


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OBITUARY

Professor Sankari Prasad Banerjee is no more.

We feel extremely grieved to mention his sad demise which occurred on 1st August 2003 at Calcutta.

Born on 9th August 1929 at Baduria, a village in North 24 Parganas he was the only child of Mahendranath and Nirmala Rani Bandyopadhyay. Professor Banerjee had a brilliant academic career. Receiving the highest marks both in Philosophy (Honours) and Bengali Vernacular, he stood second class first in the B.A. Examination in 1950, and was awarded the Ramtanu Lahiri Gold medal and the Bankim Chandra Silver Medal. He stood second in the first class in the M.A. Examination in 1952.

Professor Banerjee's teaching career began in 1953 as a Lecturer in Philosophy at Tamralipta Mahavidyalay, Midnapore. Then he taught at Asutosh College, Calcutta (1955-1963). In 1963 he joined the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences of the I.I.T. , Kharagpur, first as a lecturer, then as an Assistant Professor. He obtained his Ph.D. Degree in 1966 on the topic "Knowledge of Self" under the supervision of Professor J.N. Mohanty. Then he joined the newly created Philosophy Department of North Bengal University in 1968 as a Reader. He was the first Head of the Department.

Professor Banerjee's long professional association with Calcutta University began in 1969, when he was appointed a Reader in the Department of Philosophy. An exceptional teacher, here he also displayed his keen abilities as an administrator during a three-year term (1975-1978) as a Registrar of the University. Between 1982 and 1984 he served as a Joint Secretary of the National Commission of Teachers, Ministry of HRD, Govt. of India. This was followed by his tenure as the Vice-Chancellor of Burdwan University, Burdwan, West Bengal. In four years as Vice-Chancellor (1984-1988), he gave a new shape to the university.

In 1988 Professor Sankari Prasad Banerjee once more returned the Department of Philosophy, Calcutta University as Professor and very soon he was selected to the prestigious chair, Acharya Brajendra Nath seal Professor of

Mental and Moral Philosophy (formerly the George V Professor), which he held till his retirement in 1995.

In 1996, he was appointed visiting Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Life-World, Vidyasagar University, Midnapore. He wholeheartedly helped the new Department of a new university in its growing period. He was always a well-wisher of this Department and this University.

Professor Banerjee presented numerous papers at conferences and colloquia in national venues and international arenas, delivered presidential and valedictory lectures, edited books, and published a range of articles in scholarly journals and academic anthologies.

Recently Professor Banerjee was honoured as “Calcutta Philosopher” along with Professor Shibjeevan Bhattacharya and Professor Rama Prasad Das by the Department of Philosophy, Calcutta University.

Always accessible and unassuming, he heard his students patiently, helping them unhesitatingly and with dedication. A person beaming with energy and Zest for life and living, his interests were not only limited to philosophy. Throughout his life he was sincerely committed to various social activities.

Success did not tarnish him, during his life-time he remained a simple village boy with a sense of wonder and a love for active life.

The loss of passing away of Professor Sankari Prasad Banerjee is certainly irreparable to those who love philosophy, man and society.

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RADHAKRISHNAN'S PHILOSOPHICAL MESSAGE

G.C. NAYAK

Radhakrishnan was a multi-faceted, a multi-dimensional, personality and his contribution to our and the world-culture was manifold, regarding this there cannot be any two opinions. Here, however, I will concentrate only on Radhakrishnan as a philosopher, and within that sphere again I would be concentrating only on certain aspects, because it is almost impossible to exhaust all the aspects of his philosophical contributions.

The main thesis, rather the message, of Radhakrishnan to India and also to the world as a whole was - 'spirit above matter' or rather the 'spiritual in and through the material'. He was a great Vedāntin, perhaps the greatest in the modern age after Swami Vivekananda, whose cryptic remark about the Vedāntic vision still rings in my ears, as fresh as it was during my student days when I was obviously enthralled by the unique charm of his writings in English. Radhakrishnan had pointed out in his inimitable style in his *magnum opus*, *Indian Philosophy*, that "world is unreal, illusory it is not", according to the Vedānta. That the world is illusory, Jagat mithyā, according to S'ān kara, had been accepted almost unanimously (except Swami Vivekananda, of course) at least in the popular mind before Radhakrishnan, and Radhakrishnan gave a death blow to this illusionistic interpretation of Vedānta once for all. Declaring the world to be unreal only in a technical sense according to which reality stands for something absolutely unchanging (Kūṭastha nitya) it would only mean that the world is ever-changing (anitya), not that the world is an illusion. Rather, according to this version, even illusions have some reality in so far as they appear out there as something existing. The world is only meant for our practical transactions in accordance with the rules of the game played with practical interest from time to time differing in different contexts, instead of being taken as ultimately-real or of being something of absolute value (Niḥs'reyasa). This interpretation of Vedānta posed before the world-

audience, specially before the great contemporary idealist thinkers of his time, brought about a definite change for the better in their attitude in the positive direction towards India and Indian Philosophy which was otherwise regarded so long as otherworldly, mystical in a pejorative sense, pessimistic, and what not. This, to my mind, was one of the greatest contributions of Radhakrishnan to India and Indian thought.

His plea was not to reject matter or material life altogether, but to seek spirit in and through matter to the extent that the whole life of man gets charged, so to say, with the spiritual. This of course is just the opposite or what is now pervading the entire Indian spirit, as would be evident to anyone who is a little perceptive, the call of the material dictating terms, as it were, to our entire existence and capturing our whole being including the spiritual. This may be only a passing phase, perhaps, but this is an undeniable fact as it obtains at present.

The great dancer, Yamini Krishnamurti's tribute to Radhakrishnan's spiritual interpretation of a dance-form is worth mentioning here, if only to point out how Radhakrishnan wanted the human life to be lived, not being bereft of the material but to be lived with the spirit pervading out entire material existence. This was Radhakrishnan's message, and Yamini Krishnamurti, paying her tribute to this great philosopher-statesman, says "In the fifties, as I began to present Kuchipudi regularlythe nayika who waited for her loved Krishna in the *Krishna Sabdam*...I danced rhythmically on a copper plate, with a water-pot balanced on my head. This was a fact of coordination that upset purists as it seemed to smack of the circus ... There was, in fact, a philosophical significance to the water pot and plate which was once explained to an audience by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, President of India, before I danced Tarangam". 'It is an analogy for life itself', said the supremely dignified scholar and philosopher, quoting an appropriate Sanskrit sloka — 'Like the dancer who concentrates on the water-pot while dancing to the music accompanied by melodic instruments and rhythmic patterns, the brave one contemplates the divine fact of God, although saddled with worldly worries.' This can be further interpreted as 'we are all bound to this earth (the brass plate under the feet) and we carry heavy responsibilities on our head (signified by the water-pot, from which not a drop is supposed to spill). But just as the dancer moves joyously in rhythms, her mind in glorious contemplation of God, so too should life be lived, with grace, energy

and good purpose.' The Sanskrit sloka to which Radhakrishnan had referred is as follows : " *Puṅkhānupuṅkhaviśayānupasevyamānaḥ dhīro na muncati mukunda padāravindam. Saṅgīta vādya laya tāla vas'ana gatāpi, maulistha kumbha parirakṣaṇadhīrnatīva*". This is one of the noblest philosophical messages of Radhakrishnan to the world at large, which is entirely in keeping with the intrinsic spirit of India : I consider it to be one of his greatest contributions to the world-culture .

Was Radhakrishnan a mere interpreter of Indian thoughts or was he a philosopher in his own right ? Despite the fact that he is one and only philosopher from India whose name is included in the Library of Living Philosopher series, thus bringing definite credit to India, and despite the monumental evidence of his commentaries, like those of the great Acaryas, on the *Prasthāna trayī*, the *Upaniṣads*, the *Brahma - Sūtras*, and the *Bhagavad Gītā*, doubts continue to be there in the minds of *Some* if Radhakrishnan was not a mere syncretist without any novelty of thought. Here I propose to submit Radhakrishnan's view on intuition as only one of the examples of his unique critical insight, and to establish in my own way that Radhakrishnan was not a mere interpreter of others' thoughts but was very much a philosopher in his own right.

Regarding matters such as originality or novelty of thought, controversy is bound to be there in accordance with different standards set for assessment by different critics not only in different disciplines but also in one and the same discipline. And this is so very true of philosophy in view of the fact that philosophical critics are found to be very rarely in agreement with each other regarding the standards by which the works of their fellow thinkers, whether of the past or the present, need to be assessed. Sometimes it may so happen that standards are applied in disciplines or part of a discipline, say e.g. in Painting, Literature, Art, Philosophy, Religious thoughts, etc. which are simply inapplicable there on account of the very nature of the subject.

In matters such as this sometimes highly speculative thinking combined with deepest emotional involvement in one's favourite ideology, characterize what is regarded wrongly as critical evaluation. On account of such instability in matters of speculation the great S'ankara in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sutras*

pointed out that arguments based on mere speculative thinking are not to be relied upon in view of the fact that speculations do not have any end or limit.¹ Here I would try to avoid speculation as far as it is practicable and assess Radhakrishnan's work for what it is worth. Novelty in approach and critical insight into problems are matters of degree, according to me, and it will be appropriate to bear this in mind while assessing Radhakrishnan's contributions to the world of thought. Even a great Naiyāyika of the stature of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, while speaking of himself and his work, was candid enough to admit, rather with an extraordinary modesty, that he was only putting old things in a new style, that is all.²

For Radhakrishnan's views on intuition I will be depending here mainly on his work *An Idealist View of Life*, which was delivered as the prestigious Hibbert Lectures during 1929-30, at the University of Manchester and University College, London. According to Radhakrishnan, over the above the normal apprehension of the Reality through intellect which is fallible there is a unique and infallible way of apprehending the Real through intuition. If intuition is to be characterised as "a direct relation between the mind and some object, analogous to what common sense thinks is the relation between us and something we see unambiguously in a clear light",³ then intuition at the outset seems to have an edge over intellect. The emphasis, in case of intuition, is on the immediacy or directness of the relation without any interference in the form of interpretation or influence from outside. Radhakrishnan writes, "Intellectual inaction seems to be the prelude to the intuitive flash. To allow the non-intellectual and yet rational part of mind to play on the object, relaxation is necessary. Creative work is due as much to relation as to concentration. When we effectually concentrate on the object and think attentively about its many details, we do not seem to move far from the point at which we started. We must allow the intellect to lie fallow, let the object soak into the subsoil of our mental life and elicit its reaction on it."⁴ What is significant to note here is that Radhakrishnan is quite clear in his views regarding intuition whose origin, according to him, is inexplicable but whose directness is its greatest asset. "The relaxation of intellect", says Radhakrishnan, "means the activity of the whole mind, the awakening of the whole being for the crucial act to arise. When the flash occurs, we feel it to be true and find that it lifts up the puzzles and paradoxes into luminous atmosphere. There is no more helpless fumbling over trifles or

distraction in details. The truth is not so much produced as achieved. Though inexplicable in its origin, it is quite simple when it arises. It seems to be as direct and as effortless as ordinary perception when it occurs.”⁵ Truth, evidently according to Radhakrishnan, is *achieved* in intuition in its pristine purity whereas in the intellectual level it is *produced* and is, to that extent, distorted. He does not, however, subscribe to the view that intellect and intuition are absolutely opposed to each other. “Though intuition lies beyond intellect”, says Radhakrishnan, “it is not contrary to it. It is called *samyajñāna*, of perfect knowledge”.⁶ According to him, “Intuitions are not substitutes of thought. They are challenges to intelligence. Mere intuitions are blind while intellectual work is empty. All processes are partly intuitive and partly intellectual. There is no gulf between the two.” In this connection he also clarifies his idea of philosophy as *dars'ana*, “an insight of the whole experience”, which, according to him, is “the ancient view of philosophy”.⁷ He emphatically and clearly points out that “while it is necessary to insist that a philosopher should not allow his thinking to be disturbed by his passions, no one can be a philosopher whose non-logical sides are not well-developed”.⁸ And he laments over the present plight of philosophy which was once the pursuit of wisdom, as a mere possession of a technique.⁹

So far, so good. One thing is clear. Whatever may be the logical status of intuitive understanding, Radhakrishnan's views on intuition and in this connection his conception of philosophy are in no way fuzzy. He has a distinct and a clear stand on the question. The problem for us is how to assess this whole issue at hand: the question is to assess for ourselves the exact status of intuitive life which, according to Radhakrishnan, is ‘the spiritual wisdom at its highest’ and ‘is a type of achievement which belongs only to the highest range of mental life.’¹⁰ Is intuition a way of *knowing*? Can there be a non-sensuous, immediate knowledge? According to Radhakrishnan, there is such a knowledge, ‘a knowledge which is different from conceptual knowledge by which we see things as they are’.¹¹ It is, according to him, ‘knowledge by being’, as distinguished from knowledge by senses or symbols, an ‘awareness of the truth of things by identity’. ‘What intuition reveals is not so much a doctrine as awareness; it is a state of mind and not a definition of the object’.¹² But why should it be regarded as knowledge? If and when there is no conceptualization, can there be knowledge? Radhakrishnan is aware of the

difficulties involved in regarding intuitive apprehension as knowledge and his critical insight into the problem is evident from the way in which he analyses the whole issue. "If the term 'knowledge' is restricted to what is communicable, what can be expressed in formulas and propositions", says Radhakrishnan, "then intuitive insight as ineffable and non-propositional is not knowledge. But certainty and not communicability is the truest test of knowledge, and intuitive experience has this sense of assurance or certainty, and therefore is a species of knowledge".¹³ This passage of Radhakrishnan undoubtedly shows his critical mind regarding the problem of intuition as knowledge, whether one agrees with his viewpoint or not.

In case of intuitive experience there is indeed the further problem about the exact nature of what Radhakrishnan speaks of its sense of assurance or certainty. Knowledge certainly differs; one may point out, from purely psychological states like feeling sure. The question is whether it is appropriate on the part of some one having a sort of compelling awareness through what he designates as intuition to make a knowledge-claim or if it is appropriate on the part of any one else to make a knowledge-claim on behalf of some such person. It is course true that one is not authorized to deny such an experience to others simply because he does not have the requisite experience. And the person concerned may claim to know on the basis of his experience alone only in an extraordinary sense, although it will perhaps be more appropriate to call it wisdom or *jñāna* if one chooses to value it over and above the knowledge obtained through intellect. Radhakrishnan, it should be noted, has clearly stated here the grounds on which claims to knowledge are made on behalf of intuitive apprehension. But equally penetrating and valuable is the insight of Radhakrishnan when he points out, "it will not do to be merely logical. It is necessary to be reasonable. We have to start with right premises if logic is to yield fruitful results. Intuition is as strong as life itself from whose soul it springs".¹⁵

Is intuitive insight of the highest value in human life? Does it amount to absolute knowledge?¹⁶ In what sense, if any, are such absolutist knowledge claims made? The answer to these questions would of course depend on what we choose to value as the highest and what our grounds for knowledge claim could be. Albert Einstein, we are told, maintained that 'imagination is more important than knowledge' and 'believed in intuition and inspiration', while the philosopher-psychologist William James considered the analytical thinking of science and philosophy superior in some

ways to art and literature; nonetheless, he, too, was convinced that the process of both had commonalities. Indeed, the capability of making associations between different things was for James the essential characteristic of artistic and scientific genius.¹⁷ In any case, it would be unreasonable if intuitive apprehension, whatever may be its worth, is ruled out of court simply because intuitions that may be designated as higher, concerned as they are with what Radhakrishnan call 'the deepest things of life,'¹⁸ or that are of the 'right' types are not available to the majority of people and are somewhat unusual. It will amount to throwing the baby away along with the bath water. And Radhakrishnan's *plea for reasonableness* in this regard is not only unique in its insight but its significance also is independent of any absolutist claim that is made on behalf of intuition. In this connection, it is worth mentioning that, for Radhakrishnan, intuition "is not confused irrationalism or irresponsible mysticism".¹⁹ This not only speaks of Radhakrishnan's conceptual clarity but also of his penetrating as well as original insight into philosophical problems. The obvious message was that it is not reasonable to ignore intuitive apprehension altogether which can give us a glimpse into, rather the knowledge of, the higher form of life, the life of the spirit in and through as well as above matter. The Vedic seer, it seems, was referring to some such higher form of life amenable to the vision of the wise through intuition when he was speaking of 'Viṣṇoḥ parama pada' (the highest sphere of Viṣṇu).²⁰

Lecture delivered in the symposium on 'S. Radhakrishnan's Contribution to Indian Culture' held at Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla on 5.9.2002.

Notes and References

1. Cf. *Brahma Sūtra S'ānka* Bhāṣyaṃ 2.1.11.,
 "Puruṣoṭprekṣāṃātranibandhanāstarkā aparatiṣṭhitā bhavanti; utprekṣāyā
 niraṅkus'atvāt."
2. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Nyāya Manjarī*, "Kuto Vā nūtanam vastu
 vayanutprekṣitum k samāh, vaco vinyāsa vaicitryamātramatra vicāryatām
3. A. R. Lacey, *A Dictionary of Philosophy* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1976), p.
 101.

4. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life* [Blackie & Son (India) Limited, 1979], p. 141.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 143-144.
9. *Cf. Ibid.*, p. 144.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
14. *Cf. Lacey, op. cit.*, p. 57.
15. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 121.
16. *Cf. Ibid.*, p. 119, where Radhakrishnan says, "Absolute knowledge in its concreteness is more in the form of effortless insight or intuition".
17. *Cf. Robert Paul Weiner, Creativity and Beyond*, (State University of New York Press, 2000), p. 90.
18. *Cf. Ibid.*, p. 112. "The deepest things of life are known only through intuitive apprehension".
19. *Ibid.*, p. 169. *Cf. also Radhakrishnan, Eastern religions and Western Thought* (Oxford University Press, Third impression, 1977), p. 63, where he states that "the intuitive consciousness is not to be confused with the instinctive. It is not a flight to unreason or a glorification of ignorance and obscurity. It assumes the indivisible oneness of human life, whose apprehensions cannot be contrary to reason."
20. *Cf. R̥gveda, Viṣṇusūkta m.*, "Tad Viṣṇo parama m̐pada m̐ sadā pas'yanti sūraya h̐, diviva cakṣurātata m̐."

INTRODUCING NORMATIVE MARXISM

HAROON RASHID

Marxism, from its very emergence, raises enormous controversies which results to different trends like Classical Marxism, Western Marxism, Neo-Marxism, Analytical Marxism, Normative Marxism etc. This paper is an attempt to introduce Normative Marxism as the most recent trend in Marxist thought. I have attempted to show that Normative Marxism is formulated by Jon Elster, one of the leading figures of Analytical Marxism.¹ In his *Making Sense of Marx*² Elster analyses the issue of whether and in what sense it is still possible to be a Marxist. He introduces a new style in Marxist studies by propounding the view that Marx's ideas can only make sense if it is understood from a normative perspective, i.e., one can be a Marxist today from a normative perspective.

Elster's *Making Sense of Marx* is a comprehensive work on Normative Marxism. In this work he claims that Marx's condemnation of capitalism in terms of exploitation and alienation (two main flaws of capitalism) as well as his conception of communism entertain the normative principles of justice and good life. Although it is not possible today, morally or intellectually, to be a Marxist in the traditional sense, Elster believes that it is still possible to be a Marxist in a rather different sense of the term. In his words:

I find that most of the views that I hold to be true and important, I can trace back to Marx. This includes methodology, substantive theories, and above all values. The critique of exploitation and alienation remains central. A better society would be one that allowed all human beings to do what only human beings can do — to create, to invent, to imagine other worlds.³

This is the conclusion of Elster's *Making Sense of Marx*. It suggests that Marx's theories of exploitation and alienation are still living in the sense that exploitation is unjust and alienation prevents the worker from perceiving the injustice of exploitation.⁴ Since exploitation is wrong, it is condemnable and it ought to be

abolished . Since alienation is the lack of self-realization and turns human beings into inhuman conditions, it is condemnable and it ought to be overcome. Thus, exploitation and alienation can provide us with normative grounds to make good life and good society. This is the central view Elster holds in his *Making Sense of Marx*.

Elster's position as a normative Marxist becomes clear when he deals with the question — whether and in what sense one can be a Marxist today. Regarding this question he has a well-rehearsed answer where he claims to be a Marxist in different sense :

If, by a Marxist, you mean someone who holds all the beliefs that Marx himself thought were his most important ideas, including scientific socialism, the labour theory of value, the theory of the falling rate of profit, the unity of theory and practice in revolutionary struggle, and the utopian vision of a transparent communist society unconstrained by scarcity, then I am certainly not a Marxist. But if, by a Marxist, you mean someone who can trace the ancestry of his most important beliefs back to Marx, then I am indeed a Marxist. For me this includes, notably, the dialectical method, and the theory of alienation, exploitation, and class struggle, in a suitably revised and generalized form.⁵

This passage suggests that Elster rejects the traditional Marxist view which claims a scientific basis (of society) and instead provides Marxism with a normative foundation. Thus he claims to be a Marxist in this normative sense. As he declares 'the identity and survival of Marxism is linked, however, to its normative foundation'.⁶

Elster's view is supported by Peffer. According to Peffer, although Marx never develops the philosophical basis for a full-fledged moral theory; he exhibits a moral perspective throughout his writings. He develops this view from the historical approach. The development of Marx's moral views is traced from his earlier (1841-1847) to mature works (1847-1883). Peffer tries to discover Marx's implicit moral views and traces their development:

...although Marx does not have a fully developed philosophical theory about morality, he does have a normative moral perspective, in which there is a

fundamental continuity, at least from the formation of his original systematic views in 1844 throughout his later works. This moral perspective is based on three primary moral values : freedom (as self-determination), human community, and self-realization, as well as on some sort of principle demanding an egalitarian distribution of these goods — or at least the good of freedom.⁷

Although Marx is not a moral philosopher and makes no attempt to construct a systematic moral theory, says Peffer, it is clear from the early stages of the development of his thought that he has moral views, and these are most fundamentally based on the concept of intrinsic human dignity or worth rather than on the satisfaction of human desires. He cites from Marx:

The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the supreme being for man. It ends, therefore, with the categorical imperative to overthrow all those conditions in which man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being — conditions which can hardly be better described than in the exclamation of a Frenchman on the occasion of a proposed tax upon dogs: “Wretched dogs ! They want to treat you like men !”⁸

These remarks, according to Peffer, suggest that Marx has normative moral views which appear throughout the rest of his works.

According to Nielsen, Elster’s work forces us to ask-whether and in what sense, it is still possible to be a Marxist in the late twentieth century? In fact, this is the central question in Elster’s *Making Sense of Marx* in which he seeks to provide a normative foundation. But, Nielsen asks, is there anything left of the canonical core of Marxism in Elster’s reading. How much, if anything, is left of the canonical core? Can an economic theorist accept the labour theory of value as a central element in the science of economics? Can a philosopher who knows anything at all say that the only proper logic is dialectical? Is historical materialism the correct theory of epochal social changes? Is there a proletariat who can achieve self-emancipation and usher in a classless society through class struggle? Is socialist revolution a live option in the advanced capitalist countries ? If not, can socialism be exported over time from the Third World periphery to the industrial center?⁹

Nielsen is right in saying that Elster looks hard at these questions and answers them in a way that undermines Marxist orthodoxy. He argues that nothing is left out from the canonical core of Marxism, what is left is Marx's critique of exploitation and alienation and a moral vision of a better society — where all human beings can create, invent and imagine other worlds.

According to Wood,¹⁰ it is still possible to be a Marxist in the late twentieth century, but not in the normative sense for which Elster is arguing. He supports Classical Marxist position by saying that “capitalist oppression is just as real as today as it was a century ago; but its forms have changed, as have the social sciences whose task it is to understand them.”¹¹

Wood says that Elster's *Making sense of Marx* is a forthright and formidable attempt to address questions like — Is it still possible to be a Marxist in the late twentieth century? How far is the thought of Karl Marx still relevant either to interpreting the world or to changing it? But, he argues, Elster's book attempts nothing but to decide in what sense it is still possible to be a Marxist, which of Marx's views must be given up and which should be retained. Wood claims that “Elster's reading of Marx is extremely well-informed, but it is refreshingly irrelevant: indeed, I think its commonest fault is that it is occasionally unsympathetic to Marx, to the point of distorting his views in the way that professionally anti-Marxist writers have customarily done.”¹²

Elster finds a normative theory of communism (a society which overcomes exploitation and alienation) in Marx's thought. He says that although there is no full theory about communist justice, it is understandable or plausible what is unjust about capitalism. Capitalism is unjust because it rests on exploitation. Since some individuals lack access to means of production, they are forced to sell their labour power to capital owners. But, argues Elster, exploitation in this sense is not a fundamental moral concept, it can only serve as a guide to moral assessment. In contemporary capitalist societies workers and employees are unjustly and unnecessarily exploited by owners and top managers.

The concept of justice has become an interesting as well as burning issue in the Marxist tradition during the last decade. It raises the controversy of whether Marx himself condemns capitalism as unjust. More specifically, whether Marx condemns capitalism in the light of any principle of justice, i.e. whether there is

some such normative dimension in Marx's thought. Whatever may be the controversy, the common point of agreement is that Marx condemns capitalist exploitation. As Norman Geras says : "All parties to this dispute agree that he did, agree in other words that there is some such normative dimension to his thought , and frankly, I do not think the denial of it worth taking seriously any longer."¹³

The theoretical background of this controversy is the general lines of Marx's account of capitalist exploitation. There are two places of it in the wage relation. The first is seen in the circulation, where there is an exchange of equivalent values. The second is observed in the sphere of production, where the workers will have to work longer than the time which is necessary to reproduce the value of the wage they have received.

According to Geras, there is nothing inherently reformist or idealist in the critique of capitalism by appeal to ethical norms or ideals like justice. Moral criticism and argument are in no way incompatible with the materialist analysis of the real historical tendencies towards revolution. In conjunction with this analysis and with the actual movement and the struggles of the workers against capitalism, a normative critique is perfectly in place and the denial of this is just a form of economism. Geras shares Elster's view in maintaining that Marx's theory of ideology is perfectly encompassing every sort of normative concept. In his view, when Marx condemns capitalism for its unfreedom, oppression and coercion, he in essence condemns it for its injustice. Marx identifies principles of justice that are internal to and functional for the capitalist mode of production .

Marx, as we know, is not a moral philosopher. He is quite impatient and dismissive of avert theoretical reflection about normative questions. He is hostile (not neutral), towards the explicit elaboration of socialist ethical theory. At the same time, he makes moral judgements . Normative view points lie upon his writings in an unsystematic form. In Marx's attitude towards normative questions there remains a problem of inconsistency or paradox. Disowning any attachment to ideals or values, he is nevertheless quite free in making critical normative judgements. Marx disowns and derides the ideals of justice and rights. On the other hand, he invokes and affirms the ideals of freedom, self-realization, and community. But the ideals of freedom or of self-actualization (as opposed to the ideals of justice) are no ideals to realize, just the immanent movement.

Marx's impatience with the language of norms and values is said to be global in range. Despite, Geras says, he plainly condemns capitalism — for its oppressions and also for its injustices. Marx's own ethical commitments retains the values of freedom, self-development, human well-being and happiness, i.e., the ideal of a just society in which these things are decently distributed. The largest paradox is that Marx 'displayed a greater commitment to the creation of a just society than many more overtly interested in analysis of what justice is.'¹⁴

Elster believes that it is still possible to be a Marxist today by accepting Marxist normative elements. Among Marxist normative elements, justice does not hold first place. But it is apparently important, he holds, to claim that Marx condemns both exploitation and alienation as injustices to the workers. However, Wood argues, unfortunately for Elster there is no text in which Marx does this. He finds quite a few in which Marx criticizes those who condemn capitalism as unjust, and bluntly asserts that capitalism is not unjust at all. Wood contends that there is no question that Marx attributes to the workers the view that the exploitation of labour by capital is unjust. The question is whether Marx agrees with this opinion. Elster answers this question affirmatively in a tone of confidence, i.e., Marx believes capitalism to be unjust.

In "Reply to Comments" on his *Making Sense of Marx*, Elster persists that he has a strong feeling that the Marxist wood remains even when every single tree has been chopped down.¹⁵ In his view, Marx's contribution should be seen in a broader perspective. Marx's normative views are sufficiently important to justify the effort. In the real world workers are by and large exploited by capitalists, and this is unjust.

Marxist conception of human nature, according to Elster, contains normative commitments. Marx derives the conception of good life from the analysis of human nature, which belongs to the Aristotelian tradition of moral philosophy. In Marx's view, good life for man would be realized in communism, in which 'creation' and 'community' are two key words. That is, the essence of man is to create for the sake of others, to externalize one's creative powers in the service of humanity. In Elster's view, Marx never waveres in his commitment to the ideal of communism and his firm belief that it would inevitably come about. Marx's theory of human nature rests on the assumption that what is desirable is also possible and his

philosophy of history on the idea that what is desirable and possible is inevitable.

Marx's idea of good life suggests a theory of the good society in which man should everywhere see himself in a world of his own creation. It presupposes that society is organised rationally so that the various activities of men do not interfere with each other and with nature in destructive way. Marx's commitment for such a society, in Elster's sense, is normative.

Elster tries to reconstruct Marx's view of good life through a normative assessment of needs and capacities. For Marx, human nature can be described and evaluated in terms of needs and capacities. The development of humanity takes place by an interaction between needs and capacities. Elster observes that the concept of human needs is fundamental in Marx's theory of human nature. In Marx's view, good society is one in which people are rich in needs and in the satisfaction of needs. Communism, in that sense, is a good society. Capitalism cannot be a good society because here people have few needs and because their needs are not satisfied.

Elster's view of Marx's normative commitments is supplemented by Little.¹⁶ According to Little, Marx's statements about morality suggests deep-running normative commitments in his thought. Marx's condemnation of capitalism seems to require some form of rational justification. That is, Marx's system needs rational justification in moral judgment. Thus Little argues for a conception of moral judgment in Marx's system.¹⁷ Since Marx does not have a normative theory, his condemnation of capitalism and his assessment of human nature need a theory of rational moral judgment. This is sufficient to provide a framework for Marx's normative commitments.

Marx's system, argues Little, embodies moral judgements from beginning to end in the form of a critique of capitalism. These moral judgements are supported by his theory of human nature. In consequence Marx is committed to the possibility of objectivity in moral judgements. His normative view is more clearly contained in his early writings, in the theory of alienation and species-being. He works out a strong conception of man's nature and his place within society, and a simple conception of communism. This theory of human nature constitutes the basis of his critique of capitalism. These normative ideas, Little argues, underlie his scientific writings as well. *Capital* may be understood (in part at least) as

Marx's effort to provide the empirical theory of society which supports this normative vision. Little is right in arguing that Marx's theory of human nature and his critique of capitalism contain normative ideas. But I do not think that these normative ideas underlie Marx's scientific writings. Whatever normative ideas are contained in Marx's writings can be understood in the light of his scientific vision of society.

Marx's normative ideas derive from his philosophy of man, or his theory of man's fundamental good. Man's good is realized when he is in a position to develop fully and freely through creative activity. Marx argues that full human development can only occur within appropriate social relations. By human development he means free creative development of each and every individual in concrete social relations. Marx defines man as a social relations, as a species being (creative being), and holds that his fundamental good is contained in his species-being. Man is a species-being not only because he practically and theoretically makes the species, but also because he looks upon himself as an active living being, as a universal and free being. Marx finds this species-being in man's productive activity, in his material production.

According to Little, Marx provide normative evaluation of social institutions. Human beings have a nature which they ought to realize, and the social institutions which subvert this human nature are bad institutions. Human beings should be able to regard themselves as free. Marx's conception of man's good therefore leads to a theory of good society in which man is enabled to realize his fundamental good. Communism is a good society in which freedom and full human development are the fundamental values. Both Marx's critique of capitalism and his positive conception of communism rest upon these values. Capitalism is condemned because it rests upon the destruction of human freedom, at least for the great majority of humanity. Communism is desirable because it provides the cooperative social relationships within which genuine freedom is possible. These views constitute a developed theory of human nature, which represents a moral basis of social criticism. Marx plainly regards these judgements as meaningful and rationally defensible. From this it follows that he needs a moral epistemology which allows for rational argument concerning normative issues.

It is not controversial that Marx's early writings have value commitments. But his later writings raise controversy among some authors. For example, Althusser¹⁸ argues that Marx's later thought detaches itself from his early value commitments and is purely descriptive and scientific. However, Little argues that this interpretation is mistaken; normative critique is inseparable from the analytical theory contained in *Capital* :

It is reasonable to interpret *Capital* as Marx's effort to provide an empirical explanation of the alienating character of capitalism, and thereby to vindicate the philosophical theory of alienation.¹⁹

This view suggests that *Capital* possess both analytical and normative characteristics. Throughout *Capital* Marx stresses the dominating character of capitalist relations. In his view, capitalism is inconsistent with genuine human freedom, because it necessarily represents the domination of one class by another. Freedom and full human development remain the fundamental values in Marx's thought, i.e., he is committed to the value of human freedom and self-realization. This commitment has to do with the conditions of good life. The conception of good life for man, Little argues, implies a moral theory in Marx. In this regard he supports Elster's view. Like Elster, he claims that Marx's criticism of capitalism are moral. Capitalism is condemnable because it blocks individuals from actualizing their human nature, because it stunts and dwarfs their development.

This view is also shared by Peffer . According to him, Marx's concept of alienation is evaluative in nature. It becomes clear when Marx considers alienation as a defect of capitalism. He describes the moral content of the various forms of alienation in the *Manuscripts*. The moral grounds upon which he condemns these forms of alienation can be reduced to three primary moral principles. These principles are freedom, human community, and self realization.²⁰ On Marx's view, one is alienated when one's essential human capacities are blocked or thwarted. Capitalism (the system of private property and profit), accordingly, alienates human beings because it thwarts the fulfillment of essential human capacities (or potentialities) like health and happiness. This view represents an evaluative character. It proposes that it is good for human individuals to be whole and to flourish. Consequently, it is good for human beings to be allowed to develop what

Marx alternately calls “social”, “communal”, “universal”, or “species” consciousness and to indulge in free, creative activity. In other words, it is good that people would be allowed to realize their essential human capacities.

Although Marx’s theory of alienation and the associated values of freedom, human community, and self-realization make up his entire moral theory, it does not provide an adequate moral theory. Nevertheless, communism is to be preferred to capitalism precisely because it allows for the realization of essential human capacities, whereas capitalism does not. Peffer argues that Marx and Marxists need theories of social justice insofar as they are concerned to claim that communism is morally preferable to capitalism. Justice demands that we attempt to advance the interests of the proletariat and other oppressed classes. However, Peffer does not claim to provide a comprehensive moral theory in Marx. He offers only the outlines of an adequate Marxist moral and social theory, whose moral component is a theory of social justice, not a full-fledged theory of morality. Although the theory of social justice seeks to justify the concept of justice (as a kind of virtue), it does not mean that such a theory is a complete moral theory. This theory is important in treating basic social institutions, in explaining the nature of social inequalities and capitalist exploitation. Such a theory is important in the normative sense. That is, there requires a social revolution which demands that all forms of inequalities and exploitation be eliminated. It is normative in the sense that all forms of inequalities and exploitation can be eliminated by changing social institutions.

Marx seeks to justify proletarian revolution as a means to communism, a society free from inequalities and exploitation. Not only he justifies the rationality of revolution but also claims for the inevitability of revolution. In Elster’s view, an attempt to achieve the goal by means of a violent proletarian revolution will be self-defeating. The revolutionary bid for power can succeed only under conditions of backwardness that will also prevent the flowering of the productive forces that Marx poses as a condition for communism. Elster analyses Marx’s thought from the normative perspective which emphasizes on the flowering of the productive forces (self-realization through creative work) rather than on proletarian revolution.

According to Elster, Marx never produces a theory of revolution. Marx’s charges against capitalism allow the idea of revolutionary motivation among the

workers, that can provide the requisite will to change. First, Marx's treatment of alienation works as a motivation for revolution. His vision of communism represents a way of life totally different from capitalism. The way of life as active creation over one-sided passive consumption provides the workers with revolutionary motivation. Secondly, Elster considers the motivational force of justice. Whether or not Marx offers a theory of justice, he may have believed that it can provide a lever for action. Though the textual evidence is ambiguous, some of it strongly supports the idea that the recognition of a state as unjust provides the knell to its doom. The political, social and economical history of the last few centuries makes good sense when understood in this perspective. Justice could provide not only a motivation for the workers, but also the fact of demoralization among the rulers. Elster's idea of revolutionary motivation is shared by Peffer. According to Peffer, Marx holds the normative position that proletarians should support the movement to overthrow capitalism and establish communism. However, this view is controversial. It is controversial as to whether normative position make sense of Marx's own idea of revolution. Marx himself claims that his idea of revolution is scientific, not normative. For him, social revolution is inevitable because of the very system of capitalism. Capitalism itself creates the conditions of revolution by creating a conscious revolutionary proletariat class. It is therefore, controversial as to whether proletarians are morally motivated to engage in revolutionary action to overthrow capitalism, or whether the crisis of capitalism naturally leads to a revolutionary situation.

Notes and References

1. Analytical Marxism is the recent development of Marxist thought. Initially it attempts to use analytical tools of philosophy and social science to defend central Marxist positions. It is best exemplified in G.A. Cohen's *Karl Marx's Theory of History : A Defense*. Cohen's book is a defense of Marx's historical materialism. Elster's *Making Sense of Marx* is an example of analytical Marxism. It is a critical examination of Marx's social theories and their philosophical foundations. While Cohen's work is a defense of Marxism, Elster's work is hardly a defense of the canonical core of Marxism, although he is sympathetic to Marxist thought.
2. Jon Elster, *Making Sense of Marx*, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press), 1985.

3. *ibid.*, p. 531.
4. Marx's critique of capitalism, according to Elster, suggests that alienation prevents the worker from perceiving the injustice of exploitation. This captures both the normative view that exploitation is unjust and explanatory claim about the appearance of justice. Here Elster retains the normative view (that exploitation is unjust) as meaningful and this view is central throughout his writings.
5. Elster, *An Introduction to Karl Marx*, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press), 1986, p.4.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
7. R.G. Peffer, *Marxism, Morality and Social Justice*, (Princeton : Princeton University Press), 1990, Int. pp.4-5. Between Marx's early works (primarily philosophical) and his later works (primarily empirical) lie a group of transitional works (1844-1847), such as, *The Holy Family* (1844-1845) and the "Theses on Feuerbach" (1845). Each of the works is less philosophical and more scientific than its predecessor and constitute a polemic against young Hegelians, Feuerbach and classical German Idealistic philosophy.
8. *Ibid.*, p.46. Quoted from Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, p.52.
9. Nielsen, *Marxism and the Moral Point of View*, (Boulder & London : Westview Press), 1989, Intr, pp. 19-20.
10. Allen W.Wood, "Historical Materialism and Functional Explanation", *Inquiry* 29, 1986.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 12. Nielsen supports Wood's position by saying that Wood is justified in claiming that the commonest fault of *Making Sense of Marx* is that it is unsympathetic to Marx. (*Marxism and the Moral Point of View*, Intr. p. 20).
13. Norman Geras, "The controversy about Marx and Justice", in *Marxist Theory*, Alex Callinicos (ed.), (Oxford : Oxford University Press), 1989, p. 211.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 266-267.
15. Elster, "Reply to Comments", *Inquiry* 29, 1986, p. 66.
16. Daniel Little, "Rationality, Ideology, and Morality in Marx's Social Theory", *Social Praxis*, Vol. 8/3-4, 1981.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
18. Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, Eng. Trans, Ben Brewster, (New York : Vintage Books), 1970.
19. Little, "Rationality, Ideology and Morality", p. 76.
20. Peffer, *Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice*, p. 51.

LIBERALISM : TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING
THE VALUE OF FREEDOM

SATRUGHNA BEHERA

Liberalism begins from the idea that all human beings are by nature free and equal. The liberal tradition proclaims that human beings are free in the primary sense that no man or law can legitimately govern them unless they choose to be governed. And human beings are equal in the sense that, as beings endowed with the power to reason, they share this fundamental freedom or in the language of a very important strand in the liberal tradition right to choose the authority under which they will live. At first, the liberal tradition understands freedom in political terms as to be legitimate, government must be authorized or consented to or made by the governed. Later it requires that custom, tradition and religion must submit as well to reason's authority. Eventually, it acclaims that reason itself be seen as a matter of choice, a human invention that each individual should be free to choose to take or leave as he/she pleases. But the liberal premise of natural freedom and equality seems to generate a sort of self-devouring skepticism that consumes very claim to authority that comes before it, including ultimately its own. Thus liberalism's fundamental premise paves the way for the post-modern spirit, fatalistic vision of a world in which freedom is an illusion. For our very humanity is socially constructed, and in its utopian fantasy our humanity is socially constructed, and in its utopian fantasy our humanity is socially constructed we as human beings are free to remake and refine ourselves from the ground up. With these preliminary remarks, this paper is an attempt to highlight certain liberal ideas having ethical import and, importantly the notion of freedom in the thinking of three makers of modern liberalism : Hobbes, Kant and Mill. Hobbes stands at the beginning of the social contract strand in liberalism. Kant represents the culmination of the nationalist and idealist dimension . And Mill exemplifies the progressive and utilitarian side of liberalism. In each case, freedom as the thinker makes out it renders vulnerable the virtue on which freedom is understood to depend.

I

Thomas Hobbes belongs to the liberal tradition because he grounds his science of politics on the profession that all men are by nature free and equal¹. But what is the nature of this freedom? What is the content of this equality? The freedom that Hobbes says belongs to a man by nature is in a sense infinite, but outside of the constraints of political life, this natural freedom is of a very limited utility. The content of our equality in Hobbes's science of politics is nothing to boast about either .

By nature every human being has a right to all things according to Hobbes². Every human being has a right to all things because no outside authority or external good stands over us. No God issues authoritative commands. No immutable and eternal principles of right and wrong govern our conduct³. No qualities in man command unconditional respect. The primacy of individual right reflects the absence of a primary duty or obligation. Right comes first in Hobbes's system. Duty is at best derivative, and properly speaking is better understood as the interest one has in honoring the principles that secure peace and order for oneself and all others as well.

By itself, in what Hobbes called the state of nature, one's primary right to all things does not get one very far, because in a world in which we each have right to all things, nothing we have by right is very secure. You can take from me with perfect right what I have previously picked or gathered or made. And I can do the same to you. The sense in which we are free coincides with the sense in which we are equal. We are equal in as much as we share the right to all things. We are also equal in the sense that we are more or less vulnerable to the vagaries of misfortune and the deliberate injuries inflicted by malice. Our essential situation is thrown into sharp relief in the state of nature, a condition outside of government, for there it becomes clear that the weakest has power enough to snuff out the life of the strongest.

Under these circumstances, it is reasonable for everybody to give up some natural freedom to form a political society⁵. In exchange for the infinite, but inherently precarious freedom of the state of nature, one gets a more limited, but vastly more secure liberty under law. True to say that Hobbes endows the sovereign with enormous power to secure the peace. But it is of critical importance

that Hobbes justifies this enormous transfer of power in terms of individual freedom. According to Hobbes, subjects must obey even the laws they dislike because each subject has authorized all that the sovereign commands. In this way, Hobbes derives duty from right, and makes political society a crucial expression of human freedom.

To see that Hobbes defines freedom and equality in terms that are entirely secular and non moral. On this point he is both emphatic and obscure, managing to leave little doubt about his actual position while giving ideologues of various stripes ample opportunity to make of Hobbes's thought what they wish. In fact, though, Hobbes says explicitly at the beginning of *Leviathan* and again at the end that the world is matter in motion and nothing more⁶. Hobbes declares that good and evil are merely apparent names for appetites and aversions⁷. And he proclaims that there is no greatest good or utmost aim, no salvation, no perfection⁸. Freedom and equality must be understood in non-moral terms because there is no room for morality in Hobbes's universe.

These perfectly plain pronouncements may seem to be contradicted by what Hobbes says about the laws of nature. After all, are not the laws of nature "immutable and eternal" and hence morally obligatory everywhere and always? Actually, no, at least not in the ordinary sense of moral and not in the ordinary sense of obligation. One of the reasons that the laws of nature are properly speaking neither moral nor obligatory is that though "immutable and eternal" they are properly speaking not really laws, as Hobbes explains: "These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the names of laws, but improperly: for they are but conclusions, or theoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves"⁹. According to Hobbes the laws of nature are purely instrumental. They tell self-seeking creatures how to get along in political society, and that getting along in political society is better than going at it alone outside of political-society. But buffeted by competition, diffidence, and glory, self-seeking human beings often fail to conduct themselves in the manner that reason prescribes for the furtherance of their self-interest. For this reason, the laws of nature also denote the qualities of mind and character that enable individuals to control their passions, and act in accordance with the rules of prudence reason discovers for enabling self-interested individuals to live together. Hobbes calls these qualities of

mind and character, which include justice, equity, gratitude, modesty, and which can be summed in the principle do not do that to others what you would not have others do to you, moral virtues¹⁰. They are rightly called virtues in as much as they require cultivation and their exercise serves a particular function, namely securing peace.

The Aristotelian tradition, against which Hobbes was rebelling, had room for the understanding of virtue in instrumental terms, or as ordered toward lower ends despite Hobbes's view to the contrary¹¹. But in the Aristotelian tradition, virtue in the full sense is an excellence of the soul that was in itself a reason for action. For Aristotle, the highest virtues, the virtues of the human soul, were their own reward. For Aquinas, virtue was bound up with duty. For Hobbes it is neither. It is a technique of self-preservation. It is not inherently attractive. It is not the perfection of our nature. Its only claim on us is that it serves our interests by rendering more secure the conditions which make our freedom useful. Virtue so understood is vulnerable because the passions, which speak with immediacy and great persuasiveness, constantly proclaim that justice, equity, gratitude, and other moral virtues conflict with our interests and arbitrarily limit our freedom.

II

In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*¹², Immanuel Kant argues that morality should be understood in terms of reason and freedom. We are capable of freedom because of our reason. Reason is also the source of our dignity. We escape enslavement to the laws of cause and effect to which we are subject because we are embodied creatures, by grasping the claims upon us of the moral law and acting out of respect for it. Kant understands freedom in terms of autonomy or giving to oneself the moral law¹³. Everything in nature obeys laws including human beings. But human beings are capable of becoming law makers, of acting in accordance with a law we give to ourselves. The law giving that makes men and women free, according to Kant, is confined to the moral sphere. The moral law is universal, objective, and necessary. We each achieve freedom in the same manner, by giving to ourselves, or recognizing and respecting the authority over us of, the moral law.

Just as submitting to the coercive laws in Hobbes's theory requires virtue,

so, too, virtue is required, according to Kant, to act out of respect for the moral law. Virtue is necessary because dependence on authority is easier than depending on one's own reason, as Kant argues in "What is Enlightenment?" :

"Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity." Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore : *Sapere Aude !* Have courage to use your own understanding !

Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why such a large proportion of men, even when nature has long emancipated them from alien guidance (*naturaliter maiorennes*), nevertheless gladly remain immature for life. For the same reasons, it is all too easy for others to set themselves up as their guardians. It is so convenient to be immature ! If I have a book to have understanding in place of me, and so on, I need not make any efforts at all. I need not think, so long as I can pay : others will soon enough take the tiresome job over for me. The guardians who have kindly taken upon themselves the work of supervision will soon see to it that by far the largest part of mankind (including the entire fair sex) should consider the step forward to maturity not only as difficult but also as highly dangerous. Having first infatuated their domesticated animals, and carefully prevented the docile creatures from daring to take a single step without the leading-strings to which they are tied, they next show them the danger which threatens them if they try to walk eventually after a few falls. But an example of this kind is intimidating, and usually frightens them off from further attempts"¹⁴.

It is explicit from the above passage that Kant is right in suggesting courage and resolution are virtues central to that exercise of reason which frees one from dependence on teachers, parents, and government authority. But the courageous and resolute pursuit of enlightenment also poses a threat to freedom. First, although teachers, parents, experts and government retain legitimate and perhaps indispensable claims to guide us, Kant's conception of autonomous reason breeds a disrespect for all authority as authority. Second, reason itself represents a kind of authority. As such, it is obligated to turn its bright light on its own claims to govern. The courage and resoluteness that enable the enlightened Kantian individual

to question all authorities also impels him to question the authority of reason. He is no longer cowardly but insolent, no longer lazy but heedless, and his emergence from self-incurred immaturity encourages him to wonder whether obedience to universal, objective, and necessary laws is really freedom after all or rather a new form of enslavement, a new kind of immaturity, a new kind of superstition. Thus does the Kantian search for enlightenment, unrestrained by the virtue of practical wisdom, or the spirit of delicacy and judgement, threaten to turn moral freedom into willfulness and anarchy? This question, in fact, invites further discussion on the concept of freedom within the present conditions of human dignity and existence.

III

In his greatest work *On Liberty*¹⁵, John Stuart Mill thinks less systematically about freedom than Hobbes and Kant. Yet *On Liberty* does advance a dominant understanding of freedom. It is the understanding of freedom as self-development. Preceding the text of *On Liberty* in *Sphere and Duties of Government* Wilhelm Von Humboldt says that “the grand, leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in these pages directly covers, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity”. Two features of the modern world, according to Mill, threaten to squelch self-development. The first, as old as democracy, is tyranny of the majority through government. The second is a tyranny of the majority through society.

To overcome both kinds of tyranny it is necessary, Mill effectively asserts, to regard : “One very simple principle ... that the sole and for which mankind are warranted , individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of the number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physic or moral, is not a sufficient warrant ...over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign”¹⁶. The vexing political problem becomes how to organise a nation of individuals, all of whom are encouraged by the public philosophy of the day to regard themselves, in a vital sense, as sovereign. It is a moral problem as well.

Mill believes that the “permanent interests of man as a progressive being”¹⁷ requires the cultivation of virtues : self-control, critical rationality, imagination,

empathy and courage. He also envisages a range of institutional supports for the virtues on which freedom understood a self-development depends. These includes energetic parental involvement in children's education, likely associational life, and to the extent possible in modern democracies, active political engagement¹⁸. But more is needed to combat the forces of conformism unleashed in modern democracies. It would be necessary for example, to find ways to encourage eccentric genius and new experiments in living. Mill's models as of Socrates, Jesus and the emperor Marcus Aurelius are at the same time models of human excellence¹⁹. What Mill does not court upon is that eccentricity is a neutral and formal concept, that the encouragement of new experiments in living is more likely than not to undermine respect for those habits, customs, sentiments, and institutions that are the preconditions for success in new experiments in living. In other words, what Mill does not take account of in *On Liberty* is the extent to which the permanent interests of man as a progressive being, including the interest of the individual in self-development, are also menaced by the exaltation of self-development at the expense of discipline and duty.

IV

Contemporary commentators and critics are by no means immune to the tendency within liberalism to enlarge the scope of liberal principles in a way that endangers them. For example, Michael Sandel argues that the liberal public philosophy of the day is responsible both for "the fear that, individually and collectively, we are losing control of the forces that govern our lives ...(and) the sense that, from family to neighbourhood to nation, the moral fabric of community is unraveling around us"²⁰. Liberalism has much to answer for, since "these two fears — for the loss of self-government and the erosion of community — together define the anxiety of the age"²¹.

Sandel virtuously belongs to the group of the radicalizers of liberalism. As a replacement for liberalism Sandel contemplates a new politics that secures a "higher pluralism" and which is organised to respect the lives of "multiply-encumbered selves" who are "storytelling beings"²². Yet what is this "higher pluralism of persons and communities who appreciate and affirm the distinctive goods their different lives express?"²³ Is it not a summons to radicalize liberal

neutrality? After all, liberal neutrality is the requirement of equal respect regardless of our differences. But Sandel's "higher pluralism" demands that we esteem each other precisely for our specific beliefs and practices. Whereas liberal toleration requires that we tolerate many beliefs and practices that we dislike, Sandel's "higher pluralism" asks us to esteem, absent the guidance of principle, most every belief and practice. However, in refusing to make distinctions, in requiring citizens to affirm distinctive goods without distinctions, this "higher pluralism" issues in the very relativism that Sandel accuses liberalism of secretly sanctioning.

And what are these 'multiply-encumbered selves' who learn to appreciate "the sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting obligations that claim us, and to live with the tension to which multiple loyalties give rise", if not selves that can step back from evaluate, and, through the stories they construct, rank and recognize their ends and duties as they choose²⁴. As such are they not more like the unencumbered self, the naturally free individual that Sandel finds an inadequate basis for justice, than the encumbered selves whose duties are given and not freely chosen and whom he purports to wish to save from liberalism's non-neutral neutrality? Sandel's republican alternative to liberalism appears to culminate in a dubious and disguised radicalization of the liberal autonomy he seeks to overcome.

To conclude, liberalism as a philosophy of freedom depends for its vitality on the capacity of individuals to think for themselves and to draw on moral and intellectual resources from other traditions. If it is to win the battle against its illiberal tendencies, contemporary liberalism must cease to flatter itself and demonise its opponents. It must put aside its self-righteous certainty of its own virtue and come to grips with its characteristic vices. It must learn again a lesson it once taught clearly, that discipline, tradition and self-restraint are not anti-theses but preconditions of freedom. It may discover that freedom cannot be fully separated from duty, and that a purely mercenary virtue cannot attain even the intermediate and lesser ends it seeks. The reasonable hope is that better knowledge of liberalism's limits will render freedom under contemporary liberalism's rule more secure.

Notes and References

1. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (Indianapolis : Hackett, 1994).
2. *Ibid.*, Chapt. 13.
3. This may seem to be contradicted by Hobbes's assertion that the laws of nature are eternal and immutable. See *Leviathan*, Chapt. 15, p.99. But these are maxims about what conduces to self-preservation.
4. *Ibid.*, p.99.
5. *Ibid.*, Chapt. 14.
6. *Ibid.*, Introduction, p3 and chapt. 46, p. 459.
7. *Ibid.*, Chapt.6.
8. *Ibid.*, Chapt. 11.
9. *Ibid.*, Chapt. 15, p. 100.
10. *Ibid.*, Chapt. 15, p. 100.
11. *Ibid.*, Chapt. 6 & 46.
12. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).
13. *Ibid.*, Chapt. III, pp. 97-99.
14. See "An Answer to the Question : What is Enlightenment?" in *Kant's Political Writings*, Hans Reiss (Ed.), (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 54.
15. J.S. Mill, *On Liberty, in Essays on Politics and Society*, J.M. Robson (ed.), (Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1977).
16. *Ibid.*, Chapt. 1, pp. 223-224.
17. *Ibid.*, Chapt. 1, p. 224.
18. *Ibid.*, Chapt. 5.
19. *Ibid.*, Chapt. 2.
20. Michael Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1996), p.3.
21. *Ibid.*
22. These ideas of "multiply-encumbered selves", "higher pluralism", "Storytelling beings", etc. are discussed in detail in Sandel's *Democracy's Discontent*, pp. 116-119, 350-351.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 350.

VARṆA AND JĀTI : A REVIEW

BIJAYANANDA KAR

It goes without saying that *varṇa vyāvasthā* is found to have been inbuilt in the Hindu framework since time immemorial . It has the established scriptural authority. The classification of man into four *varṇas*, i.e. *Brāhmaṇa*, *Kṣatriya*, *vaiśya* and *Sūdra* is traced in the Vedas. It is stated that the *Brāhmaṇa* are created out of mouth, the *Kṣatriyas* from hand, the *vaiśyas* from thigh and the *Sūdras* are from foot of Brahman (*R̥g Veda*, *Puruṣa sūkta* 12). There is also well known reference about the four *varṇas* in the *Bhagavad - Gītā* (iv- 13). In addition to these references, there are number of instances found in the epics, *Smṛtis*, *Purāṇas* and *Nibandhas* which speak about *varṇa - vyāvasthā* .

Both the admirers and the critics of Hinduism have taken note of such references and have utilised those for their own purpose of either justifying the *catur - varṇa - vyāvasthā* (the four-fold order) on the basis of scriptural authority or criticising the same on the ground of giving rise to unwarranted social discord which is held to be irrational and immoral too. According to this point of view, if some traditionally sanctioned order or custom is socially found to be dangerous in the sense of boosting up hostility and tension among men at large, then obviously such *vyāvasthā* has to be given up, to whatever extent it might otherwise be respected as holy and sacred. The advocates' rejoinder that *varṇa - vyāvasthā* has been introduced not by men of the past, but by Lord Himself (*māyā sṛṣṭā*) does not at all become rationally convincing. And, consequently, Hinduism is subjected to severe criticism both by the other religionists and also by the neutralists towards any religion whatsoever.

In certain quarters, it is advanced that *varṇa - vyāvasthā* is the original formulation out of which the subsequent derivation is *jāti - vyāvasthā* . It is held that *jāti* is related with the birth of the individual in a particular caste. Since the

four *varṇas* are viewed as different on qualitative ground, i.e. *Brāhmaṇa* is the highest and *Sūdra* is the lowest in grade, caste-rigidity which is seen in the Hindu framework since centuries past is the natural outcome of the original four-fold order. By convention, *Sūdras* are treated with humiliation conspicuously. They are prohibited from reading of the *Vedas* and the *Gītā*. Even in *Rāmāyaṇa*, it is noticed that Rāma had to order the death-punishment to S'ambhuka because of his secretly learning the *Vedas*. As a matter of fact, at certain stage at least, the women were also prohibited from reading the *Vedas*. Though *Upanayana* (wearing of the sacred thread) is permissible to *Kṣatriyas* and *Vais'yas*, in addition to the *Brāhmaṇas*, *Sūdras* are debarred from it. As per *Yajur Veda*, *Upanayana* is made at the ages of 8/12, 10/16 and 14/24 for *Brāhmaṇas*, *Kṣatriyas* and *Vais'yas* respectively.

All these references reveal that there is the presence of discrimination between different castes and particularly it is most conspicuous so far as *Sūdras* are concerned. Thus the very description *Sūdras* as dalits or down-troddens does not seem to be unfounded as far as the social practice (that is mostly prevailed) is taken into consideration. This point has led the critics to assert that Hinduism, in its essential nature, lacks social justice. And, also it cannot be defended either as exhibiting the higher and refined sense of religious consciousness or as advocating a noble ethical sense at the social level. It seems to be lacking morality both at individual and also at the social level. *Jāti* or *varṇa vyāvasthā* is, therefore, regarded as most rigid, dogmatic and fanatic in its basic approach.

Of course, this sort of critical remark never goes unresponded. The defenders have tried to overcome the criticism by offering different interpretation of *varṇa vyāvasthā* and carefully trying to delink the concept of *varṇa* from *jāti*. To them, *varṇa* does not mean *jāti*. *Varṇa* stands for a broad classification of human being in terms of four-fold order on the basis of quality and action (*guṇa* and *Karma*). It is a classification based on person's ability, aptitude and efficiency which are exhibited in his various dealings with fellow-men and the socio-environmental surrounding in general. Thus *varṇa* has nothing to do with birth. It does not suggest that there is something intrinsic or innate in an individual by means of which he is born in a higher *varṇa* or in a lower *varṇa* to which he himself cannot change or modify but has to compromise with that pre-determined situa-

tion. He, of course, can better his lot by following the tracts of morality in speech, thought and action. And the effects of such noble thoughts and deeds would surely be concretised in future. At certain stage, it is found to have been conceded that a *Sūdra* by birth can be upgraded to the status of *Dvija* (literally it means twice-born, i.e. applicable to the other three *varṇas*). So, it is argued that the four-fold classification, found in the scriptures has nothing to do with caste-distinction. Neither is it based on racial nor on religious discrimination. Instances from both *s'ruti* and *smṛti* are cited in this regard as to how *Ajāmidha*, *Vis'vāmitra*, *Jābāla* etc. were accepted and revered as *Brāhmīns*, even if they were supposed to have been of *Sūdra* origin. In the epics and also in the *Purāṇas*, there are several cases about inter-caste marriages and family friendship. Again, it is argued in certain circle that *varṇa vyāvasthā*, as found in the scriptures, need not necessarily imply that there are higher and lower classes. For the total welfare of human being each and every part is important and necessary. So also, in the social sector, each *varga* or class is equally indispensable and, as such, no one is higher and no one is lower. The four-fold division of man in society need not be construed as having any dharmic or religious testimony in the sense that any alteration of that division would cause sin. It is a broad-based classification introduced on the basis of certain rational norm and principle. The changing over from one class to other is not disallowed; rather it is quite flexible. It is argued that in the *Gītā* (II-31), *Kṛṣṇa*'s suggestion to Arjuna that he was to fight because as *Kṣatriya* it was considered as his duty (*dharma*) to fight, is not to be taken as a serious argument. It is held that neither *kṛṣṇa* was serious about the point nor Arjuna was moved by the suggestion. And, also it is found that some of the noted warriors in the battle-field of *kurukṣetra* were not *Kṣatriya* (e.g., *Droṇa* and *Asvathāmā*). That is why, Arjuna was not convinced by that move advanced by *kṛṣṇa*. And, so also, *kṛṣṇa* was not insistent on this move later on. He clearly indicated that the ultimate court of appeal in any crucial state - of-affair is to take resort to the relevant reason ("*buddhau saraṇam anviccha*" II-49). Even the saying of *kṛṣṇa* "Abandon all dharmas and seek refuge in me alone" (*sarva dharmān parityajya māmekam saraṇam vraja*, XVIII-66) has been viewed differently by the interpreters, keeping in tune with the rationalistic approach. There has been attempt to vindicate this important point by way of

hinting that symbolically “seek refuge in me alone” actually refers to take resort to rational conscience (*buddhi viveka*) (cf. pt. Nilakantha Das’s commentary on *Gītā*).

But from the critic’s point of view, it is advanced that the *Gītā* clearly leans upon absolute surrender to the almighty Lord out of sheer faith and reverence and thus there is no room for reason. And, in that way, it is thought that the four - fold order of classification of man has been formulated by the theistic Lord Kṛṣṇa Himself and, as such, it is inviolable. In the theistic framework, God’s decision and course of action cannot be rationally discussed and debated. It thus remains purely unquestionable. Accordingly, *varṇa - vyavasthā* has a religious dimension or not, there is another important angle, i.e. its social significance. It is precisely in the social background, there is the advocacy of four-fold classification of man. In that context, obviously, the issue is raised as to how far such classification is morally binding. Does the four-fold scheme become a booster or an obstacle for the smooth flow of social morality ? As already hinted, attempt has been made to delink *varṇa* from *jāti*. It is held that *varṇa* by itself does not encourage the caste rigidity. The classification in terms of *varṇa* is based on some definite norm and principle. But, conceding to the distinction between *varṇa* and *jāti*, it can be noted that somehow or other valuational gradation between the upper and lower *varṇa* (i.e., *ucca* and *nicca*) persists and the *Sūdras* are placed in the lower ebb so far as the S’āstric references are taken into account. The very illustration that is cited about Vis’vāmitra etc. reveals that generally the *Sūdras* are looked down, but those rarely talented individuals are acknowledged to be great only after they are found to be exceptionally brilliant in their thought and action. That means, their brilliance is not due to their being classified as *Sūdra* or anything else; but on account of their exhibiting their excellence on the basis of their individual ability and efficiency. Being born as *Sūdra*, one is in the lower category and is taken to be inferior to the dvijas. The concession that he can go up by means of ably practising good conduct both in thought and action does not put *Sūdra* and other vargas on equal footing. It is because of this, some hold that the introduction of *jāti* among men in society is largely due to that suggestion lying implicit in the *varṇa - vyavasthā* itself. The rigid convention of

caste-discrimination which is found to be deeply rooted in the Hindu social framework is argued to be grossly immoral and unreasonable . Hence, this customary tradition is not viewed as decorative but as polluting the Hindu view of life.

Even if one concedes that the *varṇa - vyavasthā* , as originally conceived in the Hindu dharmic sources, is for noble cause and is meant to safeguard the objective of social justice, it is painfully observed that at the subsequent stage there has been wide spread of caste-discrimination in different walks of life, resulting therein grave social injustice. At the practical front, there has been full assimilation between *varṇa* and *jāti* to a considerable extent. Consequently the socio-moral foundation has been deeply affected.

Dars'ana or Indian philosophy is set perennially to probe into the practical problems, faced in life-situation. It cannot remain opaque to the issues which threaten the very ideal of Hindu dharma that is to safeguard the well-being of all (*sarve bhavantu sukhinah*) irrespective of any artificial and unreasonable distinction. As belonging to philosophic community, we have a role to play here and we cannot shirk our responsibility in this regard .

TOWARDS A SEARCH FOR HUMAN UNITY

BHASWATI BHATTACHARYA (CHAKRABORTI)

The problem of 'human unity' has been considered from different perspectives, religious, cultural and political. Religious leaders who are worried about the problem often think of a religious unity of mankind; sociologists being anxious over the problem of human unity talk of a cultural unity; politicians, when they feel tired of political whirlwind speak of a political unity of all human beings. If, however, we look back at the past, we find that the problem of human unity is not at all an altogether new problem and since from the Greek age till the modern period a number of European philosophers have considered this problem from a philosophical standpoint. The present paper is a humble attempt to analyze the notion of human unity from the view-point of some of these thinkers.

By 'human unity' is not meant obviously the physical unity, viz., the unity of existence of individuals belonging to different groups with different habits as well as different language and genes. It means the 'unity' of essence—the essence by which each individual is called a human being in spite of their innumerable differences. And the main point of concern is : how can this 'unity' be achieved ? For a man is not perfect by nature and each and every individual mind is full of many deficiencies. So by which process is it possible to unite all these individual minds thus to develop a 'group mind'? An analysis of the long history of Greco-Christian thought shows that this goal can be achieved through perfection since man is perfectible though he is not perfect by nature. According to the Greeks, individual perfection leads ultimately to social perfection and thus human unity can be made possible by a full exercise of rationality, a characteristic which distinguishes a human being from other animals. The rationality of a man becomes manifest in his speculative activity. So a man devoted to speculative activity most fully realizes the nature of man since 'the intellect more than anything else is the man'. And a man can live a speculative life only in so far as he can live like Gods. This type of perfection might be described as metaphysical perfection. And those who think

that an individual can achieve such sort of metaphysical perfection believe also that a perfect individual can have union with the one. It is to be noted that by 'perfection' Aristotle and the early Stoics meant this sort of metaphysical perfection only. It has been emphasized by Aristotle that to perfect oneself is to achieve a specific end. And there must be such an end for man as such which is called by him, 'Eudemonia' or happiness. This good can be attained only by an exercise of man's speculative activity. By 'speculative activity', however, Aristotle meant contemplation and not theorizing. Activity, according to him, does not imply actually doing anything; there is an activity of immobility also like that of thought. Now though in Aristotle we first find the idea of the perfectibility of human being yet he mentioned nothing about social perfection and human unity. It was in fact the early Stoics who started to think of a single society throughout the world and it were they who tried to show how individual perfection leads to social perfection. It is highly surprising to find out that Stoicism was in its early stage a doctrine which had revolutionary import, a movement towards perfection in human individual. The early Stoics thought of themselves as members of a single society which is united by its conformity to reason. Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism (336b.c. - 265 b.c.) himself wrote a *Politica* (Republic) in which we find an emphasis on Universality. Zeno's 'Republic' was a 'world-state' which would govern all men without any distinction. It was supposed to be a completion of the ideal state which Alexander had failed to complete because of his untimely death. It revealed a world-wide state, whose citizens were not of any particular country but of the universe. It was patterned not after local traditions but after universal nature; it had no laws since there was no crime, no class system and no hatred; love was the master of this 'world-state'. Zeno's 'Republic' contained nothing corresponding to the Platonic classes; all its members had an equal responsibility of being fully rational. Merely in virtue of his perfect rationality, a stoic was a member of such an ideal state, a community of Sages as much as, for Plato, a philosopher governed his life by the law of the ideal republic.

From 16th Century A.D., onwards, however, the outlook of the philosophers regarding the perfectibility of man had begun to change. From this period, we can observe two characteristics in their attitude. Firstly, emphasis has been given on moral perfection and not on metaphysical perfection; and secondly, it has been

held from 16th Century A.D that perfecting of the 'whole' of mankind-rather than the perfection of the individual ought to be the objective . Pietro Pomponazzi (16th Century A.D) in his book 'On the Immortality of the Soul' did not deny that in so far as men can become god-like this can only be through the cultivation of their speculative reason. What he did deny is that men can properly be described as 'perfect' only in so far as they are wholly devoted to the contemplative life. To be a philosopher-king or a Stoic sage, to make oneself worthy of eternal happiness, to achieve union with the one are regarded as too ambitious objectives. It has been pointed out by Pomponazzi that all men should develop the practical intellect to its full perfection. By 'practical intellect' is meant that intellect by which one is capable of making or moral or political decisions. And perfection has been identified by Pomponazzi with moral or 'practical perfection'. 'As to the practical intellect', he wrote, 'which is proper to man, every man should possess it perfectly ... For the whole would be most perfectly preserved if all men were righteous and good, but not if all were philosophers or smiths or builders.' By the 'whole' is meant 'mankind' or human race'. What is novel in his approach is the emphasis given by him on the perfecting of the 'whole' - of mankind - rather than the perfecting of the individual. The individual is to be perfected only as part of the perfection of mankind. And if mankind as a whole is to be perfected then the ideal of perfection has to be set at a level which men can hope to achieve. To be god-like should not be the ambition of man.

"The bliss of man is not to think or act beyond mankind."

[Alexander Pope : 'Essay on Man' : Epistle 1 lines 189-90]

A human being should recognize the fact that he is neither god nor beast and, therefore, he should remain satisfied with the perfection proper to him. All men can and ought to be of good character and this should be the objective of all human beings. Gradually bringing happiness to the fellow-beings has become the ideal of perfection. Perfection has been identified henceforth with disinterested benevolence and usefulness to others. This ideal of perfection suggests that men can be brought gradually and to an unlimited degree to care for their fellow-men and thus it is possible for all human beings to be united.

Now the question is : How this perfecting is to be brought about ? It has been pointed out by John Locke and thinkers like David Hartley (1279 A.D.) that

all men can be perfected morally by education . Locke has argued, first, that there is nothing in an individual to prevent him from being morally improved. Secondly, there are secular processes like the process of Education, by which the moral improvement of their fellow-men can be brought about. Thirdly, it is possible for the secular reformers to perfect people by manipulating pleasure and pain, viz., the pleasure of reputation and pain of blame. We get a fully developed form of Locke-based perfectibilism in Hartley.

“If beings of the same nature but whose affections and passions are, at present, in different proportions to each other, be exposed for an indefinite time to the same impressions and associations, all their particular differences will, at last, be overruled, and they will become perfectly similar, in a finite time, by a proper adjustment of the impressions and associations”.

[David Hartley : Observations on Man : Pt. 1. Chap. 1. 2 Prop. xiv, Car.6, in the 5th Ed. Vol. 1, pp. 85-5]

Association tends to make us all ultimately similar. Thus given only that association is in good hands, human or supernatural, the operations of association can, and will, make all men happy. ‘If one is happy, all must.’

It might be objected, however, that it is an absurd idea that by moral education all men can be perfected and, ultimately, a ‘group mind’ can be developed. For it is one thing to admit that by education human situation regarding knowledge or aesthetic achievement can be improved and it is quite another thing to admit that mankind as a whole can be perfected-not only in respect of some particular field but universally . So how can it be that only by education men could be perfected in such a way that once ‘a time must come when the common parent of mankind will cause wars to cease to the ends of the earth, when men shall beat their swords into ploughshares’? The mere fact of human inventiveness rather shows that it is very difficult to retain an optimistic attitude regarding human unity.

Now, if education is found to be ineffective in practice to develop a ‘world-state’ or ‘group-mind’, then, is there no other process to perfect all human beings and thus to achieve ‘human unity’ as desired ? It is to be emphasized here that this sort of human unity which ensues from moral perfection can be attained through an exercise of our rational will. This is not an impossible task for us

though to practice it, one must admit, is highly difficult. And perhaps this can be done within a consistent Kantian framework. To explain. According to Kant, pure reason has two aspects viz., theoretical and practical. As concerning knowledge the a priori principles of reason e.g., substance and attribute, cause and effect etc. are valid only within the world of phenomena. This world of phenomena is a purely mechanical system. But in order to understand fully the phenomenal world; the pure theoretical reason must postulate certain ideas (viz., the ideas of the immortality of soul, freedom and of God) the objects of which transcend sense-experience. These ideas are not theoretically valid but their validity is practically established by pure practical reason. This pure practical reason does not yield speculative truth, but prescribes its principles dogmatically in the form of imperatives to the will. The will is itself practical reason, and thus it imposes its imperatives to the will. And our sense of duty springs from this rational will. It is morally necessary that we should believe otherwise would weaken our moral efforts. The perfectibility of society is a 'regulative idea' which must govern our conduct. On Kant's view, human beings as individual must content themselves with the reflection that mankind, although not themselves as individuals, will be perfected as a result of their efforts. For it is their moral duty to content themselves. According to Kant, perfection implies much more than mere conformity to law. To be perfect means not only to do right things but to act out of respect for moral law. A man must not do what is right or must not be benevolent to his fellow-men out of his own interest but he must do it from a sense of duty. If thus the rational will of a man determines his action then the end of an action will be nothing but humanity itself. An individual should use by no means the humanity of his own or any other fellow-being for any interest other than promoting of humanity itself. And if the development of humanity itself becomes the objective of the rational will of each and every man then in this way it is possible ultimately to form a 'Kingdom of Ends'. The 'Kingdom of Ends' has been explained by him as 'the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws'. It has been emphasized that in this kingdom such a community will be constituted by different rational beings in which the humanity of every other member will be realized and honoured. The 'Kingdom of Ends' is, to some extent, analogues to the kingdom of nature. By the 'Kingdom of Nature;' is meant the whole system of natural beings

forming a unity in virtue of the laws of mutual action and reactions. The 'Kingdom of Ends' is like a 'Kingdom of Nature' in respect of being a unity, and a unity constituted by the presence of moral laws. But the latter is different from the former to the extent that its members are not things but persons and that its laws are not like those of the former uniformities of sequence but imperatives enjoining mutual consideration and respect. And in such an ideal realm men would behave as if they are individuals having a single mind and thus a 'group mind' could be developed. The realization of this unity and interconnectedness of all the human beings would become manifest in reverence for life, compassion and in a sense of universal brotherhood and thus there would prevail perpetual peace internally and externally.

But is it not a Utopian idea? Is it at all possible to form such a society as conceived by Kant? The answer would be that though Kant was not so optimistic to fancy that such a kingdom is an ideal which could easily be realized yet he was not pessimistic enough to believe that this is a dream unrealizable forever. According to him, perpetual peace as the goal of humanity is an ideal not merely as a speculative Utopian idea or a day-dream but as a moral principle which ought to be, and therefore, can be realized by all beings who want to proclaim themselves to be rational. If perpetual peace is a duty it must be necessarily deduced from the Categorical Imperative, viz., 'Act according to that maxim which can at the same time be regarded as a universal law.' And to Kant it is a duty. This end of humanity is the evolution of man from the stage of mere self-satisfied animalism to a high state of civilization. Nature has given man reason and freedom of will and she has determined that with the help of these powers and without the aid of instinct man shall win for himself a complete development of his capacity and natural endowments. The natural capacities of human beings reach full development only in the race and not in the individual.

"Justice will reign, not only in this state, but in the whole human race when perpetual peace exists between the nations of the world. But external perpetual peace presupposes internal peace-civil, social, economic, religious. If men become perfect, how can there be war? And Kant demands to a certain extent, the moral regeneration of man".

[Perpetual Peace : Immanuel Kant : Translated by M. Campbell Smith : Translator's Introduction.]

As it is hoped by the illustrious sage of Konigsberg the ultimate result of man's moral regeneration will surely be the development of a 'group mind'.

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GOD IN SPINOZA AND BRAHMAN IN VEDĀNTA

BHUPENDRA CHANDRA DAS

Benedict Spinoza was born on November 24th, 1632 at Amsetrdum. 'Ethics' is the most important work among all the writings of Spinoza. In this book five topics have been dealt with in five parts serially, such as, (i) Concerning God (ii) Concerning the nature and origin of the mind (iii) Concerning the origin And nature of the emotions (iv) On Human Servitude, or the Strength of the Emotions (v) Concerning the power of the intellect or Human Freedom. In this paper, an attempt has been made to explicate the nature of God after Spinoza and that of Brahman after the Vedānta, mainly the Advaita Vedānta and to compare between them.

I

Spinoza's entire metaphysics may be said to be the explanation of the idea of God or Substance. Spinoza defines substance as "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, that the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formal."¹ "It is the ultimate self-dependent Being-the primordial source and stuff of all that is real and in a sense, the all-inclusive Reality itself. So there cannot be a plurality of substances but there can be only one such being. Plurality is possible only in the case of things externally produced. But as substance is not produced by any external cause, there is only one Substance in Reality."²

Spinoza identifies this one Substance with God and God³ with Nature.⁴ So the expressions God, Nature and Substance rather mean the same thing. Spinoza uses one term or another according to its appropriateness in a particular context. Leon Roth says, "Three primary problems of thought are those of origin, structure and stuff. When Spinoza is thinking of the first, he would seem to use the word 'God', when of the second, 'Nature', and when of the third 'Substance'. They are all one and the same, although from different points of view."⁵

Mode is defined as the affections of Substance, or that which is another

thing through which also it is conceived.⁶ Substance and mode are contrasted concepts and they mutually help to clarify the meanings of each other. Substance is in itself, mode is in another. This 'another', on which modes depend and without which they can neither be nor be conceived, is primarily Substance itself.

Substance is not a 'thing' or (logical) 'subject', nor are modes, qualities or predicates. Modes are carved out of a Substance, so to speak. They are constituted out of the stuff of Substance. They are Substance itself made manifest.

Spinoza holds that Substance is essentially active. It is not a static 'thing' but a dynamic being. It is not an inert mass subsisting at the bottom of change, but a powerful essence as well as essential power. It is essentially creative. Agency is inherent in its very nature. In its essence, it is power⁷ that exists only as acting.

The infinity of substance follows from its definition. It is 'in itself', i.e., not dependent for its essence or existence on any external cause. What is 'finite' is necessarily subject to whatever extent, to external causality.

The infinity of substance and its oneness or uniqueness are essentially related themes. Plurality is possible only in the case of the finite. Hence plurality is utterly impossible in respect of Substance.

Along with its demonstration and a corollary, in Ethics, I, prop. 14, Spinoza is concerned with proving that "There is only one Substance in Nature". The proof is based upon the identification of Substance with God, the absolutely infinite Being. Since God is absolutely infinite, all positive essence, i.e., all the attributes must belong to him. For if any attribute were outside His nature, He would not be absolutely infinite. So it can be concluded that there is only one Substance and that it is God.⁸

In Ethics, I, Prop. 10, Spinoza says that God as the absolutely infinite Being is conceived as consisting necessarily of infinite attributes, each one of them expressing an eternal and infinite essence.⁹

To Spinoza, God has 'numerical' unity but admits of internal plurality.

Substance or God is absolutely indivisible. For if it were divisible, it could not be simple and indivisibility follows from its infinity.¹⁰

II

Now we shall present some points on the nature of Brahman according to the Vedānta. Truth etc. are the essential characteristics (svarūpa lakṣaṇa) of Brahman, because this is borne out of such S'ruti texts as, "Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinitude".¹¹ and "He knew that Bliss was Brahman."¹² Essential characteristics (svarūpa lakṣaṇa) consist in the very nature (svarūpa) of a thing.¹³ In other words, Brahman may be characterised as Self-evident Being,¹⁴ Universal Being¹⁵ and Pure Being.¹⁶ Here Self-evident Being implies the epistemological independence of Brahman, Universal Being indicates its non-duality and Pure Being emphasises its relation to the world of difference or phenomenon or its unrelatedness. These characteristics are derived from the definition of reality as *trikālābādhita sat* which is never cancelled. It (*T. sat*) is, according to Spinoza, necessarily existent or eternal or self-existent.

The difference between the Advaita definition and Spinoza's definition is that the former is not an a *priori* definition but Spinoza's definition is supposed to be an a *priori* definition. The former is the very implication of our judgement of reality and falsity and is therefore based on experience. It is common experience that what is cancelled is taken as false. But a real thing cannot be cancelled. The waking consciousness cancels dream-world as false. The knowledge of the rope cancels the appearance of the snake. Hence, what is cancelled is unreal and the real must be beyond cancellation. The merit of this definition is that it does not impose upon us the arbitrary idea of the real before it is known. It encourages us to seek that which is not cancelled. The definition is necessarily negative because Brahman cannot be comprehended through our empirical categories, it can be characterised only negatively. Thus there is the superiority of the Advaita definition.

Ordinarily we may suppose that the empirical world is never cancelled and so it is real. But actually it is not so. *Trikālābādhita* means that the real is by its very nature such that it cannot be cancelled or be conceived as cancelled in any time past, present and future; it has no reference to time whatsoever. The empirical truths are found to be nowhere in dream,¹⁷ they are cancelled. In deep sleep, the empirical world disappears. So we cannot say that the empirical world is not cancelled, though we find its apparent continuity. Is there anything which is never cancelled? It is the self or *ātman* which is never cancelled. In deep sleep, we

suppose that even the self is cancelled. But the Advaita philosophers demand that the self does not mean the ego or the *antahkarana* and in deep sleep, only the ego disappears but not the self. The real nature of the self is that of pure consciousness which is not limited by all *upādhis*, endless, pure, bliss, never affected by the presence or absence of objects, one, nondual and indifferent.¹⁸ Self is self-evident (*svayam prakāśa*). Self shines by its own light (*svayam jyotiḥ*) and it can never be cancelled. We can prove logically that the *trikātabādhitā sat* or the self must be at once self evident, pure, universal being and necessary existent.

III

Spinoza is basically correct in his conception of Substance as Pure Being. Nevertheless his position is not strong because of two reasons.

- 1) He makes only positive assertions about substance. But he does not complete the view with the negative function of showing the inherent unintelligibility of the concept of difference.
- 2) He is unable to point to any real experience of Pure Being, i.e., he does not identify his Substance with the self. For this reason, his philosophy seems to be merely a speculative work. These two points have been greatly emphasised in the Vedānta. The Vedānta establishes, by a dialectical analysis, that the logic of pure identity alone is consistent and holds also that this identity is truly experienced and it is not merely an abstraction of the mind.

There is some kind of similarity between God advocated by Spinoza and Brahman advocated by the Advaita Vedāntins. Both of them have parallel view in some respects. Like Spinoza, Advaitins also point out that Brahman is one, infinite and indivisible and they hold that this Brahman, reflected in or conditioned by *Māyā* (cosmic illusion) is called God (*Is'vara*). It is found that there is another type of similarity between God of Spinoza and That of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta of Rāmānuja. Spinoza holds that God has 'numerical unity' but admits of internal plurality. Rāmānuja, on the other hand, advocates that God is one and that the plurality of individual self are within God.

Spinoza advocates that God or Substance is essentially *active*. But Vedāntic Brahman is not essentially *active*, for it is a Pure Being i.e., Brahman is essentially

Nirguna, *Nirdharmaka*. Characteristics are of two kinds - essential and secondary. We have stated above regarding essential characteristics (*svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*) of Brahman. Actually truth, knowledge and infinitude are Brahman, but they are assumed to be its characteristics or attributes. A secondary characteristic (*taṭasthalakṣaṇa*) is that which, though not lasting as long as the thing possessing it, yet differentiates it from other things. For example, the possession of smell is a secondary characteristic of earth, for there is no smell in atoms of earth at the dissolution of the universe. With regard to Brahman, Its being the cause of birth, maintenance and dissolution of the universe is a secondary characteristic of It. Here the word 'universe' means the sum total of effects and causality is agency. For the creation of the world Brahman is reflected in *Māyā* and such type of Brahman has the secondary characteristic (*taṭasthalakṣaṇa*). Hence, though Brahman, being essentially *Nirguna*, is not essentially *active*, *Saguna* Brahman having secondary characteristic (*taṭasthalakṣaṇa*) becomes *active* for the creation of this world. But the nature of Brahman or pure being is not affected by the secondary characteristic of It.

Therefore, it can be pointed out that Brahman must be understood to be self-evident, Pure Being. Pure unity alone is real. But people imagine that something devoid of all differences will be only a blank or zero because of their empirical habits of thought.¹⁹ They imagine that differences alone give content or take them near to reality. But the fact is that differences, if anything, only negate the infinite or prevent it from being experienced. Critics of Spinoza pointed out that Pure Being is as good as nothing and hence, cannot produce the phenomenal world. This question refers to the causality of Substance.

Notes and References

1. Spinoza's *Ethics*, I, Def. 3 (Henceforth, *Ethics*)
2. *Ethics*, I, Prop. 8, Scholium 2.
3. *Ethics*, I, Prop. 14.
4. *Ethics*, IV, Preface.
5. Leon Roth : Spinoza, p. 61.
6. *Ethics*, I, Def. 5.

7. Ethics, I, Prop. 34.
8. Spinoza-Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-being, I, Chap.2.
9. The First Dialogue of Part I of the Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-being by Spinoza.
10. Ethics, Propositions of 12 and 13 of part I.
11. Tai. II.I
12. Tai. III. 6
13. Swāmi Mādhavānanda - Vedānta - Paribhāṣā of Dharmrāja Adhvarīndra, Advaita Aṣhrama, Calcutta - 14, P.152.
14. Svaya m - prakāś'a or svataḥsidha or svaya mijyotiḥ.
15. Mahā - sāmānya .
16. Nirguṇa, abheda, nirdharmaka.
17. Māndūkyakārikā , II, 7, saprayojanatā tesā m svapne vipratipadyate.
18. "Tathāhi samastop caitanyaikarasa dāsīnamekamadvitīyamātmatattva m s'rutism ṛtītiḥāsa purā nesugīyate - Edited and translated by S'ri S'rimohan Bha t t āchārya - *Bhāmati* of Vacaspati Misra, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 38, Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta - 6, P. 17.
19. S'a n kara - Chāndogya Up. VII, i, Introduction. hiparamārtha sad advayam brahma mandabuddhinam asadiva pratibhāti

TWO APPROACHES IN WESTERN AND INDIAN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

AMIT KUMAR SEN

The mode of philosophizing known as 'analytic philosophy', has been fashionable in the Anglo-American world for many decades. Started by G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, it has been exercised by prominent philosophers like Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Nelson Goodman, Austin and Strawson. The programme of analytic philosophy is to resolve philosophical puzzles by clarifying the language generating those puzzle. And this can be done in two ways, namely (i) by directing our attention to ordinary language (this I shall call Strawsonian approach) and (ii) by constructing an ideal or artificial language in which the puzzle does not arise (this I shall call Russellian approach). Due to this difference in approach Russell and Strawson had involved in an exciting debate popularly known as Russell - Strawson controversy. In this paper I shall throw some light on this controversy in section I and find a parallel of this controversy in Indian philosophy in section II.

Section - 1

One of the important issues of Russell-Strawson controversy is : How to handle a sentence with non-denoting terms in the subject position ? Or in other words what would be the truth-value of a sentence , the subject-term of which is empty or non-denoting ? According to Russell the truth-value of a sentence with non-denoting terms in the subject position is false. But Strawson's answer is that it is neither true nor false but pointless. Before going into the detail of the difference of answers given by Russell and Strawson I like to note the point where Russell and Strawson are not in controversy, namely regarding the meaningfulness of the sentence with non-denoting subject term. Both Russell and Strawson share a common assumption that if a term is a genuine constituent of a sentence then the sentence as a whole is meaningful only when each such component term of it is meaningful i.e. has a referent. Hence if a sentence with a

non-referring subject term is to consider as meaningful or significant, one must either (i) provide a denotation in cases in which it is prima facie absent or (ii) deny that such empty terms are genuine constituents of the sentence. The former alternative is adopted by Strawson; the latter, by Russell. Thus both Russell and Strawson agree that the sentence 'The present King of France is bald' (S) is significant but of course for different reasons.

Now Russell in 'On Denoting' (Mind 1905) argued that the sentence S which appears puzzling because its subject term lacks a referent, can nevertheless be shown to be false by unpacking its actual logical form. Upon analysis, he argued, S turns out to be a conjunction of three sentences, namely (i) there is at least one King of France now, (ii) there is at most one King of France now and (iii) whoever is a King of France now is bald. Since the first conjunct, (i), is false, the whole conjunction is false, and thus S must be false. Here the puzzle disappears because none of the three conjuncts has the puzzling form of S itself i.e., none of the three conjuncts has an empty subject term.

Here Russell faces a problem when he is asked to ascribe truth value to the sentence 'the present King of France is not bald'. The problem is: if the sentence 'the present King of France is bald' is false, its denial, 'the present King of France is not bald' must be true. But in Russell's analysis this latter sentence must also be false because it also turns out to be a conjunction of three sentences, namely (i) there is at least one King of France now, (ii) there is at most one King of France now and (iii) whoever is a King of France now is not bald. Since the first conjunct, (i), is false, the whole conjunction is false, and thus the sentence 'the present King of France is not bald' must be false. But it is counter intuitive because the two sentences, 'the present King of France is bald' and 'the present King of France is not bald' cannot be false together. Here Russell introduces his notion of scope distinction of negation to solve the problem by denying that 'the present King of France is not bald' and 'it is not the case that the present King of France is bald' are equivalent. He argues in *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (1919) that all propositions in which 'the King of France' has a primary occurrence are false; the denial of such propositions are true, but in them 'the King of France' has a secondary occurrence. Thus both 'the present King of France is bald' and 'the present King of France is not bald' are false because

in both cases 'the King of France' has primary occurrence.

Russell's theory purports to tell us the 'real meaning' of the puzzling sentences. But Strawson's position is that we want to know, not what the meaning of S is, but what should be said about the uses it might be put to. Strawson's idea is that a characteristic use of a sentence in an act of asserting presupposes the success of another act - referring - which we perform in order to go on to assert. That is, in order to assert that a predicate applies to the subject of a sentence we must first refer to the subject. If the subject term lacks a referent this presupposed act of referring fails, and consequently, the attempt to assert cannot succeed. This is the case with the presumed use of S as an attempt at asserting. Since there is no king of France now, the attempt to assert now that the present King of France has any predicate - e.g., is bald - is neither true nor false, because the presupposed act of referring fails.

The issues between Russell and Strawson are not, as one may suppose, merely a cunning move in a game played by the two philosophers who have no other purpose but to win. The stakes are as large as the theory of knowledge itself, for which side one chooses ought to reflect one's beliefs about the status of the external world and our ability to come to know its nature. Broadly speaking there are four views about the world and our knowledge of it that I like to distinguish. First, there is Realism, understood here as the view that there is a world external to our thinking and that in this world there are things which have characteristics independently of our conceptualizing them, but whose characteristics are ultimately and approximately knowable by us through the use of perceptual and conceptual methods. Second, we have Idealism, which denies the very existence of such an external world. Third, there is Relativism, which allows like realism that there is an external world but unlike realism denies that the things in it have any characteristics in themselves. The Relativist holds that in the world there are at least bare particulars, whose apparent clothing is entirely contributed by our mind. Finally, there is Scepticism, which holds that although the things in the external world have characteristics we can never know what those characteristics are. In my opinion among these views about the world and our knowledge of it, Russell's theory fits best with Realism, while Strawson's theory fits best with Relativism.

A sophisticated realism thinks of our corporate scientific search for the ultimate nature of things as carried out through a series of conceptual schemes, a series which will ultimately issue in a scheme which tells us the actual characteristics of independent reality. The assumption is that these characteristics are discoverable. Thus a realist is interested in reality and judges an assertion as true or false according to whether it accurately reflects the nature of things or not. Russell's Theory of Descriptions is a method of turning a problematic assertion into a conjunction of some sentences each of which can be interpreted as a description of a possible state of affairs in the real world. His suggestion is that if any of the conjuncts fails to describe an actual state of affairs we should judge the conjunction as false on that account.

On the other hand, Strawson's theory allows truth value gaps among assertions. This has the effect of relativizing truth and falsity so that their ascription turns on how our present conceptual scheme is, not on how ultimate reality is. According to Strawson an assertion is not to be viewed like a realist like Russell as a description of a possible state of affairs but rather as an act of attributing a property to the subject whose actuality is presupposed. But what is the nature of the presupposition? Is it that, e.g., the present King of France must actually exist? I think not, for if it were, we should in general never be able to know that an assertion has a truth-value without already knowing the nature of reality. Rather, what is presupposed is that our present conceptual scheme considers the present King of France to be an actual existent. Since in fact it does not, an assertion expressed by 'the present King of France is bald' is neither true nor false but pointless. If in fact we did think that there was a King of France now, such an assertion would have a truth value. In this way truth and falsity of a sentence come to depend on what we think now and not on how things are.

Section - II

The aforesaid controversy finds a parallel in the controversy between the Nyāya and the Buddhist schools of thought. In Nyāya and Buddhism we find that philosophers were puzzled by the fact that there are meaningful and grammatically acceptable expressions in language which purport to refer to or to denote some entity or entities but which actually do not refer to anything in the

world of experience. In Indian Philosophy also it is considered somewhat paradoxical to say that we refer to non-existent entities by such expressions as 'the rabbit's horn', 'the sky-flower' or 'the son of a barren woman'. All that we have here is a class of meaningful expressions, which share the same substantival structure in common and possess the grammatical property of a proper name in the sense that they can be successfully used in the context where a proper name might have been used. These expressions are called 'vacuous' or 'empty' terms. In Indian Philosophy like Russell-Strawson controversy, a controversy between Nyaya and Buddhism regarding the status of a sentence with empty subject term arises.

Udayana claims (*Ātmatattvaviveka* p. 59-89) that the subject term of a sentence must refer to something actual or real and a sentence whose subject term does not refer to anything stands in need of some philosophic paraphrasing. A sentence is a representation of some cognitive state. A cognitive state i.e., a judgemental one, usually attributes a property to a subject or qualificand. And this attributable property can be called a qualifier. Now, a cognitive judgement fails if it lacks a subject to which it can attribute some property. Hence, a sentence which apparently has a non-referring expression as its grammatical subject undergoes a philosophical paraphrasing in the Nyāya system so that it can properly represent some judgemental cognitive state. A judgemental cognitive state may be erroneous where the representing sentence will be regarded as false. If a cognitive judgement is right, the corresponding sentence will be true. Thus, knowledge and error are the epistemic counterparts of the truth and falsity of the sentences that express corresponding cognitive states. Proceeding along this line, the Nyāya realism tried to show that a sentence with a non-referring expression as its subject should be traced back to some kind of erroneous cognitive state and should be explained accordingly. In other words, according to Nyāya these sentences are demonstrably false. We have seen that Russell tried to analyse such sentences in much the same way. He shows that these sentences can be paraphrased into such logical forms as will make them false. Now, if according to the Nyāya, the sentence 'A rabbit's horn is sharp' (A) is false, what would be the truth value of the sentence 'A rabbit's horn is not sharp' (B)? Like Russell the Nyayikas say that the sentence (B) is also false. The Nyāya resolves (A) as follows : (1) something is characterized by hornness and (2) it is

characterized by the property of belonging to a rabbit and (3) it is also characterized by sharpness. Of these three constituents, if (1) is true, (2) cannot be true, and vice versa, and (3) can be true or not true according to whether the subject (whatever it is) is sharp or not. But in no case will the conjunction be true. Again the Nyāya resolves sentence (B) as follows : (1) something is characterized by hornness and (2) it is characterized by the property of belonging to a rabbit and (3') it is also characterized by the absence of sharpness. The sentence (B) will be equally not true (a-prama) like the sentence (A) because both (1) and (2) cannot be factually true together. (3') will be true or false according to whether its supposed contradictory (3) is false or true. Thus, the law of contradiction is not violated because (B) as a whole, is not strictly the contradictory of (A) (when both of them are thus analysed). The relation of contradiction may hold between (3) and (3'). Russell has declared that a sentence of type (B) is ambiguous. He introduces as I have noted earlier, the notion of primary and secondary occurrences of descriptions to explain this ambiguity (*Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*).

On the other hand, Vacaspati Misra (Nyāya - Vārttika - Tātparyā Tīkā, p-172-73) admits Udayana's view that the subject term of a sentence must refer to something actual but remarks that we can neither affirm nor deny anything of the non-referring terms like the rabbit's horn. If we attribute some property (positive or negative) to the non-referring entity we will have no way of deciding whether they are true or false, for it will never be possible to experience the non-referring entity through any accredited means of knowledge. Hence a judgement is no judgement if the subject term is empty which is the same as saying that a sentence having a subject term without a referent is neither true nor false and Vacaspati wants to exclude such judgements from logical discourse. Thus Vacaspati has the Strawsonian line of thinking. Strawson in his 'On Referring' argues that it is sentences which have meaning, but statement (i.e., use of Sentence) which have truth-values. A sentence whose subject term fails to denote is meaningful, but, because the utterance of such a sentence necessarily involves failure to refer, such an utterance cannot be a genuine, but only a 'spurious' use of the sentence, and hence does not constitute a statement. So, use of sentences with non-denoting subject terms are not statements, and are therefore, not within the scope

of logic at all. But Strawson is unable to confine himself comfortably to the no-item thesis but also argues (*Introduction to Logical Theory*) for the truth value gap thesis i.e., some statements lack truth-value and that logical relations (relation of presupposition) can hold between these truth-value less items or between them and truth-valued items.

The Buddhist does not accept the Nyaya position that the subject-term of a sentence must refer to something actual. That it is impossible to flatly deny that an unreal entity can function as subject with respect to any attribute whatsoever is clear from Ratnakirti's (*Ksanabhanga Siddhi Vyatirekatmika*) exposure of the self-contradictory character of the Naiyayika's thesis to the effect. Ratnakirti argues as follows : To deny all attributes of an unreal x is to ascribe the non-ascribability of all attributes X- which, in turn, is to make a self-refuting statement. i.e, if X is unreal, then to say that x is not characterizable by any real attribute is to make an analytic statement. But to deny that an unreal x may be characterized as unreal is to engender a paradox. Thus the ascription of a (appropriately restricted) class of attributes to an unreal subject must at the very least be possible. Thus according to Ratnakirti "The rabbit's horn is sharp" is a normal sentence which we may use in our discourse for various purpose. One of such uses is made when we cite an example of a non-entity viz, 'the rabbit's horn is non-momentary and also non-existent', Jñānas' rīmitra in (*Nibandhabali*) argues that we do utter statements about fictitious entities. We tell fictitious stories, and we conceive of unreal entities like the rabbit's horn. It is not always the case that we have to know a thing before we may make statement about it or attribute some property to it . A simple cognition, an error, a conceptual construction or even a deliberate attempt at fiction, will be enough to justify our speech-acts about fictitious entities. And statement about fictitious entities like Rabbits horn may also serve some useful purpose in a logical discourse.

But Buddhist's insistence that we can and do make statements with empty subject terms need not be taken as a plea for accepting a third truth value 'neither true nor false' (in determinate) to be attached to such statements. His argument is like that of Meinong who wants us to accept the fact that there are unreal object which can be spoken about, can be thought of. The Buddhist, in fact, would like to put all the objects on which our thoughts may go at the same

level and this will include not only (a) things which do exist now (i.e. which are assumed to be existent by the common people or by the realist) but also (b) things which do not exist now (i.e., past and future things), (c) things which cannot exist (viz., the rabbit's horn) and also (d) things of which it would be a logical contradiction to say that they exist (viz., the son of a barren woman). One thing is common to all of these four groups namely, we can think about them.

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PHILOSOPHY OF BIO-ETHICS : MAPPING THE DOMAIN

KUMAR MITRA

The study of bioethics incorporates the whole biosphere. Hence this branch of study cannot and should not be confined within the bounds of any particular academic departments or of any religious dogma, or of a particular philosophical belief.

Though the relevant concerns regarding biosphere were there even in the remote past, bioethics as a branch of systematic study emerged quite recently, and just after its emergence it has grown rapidly throughout the world. It is going to play a central role in professional and public discussions. As we see, bioethical issues are featuring prominently, and globally, in legal, medical scientific and policy agenda.

Bioethics, as the name suggests, has, along with biotic considerations, some basic ethical considerations. It took a long period of time to develop human moral sense which has biological, social and intellectual heritage. Human sense of morality (or moral responsibility) is not only having relationships to fellow-humans but also to other living organisms who somehow affect and exert influence on human existence. It is obvious that to traverse such a large domain bioethics, as a branch of study, needs to be replenished by different disciplines.

To include this vast panorama of bioethics within a single definition is almost and impossibility. Still, we may opt for the following workable definition of bioethics:

“Bioethics is a process of reflection over ethical issues raised in our relationships with other living organisms ; it considers ethical issues in spheres including environmental ethics, health-care ethics, social ethics and in the use of technologies affecting human livelihood.”

If we examine the bioethical principles proposed by several bioethicists, we will find, amid many variations, some important points of convergence. All these principles endorse the ethical values of respect for persons, of doing good

(beneficence), doing no harm (non-malificence), and justice, and emphasize the virtues of the moral agent and his/her relationship to others and to the environment. Regarding the viability or practicability of these principles, there may always be questions we, as bioethicists, cannot answer properly in the way of scientific falsifiability, but we have to admit that all these values like love, altruism, harmony and holism inherent in these principles are common goods.

WHAT WE, AS BIOETHICISTS, SHOULD DO?

As bioethicists, we should respect the life of all living organisms (no matter their bodily or mental composition) for their intrinsic value. This sort of consideration entails that we should limit the consumption of resources in order to minimize our impact on this planet and its ecosystems in order to live our lives and to let live other organisms sustainably. We should recognize the dependence of all life (biota) on naturally - functioning ecosystems and the essential services that ecosystems provide. Wildlife provides numerous free services that make our life possible and pleasant ; it cleans the air, water and the soil of pollutants, provides us food, medicines and a beautiful place to live; it acts as a source for replenishing our supplies of plants and animals. But, though wildlife protects us from extinction, it cannot protect itself from us; so without our help it cannot survive. And presently wildlife is in grave danger from the loss of habitat, the spread of exotic species, pollution and direct consumption by humans. We should urge action to halt environmental damage by humans that reduces biodiversity or degrades ecosystem processes. The presence of humans greatly reduces the usefulness of a habitat to wildlife. Hence, we should urge all nations to make the protection of wildlife and wildlife-habitat a top priority; in particular, we urge them to set aside a large portion of their territory, interconnected by the wildlife travel corridors, for the exclusive use of wildlife. We should call upon states not to allow exemptions to the military or other special-interest groups in regulations to protect the environment and the living organisms (including human beings). We should especially demand proper ethical and scientific evaluation of sonar technology against its reported adverse impact on marine mammals, and should urge for immediate reduction in the energy levels that are utilized.

When considering the good of living organisms, we have to think not only of

those on the planet Earth now, but also of those who will emerge in the future through natural or deliberate creation. We should urge reflection on the way that we will treat hybrid persons (e.g. cyborgs) or cloned humans before they are made. As life is the common heritage of all, it is to be ensured that no one group of persons can claim to own a living organism so as to stop others growing similar organisms. No part of the human body (DNA, genes, gametes, cells, tissues or organs) should be exploited as a source of profit.

At the same time, we should seriously consider whether even relatively simple and natural non-organic creatures, such as rocks and minerals, are worthy of respect as ends in themselves. Their use, in ways, which involve their destruction and/or changes in their form should be restricted to what is absolutely necessary for our life and health.

To work towards a social consensus to obey bioethical norms requires participation of informed citizens, which again requires education about issues of bioethical importance. It is intriguing to find that the public and academic discussion on bioethics has started to emerge in a number of countries, but these efforts need further support. Greater effort is required to educate all members of every society about the scientific, clinical and environmental background (by 'all members' is meant not only those with access to electronic communication media and to well-organized schools, but also persons who lack such basic facilities, open-minded bioethical discussions, together with health-education) so that they may be encouraged to do something for the deprived populations in developing and other countries.

Education of bioethics is to empower people to face ethical dilemmas. Ethical challenges come to everyone. The process of debate and discussion is important for developing good minds to face bioethical dilemmas. It also develops tolerance and respect of others. In these troubled international times, it is very important to develop tolerance of others, and to learn that everyone as a human being is the same regardless of social status, race, sex or religion ('same' in this sense means 'equally diverse'; it does not mean 'identical').

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND BIO-ETHICS

We should try to ensure that states and institutions should take appropriate

measures to encourage all forms of research, training and information — dissemination conducive to raising the awareness of society and all of its members of their responsibilities regarding the fundamental issues relating to bioethics. To achieve these goals, the co-operation of all is required, and to generate that sort of co-operation, open international discussion, ensuring the free expression of various socio-cultural, religious and philosophical opinions, are needed. In order to effect these, ethics committees with full community and ethnic representation, for the purpose of reviewing research proposals and monitoring the impact of science and technology, should be established immediately. In principle, all research on humans that has the rational potential to harm should be validated by the documented and informed consent (which is voluntary and non-coerced) from competent participants. There are important issues to discuss regarding consent from communities and further studies on these issues must proceed. We must devote more research to the topic of research on human subjects who lack the capacity for fully informed consent (such as in pediatric and psychiatric medicine).

We should applaud the development of science and technology if it is for the betterment of all and should stress on the better sharing of the benefits of technology with all. Practical methods for appropriate (both new and traditional) technology-transfer should be effected, together with mechanisms to assess the cultural, environmental, ethical, social and health-impacts of such technology. Encouraging simpler technologies should often be preferable to transfer of advanced scientific technology. Effective risk management, with sound and scientific risk-assessment and appropriate consideration of global interests, is essential for all avenues of life.

In particular, we should call upon all those in the research community to use any appropriate technology to reduce the burden of diseases and afflictions (both mental and physical) of persons in all societies (in particular, in developing and least developed countries).

At the same time, we recognize that technology is not always the answer. Low-technology and no-technology methods should also be considered, especially for populations who have no access to modern medicine anyway. Among these low and no-technology methods are educative courses for nutrition, sanitation, midwifery, disease-prevention and recycling by means of compost of human and

animal waste. We should respect, protect and document the rights of indigenous people, the ecology of rural areas, bioethical management of the coastal zones, and knowledge of indigenous people (like farmers, fishermen, hunters, gatherers, etc.) of their ecosystems.

TO CONCLUDE

Every person has a lifelong responsibility to develop his/her own bioethical maturity and values. We may define bioethical maturity as the ability to balance the benefits and risks of ethical choices, considering the parties involved and the consequences. At the societal level we should try to construct a social mechanism which would develop public policies and laws balancing conflicting ethical principles. We should undertake to develop our maturity together, to work all together towards peace for all and should hope for a more humble standing of all nations committed to serve humanity.

MAN IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF M.N. ROY

MRINAL KANTI DE

I

The rise of cold-war in the post-war international politics presented a dilemma for M.N. Roy who was once an associate of the Communist Party of Soviet Russia and later realising the limitations of Marxism founded a new socio-political theory called New Humanism. Faced with a choice between Democracy and communism, he felt distressed because as an earnest advocate of individualism, he was anxious to check communism while acknowledging the inadequacy of existing parliamentary Democracy. He felt that popular movement against communism could be derived only from the democratic tradition which is informed with the norms and ideals of humanistic culture, the most important being the ideal of freedom and dignity of the individual. Neither communism nor the existing parliamentary capitalist democracy but the third alternative was necessary for further progress of human civilization. Thus he tried to construct a new political theory and economic doctrine on the basis of his New Humanism. M.N. Roy observes that the cultural and moral crisis of modern civilisation is compelling sensitive and thoughtful men throughout the world to turn towards its humanist tradition. The restoration of moral values in public life is the crying demand. He felt that the restoration of moral values in public life could be achieved if we could have a new political and social philosophy deduced from a scientific interpretation of Humanism.

While charting the Western intellectual tradition Roy found mainly two main assumptions, with some variations, regarding human nature. In the first place, there is the assumption that man is selfish by nature and so “instinctively concerned only with his own interest”. Secondly, it is also held by people that human nature is to believe in benevolent supernatural power. Obviously this second assumption was historically associated with the religious tradition that believe in man’s original sin. This last view led to the view of redemption of man by virtue of his readiness to subordinate himself to a supernatural power. Roy also opined that both these

assumptions had inspired social philosophies which could conceive of society only as a coercive organization. Either man-made laws or providential ordinance were admitted to curb the evil instinct of man. Roy held that on the basis of these views of human nature it was not possible to develop any social philosophy which could allow economic and political theories that guarantee freedom and dignity of the individual. This resulted in the present crisis of modern civilization. The view that man is a self-interested creature and that the incentive of all economic enterprise is personal gain leads to economic determinism. So “Karl Marx raised the economic interpretation of history on the level of a social philosophy”¹. And for M.N. Roy “The Practice of any theory, conservative, liberal, revolutionary which starts from the doctrine of the economic man, must lead to the loss of freedom and the degradation of man. If man is selfish and irrational by nature, society must be a coercive organization, a prison house to be guarded by earthly policemen backed up by heavenly colleagues. Economic determinism therefore cannot be the social philosophy which is required to lead civilized mankind out of the present crisis”².

In fact our wrong notions about human nature is the root cause of all evils of our time. Hence, all types of social reconstruction for the betterment of man must begin with man. Social philosophy, built on the false notion of human nature, undermined man’s faith in himself and thus leading to spiritual crisis which characterises modern predicament.

So, Roy argued, if man is by nature a believer in some power greater than himself then the idea of human freedom must be abandoned. Hence, both the assumptions about human nature mentioned above cancel human freedom. Roy contended that the history of civilization revealed invalidity of both the assumptions about human nature.

Inspired by modern science, he held that man, as a biological form, evolved from matter. Thus, being free from those false assumptions, man can think of being free as man. In his words : “Humanism is as old as history..... But today scientific knowledge as well as a careful reading of history enable Humanism to challenge the wrong notion about human nature and thus free itself from all contradictions and fallacies. Therefore, we call it New Humanism”³.

Drawing on anthropology, he maintained that human society did not come into being in an abhoc contract. Primitive man had to struggle against nature in

co-operation with others. The instinct of self-preservation as well as the struggle for existence instituted the basis of civil society. "Instinct is primitive reason" claimed Roy. "Man therefore is essentially a rational being, rudiments of reason, the ability to connect experiences, can be traced in lower animals. Rationality, therefore, is a biological function which can very highly develop in the highest biological form. Rationality can subordinate man's selfishness to enlightened self-interest, which is a social virtue"⁴. Though Roy was a materialist, he never accepted the supremacy of the social environment over the nature of man. According to the philosophy of New Humanism human nature is mainly determined by physical and biological factors. Hence, the main problem before Roy was to find in human nature a basis for a harmonious social order and the incentive to all social progress. In human reason and in man's urge for freedom, which was also for him is rooted in humanism, he found the basis.

Man is the product of evolution. His nature is subject to this process. Yet he maintained that there is some constant in human nature. Thus the uniqueness of the individual was recognised as well as the fact that the individuals have some factors in common which constitutes the foundation of human nature.

Two basic features of human nature are emphasized in the philosophy of New Humanism of M.N. Roy. The first feature is the rationality of man and the second is man's urge for freedom. He attempted to trace the origin of these two features to the physical universe as well as to the pre-human biological evolution. He maintained that this foundation of human rationality was the law-governed physical universe. He said, "Rising out of the background of the law-governed physical nature the human being is essentially rational"⁵. Physical nature is uniform and law-governed. Man's highly evolved brain functions as the instrument for interrelations between the organisms and its environment. In this way man becomes conscious of the law-governed nature of the universe "The mind", Roy maintained, "becomes conscious of the environments the radius of which gradually expands until the entire nature is embraced. Its being consciousness of law-governed system, human mind is necessarily rational in essence"⁶. Man becomes conscious of the fact of this law-governed physical world and of the fact that every phenomenon is connected with some other phenomenon. This led to man's knowledge that nothing is uncaused. This experience leads him to think in causal terms and thus

makes him rational. In order to explain human reason he wrote : “Reason is the simple, instinctive notion that every object of experience connected with some other object or objects which may or may not have been already experienced; but, because of the belief in the connection, which holds the world of experience together, their existence is assumed”⁷. He considered reason as an echo of the harmony of the universe. In the instinctive level of the animal activity reason is expressed in rudimentary form. Thus, for him, human rationality is a developed form of instinctive rationality present in the animals. The “humanness”, Roy held, was inherited from the mental and emotional equipment of the animals. Thus, reason is no longer a metaphysical category. Reason is the consciousness of the harmony of nature. Rationality then becomes a biological function. Roy characterised reason in nature as physical determinism. Reason was considered as a biological function because with the help of his developed brain which he has inherited from animals man becomes conscious of law-governed physical nature.

As to man’s will and emotion Roy observed in the fourth of his 22 theses : “Reason being a biological property, it is not antithesis of will. Intelligence and emotion can be reduced to a common biological demonstrator. Historical determinism, therefore, does not exclude freedom of the will”. Man’s will and emotions are also determined or caused by physical factors. “He rose out of the background of the physical universe. The latter is a cosmos — a law-governed system. Therefore, man’s being and becoming, his emotions, will, ideas are also determined; man is essentially rational”⁸. However, Roy was aware of the fact that most of our voluntary emotional acts are not rational in that they are not any result of free thinking. As a solution to this problem he wrote: “the universe is a physical system. Having grown out of that background, the human is also a physical system. But there is great difference : The physical universe law-governed, the laws being inherent in itself, whereas man possesses will and can choose. Between the world of man and the world of inanimate matter, there lies the vast world of biological evolutions. The latter has its own specific laws which, however, can be referred back to the general laws of the world of dead matter; consciousness appears at a much later stage. Therefore, human will cannot be directly related to the laws of the physical universe . It is rooted in the intervening biological world. But in as much as the entire process of biological evolution take place in the context

of the world of dead matter, human will cannot be antithesis to the law-governedness of the physical universe, Reason harmonizes the two...”⁹. Thus man can control his emotions and direct his will with his rational faculty. Roy’s contention that human will can not be directly related to the laws of the physical universe should dispel the feeling of fatalism in man and make room for freedom which can explain the possibility of moral individual. He observed : “The rational and scientific concept of determinism is not to be confused with the teleological or religious doctrine of predestination”¹⁰.

The second basic feature of human nature, according to M.N. Roy, is the urge for freedom which originates from the biological heritage of man. As to the definition of freedom he wrote : “Freedom is progressive disappearance of all restrictions on the unfolding of the potentialities of individuals, as human beings, and not as cogs in the wheels of a mechanised social organism”¹¹. The potentialities of the individual are not divine potentialities, but inherent in man biologically. With his highly developed brain and nervous system man has reached the evolutionary stage of infinite potentialities. The creative urge to actualize these potentialities constitute his urge for freedom. A man is free only if he becomes conscious of his latent potentialities and feels the urge to develop them. Hence, for Roy, “the position of the individual, therefore, is the measure of the progressive and liberating significance of any Social organization”¹². Actual well-being is said to enjoyed by individuals. This is why it is claimed that, according to New Humanism , human nature is determined more by the biological than by social factors. Thus Roy did not accept social materialism. For his human freedom does not necessarily follow from any socio — economic order. He maintained that in addition to economic well being and political democracy the word ‘freedom’ must have a cultural connotation which is based on human nature. So, the urge for freedom is grounded in human nature. He wrote: “...the quest for freedom is the continuation on a higher level of intelligence and emotion of the biological struggle for existence”¹³. In the biological world the struggle for existence is a universal phenomenon and he tried to trace the human urge of freedom to this phenomenon. In the animal world this struggle is carried through a mechanical adaptation. In the human plane this struggle is transformed into a purposive struggle in that over and above the said adaptation man tries to change his environment in order to actualize order to actualize his

potentialities and thereby enjoy freedom. The impetus behind the transformation of the struggle for existence into the urge of freedom was provided by his desire to be free from physical limitation and the incentive was the power of his highly developed brain. All these were made possible by the superior intelligence of man. Thus, for Roy, reason or intelligence is the foundation of the urge for freedom.

II

Any comparison between Marxian Humanism and Roy's New Humanism must involve their theories of History. Marxian theory of history is derived from Marx's Philosophy of dialectical materialism. Roy's materialism has some affinity with Marxian materialism. However, the crucial difference between them is that Marxian materialism is dialectical. According to Marx the dialectical laws of the development of nature and human society have been abstracted from the history of nature and human society. There are three basic laws of dialectics. These are as follows :

- a) The law of the transformation of quantity into quality.
- b) The law of contradiction or the inter-penetration of opposition.
- c) The law of the negation of the negation.

In some form or other the admission of the first law can be found in Roy's theory of mutation. However, the other two laws have not been admitted in Roy's materialism. Roy's objection to these two laws is that this mixture of Hegelian dialectics with materialism is nothing but confounding logic with ontology.

Implicit in the Marxian theory of history is a conception of man and his relation with society and nature. According to him the starting point must be the real life-processes of man. The distinctive feature of man's life process is that it is out and out biological. Without denying the uniqueness of man's individuality Marxian theory of history shows that individuality cannot be abstracted from society and explains why man can attain his real human existence only in society. Thus, for Marx, the first premise of all human history must be the existence of living human individuals. That is to say, the first historical act is the production of material life itself. This actual material life is produced in the process of producing man's own means of subsistence. Again, this production of material life provides the occasion for establishing man's unique relation with nature which is termed

as 'Labour'. From a truly historical perspective according to Marx, development of labour signifies development of the instruments of labour which leads to greater domination of nature. This development brings in the division of labour. Which, in its turn, creates class-division within society and fosters antagonism between individual interest and social interest. Thus, for Marx, the history of all society, riddled with division of labour determine the productive activity of individuals, which again, determines the form of social and political life. One of the basic tenets of Marxism is that material production constitutes the foundation of man's life process. Therefore, the mode of production or economic structure (relations of production and forces of production) determines the general form of our social, political and spiritual life. The entire superstructure gets transformed owing to the changes in this economic foundation.

Roy's theory of history is markedly different from the Marxian theory. Roy's theory derives from his cosmology. For him, history is an organic evolutionary process which is causally determined but not predetermined by any telos, secular or religious. This evolution depends on the laws pertaining to the human level of existence. Human evolution is not completely different from biological evolution, because the former is a continuation of the latter. However, the difference is due to the fact that while merely biological evolution takes place by means of mechanical adaptation and struggle for existence, the human evolution depends, in an important respect, on reason and man's purposive and creative efforts. Human evolution is characterised by our aspiration for freedom, knowledge and truth. In Roy's view, it is only due to the activities of the creative man aspiring for freedom that human civilization has progressed. The primacy of the freedom of human will and human creativity in Roy's philosophy gives us a romantic view of life. According to him, when this romanticism is tempered with reason and rationalism, it is only our spirit of adventure that can bring about a social revolution. In the human level of existence the struggle for existence is transformed into the urge for freedom and the expression of human creativeness brings about the revolution.

Another important difference between Marx's and Roy's theory of history is that in Roy's theory the role of ideas in history receives greater importance. In his works he tried to show that Marx's theory of history subordinates man to the inexorable laws of forces of production and reduces all ideas and cultural forms to

mere superstructure of economic relations. In Roy's view, this makes Marx's theory of history fatalistic and eliminates man's freedom. On the other hand, Roy's theory accords primacy to the thinking man in opposition to Marx's productive man. In Roy's view. It is conceptual thought that distinguishes the most primitive man from other animals.

Marx's critique of all social systems is based on the observation that in those social systems man's life has not been genuinely social and hence, has not been truly human. This should be changed. Thus, he declares : "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways : the point is to change it". According to Marx this change can be brought only if the real life — processes are completely grasped. According to the Marxian theory of history, the socio-economic conditions in which men live are necessary and objective in the sense that they correspond to a prevalent mode of production. That is to say, while producing their material life men enter into determinate socio-economic and political relations, which impose certain material limits, presuppositions and conditions that are independent of their will. In such situation division of labour creates a class-divided society. In such a class — divided society the total productive force confronts men as an alien social power existing outside them and appear not as voluntary but natural. This economic or social alienation is the basic form of alienation. Thus, in a class — society the antagonism between the individual and common interest leads to the creation of the State, i.e. a power dominating society.

Religious alienation is another aspect of this basic alienation. Man's real nature being the totality of social relations, the religious consciousness, according to Marx, is a social product. This State and society constitute an inverted world and consequently, produce religions, which foster an inverted world — consciousness. In the off-quoted Marx's words. "Religion is the sign of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless condition . It is the opium of the people." Therefore, the demand for the real human happiness necessitates the abolition of religion.

In his analysis of alienation in the capitalist society Marx has shown that in this stage alienation is both extensive and intensive. And with the abolition of capitalism the alienation of man will get abolished and true human existence and

freedom will be gained. In this condition man will be emancipated from all alienation and his social life will be truly social. He will be the master of his social and natural environment.

M.N. Roy has made two basic criticism of Marxian humanism. According to him, Marxian humanism is vitiated by contradiction, which is due to Hegelian influence. The concept of dialectics and economic determinism in Marx's theory of history contradict the basic humanist standpoint — the freedom of the individual man. It has been assumed by M.N. Roy that any humanist theory of history must acknowledge the fact that man is the maker of history. The second basic criticism of Marxian humanism is that Marxian humanism views human nature as the totality social relations. According to M.N. Roy, on the other hand, reason is the essence of man. This reason guides men to enter into social relations. Thus, the aggregate of social relations presupposes individual existence. This view is opposed to Marx's organic conception of society.

In the last phase of his life M.N. Roy endeavoured to develop the philosophy of New Humanism as an alternative to Marxism. He tried to develop a new philosophy distinct from Liberalism and Marxism. Despite his good intentions he could only revive the tradition of liberal humanism of Pre-Marxian period. In his philosophy he opposed all types of collectivism and authoritarianism in order to secure the freedom of the individual. This is the hallmark of a liberal thinker.

III

Roy's emphasis on human dignity and individual freedom has great significance in our age of statism, planning and technology. He believed that the freedom of the individual and democracy do not depend primarily upon constitutional provision or economic arrangement, but upon the quality of the individual. In order to achieve this he laid heavy stress on education, which can help us to practise rational politics and place individuals at the centre of society.

The necessity of value-based politics in the present age can hardly be over-estimated. One major influence of natural science on politics has been the growth of secular outlook in our political thinking. However, along with this, politics has developed a tendency to become objective in the sense of being completely value-free and, thus, has fostered an apathy for all ethical norms. In his philosophy of

New Humanism Roy tried to develop secular ethics by combining scientific objectivity with ethical idealism.

Roy believed that a secular rationalist system of ethics could be logically deduced from the mechanistic cosmology of the materialist philosophy. He thought that a system of secular morality is *sine qua non* for human freedom. He argued that it is the age of secularism. Morality based on religion would be meaningful only in man's private life. Moreover, a secular state cannot survive upon religious morality. Therefore we must have a system of secular morality. That is why Roy sought to develop a system of secular ethics on the basis of scientific principles.

The best way to develop such ethics, Roy thought is to find scientific account of the origin of morality. He wrote, "one knows from experience what is good for him and what is bad for him. Therefore he generalises that what is good for him is good for all like himself, and what is bad for him is also bad for all. That is the origin of morality"¹⁴

Man needs society for the realisation of his own potentialities and so the observance of existing social laws serves his own interests. Roy claimed that when man becomes moral on the basis of such rational consideration he chooses his course of action voluntarily. Thus, according to Roy, morality must be viewed as grounded in man's inherent rationality. Though one's own existence is the primary concern one can subordinate such selfish interest to enlightened self-interest. Again, Roy believed that secularism and freedom of man are not compatible with religious morality. He wrote : "The religious faith in man's moral essence limits his sovereignty, indeed it is a negation of the liberating concept. In the last analysis, it implies that man as man cannot be moral; to be so, he must feel himself subordinated to a super-human power. With this paralysing sense of spiritual subservience, man can never be really free".¹⁵ So "Morality must be referred back to man's innate rationality. Only then can man be moral, spontaneously and voluntarily. Reason is the only sanction of morality."¹⁶

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চরকসম্মত নিগ্রহস্থান

রত্না দত্তশর্মা

প্রাচীন ভারতীয় চিকিৎসা শাস্ত্রের অন্যতম স্বীকৃত গ্রন্থ চরকসংহিতা। চরকসংহিতার বিমানস্থানের অষ্টম অধ্যায়ে চরক চিকিৎসকের সঙ্গে চিকিৎসকের শাস্ত্রালোচনের প্রয়োজন ব্যাখ্যা করেছেন।^১ শাস্ত্রালোচন যে যে বিশিষ্ট ফল উৎপন্ন করে তার মধ্যে বিশেষভাবে উল্লেখযোগ্য হচ্ছে শাস্ত্রালোচন জ্ঞান বৃদ্ধির সহায়ক। তা আনন্দবর্ধকও বটে। তজ্জন্য বচনশক্তি বৃদ্ধি হয়। যশ বিস্তৃত হয়। কোনও বিষয়ে সন্দেহ থাকলে শাস্ত্রালোচনা সেই সন্দেহ দূর করে। শাস্ত্রালোচনা প্রসঙ্গে অশ্রুত বিষয় শ্রবণগ্রাহ্য হয় ইত্যাদি ইত্যাদি।^২ মহর্ষি গৌতমও ন্যায়দর্শনে তদ্বিদ্য সংবাদের উপর গুরুত্ব আরোপ করেছেন।^৩

সমশাস্ত্র ব্যবসায়ী বা তদ্বিদ্যা-সম্ভাষা চরকের মতে মূলত দুপ্রকার — সন্ধ্যায় সম্ভাষা এবং বিগৃহ্য সম্ভাষা।^৪ পরস্পর সাক্ষি পূর্বক যে শাস্ত্রালোচনা তাকে সন্ধ্যায় সম্ভাষা বলে। পরস্পর বিগ্রহপূর্বক যে শাস্ত্রালোচনা তাকে বলা হয় বিগৃহ্য সম্ভাষা। শাস্ত্রালোচনা যে ধরনেরই হোক না কেন তাতে অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষ বিশেষ উদ্দেশ্য নিয়েই অগ্রসর হয়। কখনও সে সেই উদ্দেশ্য লাভে সফল হয় কখনও বা হয় ব্যর্থ। বিশেষ উদ্দেশ্যলাভে ব্যর্থ হওয়া তার কাছে পরাজয় স্বরূপ।^৫ নিগ্রহস্থান বলতে চরক পরাজয়প্রাপ্তিকে বুঝিয়েছেন।^৬ জল্পকল্পতরু টীকাকার গঙ্গাধরের মতে এই নিগ্রহ বা পরাজয়ের হেতু বস্তুঃ নিগ্রহস্থান।^৭ চক্রপাণি দত্ত তার আয়ুর্বেদীপিকা নামক টীকাতে নিগ্রহ বা পরাজয়ের কারণকে নিগ্রহস্থান বলে বুঝিয়েছেন।^৮ যে যে বিভিন্ন পরিস্থিতিতে সম্ভাষায় অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষ পরাজিত হয় তাই চরকের মতে নিগ্রহস্থান। যেমন কোনও বক্তব্য বিজ্ঞ সভায় তিনবার উপস্থাপিত হলেও যদি তা অনুধাবনে কেউ ব্যর্থ হয় তবে তা বক্তব্য উপস্থাপনকারীর পক্ষে নিগ্রহের উন্মায়ক। চরকের মতে সম্ভাষায় অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষ অপরের এমন সমালোচনা যদি করেন যে সমালোচনা বস্তুত তার প্রাপ্য নয় তবে উক্ত সমালোচনা উত্থাপনকারী পুরুষ পরাজিত বলে গণ্য হয়। প্রকৃতপক্ষে কোনও পুরুষ যদি কোনও দোষের উদ্ভব ঘটান কিন্তু প্রতিপক্ষ তা প্রদর্শনে ব্যর্থ হন তবে ঐ ব্যর্থ পুরুষ নিগ্রহের যোগ্য বলে বিবেচিত হয়।^৯ যদিও চরক উক্ত নিগ্রহস্থানগুলির নাম উল্লেখ করেননি তবুও মহর্ষি গৌতমকে অনুসরণ পূর্বক তাদের যথাক্রমে অবিজ্ঞাতার্থ, নিরনুযোজ্যানুযোগ, পর্যনুযোজ্যোপেক্ষণ নামে অভিহিত করা যায়।^{১০}

চরক যে বিভিন্ন নিগ্রহস্থানগুলির উল্লেখ করেছেন তারা হচ্ছে — ১. প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি ২. অভ্যুজ্ঞা ৩. কালাতীতবচন ৪. অহেতু ৫. নুন ৬. অধিক ৭. ব্যর্থ ৮. অনর্থক ৯. পুনরুক্ত ১০. বিরুদ্ধ ১১. হেয়স্তর ১২. অর্থান্তর।^{১১} নিগ্রহস্থান বলে যাদের উল্লেখ করেছেন তাদের মধ্যে বেশ কয়েকটিকে বাক্যদোষ বলে পৃথক উল্লেখ করেছেন। তার মতে নুন, অধিক, অনর্থক, পুনরুক্ত, বিরুদ্ধ ইত্যাদি বাক্যদোষ।^{১২} দেখা যাচ্ছে বাক্যদোষ বলে যাদের স্বতন্ত্র উল্লেখ করেছেন তাদের মধ্যে অপার্থক ছাড়া অন্য সবকটিকেই নিগ্রহস্থান বলে উল্লেখ করেছেন। এই অনুল্লেখের হেতু হতে পারে এই যে সে সকল নিগ্রহস্থানের তিনি উল্লেখ করেছেন তারাই কেবলমাত্র নিগ্রহস্থান, অপর নিগ্রহস্থান সম্ভবপর নয় — এমনটি নয়। নিগ্রহস্থানের উদাহরণরূপে

তাদের উল্লেখ করেছেন। পূর্বে নিগ্রহের হেতুরূপে চরক যে যে স্থলের উল্লেখ করেছেন অথচ তাদের কোনও বিশেষ নামের উল্লেখ করেননি তাদের কিন্তু উপরিউক্ত নিগ্রহস্থানগুলির মধ্যে স্থান দেননি। তার থেকে পূর্বে উল্লিখিত বক্তব্যই সমর্থিত হয় যে চরক যে যে নিগ্রহস্থানগুলির উল্লেখ করেছেন তা নিগ্রহস্থানের উদাহরণ প্রদর্শনমাত্র। কিন্তু নিগ্রহস্থান এই কয়টিই একথা বলা তার উদ্দেশ্য নয়।

মহর্ষি গৌতম ন্যায়দর্শনে অপ্রতিপত্তি বা অজ্ঞান বিপ্রতিপত্তি বা বিপরীত জ্ঞানকে পরাজয়ের কারণ বলেছেন। কিন্তু সেই বিপরীত জ্ঞানের বা অজ্ঞানের সূচক পরিস্থিতিকে তিনি নিগ্রহের স্থান বলেছেন। তার মতে অজ্ঞান ও বিপরীতজ্ঞানের নানাপ্রকার ভেদহেতু নিগ্রহস্থানও বহু। কিন্তু নিগ্রহস্থানের প্রকারভেদ পুদর্শনের নিমিত্ত মহর্ষি গৌতম বাইশ প্রকার নিগ্রহস্থানের উল্লেখ করেছেন যদিও নিগ্রহস্থান অসংখ্য। মহর্ষি গৌতম উল্লিখিত বাইশ প্রকার নিগ্রহস্থান হচ্ছে - ১. প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি ২. প্রতিজ্ঞাস্তর ৩. প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ ৪. প্রতিজ্ঞাসম্ম্যাস ৫. অর্থাস্তর ৬. নিরর্থক ৭. অবিজ্ঞাতার্থ ৮. অপার্থক ৯. অপ্ৰাপ্তকাল ১০. নূন ১১. অধিক ১২. পুনরুক্ত ১৩. অনগুভাষণ ১৪. অজ্ঞান ১৫. অপ্রতিভা ১৬. বিক্ষিপ ১৭. মতানুজ্ঞা ১৮. পর্যনুযোজ্যোপেক্ষণ ১৯. নিরণুযোজ্যানুযোগ ২০. অপসিদ্ধান্ত ২১. হেত্বাভাস।^{১৬}

উপরিউক্ত আলোচনা থেকে একথা স্পষ্ট যে চরক যেমন বিভিন্ন প্রকার নিগ্রহস্থান নিয়ে আলোচনা করেছেন মহর্ষি গৌতমও ন্যায়দর্শনের বিস্তৃত অংশ নিগ্রহস্থানের আলোচনার জন্য নির্দিষ্ট রেখেছেন। কতগুলি নিগ্রহস্থানের নাম উভয়েই ব্যবহার করেছেন। কিন্তু উভয়েই একই নাম ব্যবহার করলেও তাদের স্বরূপ বিষয়ে মত পার্থক্য আছে কিনা এই জিজ্ঞাসা থেকেই যায়। মহর্ষি গৌতম স্বীকৃত বিভিন্ন নিগ্রহস্থান যাদের উল্লেখ চরক করেননি তাদের চরক উল্লিখিত কোনও নিগ্রহস্থানের অন্তর্গত রূপে গণ্য করা যায় কিনা তা ভেবে দেখার বিষয়। দুজনে ভিন্ন ভিন্ন নাম ব্যবহার করলেও বস্তুত তাদের দ্বারা নির্দিষ্ট নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ অভিন্ন অথবা সদৃশ এরূপ প্রদর্শন করা যায় কি? যে সমস্ত নিগ্রহস্থান গুলির বাক্যদোষ রূপে উল্লেখ করেছেন, কেন তাদের বাক্যদোষ বলা হচ্ছে? মহর্ষি গৌতমের পক্ষে তাদের উক্ত অর্থে বাক্যদোষ বলে স্বীকার করার কোনও অসুবিধা আছে কিনা এ প্রশ্ন থেকে যায়। অহেতু বলতে চরক বস্তুত কি বোঝাতে চেয়েছেন? অহেতু কতপ্রকার ও কি কি? অহেতুর স্বরূপ আলোচনা চরকের মতে প্রকৃত হেতুরস্বরূপ নির্দেশ করে কিনা তা ভেবে দেখতে হবে। উল্লিখিত বিভিন্ন প্রশ্নের উত্তর খোঁজার চেষ্টা করবো বর্তমান প্রবন্ধে।

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প্রথমে আমরা চরক যে সমস্ত নিগ্রহস্থানগুলি বাক্যদোষরূপে পৃথকভাবে উল্লেখ করেছেন তাদের স্বরূপ পর্যালোচনা করবো। উপরিউক্ত আলোচনা থেকে একথা স্পষ্ট যে চরক বাক্যদোষ বলে যাদের উল্লেখ করেছেন, তাদের মহর্ষি গৌতমও নিগ্রহস্থান রূপে স্বীকার করেছেন। সেই কারণে চরক কর্তৃক আলোচিত বিভিন্ন বাক্যদোষগুলির স্বরূপ আলোচনাপূর্বক ন্যায়মতের সঙ্গে তুলনামূলক আলোচনা করা স্বাভাবিক।

বাক্যদোষগুলির মধ্যে চরক প্রথম উল্লেখ করেছেন 'নূন'। চরকের মতে সম্ভাষাস্থলে নিজপক্ষ উপস্থাপনার্থে সম্ভাষায় অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষ প্রতিজ্ঞা, হেতু, উদাহরণ, উপনয় ও নিগমন এই পাঁচটি বাক্য নির্দিষ্টক্রমে প্রয়োগ করেন।^{১৭} কিন্তু আলোচনায় অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষ যদি উক্ত অর্থ সাধনার্থে স্বীকৃত বাক্যগুলির মধ্যে কোনওটি প্রয়োগ না করেন তবে 'নূন' নামক দোষের উদ্ভব হয়। অর্থাৎ সম্ভাষায় অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষ কর্তৃক স্বপক্ষ স্থাপনার্থে প্রযুক্ত বাক্যের সংখ্যা যদি স্বীকৃত পাঁচটি বাক্য অপেক্ষা কম হয় তবে উক্ত দোষের সূচনা

হয়। চরক অপর একটি স্থলেও ন্যূন নামক বাক্যদোষের সম্ভাব্যতা স্বীকার করেছেন। যেখানে বহু হেতু দ্বারা কোনও পক্ষ স্থাপিত হতে পারে সেখানে একটি হেতু দ্বারা তা স্থাপিত হলে ন্যূন নামক বাক্যদোষ সূচিত হয়।^{১৭}

মহর্ষি গৌতম ‘ন্যূন’ নামক নিগ্রহস্থান স্বীকার করেছেন। তার মতে কথা স্থলে নিজপক্ষ স্থাপনার্থে প্রতিজ্ঞাদি পঞ্চাবয়ব অপেক্ষা প্রযুক্ত বাক্যের সংখ্যা যদি কম হয় তবে ‘ন্যূন’ নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভব হয়।^{১৮} পরবর্তী নৈয়ায়িকদের মতে বস্তুতঃ এই স্থলটি অবয়ব ন্যূন নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের স্থল বলে পরিচিত। তারা কথা নামক বিচার বিশেষের বিভিন্ন অংশের প্রয়োগ না হলে বিভিন্ন প্রকার ন্যূন নামক নিগ্রহস্থান সূচিত হয় বলে মনে করেছেন। যেমন কথার পূর্বাংশে সম্পাদনীয় কর্তব্যের অকরণজন্য কথারন্তু ন্যূন। বিচারের কোনও অংশের কর্তব্যের অকরণজন্য বাদন্যূন নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভব হয়। যেমন বিচারে নিজ পক্ষে হেতুর উপস্থাপনা পূর্বক তা নির্দোষত্ব প্রতিপাদন করা কর্তব্য। কিন্তু বিচারে অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষ যদি হেতুর প্রয়োগ না করেই তার নির্দোষত্ব প্রমাণ করতে চান অথবা হেতুর প্রয়োগ করেও যদি তার নির্দোষত্ব প্রমাণ না করেন তবে বাদাংশন্যূন নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভব হয়। প্রতিবাদী বাদীর পক্ষ স্থাপনার খণ্ডন না করে যদি নিজপক্ষ স্থাপন করেন অথবা নিজপক্ষ স্থাপন না করে কেবল বাদীর পক্ষ খণ্ডন করেন তবে বাদন্যূন নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভব হয়। অবয়ব ন্যূন নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের পূর্বেই বলা হয়েছে।^{১৯} উপরিউক্ত আলোচনা থেকে বোঝা যায় যে অবয়বন্যূন নামক নিগ্রহস্থান চরক ও ন্যায় দর্শন উভয়েরই স্বীকৃত।

চরক অধিককে ন্যূনের বিপরীত বাক্যদোষরূপে উল্লেখ করেছেন। অর্থাৎ প্রতিজ্ঞাদি বাক্যগুলির মধ্যে কোনওটি যদি একাধিক প্রযুক্ত হয় তবে অধিক নামক বাক্যদোষের প্রসঙ্গ হয়।^{২০} মহর্ষি গৌতম কিন্তু প্রতিজ্ঞাদি বাক্যগুলির যে কোনটির একাধিক প্রয়োগ জন্য অধিক নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের সম্ভাব্যতা স্বীকার করেননি। তার মতে একাধিক হেতু ও একাধিক দৃষ্টান্ত প্রয়োগজন্য প্রয়োগকারীর অধিক নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের সূচনা হয়।^{২১} প্রশ্ন থেকে যায় একাধিক প্রতিজ্ঞা বা একাধিক উপনয় বাক্য প্রয়োগের সম্ভাব্যতা কি তিনি স্বীকার করেননি অথবা একাধিক প্রতিজ্ঞা বা একাধিক উপনয় বাক্যের প্রয়োগজন্য অপর স্বীকৃত কোনও দোষের উদ্ভব হয়। ২০ চরক কেবলমাত্র উল্লিখিত পরিস্থিতিতেই অধিক নামক বাক্যদোষের সম্ভাব্যতা স্বীকার করেননি। অন্য পরিস্থিতিতেও তিনি অধিক নামক বাক্যদোষের উদ্ভাবনের সম্ভাব্যতা স্বীকার করেছেন। আলোচনায় অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষ আলোচনা প্রসঙ্গে অপ্রাসঙ্গিক বিষয়ের উপস্থাপনা করলেও অধিক নামক বাক্যদোষের উদ্ভব হয়। যেমন আয়ুর্বেদের আলোচনা প্রসঙ্গে যদি কেউ বার্হস্পত্য, ঔশনস বা অপর কোনও সম্পূর্ণ অপ্রাসঙ্গিক বিষয়ের উপস্থাপনা নয় প্রাসঙ্গিক বিষয়ও যদি পুনরুক্ত হয় তবে অধিক নামক বাক্যদোষ সূচিত হয়।^{২২} পুনরুক্তি আবার দ্বিবিধ — শব্দ পুনরুক্তি ও অর্থ পুনরুক্তি। কেউ যদি একই শব্দ একাধিক বার উচ্চারণ করেন তবে শব্দ পুনরুক্তি নামক বাক্যদোষ সূচিত হয়। যেমন কেউ যদি বলেন ‘ভেষজ ভেষজ’ তবে তা হবে শব্দ পুনরুক্তির স্থল। কিন্তু একই অর্থের নির্দেশক ভিন্ন ভিন্ন শব্দ ব্যবহার জন্য অর্থ পুনরুক্তি নামক বাক্যদোষ উদ্ভূত হয়। যেমন ভেষজ, ঔষধ, সাধন ইত্যাদি।^{২৩} মহর্ষি গৌতমও পুনরুক্তি নামক নিগ্রহস্থান স্বীকার করেছেন। তার মতে অনুবাদ বা সপ্রয়োজন পুনরুক্তি থেকে ভিন্ন শব্দ বা অর্থের পুনরুক্তির জন্য পুনরুক্তি নামক নিগ্রহস্থান স্বীকার করেছেন। তার মতে অনুবাদ বা সপ্রয়োজন পুনরুক্তি থেকে ভিন্ন শব্দ বা অর্থের পুনরুক্তির জন্য পুনরুক্তি নামক নিগ্রহস্থান উদ্ভূত হয়।^{২৪} মহর্ষি গৌতম কিন্তু পুনরুক্তি ও অধিক নামক নিগ্রহস্থানকে সম্পূর্ণ পৃথক বলে স্বীকার করেছেন। ধরা যাক বিচারে অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষ নিজমত স্থাপনার্থে ‘ক’ নামক হেতুর উপন্যাস করেছেন। পরে আবার তিনি একই উদ্দেশ্যে ‘খ’ নামক হেতুর

উপস্থাপনা করলেন। স্পষ্টতঃই এইটি শব্দ পুনরুক্তি বা অর্থ পুনরুক্তির স্থল নয়। তথাপি এস্থলে ‘খ’ নামক হেতুর উপস্থাপনা দ্বারা যে উদ্দেশ্য সিদ্ধি অভিপ্রেত তা পূর্বে সিদ্ধ হয়ে গেছে ‘ক’ হেতুর প্রয়োগ দ্বারা। তাই ‘খ’ নামক হেতুর প্রয়োগ জন্য অধিক নামক দোষের উদ্ভব হচ্ছে।^{১৪}

অর্থবিশিষ্ট প্রযুক্ত পদ পরস্পর অসম্বন্ধ হলে অপার্থক নামক বাক্য দোষের সূচনা হয়। এরূপ স্থলে প্রত্যেকটি পদের পৃথক পৃথকভাবে অর্থ থাকলেও তারা মিলিতভাবে কোনও অর্থ প্রকাশ করতে পারে না। এরূপ বাক্য প্রয়োগকারী অপার্থক নামক বাক্যদোষের সূচনা করেন। যেমন চক্র - বংশ - বজ্র - নিশাকর - এরূপ অর্থসূচক ভিন্ন ভিন্ন শব্দের প্রয়োগকারী কোন সম্বন্ধবিশিষ্ট অর্থের জ্ঞাপন করতে ব্যর্থ হন। যদিও পৃথক পৃথকভাবে প্রযুক্ত শব্দগুলি অর্থবহ।^{১৫}

মহর্ষি গৌতম অপার্থক নামক নিগ্রহস্থান স্বীকার করেন। ভাষ্যকার মহর্ষির বক্তব্যকে ব্যাখ্যা করতে গিয়ে দু’প্রকার অপার্থক স্বীকার করেছেন- ১। পদঅপার্থক ২। বাক্য অপার্থক। ধরা যাক কোনও ব্যক্তি (১) দশ দাড়িমানি (২) রৌরুকমেতং (৩) ষড়পূপা (৪) কুণ্ডম (৫) অজা (৬) অজিনম (৭) পললপিণ্ড এই প্রকারে কতগুলি শব্দ প্রয়োগ করেছেন। এই শব্দগুলি স্বতন্ত্রভাবে অর্থযুক্ত হলেও মিলিতভাবে কোনও বিশিষ্ট অর্থের বোধক হয় না। কারণ, এদের মধ্যে আকাঙ্ক্ষার সম্বন্ধ নেই। রৌরুকমেতং এবং অজিনম এই শব্দ দুটির মধ্যে আকাঙ্ক্ষার সম্বন্ধ থাকলেও তারা বিস্তর কালিক ব্যবধানে উচ্চারিত হওয়ায় মিলিতভাবে আকাঙ্ক্ষিত অর্থ প্রকাশে ব্যর্থ। তেমনি (১) কুমার্যা পায়ং (২) তস্যাঃ পিতা অপ্রতীলীন এই বাক্যদ্বয় পৃথকভাবে অর্থযুক্ত হলেও তারা মিলিতভাবে কোনো বিশেষ অর্থের প্রতিপাদক নয়। কারণ ঐ বাক্যদ্বয় যে ভিন্ন ভিন্ন বক্তব্যের উপস্থাপক তারা পরস্পর বিরোধী। বাক্যদ্বয়ের বক্তব্য পরস্পর অসঙ্গতিপূর্ণ কারণ যে শিশুকুমারী সদ্যোজাত স্তন্যপায়ী তার পিতা কখনোই বৃদ্ধ হতে পারে না। বাক্য অপার্থকের দৃষ্টান্তরূপে উক্তস্থলের উল্লেখ করা যায়।^{১৬} চরক প্রদত্ত উদাহরণ কিন্তু পদ অপার্থকের স্থলই নির্দেশ করে।

শঙ্করমিশ্র তার বাদিবিনোদ গ্রন্থে পদ অপার্থক ও বাক্যঅপার্থক প্রত্যেকটির আবার তিনপ্রকার ভাগ স্বীকার করেছেন — অনাকাঙ্ক্ষ, অযোগ্য এবং অনাসন্ন যথাক্রমে আকাঙ্ক্ষা, যোগ্যতা ও আসত্তির সর্ভ উল্জন জনিত। প্রথম যে স্থলটি পদ অপার্থকের উদাহরণ রূপে উল্লিখিত হয়েছে তা অনাকাঙ্ক্ষার উদাহরণ। কিন্তু রৌরুকমেতং অজিনম এই পদদ্বয় সাকাঙ্ক্ষ হলেও তারা অনাসন্ন হওয়ায় মিলিতভাবে অর্থবোধ জন্মাতে ব্যর্থ। আবার বহ্নি অনুষ্ণ পদদ্বয় একত্রে অর্থবোধ জন্মাতে সমর্থ নয় যেহেতু এই পদদ্বয় উপস্থাপিত অর্থ অসঙ্গতিপূর্ণ। এটি অযোগ্যের স্থল। পর্বত বহ্নিমান এবং সূর্য পূর্বদিকে উদ্ভিত হয় এই বাক্যদ্বয় মিলিতভাবে শব্দ বুদ্ধির জন্য নয় কারণ তাদের মধ্যে আকাঙ্ক্ষার সম্বন্ধ নেই। এটি অনাকাঙ্ক্ষার স্থল। ‘দেবদন্তেন গিরিরভুক্তমগ্নিমানিতি’ এরূপ বাক্য উচ্চারণকারী কোনও বিশেষ অর্থ প্রকাশে ব্যর্থ। যেহেতু এখানে নির্দিষ্ট ক্রমে পদগুলি প্রযুক্ত হয়নি। যদি দেবদন্তের পরেই ভুক্তম পদটি ব্যবহৃত হত তবে বোঝাতে সক্ষম হত যে দেবদন্ত খাদ্য গ্রহণ করেছে। তেমনি গিরিরগ্নিমানিতি বললেও পর্বত বহ্নিমান এই অর্থ উপস্থাপিত হয়। পূর্বে বাক্য অপার্থকের স্থলরূপে যার উল্লেখ করা হয়েছে তা অযোগ্যের উদাহরণ রূপে গণ্য হতে পারে।

আলোচনায় অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষ যদি অক্ষর সমষ্টির সদৃশ অর্থহীন শব্দসমূহ প্রয়োগ করেন তবে তিনি নিরর্থক বা অনর্থক নামক বাক্যদোষের সূচনা করেন। যেমন পঞ্চবর্গের ন্যায় কেবল অক্ষর সমষ্টিমাত্র প্রয়োগ করলে তা অভিপ্রেত অর্থের উপস্থাপনা করতে ব্যর্থ হয়।^{১৭} মহর্ষি গৌতম নিরর্থক নিগ্রহস্থান স্বীকার করেছেন।

বর্ণসমূহের ক্রমিক নির্দেশের তুল্য অর্থশূন্য বচন প্রয়োগ জন্য উক্ত নিগ্রহ স্থানের উদ্ভব হয়। যেমন শব্দ অনিত্য এই পক্ষ স্থাপন করতে গিয়ে কেউ যদি বলেন ‘অনিত্য: শব্দ ক চ ত পা নাং, জ ব গ ড দশত্বাৎ, ঝ ভ ঞ ঘ চম বদিতি’ তবে তিনি মহর্ষি গৌতমের মতে নিজপক্ষে নিরর্থক নাম নিগ্রহস্থানের সূচনা করেন।^{১৮}

যে বাক্য দৃষ্টান্ত, সিদ্ধান্ত ও সময় বা নিয়মের বিরুদ্ধ তার প্রয়োগ জন্য বিরুদ্ধ নামক বাক্যদোষের উদ্ভব হয়।^{১৯} কোনও বাক্য দৃষ্টান্তের বিরুদ্ধ বলতে গেলে চরকের মতে দৃষ্টান্ত কাকে বলে আলোচনা করা প্রয়োজন। দৃষ্টান্ত বলতে চরক বুঝিয়েছেন এমন বিষয়কে যার সম্বন্ধে মূর্খ ও পণ্ডিতের বুদ্ধি সাম্য আছে এবং সেই সাম্য দ্বারা বর্ণনীয় বিষয় বর্ণনা করা যায়। চরককে অনুসরণ করে বলা যায় যদি কেউ বহির উষ্ণতা বোঝাতে গিয়ে সলিলকে দৃষ্টান্তরূপে উল্লেখ করেন তবে তা হবে দৃষ্টান্ত বিরুদ্ধ স্থল। কারণ সলিলকে দৃষ্টান্তরূপে উল্লেখ করার অর্থ হচ্ছে সলিলও যেমন উষ্ণ বহিও তেমন উষ্ণ এরূপ বলা। কিন্তু সলিল যে উষ্ণ নয় তা বলবৎ প্রমাণ দ্বারা সিদ্ধ। উক্ত বাক্য দ্বারা উপস্থাপিত বক্তব্য বাধিত। বহুবিধ পরীক্ষাপূর্বক হেতুসমূহ দ্বারা সাধন করে যে নির্ণয় স্থাপিত হয় তা সিদ্ধান্ত। চরক চার প্রকার সিদ্ধান্ত স্বীকার করেছেন। যে বাক্য সিদ্ধান্ত বিরোধী তা বাক্যদোষ। যেমন নিস্পৃহ হেতুমুক্ত পুরুষ পরজন্মে ফলপ্রদকর্ম করে না এই বক্তব্য নিম্নোক্ত বিষয়গুলিকে সিদ্ধ করে — কর্মফল, মুক্তি, পরজন্ম ইত্যাদি। এগুলি অধিকরণ সিদ্ধান্ত নামে পরিচিত। এমন বাক্য যদি প্রযুক্ত হয় যার বক্তব্য হচ্ছে কর্মফল নাই অথবা মুক্তি অসম্ভব অথবা পরজন্ম নাই তবে সেরূপ বাক্য সিদ্ধান্ত বিরুদ্ধ হওয়ায় বাক্য দোষ নামে পরিচিত। সময় বা নিয়মের সঙ্গে বিরোধী বাক্য প্রয়োগ জন্য বাক্য দোষের উদ্ভব হয়। সময় আবার তিনপ্রকার - আয়ুর্বেদিক সময়, বৈদিক সময় ও মোক্ষশাস্ত্রিক সময়। যেমন — মোক্ষশাস্ত্রিক সময় হচ্ছে সর্বজীবে অহিংসা। এই সময়ের বিরোধী বচন প্রযুক্ত হলে বাক্যদোষের উদ্ভব হয়।^{২০}

মহর্ষি গৌতম প্রতিজ্ঞা বিরোধ নামক নিগ্রহস্থান স্বীকার করেছেন। বিচারে অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষ যে প্রতিজ্ঞা উপস্থাপনা করেছেন তার সঙ্গে যদি প্রযুক্ত হেতু বিরুদ্ধ হয় অথবা প্রতিজ্ঞা বাক্যের সঙ্গে যদি হেতু বাক্যের বিরোধ থাকে তবে প্রতিজ্ঞা বিরোধ নামক নিগ্রহ স্থান সূচিত হয়।^{২১} যেমন কেউ যদি দ্রব্য গুণব্যতিরিক্ত এ পক্ষ প্রতিষ্ঠার জন্য রূপাদি থেকে ভিন্ন পদার্থের অনুপলব্ধিকে হেতু বলেন তবে তিনি প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভব ঘটান।

চরক যে বিরুদ্ধ নামক বাক্যদোষের উল্লেখ করেছেন তার থেকে প্রতিজ্ঞা বিরোধের স্বাতন্ত্র্য এই অংশে যে এই স্থলে যাদের মধ্যে বিরোধ তারা উভয়েই আবশ্যিকভাবে নিজপক্ষ স্থাপনার্থে প্রযুক্ত বাক্যসমূহের অন্তর্গত অঙ্গদ্বয়। কেউ কেউ প্রতিজ্ঞা শব্দটিকে উপলক্ষণপর গ্রহণ করে নিজপক্ষ সাধনার্থে উপস্থাপিত যুক্তির যে কোন অংশদ্বয়ের বিরোধকেই প্রতিজ্ঞা বিরোধ বলতে চেয়েছেন।

বিরুদ্ধ নামক বাক্যদোষ বিষয়ে চরকের বক্তব্য দেখে মনে হয় কোনও বাক্য স্বীকৃত নিয়মের বিরোধী বক্তব্য উপস্থাপনা করলে তা অভিপ্রেত অর্থ প্রতিপাদন করতে ব্যর্থ হয়। এই কথা আমাদের মনে করিয়ে দেয় কোনও কোনও নৈয়ায়িকের কথা যারা কোনও বাক্যের অর্থ প্রতিপাদক হওয়ার পক্ষে তার দ্বারা উপস্থাপিত অর্থের বাধাভাবকে অন্যতম শর্ত বলে স্বীকার করেছেন। যেমন আমরা জানি উদয়নাচার্যের মতে কোনও বাক্য প্রমাত্মক বুদ্ধির জনক হবে যদি তা আকাঙ্ক্ষা, যোগ্যতা, আসক্তি যুক্ত পদদ্বারা গঠিত হয় এবং অবাধিত অর্থের প্রতিপাদক হয়।^{২২}

চরক স্বীকৃত বিভিন্ন বাক্যদোষের স্বরূপ আলোচনা করা হল এবং সম্ভাব্য স্থলে ন্যায়মতের সঙ্গে তুলনামূলক

আলোচনা করা হয়েছে। এখন প্রশ্ন হচ্ছে চরক এদের সকলকে বাক্যদোষ বলে কেন স্বীকার করলেন? পরের অধ্যায়ে আমরা সেই প্রশ্ন আলোচনা করবো।

চরক স্বীকৃত বিভিন্ন বাক্যদোষের স্বরূপ আলোচনা করা হল এবং সম্ভাব্যস্থলে ন্যায়মতের সঙ্গে তুলনামূলক আলোচনা করা হয়েছে। এখন প্রশ্ন হচ্ছে চরক এদের সকলকে বাক্যদোষ বলে কেন স্বীকার করলেন? পরের অধ্যায়ে আমরা সেই প্রশ্ন আলোচনা করবো।

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বাক্য শ্রবণ জন্ম যে আমরা জ্ঞানলাভ করতে পারি সে কথা অনস্বীকার্য। কিন্তু কোনও বাক্য অভিপ্রেত অর্থ প্রতিপাদন করতে গেলে কতগুলি শর্ত পূরণ করতে হয়। এই শর্তগুলির কতগুলি যেমন শ্রোতার দিক থেকে পূরণ হওয়া প্রয়োজন, কতগুলি আবার বক্তার দিক থেকে সত্য হওয়া আবশ্যিক। অপর কতগুলি শর্ত যে বাক্য প্রযুক্ত হচ্ছে তার পূরণ করা দরকার।^{৩৩}

বাক্যটিতে যে যে শর্ত পূরণ করতে হয় তারা হচ্ছে বাক্যান্তর্গত পদগুলিকে সাকাক্ষ হতে হবে। একটি পদ অপর পদটিকে অপেক্ষা করে তবেই কোন বিশিষ্ট অর্থ প্রতিপন্ন করতে পারে এবং অপর পদটিকে অপেক্ষা না করে ঐ অর্থ প্রতিপাদনে ব্যর্থ হয়, তবেই বলা যাবে পদদ্বয় সাকাক্ষ।^{৩৪} যে পদের সঙ্গে অপর পদ মিলিতভাবে কোনও বিশেষ অর্থ প্রতিপাদন করবে তারা অব্যবধানে উচ্চারিত হওয়া প্রয়োজন। অনাবশ্যক ব্যবধানে তারা উচ্চারিত হলে মিলিতভাবে কোনও অর্থ প্রতিপাদনে ব্যর্থ হয়। পদগুলি একরূপ অব্যবধানে প্রযুক্ত হলে তাদের মধ্যে আসক্তি আছে বলতে হয়। যে যে পদ মিলিতভাবে বিশেষ অর্থ প্রতিপাদনে প্রযুক্ত হয়েছে তারা পৃথক পৃথক ভাবে এমন অর্থ নির্দেশ করতে পারবে না যারা পরস্পর অসঙ্গতিপূর্ণ। একপস্থলে পদদ্বয়ের মধ্যে যোগ্যতা আছে একথা স্বীকার করতে হয়। অন্যভাবে বলতে গেলে দুটি পদ যদি এমন ভিন্ন ভিন্ন অর্থের প্রতিপাদক হয় যাদের মধ্যে বিরোধিতার সম্বন্ধ বর্তমান তারা মিলিতভাবে কোনও অভিপ্রেত অর্থ প্রতিপাদনে ব্যর্থ হয়।

কোনও বাক্য যদি একাধিক খণ্ড বাক্যের সমন্বয়ে গঠিত হয় তবে খণ্ড বাক্যগুলির মধ্যে অনুরূপ প্রয়োজনীয় সম্বন্ধ থাকতে হবে। যে দুটি বাক্য মিলিত ভাবে কোনও অর্থ প্রতিপাদন করতে পারে তাদের মধ্যে একটি মূল অর্থ প্রতিপাদনে অবশ্যই অপরটিকে অপেক্ষা করবে এমনভাবে যে অপরটিকে ছাড়া এককভাবে তা ঐ অর্থ প্রতিপাদনে সক্ষম হবে না। যে বাক্যগুলি মিলিতভাবে কোনও বিশেষ অর্থ প্রতিপাদন করবে তাদের অব্যবধানে উচ্চারিত হতে হবে। অনাবশ্যক ব্যবধানে দুটি বাক্য উচ্চারিত হলে তারা মিলিতভাবে কোনও অর্থ প্রতিপাদনে ব্যর্থ হয়। কোনও বাক্যদ্বয় যদি পরস্পর অসঙ্গতিপূর্ণ অর্থের উপস্থাপক হয় তবে তারা সংযুক্তভাবে কোনও বিশিষ্ট অর্থ উপস্থাপনা করতে পারে না।

যে যে বাক্যদোষের কথা চরক উল্লেখ করেছেন তাদের প্রত্যেকটির ক্ষেত্রে উক্ত সর্তের কোনও না কোনটি পূর্ণ হয়নি।^{৩৫} যেমন ন্যূন নামক বাক্যদোষের ক্ষেত্রে যে বাক্যটি কোনও বিশেষ অর্থ প্রতিপাদনে অপরবাক্যকে অপেক্ষা করে না তা প্রযুক্ত হয়। যে স্থলে মূল আলোচ্য বিষয়ের সঙ্গে সর্বথা অসম্বন্ধ বক্তব্য উপস্থাপিত হয় সেস্থলেও যে বক্তব্য আকাঙ্ক্ষিত তার উপস্থাপনা না হয়ে যা অনাকাঙ্ক্ষিত তা উপস্থাপিত হয়। যে পদ সমূহ বাক্যরচনা করে সে পদগুলির মধ্যে কোনটি যদি অর্থহীন হয় তবে বাক্যটি অর্থপ্রতিপাদনে ব্যর্থ হয়। যে

কোন অক্ষর সমন্বয়ই অর্থাবহন করে না। কিন্তু অক্ষর সমন্বয়ই অর্থাবহন করে না। কিন্তু অক্ষর সমন্বয় যা অর্থ বহনে ব্যর্থ তা বাক্যের অন্তর্গত হলে সেই বাক্যপ্রয়োগ অনর্থক। খণ্ডবাক্যগুলি পৃথক পৃথকভাবে অর্থবাহক হলেও তারা যদি অপ্রয়োজনীয় ব্যবধানে প্রযুক্ত হয় তারা মিলিতভাবে কোন অর্থ প্রতিপাদন করতে পারে না। উক্তস্থলে অর্থ প্রতিপাদক বাক্যগুলির মধ্যে অব্যবধানে প্রযুক্ত হয় তারা মিলিতভাবে কোন অর্থ প্রতিপাদন করতে পারে না। উক্তস্থলে অর্থ প্রতিপাদক বাক্যগুলির মধ্যে অব্যবধানে প্রযুক্ত হওয়ার শর্ত পূরণ হয়নি। খণ্ডবাক্যগুলি পৃথক পৃথক ভাবে অর্থবাহক হলেও তাদের দ্বারা উপস্থাপিত অর্থ অসঙ্গতি পূর্ণ হলে তারা মিলিতভাবে কোনও অর্থের উপস্থাপক হতে পারে না। কোনও বাক্য যদি এমন অর্থ প্রতিপাদনাথ্যে প্রযুক্ত হয় যা কোনও স্বীকৃত সত্যের বিরোধী তবে তা অভিপ্রেত অর্থ প্রতিপাদনে ব্যর্থ হয়। এক্ষেত্রে লক্ষ্যনীয় যে সাধারণত পদের মধ্যেই আকাঙ্ক্ষা, আসক্তি, যোগ্যতার সন্স্ক স্বীকার করা হয় কিন্তু মহাবাক্যের অন্তর্গত খণ্ডবাক্যগুলোর মধ্যেও ঐ জাতীয় কোনও সন্স্ক স্বীকার করতে হয়। চরক এবং উদয়নাচার্য যাদের মতের কথা আমরা উল্লেখ করেছি তাদের মতে বাখা ভাবকে যথার্থ জ্ঞানজনক বাক্যের দ্বারা পূর্ণনীয় অন্যতম শর্ত হিসেবে স্বীকার করতে হয়। সেক্ষেত্রে অবশ্যই যোগ্যতাকে বাধাভাব অর্থে গ্রহণ করা যায় না। যদিও যোগ্যতা বলতে কেউ কেউ বাধাভাব বোঝেন।

মহর্ষি গৌতম যতন্ত্রভাবে বাক্যদোষের আলোচনা করেছেন বলে জানা নেই। কিন্তু নৈয়ায়িকের পক্ষে পূর্বোক্ত নির্দিষ্ট অর্থে বাক্যদোষ স্বীকার অসম্ভব নয়। বস্তুত উদয়নাচার্য তার ন্যায়কুসুমঞ্জলি গ্রন্থের মঙ্গলাচরণ শ্লোকে ‘অন্য’ শব্দে প্রয়োগ করেছেন। ৩৬ এই অন্য শব্দ শব্দ দোষ রাহিস্থকে বোঝায়। বাক্যদোষ একরকম শব্দ দোষই।

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এই অধ্যায়ে আমরা চরকসম্মত সেই সেই নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ আলোচনা করব যাদের চরক বাক্যদোষ রূপে যতন্ত্রভাবে উল্লেখ করেননি। সম্ভাবস্থলে আমরা ন্যায়মতের সঙ্গে চরকের মতের তুলনা করবো। নিগ্রহস্থানের বিভিন্ন প্রকার উল্লেখ করতে গিয়ে চরক প্রতিজ্ঞাহানির কথা প্রথম উল্লেখ করেছেন। চরককে অনুসরণ করে আমরা প্রথমে প্রতিজ্ঞাহানিনামক নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ বোঝার চেষ্টা করবো। ধরা যাক সম্ভাব্য অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষ আত্মার নিত্যস্থ পক্ষ অবলম্বন পূর্বক তা স্থাপন করলেন। প্রতিপক্ষ উক্ত মতের বিরুদ্ধে আপত্তি উত্থাপন করতে তিনি পূর্ণগৃহীত পক্ষ ত্যাগ পূর্বক আত্মার অনিত্যস্থ পক্ষ গ্রহণ করলেন। এই ক্ষেত্রে তিনি তার পক্ষে প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভব ঘটালেন।^{১৭}

আমরা জানি মহর্ষি গৌতমও প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি নামক নিগ্রহস্থান স্বীকার করেছেন। তারমতে বিচারস্থলে বাদী যদি অপরপক্ষ কর্তৃক সমালোচিত হয়ে নিজ দৃষ্টান্তে প্রতিদৃষ্টান্তের ধর্ম স্বীকার করেন তবে তিনি নিজপক্ষে ‘প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি’ নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের সূচনা করেন।^{১৮}

ভাষ্যকার উল্লিখিত উদাহরণের সাহায্যে আমরা প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ আলোচনা করবো। ধরা যাক বিচারস্থলে বাদী বললেন ‘শব্দ অনিত্য যেহেতু তা ইন্দ্রিয় গ্রাহ্য যেন ঘট’। কিন্তু প্রতিবাদী বাদীর বিরুদ্ধে আপত্তি উত্থাপন করলেন যে ইন্দ্রিয়গ্রাহ্য স্বরূপ হেতু যার সাহায্যে শব্দের অনিত্যত্ব সাধন করার চেষ্টা করা হয়েছে তা নিত্য জাতিতেও বর্তমান হওয়ায় উক্ত হেতু ব্যভিচার দোষে দুষ্ট। প্রতিবাদীর আপত্তির উত্তরে বাদী

বলেন যে ইন্দ্রিয়গ্রাহ্যত্বহেতু ঘটনাদি জাতি যদি নিত্য হয় তবে ঘটও নিত্য হোক তবে ঘটের ন্যায় শব্দ অনিত্য একথা বলা কোনও ক্রমেই সম্ভব নয়। তাকে বস্তুতঃ ‘শব্দ নিত্য’ এ পক্ষই স্বীকার করতে হবে। তা তার প্রথম প্রতিজ্ঞা হানিরই নামান্তর। ‘ঘট নিত্য’ এই আকারে দৃষ্টান্তহানির জন্যই ভাষ্যকারের মতে প্রতিজ্ঞাদি নিগমনান্ত পক্ষের ত্যাগ করতে হয়। এই ত্যাগ প্রযুক্ত উক্ত পক্ষাবলম্বনকারীর ‘প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি’ নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের সূচনা হয়। কিন্তু বাদী স্পষ্টতঃ ‘শব্দ নিত্য’ এরূপ না বলায় তা সরাসরি পূর্ব প্রতিজ্ঞা ‘শব্দ অনিত্য’র হানি নয়। কিন্তু চরক সরাসরি পূর্ব প্রতিজ্ঞার ত্যাগকেই প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি বলেছেন। কিন্তু বার্তিককার উদ্যোতকর মনে করেন মুখ্য অর্থে প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি দেখানো সম্ভব হলে উপচারের দ্বারা প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি প্রদর্শনের প্রয়োজন নেই।^{১১} ধরা যাক বাদী বললেন শব্দ অনিত্য যেহেতু তা ইন্দ্রিয়গ্রাহ্য। প্রতিবাদী উক্ত হেতুর বিরুদ্ধে ব্যতিচার দোষের আপত্তি উত্থাপন করলেন এইভাবে যে সামান্যে ইন্দ্রিয় গ্রাহ্যরূপ হেতু থাকলেও তা নিত্য। বাদী এই আপত্তির পরিপেক্ষিতে যদি বলেন যে তাহলে শব্দ নিত্য হোক তবে তিনি পূর্ব প্রতিজ্ঞা ত্যাগ করে শব্দরূপ পক্ষে পূর্ব স্বীকৃত ধর্মের বিরুদ্ধ ধর্ম নিত্যত্ব স্বীকার করায় তার প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভব হয়।^{১২} কোনও কোনও মতে আবার বিরুদ্ধ সমালোচনার পরিপেক্ষিতে কথায় অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষের প্রথমোক্ত পক্ষ, হেতু, দৃষ্টান্ত, দূষণ যে কোনওটির হানিই প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি।^{১৩}

ইষ্ট স্বপক্ষে অনিষ্ট জ্ঞানকে অভ্যনুজ্ঞা বলে।^{১৪} গঙ্গাধরের মতে নিজপক্ষবাদের কাছে ইষ্ট। সেই ইষ্ট স্বপক্ষ প্রতিবাদী কর্তৃক প্রদর্শিত দোষ হেতু অনিষ্টতে পর্যবসিত হয়ে পরমতের স্বীকার অভ্যনুজ্ঞা।^{১৫} কিন্তু কবিরাজ ব্রজেন্দ্রলাল শীলের মত ইষ্ট স্বপক্ষে পর কর্তৃক দোষ প্রদর্শিত হলে অনিষ্ট জ্ঞানকে অভ্যনুজ্ঞা বলে।^{১৬} উদাহরণের সাহায্যে বিষয়টিকে বোঝানো যায়। ধরা যাক আলোচনায় অংশগ্রহণকারী কোনো পুরুষ প্রতিবাদীর বিরুদ্ধে আপত্তি উত্থাপন করলেন যে তিনি চোর। প্রতিবাদী এর উত্তরে বাদীকেই বললেন যে তিনিও চোর। এক্ষেত্রে নিজের চৌরত্ববাদের কাছে অনিষ্ট কিন্তু প্রতিবাদীর চৌরত্ব তার কাছে ইষ্ট। কিন্তু তাকে উভয়ই স্বীকার করতে হচ্ছে। চরক স্বীকৃত অভ্যনুজ্ঞা নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ আলোচনা থেকে মনে হয় ন্যায়দর্শনে উল্লিখিত মতানুজ্ঞা নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের সঙ্গে তার অনেকাংশে সাদৃশ্য বর্তমান। মহর্ষি গৌতমের মতে বিচারস্থলে বাদীর বিরুদ্ধে প্রতিবাদী আপত্তি উত্থাপন করলেন। বাদী প্রতিবাদীর আপত্তির উত্তর না দিয়ে তার বিরুদ্ধেও সেই আপত্তিই উত্থাপন করলে তবে তার পক্ষে মতানুজ্ঞা নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভব ঘটে। যেমন কোনও বাদীকে প্রতিবাদী বললেন আপনি চোর। বাদী সেই আপত্তির উত্তর না দিয়ে প্রতিবাদীকে বললেন ‘আপনিও চোর’। সেই স্থলে বাদী নিজের বিরুদ্ধে মতানুজ্ঞা নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের সূচনা করলেন।^{১৭}

চরকের মতে বিচারে অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষের যা পূর্বে বলা উচিত ছিল তা পরে বললে কালাতীত বচন নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভব ঘটে। যেমন বিচারে নিজ পক্ষ স্থাপনের উদ্দেশ্যে প্রতিজ্ঞাদি পঞ্চাবয়ব প্রযুক্ত হয়। ঐ বাক্য সকল একটি নির্দিষ্ট ক্রমেই প্রযুক্ত হয়। কিন্তু এই বাক্য প্রয়োগের ক্ষেত্রে ক্রম লঙ্ঘন করে ধরা যাক নিগমন বাক্যের করে প্রতিজ্ঞাবাক্য প্রয়োগ করা হলো। এক্ষেত্রে উক্ত প্রয়োগকারী নিজপক্ষে কালাতীত বচন নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের সূচনা করলেন।^{১৮} ধরা যাক বাদী প্রতিবাদী কোনও বিশেষ নিগ্রহস্থান প্রাপ্ত হলেও যদি সেইসময় তার উল্লেখ না করে বহুপরে তার উল্লেখ হয় তবে সেক্ষেত্রেও কালাতীত বচন নামক নিগ্রহস্থান সূচিত হয়।^{১৯}

চরক স্বীকৃত কালাতীতবচন নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের সঙ্গে গৌতম স্বীকৃত অপ্ৰাপ্তকাল নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের সাদৃশ্য আছে বলে মনে হয়। গৌতমের মতে বিচারে নিজ পক্ষস্থাপনকারী প্রতিজ্ঞাদি পঞ্চাবয়ব নির্দিষ্ট ক্রমে

প্রয়োগ না করে যদি ক্রম লঙ্ঘন পূর্বক ঐ পঞ্চাবয়ব প্রয়োগ করেন তবে অপ্রাপ্তকাল নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভব হয়।^{৪৮} কিন্তু পরবর্তীকালে বিচারে অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষের ক্রমান্বয়ে সম্পাদনীয় কার্যের ক্রম লঙ্ঘন করার দরুণও অপ্রাপ্তকাল নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভাবন হয় বলে স্বীকার করা হয়েছে। বিচার স্থলে বাদী প্রতিবাদীকে ক্রমান্বয়ে বিভিন্ন অংশের কর্তব্য সম্পাদন করতে হয়। বিভিন্ন অংশকে বিভিন্ন ‘পাদ’ বলা যায়। একই পাদের অন্তর্গত আবার বিভিন্ন কর্তব্য। সেই কর্তব্যের আবার নির্দিষ্ট ক্রম স্বীকার করা হয়েছে। যেমন প্রথমপাদে বাদী নিজপক্ষ স্থাপন করবেন এবং নিজপক্ষে উপস্থাপিত হেতুর নির্দোষতা প্রমাণ করবেন। দ্বিতীয় পাদে প্রতিবাদী বাদীর পক্ষে দোষ প্রদর্শন করবেন, তৃতীয় পাদে নিজমতস্থাপন করবেন। কিন্তু প্রতিবাদী যদি বাদীর পক্ষ খণ্ডন না করেই নিজ পক্ষ স্থাপন করেন তবে কথাপাদ বিপর্যাস বলে গণ্য হবে। কথার প্রথম পাদে বাদী নিজপক্ষে হেতুর উপস্থাপনা পূর্বক তার কষ্টকোদ্ধার করেন। সুতরাং একই পাদে পর্যায়ক্রমে এই কর্তব্যদ্বয় সম্পাদনীয়। কিন্তু বাদী যদি স্বপক্ষস্থাপনে হেতু প্রয়োগ না করেই কষ্টকোদ্ধারে প্রবৃত্ত হন তবে কথা পাদাংশ বিপর্যাস ঘটে। নিজপক্ষ স্থাপনার্থে প্রতিজ্ঞাদি পঞ্চাবয়ব নির্দিষ্ট ক্রমে প্রযুক্ত না হলে অবয়ব বিপর্যাসের উদ্ভব হয়। আবার একটি স্বীকৃত অবয়বের মধ্যে পরবর্তী অংশটি যদি আগে ও পূর্বাংশটি পরে উচ্চারিত হয় তবে অবয়বাংশ বিপর্যাসের সূচনা হয়।^{৪৯}

চরক তিনপ্রকার অহেতুর আলোচনা করেছেন উদাহরণসহ। এই তিনপ্রকার অহেতু হচ্ছে যথাক্রমে প্রকরণসম, সংশয়সম ও বর্ণ্যসম। সম্ভাষায় অংশগ্রহণকারী পুরুষ অহেতুর প্রয়োগজন্য নিগ্রহ প্রাপ্ত হন। প্রকরণসম হেতুর উদাহরণ দিতে গিয়ে চরক বলেছেন ধরা যাক কেউ বললেন শরীর থেকে ভিন্ন আত্মা নিত্য। কিন্তু শরীর থেকে ভিন্ন আত্মা নিত্য কেন? যেতেই তা শরীর থেকে ভিন্ন। কারণ শরীর অনিত্য। তাই তার থেকে ভিন্ন আত্মা নিত্য। কিন্তু এই অনুমান চরকের মতে দুষ্ট কারণ এই অনুমানের পক্ষ ও হেতু অভিন্ন।^{৫০}

যা সংশয়ের হেতু তাই যদি সংশয়চ্ছেদের হেতুরূপে ব্যবহৃত হয় তবে সংশয়সম নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভব হয়। ধরা যাক এই ব্যক্তি আয়ুর্বেদের এক অংশ নিয়ে আলোচনা করেছেন। সেই কারণে সন্দেহের উদ্বেগ হয়েছে যে তিনি প্রকৃতই একজন চিকিৎসক অথবা নন। এই সংশয় নিরাশার্থে যদি এরূপ অনুমানের অবতারণা করা হয় যে ঐ ব্যক্তি একজন চিকিৎসক যেহেতু তিনি আয়ুর্বেদের একদেশ বলেছেন। এরূপ অনুমানে যা সংশয়ের কারণ অর্থাৎ আয়ুর্বেদের একদেশ কখন তাই এ সংশয় নিরাসের হেতুরূপে উল্লিখিত হয়েছে। সুতরাং তা অহেতু।^{৫১}

বর্ণ্যসম অহেতুর উদাহরণ দিতে গিয়ে চরক বলেছেন যে বুদ্ধি অনিত্য যেহেতু তা স্পর্শ করা যায় না। যেমন শব্দ। এক্ষেত্রে দৃষ্টান্ত শব্দ। দৃষ্টান্ত হচ্ছে যেখানে হেতু ও সাধ্যর ব্যাপ্তি সম্বন্ধে গৃহীত হয়েছে। দৃষ্টান্ত হচ্ছে পক্ষভিন্ন যাতে সাধ্য নিশ্চিত। কিন্তু এ স্থলে যদি দৃষ্টান্ত শব্দতেও সাধ্য অনিত্যত্ব অনিশ্চিত হয় তবে দৃষ্টান্তও পক্ষের সদৃশ হবে। পক্ষে যেমন সাধনীয় ধর্ম প্রতিষ্ঠিত নয় তেমনি দৃষ্টান্তেও সাধ্য নিশ্চিত নয়। সেই কারণে উক্ত অনুমানের প্রযুক্ত হেতু বর্ণ্যসম।^{৫২}

অহেতুর উক্তস্থল গুলি পর্যালোচনা করে দেখা যাক এক্ষেত্রে মূল দূষকতা বীজ কোথায় নিহিত। ধরা যাক প্রকরণসম অহেতুর ক্ষেত্র। সে স্থলে পক্ষ ও হেতু অভিন্ন হওয়ায় কি অসুবিধের সৃষ্টি হতে পারে। পক্ষে হেতুর ভিত্তিতে সাধ্যের নিশ্চয় হওয়া সম্ভব নয় যদি পক্ষতে হেতুর নিশ্চয় না হয়। পক্ষে হেতুর নিশ্চয় হওয়া অর্থ পক্ষধর্মতা জ্ঞান থাকা অর্থাৎ হেতুর পক্ষসত্ত্ব ধর্মের জ্ঞান থাকা। হেতুর পক্ষবৃত্তিত্ব জ্ঞান থাকতে হলে হেতুকে

পক্ষের ধর্ম বলে জানতে হয়। পক্ষ ধর্মী ও হেতু ধর্মী না হলে হেতুর পক্ষধর্মতা জ্ঞান হওয়া সম্ভব নয়। কিন্তু পক্ষ ও হেতুর যথাক্রমে ধর্মী ও ধর্ম হতে গেলে উভয়ের মধ্যে ভেদ থাকা প্রয়োজন। কিন্তু পক্ষ ও হেতু যদি অভিন্ন হয় তবে একরূপে ধর্ম ধর্মীভাব উৎপন্ন হয় না। সুতরাং প্রকরণসম অহেতু পক্ষসত্ত্ব ধর্মশূন্য। সংশয়সম অহেতু হেতুরূপে কি কারণে গণ্য হতে পারে না তা ভেবে দেখতে হবে। কোনও পক্ষে কোনও হেতুর ভিত্তিতে বিশেষ সাধ্য ধর্ম অনুমান করতে গেলে উক্ত হেতুর সঙ্গে সাধ্যের ব্যাপ্তি সন্দ্বন্ধের জ্ঞান থাকা প্রয়োজন। কিন্তু যতক্ষণ পর্যন্ত সাধ্যভাবের সঙ্গে হেতুর সন্দ্বন্ধের সম্ভাবনা থেকে যাচ্ছে ততক্ষণ হেতু ও সাধ্যের মধ্যে ব্যাপ্তি সন্দ্বন্ধের জ্ঞান হওয়া সম্ভব না। কিন্তু এই সম্ভাবনা থেকে যায় যতক্ষণ পর্যন্ত সাধ্যভাবের নিশ্চিত অধিকরণে বা বিপক্ষে হেতুর অস্তিত্বাভাব সিদ্ধ না হয়। অন্যভাবে বলতে গেলে হেতুর বিপক্ষাসত্ত্ব ধর্ম সিদ্ধ না হয়। কিন্তু সংশয়সম অহেতু সাধ্যের সঙ্গে যেমন সন্দ্বন্ধযুক্ত সাধ্যভাবের সঙ্গেও তার সন্দ্বন্ধযুক্ত হওয়ার সম্ভাবনা থাকায় তা সাধ্যকে প্রমাণ করতে অক্ষম। বর্ণ্যসম অহেতুটি সাধ্যের সঙ্গে ব্যাপ্তি সন্দ্বন্ধযুক্ত রূপে নিশ্চিত নয়। কারণ হেতুটি সাধ্যের সঙ্গে সন্দ্বন্ধযুক্ত হলে এবং সেই ব্যাপ্তির আকার যেখানে যেখানে হেতু সেখানে সেখানে সাধ্য একরূপ হলে, এই আকারের ব্যাপ্তি যে স্থলে গৃহীত হবে তা আবশ্যিকভাবে স্পক্ষ, অর্থাৎ যেখানে সাধ্যের অস্তিত্ব নিশ্চিত। কিন্তু দৃষ্টান্তরূপে যাকে গ্রহণ করা হয়েছে তাতে যদি সাধ্য নিশ্চিত না হয় তবে হেতুর সাধ্যের সঙ্গে ব্যাপ্তি সন্দ্বন্ধ সেইস্থলে গৃহীত হতে পারে না। অর্থাৎ হেতুর সপক্ষ সত্ত্ব ধর্ম নিশ্চিত হতে পারে না।

উপরিউক্ত আলোচনার ভিত্তিতে বলা যায় যে চরক হেতুর পক্ষসত্ত্ব, সপক্ষসত্ত্ব ও বিপক্ষাসত্ত্ব ধর্মে বিশ্বাস করতেন। এই ত্রিবিধ ধর্মের কোনও একটি না থাকলেই তা অহেতু বলে গণ্য হয়েছে। এখানে অহেতু শব্দ দৃষ্টহেতু বা হেত্বভাস অর্থেই ব্যবহৃত হয়েছে।^{১০}

মহর্ষি গৌতমের মতে যেহেতু সাধ্য ও সাধ্যভাব উভয়ের অধিকরণেই বর্তমান ও সব্যভিচার হেত্বভাস। যেমন শব্দঃ নিত্য অস্পর্শত্বাৎ এই অনুমানের হেতু অস্পর্শত্ব নিত্যত্বের অভাবের নিশ্চিত অধিকরণ বুদ্ধিতে বর্তমান হওয়ায় তা ব্যভিচারি। কোনও পক্ষ স্বীকার করে তা প্রতিপাদনার্থে যদি এমন হেতুর প্রয়োগ করা হয় যা নিয়তই তার বিরুদ্ধ পক্ষের সঙ্গে সন্দ্বন্ধযুক্ত তবে সেই হেতু বিরুদ্ধ। যেমন শব্দ নিত্য যেহেতু তা উৎপন্ন হয় একরূপে অনুমান স্থলে ‘উৎপত্তিমত্ব’ রূপ হেতু নিয়তই সাধ্যভাব নিত্যত্বভাবের সঙ্গে ব্যাপ্তি সন্দ্বন্ধযুক্ত হওয়ায় উক্ত হেতু বিরুদ্ধ। ধরা যাক নৈয়ায়িক পক্ষ অবলম্বনকারী পুরুষ শব্দের অনিত্যত্বধর্ম প্রতিষ্ঠার্থে বললেন শব্দ অনিত্য যেহেতু তাতে নিত্য ধর্ম অনুপলব্ধ। তার বিরোধিতা পূর্বক স্ত্রীমাংসক পক্ষ অবলম্বনকারী পুরুষ বললেন শব্দ নিত্য যেহেতু তাতে অনিত্য ধর্ম উপলব্ধ হয় না। উক্ত অনুমানদ্বয়ের হেতু দুটির কোনওটিই অভিপ্রেত সাধ্য সাধনে সমর্থ নয়। কিন্তু শব্দের অনিত্যত্ব ও নিত্যত্ব রূপ প্রকরণ দ্বয় জিজ্ঞাসার উৎপাদক হওয়ায় প্রকরণসম নামে পরিচিত। কোনও সাধ্যধর্মের সাধকহেতু যদি সাধ্য ধর্মের ন্যায় সাধনীয় হয় অর্থাৎ পূর্বে অসিদ্ধ হয় তবে তা সাধ্যসম। ভাষ্যকারের মতে ছায়াতে দ্রব্যত্ব সাধনার্থে যদি গতিমত্বকে হেতুরূপে প্রয়োগ করা হয় এবং পূর্বপক্ষীর মতে ছায়াতে গতিমত্ব সিদ্ধ না হয় তা অভিপ্রেত সাধ্য প্রতিপাদনে অক্ষম হয়। ছায়ার দ্রব্যত্ব যেমন সাধনীয় সেরূপ ছায়ার গতিমত্বও সাধনীয় হওয়ার উক্ত সেতু সাধ্যসম। উদাহরণের সাহায্যে কালাতীত হেতুর স্বরূপ বোঝা যাক

। যেমন শব্দ নিত্যঃ, সংযোগব্যঞ্জিত্ব হেতু যেমন রূপ এরূপ অনুমানের উপস্থাপনা করা হচ্ছে। উক্ত হেতু অভিপ্রেত সাধ্য সাধনে অক্ষম কারণ শব্দের অভিব্যক্তি সর্বদাই সংযোগের কালকে অতিক্রম করে। অর্থাৎ সংযোগ নিবৃত্ত হলে বিভাগকালে শব্দশ্রুত হয়।

মহর্ষি গৌতম স্বীকৃত হেত্বাভাসগুলি আলোচনার থেকে বোঝা যায় যে সম্ভাব্যস্থলে তিনি হেতুর পঞ্চরূপ স্বীকার করেছেন। সেই পঞ্চরূপ হচ্ছে (১) পক্ষসত্ত্ব (২) সপক্ষসত্ত্ব (৩) বিপক্ষাসত্ত্ব (৪) অসৎপ্রতিপক্ষত্ব ও (৫) অবাধিতত্ত্ব। হেতুর পক্ষসত্ত্ব ধর্মের অভাবে সাধ্যসম নামক হেত্বাভাস, সপক্ষসত্ত্ব ধর্মের অভাবে সাধ্যসম নামক হেত্বাভাস, সপক্ষসত্ত্ব ধর্মের অভাবে বিরুদ্ধনামক হেত্বাভাস, বিপক্ষাসত্ত্ব ধর্মের অভাবে সব্যাভিচার নামক হেত্বাভাস, অসৎ প্রতিপক্ষত্ব ধর্মের অভাবে প্রকরণসম নামক হেত্বাভাস, অবাধিতত্ত্ব ধর্মের অভাবে কালাতীত নামক হেত্বাভাসের উদ্ভব হয়।

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উপরিউক্ত আলোচনার ভিত্তিতে বলা যায় যে চরক সামান্যতঃ নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ আলোচনার পূর্বেই প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি, অভ্যনুজ্ঞা, হেত্বস্তর ইত্যাদি নিগ্রহস্থানের স্বরূপ আলোচনা করেছেন। এবং শাস্ত্রীয় আলোচনার ক্ষেত্রে সাধারণতঃ উদ্দেশ্য, লক্ষণ, পরীক্ষা ইত্যাদির যে নির্দিষ্ট ক্রম অনুসরণ করা হয়, তা তিনি অনুসরণ করেননি।

অতীতকাল বা কালাতীত নামে যে নিগ্রহস্থানের আলোচনা করেছেন তার স্বরূপ আলোচনা অহেতুর আলোচনার পরেই করা হয়েছে। অহেতু বা দৃষ্ট হেতুর প্রয়োগকারী সম্ভাব্যস্থলে অবশ্যই নিগ্রহীত হবেন এই মতে চরক বিশ্বাসী হলেও অহেতুর স্বরূপ নিগ্রহস্থানের আলোচনার থেকে স্বতন্ত্রভাবেই করেছেন। পূর্বেই বলা হয়েছে যে বাক্যদোষ গুলির স্বতন্ত্র আলোচনা করেছেন। যদিও বাক্যদোষগুলির বেশীরভাগই নিগ্রহস্থান রূপে উল্লেখ করেছেন। ব্যর্থ নাম নিগ্রহস্থানের উল্লেখ করেছেন কিন্তু তার স্বরূপ আলোচনা করেননি। এখন প্রশ্ন হচ্ছে কিরূপ স্থলে ব্যর্থ নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভব হতে পারে? কোনও বক্তব্য যদি অপ্রাসঙ্গিক হয় তবে তার উত্থাপন ব্যর্থ হয়। যদি কোনও বক্তব্য পুনরুক্তি করা হয় তা ব্যর্থ হয় অর্থাৎ প্রয়োজনীয় উদ্দেশ্য সাধন করতে পারে না। অথবা ধরা যাক একটি হেতু প্রয়োগ করে নিজ পক্ষ স্থাপন করতে হবে এই প্রকার পূর্বচুক্তি থাকা সত্ত্বেও যদি একাধিক হেতু প্রয়োগ করা হয় তবে তা ব্যর্থ হয়। কিন্তু এই পরিস্থিতিগুলিতে যথাক্রমে অর্থান্তর, পুনরুক্তি এবং অধিক নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভব হয়। অতিরিক্ত নিগ্রহস্থানরূপে তাকে স্বীকার করার প্রয়োজন কি?

ন্যায়দর্শনে স্বীকৃত প্রতিজ্ঞান্তর, প্রতিজ্ঞাবিরোধ, প্রতিজ্ঞাসন্যাস চরক নিগ্রহস্থান বলে উল্লেখ করেননি। টীকাকার গঙ্গাধর অবশ্য এদের প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের অন্তর্গত করেছেন। তার মতে চারটি বিভিন্ন ভাবে হতে পারে প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি।^{৪৩} ন্যায়দর্শনে স্বীকৃত অপসিদ্ধান্ত নামক নিগ্রহস্থান চরক স্বীকার করেননি। কিন্তু তাকে চরকসম্মত বিরুদ্ধ নামক বাক্যদোষের অন্তর্গত করা যায় কিনা তা ভেবে দেখার বিষয়। কারণ অপসিদ্ধান্ত নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের উদ্ভব হয় কোনও সিদ্ধান্তকে স্বীকার করে নিয়ে বিচারে অংশগ্রহণ করে প্রসঙ্গক্রমে সেই সিদ্ধান্তের বিরোধী বক্তব্য উপস্থাপনার দরুন।^{৪৪} বিরুদ্ধ নামক বাক্যদোষের ক্ষেত্রেও বিভিন্ন শাস্ত্রীয় নিয়ম বিরুদ্ধ বাক্যপ্রয়োগের কথা বলা হয়েছে। চরক ন্যায়দর্শনে উল্লিখিত অবিজ্ঞাতার্থ, নিরণুয়োজ্যানুযোগ, পর্যনুয়োজ্যাপেক্ষণ নামক নিগ্রহস্থান যে যে পরিস্থিতিতে উৎপন্ন হয় তাদের নিগ্রহস্থান রূপে উল্লেখ করলেও তাদের ঐ বিশেষ নাম উল্লেখ

করেননি। একথা আমরা আগেও বলেছি। ন্যায়দর্শনে স্বীকৃত বিক্ষেপ, অজ্ঞান, অননুভাষণ অপ্রতিভা নামক নিগ্রহস্থানের কথা চরক উল্লেখ করেননি। কিন্তু তিনি যে তাদের অস্বীকার করেছেন এ পক্ষে কোনও প্রমাণ নেই। এমন হতেও পারে যে গৌতমের মত চরকও নিগ্রহস্থানের উদাহরণ প্রদর্শন করতে গিয়ে এদের উল্লেখ করেছেন। নিগ্রহস্থানের সংখ্যা নির্ধারণ তার উদ্দেশ্য নয়।

উল্লিখিত আলোচনার ভিত্তিতে একথা বলা যায় যে চরকের তুলনায় গৌতমের নিগ্রহস্থান সম্পর্কীয় আলোচনা অনেক বেশী বিস্তৃত ও সুশৃঙ্খল। তবে পরবর্তী নৈয়ায়িকদের হাতে এই আলোচনা বিস্তৃত থেকে বিস্তৃততর হয়েছে।

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- ৫২। ঐ
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- ৫৪। চরকসংহিতার উপর রচিত জল্পকল্পতরু টীকা - গঙ্গাধর চরকসংহিতা ৩য় খন্ড ১৯৯১ বিমানস্থান পৃ: ১৬৫৭

Book Review - I**Philosophical Reflections (Revised and enlarged Edition)****G.C. NAYAK**

Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi

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A PHILOSOPHER'S REFLECTION

PRABHAT MISRA

Professor G.C. Nayak's Philosophical Reflections contains twenty one outstanding articles : 1. Illumination through Analysis : A Study in Vedantic Conception *Viśa-Viś* the Mādhyamika; 2. The Philosophy of Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti; 3. Satori in Zen Buddhism; 4. The Noble Truths, 5. Māyā: The Advaitin's Gordian Knot; 6. Significance of Knowledge in S'ankara and Yājñavalka 7. Tolerance in Advaita; 8. Transcendental Secularism; 9. Freedom in Indian Thought; 10. Rationalism of the Gītā ; 11. The Philosophy of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa ; 12. The Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo; 13. What is living and what is dead in Religion; 14. A plea for Common-ism; 15. Values : Dharma and Mokṣa ; 16. Dharma and its Transcendence as a value in Indian Thought and its culmination in Madhyamika and Ch'an / Zen Buddhism; 17. Analytic Philosophy : Its Multiple Facets; 18. The Problem of Universals; 19. Can there be any Indeterminate Perceptions (Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa); 20. The Criterion of Personal Identity; 21. Can There Be a Synthesis of Eastern and Western Thought ?

As mentioned above, the articles are different from one another. Professor Nayak has covered many areas of Philosophy with a leaning towards Indian Philosophy. Every article demands good review. But space of this journal will not permit to cover all. As a whole, I may state that each article carries weight and bears the stamp of Professor Nayak's original thought . Twenty one articles may be classified into three main heads : metaphysical , Moral and Epistemological. In each of them there is in-depth analysis of the subject based on authority and solid reasoning.

As for example, in the First article, Professor Nayak justifiedly comments

that S'ankara's idea of illumination through analysis is nothing but the analysis of akhaṇḍārtha - vākyas of the Upaniṣads. And it should not be taken as a mere linguistic illumination, but an illumination of Ultimate Reality to be received after the eradication of avidyā. He has also compared this illumination with The Prajñā of the Mādhyamika. Mentioning some difference between the two he also emphasises that both S'ankara and the Mādhyamika take 'normal transactions of our day-to-day life as also the ordinary language to be sacrosant in their our sphere.'

The Second article is concerned with the Mādhyamika theory of S'unyaṭā in Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. To Professor Nayak, the concept of S'unyaṭā is neither mystical, nor religious. 'What is denied is the ontology of immutability fixed and independent metaphysical essence of things as well as concepts, leaving our day-to-day transactions unaffected.'

The fourth article 'The Noble Truths' emphasises that the cessation of desire (*tanhā*) is a necessary feature of the enlightenment in the teaching of Buddha. Buddha, Professor Nayak Shows, actively participated to eradicate the social evils of egoistic desire and craving by preaching his moral teaching.

According to Professor Radhakrishnan and Professor S.N. Dasgupta, by introducing the concept of *Māyā*, S'ankara has explained the world away. Our author opines that S'ankara was not at all interested in giving explanations of the origination of the world. In the Fifth article on *Māyā* he states that to S'ankara, Philosophy has nothing to do with cosmology. It is entirely neutral to any theory of creations. The follows of S'ankara has misinterpreted his introduction of the concept of *Māyā*.

The Advaita Monism has an appreciable contribution to Indian culture. It teaches us the ideal of tolerance. In the article *Tolerance in Advaita Vedanta* (Seventh article), Professor Nayak Comments, 'What is important is to note how tolerance as an ideal is found to be woven into the very structure and forms an integral part of Indian culture as reflected in the philosophy of transcendental monism and a unique variety of secularism associated with this philosophy.'

The Most original article in this collection is *A Plea for Common-ism* (Fourteenth article). From an anecdote in *Saptas'atī Candī* of the *Markandeya Purāṇa*, Professor Nayak has discovered a Unique philosophy, which is, to him,

common-ism. This philosophy emphasises that knowledge is not only the private property of some selected wise and aristocrate - knowledge is the property of human beings in general - common men - even of all the living beings. Ignoring this fact, we are being misled in the human society - in the fields of democracy, educations and morality. This article reminds us of Husserl's introduction of the concept of the life-world in *The Crisis. Husserl* was also of opinion that our ignorance of the life-world-the lived world of common men is the root of the crisis of the day.

Due to shortage of space, very unwillingly I am jumping to the last article, *Eastern and Western Thought*. Here Professor Nayak has particularly attacked Professor Paul Deussen, an eminent German Scholar of 19th century, who frequently attempted to compare the thoughts of Indian and Western philosophers. To him, 'the comparison of Advaita with Parmenides or Plato or even Kant as is done in Denssen's work though at times illuminating, is bound to be misleading in so far as the unique approach of the Advaita is assimilated to and loses its independent identity in the jungle of Western thought relevant only in the specific context to which it belongs.' According to our author, 'all such comparative estimates are bound to suffer from a sort of reductionism, if the comparison is pushed beyond a certain limit.' In fact, some thinkers of east and west, often want to compare classical Indian Philosophical thoughts with Western philosophical thoughts for the international recognition of Indian philosophy. They are not doing right. They are not doing justice to Indian Philosophy. They must be aware of the mentioned 'limit', about which Professor B.K. Lal was aware and Professor J.N. Mohanty and Professor Daya Krishna are very conscious.

In Professor Nayak's collection of essays there are some new interpretations of the thoughts of Sri Aurobindo and Baladeva Vidyabhūṣaṇa . There are some thought-provoking ideas about the problem of Universals and the status of *Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa* . As a whole all the articles may arouse philosophical reasonings in the reader's mind. The language is artistic, but lucid. *Philosophical Reflections* is certainly a valuable contributions to contemporary Indian Philosophy. This reviewer humbly expects more and more such contributions from Professor Nayak, who so far his *Reflections* reveals, is basically an Advaita Vedāntin .

Book Review - II

THE SĀMKHYA PHILOSOPHY
 An Analytical Study
 BIJAYANANDA KAR
Ajanta □ *Delhi* □ 2003 □ *Rs. 125*

A CRITIQUE OF SĀMKHYA

PRABHAT MISRA

The Sāmkhya is the oldest system of Indian Philosophy. The philosophy of Sāmkhya as we acquire from its basic texts like S'āmkhya - Karika, Yukti - Dīpika, Tattva - kaumudī etc. is not always consistent. So an analytic study of the Sāmkhya Philosophy is always welcome. This has been done by Professor Bijayananda Kar, a stalwart in the field of contemporary Indian Philosophy.

Professor Kar's *The Sāmkhya Philosophy : An Analytical Study* has seven chapters. Beginning from the study in the Sāmkhya concept of S'ruti pramāṇa, the study ends with a new interpretation of the Sāmkhya concept of *Kaivalya*. Within the campus of his study, he covers the main parts of the conceptual framework of the system like Kāraṇata, prakṛti, guṇas and puruṣa.

After a brief but reasonable study of the place of s'ruti pramāṇa in the Sāmkhya Philosophy, Professor Kar opines that, the Sāmkhya philosopher does not accept sruti as a pramāṇa in the sense of just accepting the authority of the Vedas. To the Sāmkhya, philosophical propositions — Vedic or non-Vedic must conform to reason. The Vedic assertions can be accepted as valid only when they are found to be reason-based, otherwise there would be little to distinguish between *aitihya* and *s'ruti*. So Prof. Kar firmly concludes, "... for the Sāmkhya Philosophy, *s'ruti pramāṇa* cannot signify the Vedic authority. It rather means that method through which valid knowledge regarding the meanings of different assertions become possible." We know, though the Sāmkhya system is recognised as Vedic, it has

original philosophical speculations independent of the Vedic Philosophy.

According to Prof. Kar, Sā m khya Satkaryavāda is established in opposition to the a Satkaryavāda of the Nyāya - Vais'eṣika . But both the theories of causation are theoretically right from their own standpoints. Each view appears to be ultimately based on an arbitrary definition of the world 'effect' : And the definitions are of the nature of recommendations — may not be justified on the basis of observed or experimental facts. So to Kar, "We are free to accept one and reject the other without thereby committing a mistake."

Prof. Kar has also seriously reviewed Vācaspati's commentary to the arguments for Satkāryavāda as furnished in the Sā m khya - Kārikā. To him, the whole of Vācaspati's defence has tried to establish the non-difference (*abheda*) between cause and effect at the formal level. But can it be consistently applied to the natural phenomena of experience ? Kar illustrate, "Though verbally cloth is treated as nothing but the arrangement of yarn in a particular manner, still factually cloth is not yarn and not even yarn being arranged in a particular manner.' So the identity of cause and effect like the yarn and the cloth is nothing but the instance of linguistic manipulation without having any factual significance. The arguments of Vacaspati in support of Satkāryavāda may obviously be disputable. And Satkāryavāda has not been firmly established.

As Satkāryavāda has no solid foundation, the arguments for the existence of prakṛti, which are based on this theory of causations are not also well-founded. Here also Prof. Kar reviews Vacaspati's commentary. He critically observes, 'throughout the series of arguments there is an explicit confusion between the formal level and the material level. From a peculiar concept of the world-order, the argument proceeds to postulate a type of cause, the notion of which is formally implied in the previous conception of the world-order . So from one arbitrary formulation of the world-view , we pass on to a conception which is logically implied in the former. This does not prove any fact. It only shows inter-relation among concepts or ideas, in an arbitrary manner.' And 'so at last it seems to us that the Sā m khya arguments are logically powerless to establish the existence of prakṛti as the sole cause of the world-order.'

Prakṛti in the Sāṃkhya is nothing but the guṇas . What are the guṇas ? Prof. Kar, being unanimous with Prof. Radhakrishnan, thinks that the guṇas are neither *dharma*s, nor substances, nor mental properties, nor something as *apradhāna*s , but power or *s'akti* . Yet Kar is confused about the Sāṃkhya estimate of the change of the state of equilibrium of the guṇas to the state of their disequilibrium. His confusion is not unjustified.

The twenty fifth *tattva* of the Sāṃkhya is *puruṣa* . Prof. Kar finds serious inconsistency in the arguments for the existence of *Puruṣa* as furnished in the Sāṃkhya -*Ārika* and its commentary of *Vacaspati*. He finally remarks, 'Sāṃkhya philosophers fail to establish the existence of *puruṣa* . Their failure is mainly because they have become victim to the illusion of both logic and language. While they seek to prove the actual existence of *puruṣa* they employ most of the arguments which are merely formal in character and do not yield any conclusions regarding matter-of-fact.'

In the Sāṃkhya , liberation or *mukti* is called *kaivalya* as it means the realisations that *puruṣa* is absolutely isolated (*kaivalya*). The Sāṃkhya postulates a novel view that *puruṣa* is fully left to its own stall without having association or involvement with *prakṛti* in any sense of the term. In dealing with the Sāṃkhya concept of *Kaivalya* Prof. Kar finally opines that 'the state of *kaivalya* or complete dissociation cannot be conceived as a state of release or freedom as ordinarily understood. It is not the sense of relief from pain and suffering. Because the state of relief in the ordinary sense requires the presence of individuality with the background of ego. The *jīva* is to realise that he is free from suffering and he remains for that attainment. But he ceases to be as the Sāṃkhya philosophical positions requires. And the real *puruṣa* is ever *asaṅga* in view of absolutely being uninvolved and unconcerned being with the affairs of *prakṛti* and its cause of evolution. So the sense of attaining freedom, in the Sāṃkhya *dārs'anic* framework at least, seems to be quite nebulous and not promising.'

Scholars interested in the Sāṃkhya philosophy must collect and go through Prof. Kar's work. My study of this scholarly study always reminds me the name of *Iswarchandra Vidyasagar* to whom the Sāṃkhya is a false philosophy. Kar does not go to that end, but to him this philosophical system lacks rational foundation.