 'প্রতিজ্ঞাহেত্বো' রিতি বাক্যাত্তপ্রতিজ্ঞাহেতুসমানকালেন বিরোধেনতার্নিহ্নুতেঃ লক্ষণাত প্রতিজ্ঞাবদন্যুক্তবদন। এক সপ্তের্ক্কীর্তাপ্ত তদর্শিবিরোধেনত্রয়োদর্শিবিরোধনাবরবাভ্রোলক্ষনকেলাবর বারারি।" — উদ্দ্যোতকর — ন্যায়বার্তিক, অ. ৫, 'ৎ আ. — ৭৯৫ — ।

২৩। "অত চ প্রতিজ্ঞাহেতুনে কথাকালিনবাক্যপ্তের। তথা চ কথায়াং স্ববচনার্থ বিরোধঃ প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধঃ। বিশ্লোম — ন্যায়বার্তিক — ন্যায়দর্শন, অ. ৫, আ. ২, সূ. ২২, গৌতম, সন, পৃঃ — ২৭৯৫-১১৮১।

২৪। "একবক্তৃক্রোধ পদবোর্থবোরৈকরৌার্থ যৎ পরস্পরব্যাবৃত্যঃ স প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধানাম নিগ্রহস্থান ভবতি।" বরদরাজ — তার্কিকরক্ষা, সন — ২৭৫০৭, পৃঃ — ৭২৭।

২৫। "ব্যাঘাতেবিরুদ্ধার্থিকত্বম্। তথাচ বিরুদ্ধার্থিক পদবাক্যত্বং লক্ষণম্। ... প্রতিজ্ঞাহেত্বোর্পদোর্যোকিয়ার্থপ্রতিপাদনাৎ।" জয়রাম — ন্যায়সিদ্ধান্তমালা (২য় খণ্ড), সন — ৮২৭৮, পৃঃ — ২৭২-২৭৯।

২৬। "স্থানবহুত্বব্রোধেরেকত্র বাক্যে একনিরৌতহেকলাবিধানং প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ। সহনবহুলিঙ চ কমাদিদেশ কলাতদরা, কমাদি দেশ প্রকারতয়া, কমাদিতত্তবোধিতিবত্তবনবারা।" মণিকণ্ঠ মিশ্র — ন্যায়রত্ন, সন — ১৯৮৫, পৃঃ — ২২৮।

২৭। "তথাপি বিরোধমাত্রে নান্তুন্মাদেরঃ ...।"মণিকণ্ঠ মিশ্র — ন্যায়রত্ন, সন — ১৯৮৫, পৃঃ — ২২৮।

SWAMI VIVEKANANDA AS A SOCIAL REFORMER

BHUPENDRA CHANDRA DAS

Vivekananda's approach to social reforms is practical in nature. The reforms of a society are based on the conditions of the masses. This conditions depend on their acquiring food, clothing, shelter and their psychical expressions. All social individuals do not know their rights, self-identities and they have no self-confidence. These types of negative aspects of the society will gradually come to an end through reformation and renaissance and as a result of these movements people of different societies become conscious about proper justice, dignity and human rights. Raja Rammohan Roy, Vidyasagar, Vivekananda, Gandhi, Rabindranath, Aurobindo and some other persons participated in the reformation movement before the freedom movement. They expected to revive social values. These values were accepted with respect by common people but these were gradually lost later because of a general decline. The cause of this decline was some negative aspects of society, such as, caste system, influence of powerful authority, long tyranny, prohibition, fear for supernatural power, lack of confidence. Vivekananda wanted to recover self-confidence of the common people and we know that his many articles and speech are full of reviving our self-confidence.

Vivekananda realized that at least some of the social evils were due to the orthodoxy and superstitions prevalent in the society of that time. He believed that this was due to a loss of faith in spiritual values. Therefore, he aimed at a spiritual awakening among the Indian masses and this is a basic need for social reforms etc. He is of the opinion that in India, social reforms are not possible without religion because Indian people are spiritual and religious in nature.

Both the expressions 'spirituality' and "divinity' are used in very broad senses. The word 'spirituality' includes everything that transcends the sensuous and the intellectual. Hence to say that religion is a spiritual pursuit is just to emphasize that it begins in an awareness of the inadequacy of sense and reason. Man finds himself unable to tackle many of the, things he comes across. He does

not understand some of the "mysteries" of the nature. It evolves an awareness of his limitation and imperfection. So he believes in some super-natural element. It is religion. The nature of this super-natural element is to be known here. According Swami Vivekananda, it can be anything, such as, a God or the Absolute reality or an impersonal principle or the Destiny or the law or anything of this sort.

There is another important characteristic of religion, according to Vivekananda. Religion surely has a value and significance for an individual but has a social content also. There is a distinction between morality and religion. Morality serves social purpose and religion has a value that transcends even the social. To Vivekananda, religion provides a secure foundation and an ultimate sanction to morality also. Without this sanction ethics will remain blind and chaotic. Doing well is all right. But here a question may be raised: why should we do well? There must be an ideal and this ideal must be somehow universal; otherwise there will not remain any ethics because the ethics of one group will conflict with that of the other. Religion supplies that universal ideal. Thus religion is able to justify ethics. Besides, a religious sense which somehow bases itself on an awareness of unity of everything makes ethical practice both convenient and easy. Vivekananda says, "Of all the forces that have worked and are still working to mould the destinies of the human race, none certainly is more potent that, the manifestation of which we call religion."

There is a novelty in the idea and method of social reforms advocated by Vivekananda. In connection with his address delivered in Madras on "My Plan of Campaign" he says that he is a greater social reformer than any one of the previous reformers, they wanted to reform only little bits. Vivekananda wanted root- and-branch reform. His method was different from theirs. The method of them was that of destruction but his method was that of construction. He did not believe in reform but he believed in growth. According to Vivekananda, there are evils in every society in the East and the West. Here man dies for want of food and there he dies because of plenty of food. He says that some men who think that certain things are evil will not make a nation move. We shall have to educate the nation and to create

our legislative body and then the law will be obtainable. The first duty is to note the power, the sanction from which the law will be effective. There are no kings today for sanctioning a law. Now new power belongs to the people. So he advised to bring it up. Hence the first duty is to educate the masses even for social reforms and we shall have to wait till that time comes. He advised to go down to the basis of the thing, to the very root of the matter. He called it radical reform. The solution of the problem is not an easy matter because it is a big and a vast problem. We should not be in a hurry because it is a problem of several hundred years.[2] Vivekananda speaks of the method of construction, which depends on three things: (1) intellect or reason, (2) feeling evolving from the heart and (3) love. Intellect or reason goes a few steps and there it stops. Secondly, we should have to feel from the heart. Inspiration comes through the heart. So he advised us to feel from the heart about the sufferings of the undeveloped and downtrodden people in society and an earnest desire to remove their sufferings is necessary. Thirdly, this earnest desire comes from love because he says that inspiration comes through the heart. Love opens the most impossible gates; love is the gate to all the secrets of the universe.

Vivekananda greatly emphasized the spreading of education among the Indian masses for social reforms and for other purposes. He says that the chief cause of India's ruin has been the monopolizing of the whole education and intelligence of the land, by dint of pride and royal authority, among a handful of men. If we are to rise again, we shall have to do it in the same .way, i.e. by spreading education among the masses. Vivekananda traveled many cities of Europe and observe the comforts and education of even the poor people. This observation brought to his mind the state of poor people of India and remembering this he used to shed tears. It is education, which made this difference. Through education comes faith in one's own self and through faith in one's own self the inherent Brahman is waking up in them, while Brahman in us is gradually becoming dormant. So, to educate the masses is the basic need for social reforms. We should educate our people so that they may be able to solve their own problems. Until that is done, all these reforms will remain ideas only. It takes time to make it workable, especially

in India.[4]

According to the Upanisads, to have faith in us nature herself spoke, as it were, "Arise, awake and stop not till the goal is reached"[5] and Vivekananda was very pleased to utter this saying for awakening of the human beings.

Vivekananda reminds us the scriptural saying - "The ignorant, the man devoid of *s'raddhā*, the doubting self runs to ruins *(Ajñas'cās'raddadhāb ñ scu sams'ayātmā vinas'yati). "* We have lack of *s'raddhā*. So we are near destruction. The remedy now is the spread of education. Firstly, self-knowledge is necessary. This knowledge not only brings freedom from the bondage of worldly existence but also brings ordinary material prosperity.

The combination of the Greek mind represented by the external European energy added to the Hindu spirituality would be an ideal society for India. It is absolutely necessary to learn from the Englishman the idea of prompt obedience to leaders, the absence of jealousy, the indomitable perseverance and the undying faith in oneself. In India, everybody wants to become a leader and there is nobody to obey. Everyone should learn to obey before he can command.

For imparting education among the masses he suggests the following: there are thousands of unselfish, kindhearted men in our country who had renounced everything. They are interested to give religious instruction without any remuneration. At least half of them can be trained as teachers or bearers of such education as we need most. For this purpose, first of all a centre in the capital of each Presidency will be established, from where education will be spreaded over slowly throughout the whole of India .Two centres have already been started in Madras and Kolkata . More centres will be started shortly. The greater part of education should be given orally because time is not yet suitable for schools. Gradually, agriculture, industry, etc. will be taught in these main centres. Workshop will also be established for the furtherance of arts.

To start centres for women also is equally necessary. These centres will be exactly like those for men. It was difficult, at the time of Vivekananda , to educate women in this country .[6]

Vivekananda speaks of two things for the development of societies of India:

(1) the preparation for the cultural development of human beings and (2) self-development of human values. These two things are related to each other. The welfare of an individual requires his freedom in getting food and clothes and his field of expression of his honesty and goodness of character. He pointed out this item in connection with civilization. According to Vivekananda, the everlastingness of our civilization is based on the welfare of the masses. Besides, he says that the sufferings of the downtrodden are rooted in different evils in society. These evils are mainly as follows: (a) Ignorance, (b) Tyranny of the authority over the weak, (c) poverty in general, (d) untouchability ,(e) widows in tears.

For the cessation of these evils our first duty is to educate the people. We have already mentioned that to him, education is the power to comprehend the problems of life and this knowledge. Liberates human life because liberty is the first condition of growth. By education he does not mean present system, but something in the line of positive teaching. Mere book learning will not fulfill our purpose. It is that education by which character is formed, strength of mind is increased, the intellect is expended and by which one can stand on ones own feet.

The caste barrier is another serious problem in India. Vivekananda has felt that the people in Indian society are facing different hardship like alienation etc. because of caste barrier and untouchability. These also can be removed by education and this can help the tyrannized to gain their suitable status.

Vivekananda realized the necessity of widow marriage. Speaking of social reforms, he expressed himself about widow-marriage thus : " I have yet to see a nation whose fate is determined by the number of husbands their widows get." But the social authority did not accept widow-marriage at the time of Vivekananda. Therefore, it is better to make the widow self-reliant. If the widows can arrange for their food, shelter and education, then they are free to take decision on their marriage.

We have mentioned above another important thing regarding the preparation for the cultural development of human beings. Culture implies mans capacity to leam and to convey knowledge to succeeding generations. Man's ability to learn is

based on education, which must be natural, and open i.e. it must find out the organic connection with the rest of our surroundings.

In India, culture depends on religion. Religion also is related to man's ways of life and is indirectly essential for social reforms. Vivekananda reminds us -"Even a little of this *Dharma* saves one from the great fear of birth and death *(Svalpamapyasya dharmasya trāvate mahato bhayat)* ." Monist, Dualist , Qualified-monist , Shaiba , Vaishnava , Shākta , even the Buddhist and the Jaina are all at one in this respect that infinite power is latent in this individual self *(Jivātman)* , from the ant to the perfect man there is the same *Atman* in all, the difference being only in manifestation. According to him, we shall have to go from door to door of everyone for calling forth that power.

Notes and reference

1. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol- II (Mayabati Memorial Edition), Advaita Ashram, 5, Dehi Entally Road, Kolkata- 700014, p.57.

2. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda , Vol- III (Mayabati Memorial Edition, Advaita Ashram , 5, Dehi Entally Road . Kolkata- 700014 , p. 216.

3. Ibid, Vol. III, p. 225.

4. Ibid, Vol. V. p. 216.

5. Kama Upanisad, 1. ii.4.

6. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda , Vol- IV (Mayabati Memorial Edition), Advaita Ashram , 5 Dehi Entally Road , Kolkata - 700014 , p. 485.

7. Ibid, Vol. V, p. 342.

WHAT IS IT THAT INTEGRAL YOGA LEADS TO?

SUNIL ROY

Sri Aurobindo's is a yogic practice of his own. It is called the integral yoga because it takes up the essence and processes of the traditional yogas. Like any other practice of yoga this yoga leads to an end. But it is very difficult to say specifically what this end is. This difficulty arises because several statements made by Sri Aurobindo regarding this aim seem to be paradoxical. As a result different views crop up in the minds of his readers about it. In this paper each of these views has been explained and its partial nature has been shown. An attempt has also been made here to show what the real aim of integral yoga is to be. In order to make the theme comprehensible the paper begins with a brief sketch of the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo.

The philosophy of Sri Aurobindo is known as integral non-dualism. It is non-dualism because according to it only one all-pervading reality is all that there is, but it is beyond anything else. Sri Aurobindo coins the term "Brahman' from the Upanishads and uses it to mean this reality. It is integral because it accepts and sublimates the opposition between matter and spirit. According to him matter as well as spirit is to be looked upon as real.

The world-process in Sri Aurobindo's view has two aspects — the descending aspect or involution and the ascending aspect or evolution. As he proclaims, without the-descent of the spirit into the world, no ascent of the world into the spirit is possible. The order of the process of involution is as follows — existence, consciousness-force, bliss, supermind, mind, psyche, life and matter. Of them, the first four constitute the higher hemisphere, the last four, the lower one. There is a veil between the two hemispheres. This is the veil of ignorance.

The ascending aspect or evolution follows the reverse order of evolutionary process. So, Sri Aurobindo says,

> "...Spirit is a final evolutionary emergence because it is the original
> element and factor. Evolution is an inverse action of the involution:

what is an ultimate and last derivation in the involution is the first to appear in the evolution. What was original and primal in the involution is in the evolution the last and supreme emergence."[1]

Evolution is a triple process of widening, heightening and integrating. The process of widening means providing greater scope for the operation of every new element, that of heightening means ascent from one grade to another higher grades and the last one means uplift and transformation of the lower ones.

According to Sri Aurobindo the evolution of the world has so far reached four stages — matter, life, psyche, and mind. But its upward ascent is not yet ended. Mind is not its summit. Time has come when evolution must take a leap into the next higher plane, viz., the supramental plane. And man's ascent from the physical to the supramental plane means the evolution not only of consciousness, mind and sense, but also of a life-power liberated from mortal limitations. In other words, it is a physical life fit for a divine inhabitant, — and in the sense not of attachment or restriction to our present corporeal frame but an exceeding of the law of the physical body, — the conquest of death, an earthly immortality",[2]

Thus the concept of the supermind is the pivot around which the entire philosophy of Sri Aurobindo moves. This is true to his integral yoga as well. That is why we find him to say in his Bases *of Yoga*, "Our object is the supramental realization and we have to do whatever is necessary for that or towards that under the conditions of each stage."[3] Accordingly, he has an important lesson to give to his disciples. He encourages them for necessary preparation in this direction. The above statement of *Bases of Yogh* is perfectly in consonance with an extract in Sri Aurobindo's *Letters* on *Yoga.* The extract is as follows.

> "The Supermind is the vast truth-consciousness of which the
> ancient seers spoke; there have been. glimpses of it till now,
> sometimes an indirect influence or pressure, but it has not been
> brought down into consciousness of the earth and fixed there. To
> so bring it down is the aim of our yoga."[4]

We see him proceed further in the same book. He warns us that the intellectual mind cannot even realize what the supermind is. It is only by constant experience and growth of consciousness that one can reach the higher levels of consciousness. Of course, those higher levels are not the supermind. Yet one can receive some knowledge of the supermind by reaching those levels successively. In Sri Autobindo's philosophy and yoga those higher levels are the levels of higher mind, illumined mind, intuitive mind and overmind respectively.

The Vedic seers, Sri Aurobindo further adds, never attained to the supermind. Maybe, they tried to rise individually to the supermind. But they could not bring it down or make it a permanent part of the earth-consciousness. We know integral yoga is double movement of both ascent and descent. One must rise to higher and still higher levels of consciousness and at the same time one must bring down their power into mind, life and' body. The supermind is the highest of these levels. And many Aurobindonian scholars hold that the supramental realization is the object of integral yoga.

But we cannot regard the supramental realization as the object of integral yoga directly. There is a difficulty in doing so. According to Sri Aurobindo no human endeavour or *tapas ā* can alone rend the veil of ignorance that exists between the two hemispheres mentioned earlier. And the light of the supermind will not illumine our consciousness until and unless the veil is rent. In a word, the rending of the veil is necessary for the occurrence of the supramental descent. But how is it to be effected ?

Sri Aurobindo replies that this is to be effected by the divine Shakti or the Mother. Only she has the power to rend the veil. But she also does not rend the veil unless there is an intense aspiration and an exclusive self-opening to the divine Power. This reminds us of a kind of *sadhana* prescribed in the integral yoga. It is through *sadhana* that human nature gets transformed. It is here that the possibility of another dimension of the object of integral yoga begins. This concerns the transformation of nature. There are many others who hold this to be the object of integral yoga.

According to Sri Aurobindo terrestrial evolution leads to a final goal. But this is not merely to awaken man to the supreme reality and to release him from ignorance and bondage. In other words, the task is not accomplished only with the advent of the spiritual man. There is a further intention — a radical and integral transformation of nature. Sri Aurobindo discloses its triple phase in *The Life Divine* thus.

> "...there must first be the psychic change, the conversion *of* our whole present nature into a soul instrumentation; on that or along with that, there must be the spiritual change, the descent of a higher Lights Knowledge, Power, Force, Bliss, Purity into the whole Being, even into the darkness of our sub-conscience; last there must supevene the supramental transmutation, — there must take place as the crowning movement the ascent into the supermind and the transforming descent of the supramental consciousness into our entire being and nature."[5]

This extract means that what is called the psychic transformation constitutes the very first step of triple transformation. Any way, the epithet 'psychic transformation' needs some elaboration. As Sri Aurobindo holds, in the course of evolution it is in man that the mental stuff is best represented; and in man lies the possibility of the next higher step of evolution, i.e., the transition to the supramental level. But the man that is known to us is not the real or complete man. Man has two aspects — the outer and the inner. The inner aspect of man, again, has two layers — the upper and the lower. The upper is the *Jivātmā* and the lower is the psyche or *caitya purusa*. The psyche or soul is an immortal element in man. In his *Lights on Yoga* Aurobindo calls it" the Son of God." It employs mind, life and body as its instruments but itself remains unaffected by their operations.

But it is all due to ignorance, particularly constitutional ignorance, that man believes that life, mind and body constitute the whole constitution of his being. He forgets that he has an inner being as well that nourishes and sustains the physical, the vital end the mental activities. Sri Aurobindo speaks of removing the veil of

this ignorance that hides this inner being and let its light illumine over outer being, life, mind and body. This is the firststep of triple transformation.

But psychic transformation bringing changes in the ways and activities in the soul is not enough. The psychic being, according to Sri Aurobindo, must turn towards whatever seems to belong to a higher reality. There must be an opening to an Infinity, an eternal Presence, a boundless Self, an infinite Existence, an infinity of Consciousness, an infinity of Bliss, an All-Power. This is the second phase of triple transformation.

But complete transformation of nature, Sri Aurobindo thinks, can be feasible only by the intervention of the supramental power and its direct action upon the earth - consciousness. This is the final phase of transformation. It finishes the passage of the soul through ignorance and bases its consciousness, life, power and form of manifestation on a completely effective self- knowledge.

So far we have explained two views concerning the object of integral yoga. We have shown that supramental realization by itself cannot be the object of integral yoga directly. And what is called the transformation of nature is not complete without supramentalization, i.e., supramentalization is a part and parcel of necessary transformation. Yet, while mentioning the transformation of nature as the object of his yoga, Sri Aurobindo does not forget to speak of its another object. This, to quote him, is as follows:

> "This yoga aims at the conscious union with the Divine in the supermind and the transformation of the nature."[7]

In other words, integral yoga has two objects — the transformation of nature and the union with the Divine. This statement implies two things — (1) transformation by itself cannot be the whole object of integral yoga and (2) We must consider union with the Divine as a claimant to the object of integral yoga. And there are still many others who hold the latter to be the object of this yoga.

What Sri Aurobindo means by Divine union is by no means union with the featureless *Brahman* in a supracosmic consciousness, as it is for the ascetic schools. Nor is it mere spiritual realization. According to him, there are many planes above

mind. All of them are divine planes. On all of them the Self can be realized. They are all spiritual planes. But while the other yogas proceed from realization of the Self to *nirvana* and abandon life, the *sadhaka* of integral yoga does not stop there.

For him realization of the Self in the supramental level is just one aspect of the Divine. But it is a beginning, not an end of the highest realization. He does not merely pass into the superconscient. He also brings down the superconscient into the waking consciousness. That results in the transformation of the lower nature and its elevation to the higher. So, Sri Aurobindo expressly states in **The Synthesis of Yoga,**

> "If indeed our aim be only an escape from the world to God,
> synthesis is unnecessary and waste of time; for then our sole
> practical aim must be to find out one path out of the thousand that
> lead to God, one shortest possible of shortcuts, and not to linger
> exploring different paths that end in the same goal. But if our aim
> be a transformation of our integral being into the terms of God -
> existence, it is then that a synthesis become necessary,"[8]

That is all about several statements of Sri Aurobindo with regard to the aim of integral yoga. There is an apparent disagreement between them. This, we have mentioned earlier, paves the way of holding different views for his readers — that the aim' of integral yoga is the supramental descent, that it is the transformation of nature and that it is the union with the Divine. But actually there is no disagreement between the statements of Sri Aurobindo and as such different views should not be held regarding the aim of this yoga. This is because (1) those aims may be regarded as aims at different stages of integral yoga and (2) further, all those aims together signify another remote aim. The first point may be explained as follows.

Integral yoga maintains a process. It has a beginning, an end and a midway too. It begins with an intense aspiration and an exclusive self-opening to the divine Power. The aim of integral yoga at the beginning stage is the transformation of nature. But transformation at this stage is nothing more than psychicisation and spiritualization. The second stage, we may say, comprises the

call from below with a will to recognize the Light when it comes. The sanction of the Supreme is needed thereby. The power of the divine Mother mediates between the call from below and the sanction of the Supreme from above. This mediation ultimately results in supramentalization. This, we know, completes triple transformation. And what is called the union with the Divine is a thing that occurs at the final stage of the process. But this union is a mere escape from the world to God. Sri Aurobindo speaks of another aspect of this union. This is the aspect of divine descent. It means that the *sādhaka* of integral yoga must escend into the world with God. This is what is called in Sufism the "journey from God with God."

Thus the last but not the least thing that must be added to the so-called aims is the divine descent. This, to my mind, completes the total target of integral yoga. It is the divine life upon earth which is the other name of this target, the remote aim of this yoga. And this very idea is reflected in a letter of Sri Aurobindo published in 1912,

"The yoga we practice is not for ourselves alone, but for the Divine: its aim is to work out the will of the Divine in the world, to effect a spiritual transformation and to bring down a divine nature and divine life into the mental, vital and physical nature and life of humanity. Its object is not personal *Mukti*, although *Mukti* is a necessary condition of the yoga, but the liberation and transformation of the human being. It is not personal *Ānanda*, but the bringing down of the divine *Ânanda* — Christ's kingdom of heaven, our *Satyayuga* — upon the earth."[9]

Notes and References

1.   Sri Aurobindo, The *Life Divine* (7th Imp., Pondicherry :   Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 2001), p.887 - 888

2.   Ibidem, p. 276

3.   Sri Aurobindo, **Bases of Yoga**   (3rd Imp., Pondicherry : Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1989). p. 83

4.   Sri Aurobindo, *Letters on Yoga,* Vol.1 (7th Imp.. Pondicherry : Sri Aurobmdo Ashram. 2000). p. 10

5.   Sri Aurobindo, The *Life Divine,* op. cit., p. *926*

6.   Sri Aurobindo, *Lights on Yoga (2nd* Imp., Pondicherry : Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1987), p. 15

7.   Sri Aurobindo. *Letters on Yoga,* op. cit., p. 104

8.   Sri Aurobindo, *The Synthesis of Yoga (2nd* Imp. , Pondicherry : Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 2000), p.45.

9.   Sri   Aurobindo,   The *Yoga And Its Objects*   (11th Imp., Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 2002), p.1