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For all editorial communications :

Prabhat Misra, Chief Editor, Philosophy and The Life-world, Department of Philosophy and the Life-world, Vidyasagar University, Midnapore 721102, W.B., India Telephone- 03222-60554 (Extn) 422- e-mail : Vidya 295@sancharnet.in

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VOLUME 4 CONTENTS MARCH 2002

CAN A MAN BE CIVILIZED AND YET VIOLENT ? Laxminarayan Lenka	1
HUMAN CLONING : SOME BIO-ETHICAL QUESTIONS D.N. Tiwari	7
MORAL JUSTIFIABILITY OF VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA Padmabati Rakshit	17
THE BIOLOGICAL MODEL OF THE RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND BODY : SOME REFLECTIONS Shampa Bhattacharya	26
TRUTH AND DESIGNATION Mamata Bandyopadhyay	40
QUANTIFICATION OVER POSSIBLE WORLD : A MODAL INTERPRETATION Kantilal Das	48
MILL AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS R.N. Karani	57
BHĀVA-RUPA : AN ANALYSIS Bijayananda Kar	70
পঞ্চপাদিকা-বিবরণ (সবিত্তি অনুবাদ) অমরনাথ ভট্টাচার্য	75
অখ্যাতিবাদ : একটি অদ্বৈতবাদী সমীক্ষা মৃদুলা ভট্টাচার্য	89
BOOK REVIEW Bhupendra Chandra Das	92

CONTRIBUTORS

LAXMINARAYAN LENKA Department of Philosophy, North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong 22, Assam

D. N. TIWARI Department of Philosophy, L.N. Mithila University, Darbhanga 846004, Bihar

PADMABATI RAKSHIT Department of Philosophy, Santipur College, Nadia, West Bengal

SHAMPA BHATTACHARYA Department of Philosophy, Mrinalini Dutta Mahavidyapith, Birati, Calcutta 700051, West Bengal

MAMATA BANDYOPADHYAY Department of Philosophy, Burdwan University, Burdwan West Bengal

KANTILAL DAS Department of Philosophy, North Bengal University, Darjeeling, West Bengal

R. N. KARANI 75, Hughes Road, Mumbai 400 007, Maharashtra

BIJAYANANDA KAR AM-26, VSS Nagar, Bhubaneswar 751004, Orissa

AMARNATH BHATTACHARYA Department of Philosophy, Burdwan University, Burdwan, West Bengal

MRIDULA BHATTACHARYA Department of Philosophy, Burdwan University, Burdwan, West Bengal

BHUPENDRA CHANDRA DAS Vidyasagar University, Midnapore, West Bengal

CAN A MAN BE CIVILIZED AND YET VIOLENT ?

LAXMINARAYAN LENKA

Gandhiji has discovered one of the most popular and effective weapons, namely, non-violence . It is popular because most of us do not like blood-shedding. It is effective because it compels the targeted people to go back or surrender the arms. The simple tactical reason behind its use is this. If you are nowhere before the violent power of your opponent and violence legitimizes violence,¹ then, it is suicidal on your part to become violent. In a context like this, it is always wise to choose the path of non-violence . Even if you do not like to have it as a moral ground, you can use it as a tactical ground. Non-violence, as John Kenneth Galbraith puts it, "is not only a powerful moral instrument, it is also a weapon of choice."²

Turn on the TV news; you will hear about bomb-blasts, accidents, inhuman killings, crossfire, etc. Are we genuinely moved by such informations ? Is it true that our conscience does express us something when we hear the sufferings of others ? Every conscience condemns an inhuman act. But no conscience has become strong enough to prevent such acts in absolute terms. This in turn issues license to become complacent enough with the little "no" we have towards violence and injustice . Often we prefer escapism, reasoning out that we cannot prevent such acts in absolute terms.

Not only inhuman acts but also any injustice towards our fellow beings does not affect us significantly. It is not necessarily because we are selfish and cowardice. The indifference is largely due to our failure to exercise our conscience. Unlike the laws of our sciences, the laws of our conscience are not in use. In fact, we are yet to use our conscience in the sense that we have no system of conscience parallel to the systems of science; no language of conscience parallel to different languages of different sciences. Insofar as meaning of our expressions is inseparable from its use, that is, no language is possible without being in use, language of conscience exists or does not exist depends on whether there exists the use of such language or not.

If we lack courage we cannot be selfish and, on the other hand, if we are selfish we must be courageous. If one tolerates an injustice on him and tolerates the same kind of injustice on others, his indifference cannot be due to his selfishness; if "x is selfish" means that x reacts to something that directly affects x, otherwise x does not. One may tolerate an unjust act because he considers the act a relatively minor one; resistance against that act may incur a major injustice. Perhaps, he is wise enough to avoid unnecessary complications in the simple life he has chosen to lead. He does not lack courage; if "x is courageous" means that x has the ability to resist against injustice, he is able to resist but, on the basis of his wisdom, he does not. Neither the presence of selfishness nor the absence of courage is necessary for the indifference towards injustice. On the basis of the wisdom one tolerates injustice on himself. On the same basis, one can become indifferent to the injustice done to others. He can be indifferent, yet he does not lack courage, nor is he selfish. One may be selfish and yet become sensitive to an injustice, to get some political or professional mileage. One may lack courage and yet become sensitive to injustice to prevent a major injustice for which he does not have the courage to face. One may be both selfish and lacking courage and yet become sensitive to injustice because he not only gains in his own way but also lacks the courage to face the relatively major one. So selfishness and lack of courage are not sufficient to give rise to indifference as much as a non-selfish courageous man is not necessarily a compassionate man.

We can rationalize a lie; justify an act of lying. The ground can be this. The committed vice is justifiable if it leads to a greater virtue. For example, murdering a murderer is less vicious than murdering an innocent person; telling a lie is not at all vicious if it saves an innocent's life; saving an innocent's life is more virtuous than speaking the truth. War is virtuous if it protects our motherland. Protection of motherland is more virtuous than peace. Any such rationalization presupposes a hierarchy of virtues and vices. Accordingly, one can rationalize any vice except the one committed in violation of the highest virtue. If the highest virtue varies, the hierarchy varies and, accordingly, what is worthy of rationalization also varies, hence, rationalization itself becomes unjustified.³

If we consider peace more virtuous than the virtue of defending our national interest, we cannot rationalize war in the name of national interest. Either we lose our national interest or we choose some means other than war to protect our national interest. The Operation Vijaya is an example of our choice

in which we have not rationalized war for our national interest. Of course, we have not asserted the same. Rather, we are ready to assert that our national interest is more virtuous than peace and thereby, we are ready to rationalize war.⁴

The ultras, extremists, fanatics and fundamentalists may rationalize their violent acts as much as a patriot or a nationalist can. However, a difference can be made out.⁵ A nationalist sees to it that the nation does not perish in the course of the violent action he has adhered to with whatever ideology. On the other hand, a fanatic can sacrifice the whole group (including himself) for the cause of the ideology he adheres to. Even if, like the fanatics, we rationalize some vice or other, we won't be ready to sacrifice ourselves, at least, not ready to sacrifice every member of the society we belong to.

War does not exhaust violence, nor does the militant operations. War and militancy easily attract our attention due to the high magnitude of violence they bring about. The scale of violence is very high in terms of the number of victims and the amount of loss. However, the number of persons creating such violence is very less in comparison to the number of persons having an attitude of violence. Almost all of us have this attitude.

We can distinguish

1) We should not have violence against dogs and abstain from throwing stones at them.

From 2) We should not create a violence between two dogs by throwing a piece of bone.

In the 1st case violence stands for an attitude that we should not have towards dogs. In the 2nd case, violence stands for a kind of disturbance in the normal life of the two dogs. We are more conscious of the disturbances, not of the attitude that leads to the disturbances. Perhaps, we are just aware of the disturbances rather than being seriously concerned about the disturbances.

If you have an attitude of non-violence, it prevents you from thinking to do violence, thereby, from doing violence to animals as well as to human beings. Thus, if the concept of non-violence includes actual as well as the thinking of doing non-violence, and targets to both human beings and animals, then, it fundamentally refers to an attitude. "Be non-violent" is closer to "Believe in God", rather than "Don't kill that man". Whether God really exists or not, you can believe or disbelieve in God; you cannot kill or save a man if he does

not exist. Similarly, the attitude of non-violence can be held with respect to non-existing beings as well as to the existing ones. That is why non-violence in thinking, besides being in practice, is possible. As Gandhiji holds, a true non-violence in thinking, besides being in practice, is possible. As Gandhiji holds, a true non-violence includes both. Otherwise, non-violence towards animals or to one's own conscience makes no sense.⁶

Insofar as violence and non-violence are moral values and moral values are determined in relation to our civilization, violence and non-violence cannot be determined without reference to civilisation. If most of us are civilized and we consider the act of running after money morally good, the act is morally good, otherwise not. Similarly, if we accept militancy as our normal behaviour, militancy is no more a violence. If we consider the act of loving or respecting the opponent quite unbearable and responsible for a social turmoil, the act is no more a non-violence.⁷ In other words, if "violence" stands for disturbances quite unbearable on the part of the civilized members of the society, today what we consider violence, tomorrow we may consider the same as non-violence. What matters is the way we accept the things; acts we consider responsible for a disturbance in our normal social life and to what extent the disturbance is bearable. Accordingly, when we say that someone created violence in the meeting we mean that he has created a disturbance in the proceedings of the meeting such that the civilized members cannot tolerate it. When we say that the ultras have chosen the path of violence, we mean that their chosen path of violence, we mean that their chosen path disturbs the law and order situation which is unbearable on the part of the civilized members of the state. When we say that war is violence, we mean that their chosen path disturbs the law and order situation which is unbearable on the part of the civilized members of the state. When we say that war is violence, we mean that war is an unbearable disturbance in the normal social life of civilized members of our society cannot tolerate.⁸

There is an escape route. Even if we are civilized members and we kill or help in killing animals, we can make sense when we sincerely say that we should not do violence to the animals. We can do so by dissociating the meaning of "civilization" from that of "the civilized members". Insofar as civilized members of a society are concerned, killing of human beings is a violence but killing of animals is not; both may be violences with reference to a civilization. This is not at all to say that we are civilized members of a society without civilization. It just points out that the quality of becoming civilized does not require the fulfillment of what the civilization demands. To be a civilized member is quite different from

belonging to a civilization. To be a civilized human being is different from belonging to a civilization, to be a civilized Indian is different from belonging to Indian civilization. Thus, even if killing or help in killing the animals is forbidden in a civilization we happen to be its members, our killing or help in killing animals does not prevent us from becoming civilized.

We can make an easier move. Exclude the act of killing animals from the trait of becoming uncivilized, we can call ourselves civilized even if we kill animals. But, why should we exclude?⁹ It is all right if majority of us reflect on it and decide in favour of this exclusion and, then, kill animals. But it is wrong to say that we should exclude because majority of us kill animals and, no matter what we do, we would like to call ourselves civilized. If we exclude, we should be able to justify. If we cannot, a civilized member is not at all dissociated from civilization; at least, when "civilization" means "that mode of conduct which points out to man the path of duty".¹⁰

One may conclude in suggesting the following explicit answer to *Can a man be civilized and yet violent* ? Non-violence, taken as an attitude which excludes the thinking as well as the practice of violence against any living being, is almost absent in human civilization. Hence, either a man can be civilized and yet be violent or no human being is civilized. Secondly, if x is civilized means x acts in accordance with certain rules prescribed in the civilization he belongs to, then, some men can be civilized and yet violent whereas others cannot be civilized and violent. It all depends on what one's civilization prescribes one to do and what the concept of non-violence includes in its scope for that civilization. If none of these is a suitable answer, the concept of civilized man has nothing to do with the concept of civilization.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The violence of a group of religious persons distorts the law and order situation of the state. This justifies the governing authority to use force in order to restore the law and order situation.
2. John Kenneth Galbraith (1994), "Gandhi, The Tactician" in Dr. Arun Gandhi (Ed.) *World without Violence*, New Age International Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi., pp.95-96
3. In the sense that every rationalization is questionable, consequently, the wisdom that practically legitimizes indifference to injustice on oneself or other

is also questionable. We may rationalize selfishness and lack of courage but, since rationalization is questionable, we cannot successfully justify our selfishness or lack of courage.

4. A debate on the issue of nationalism vs. Cosmopolitanism with reference to moral preferences and educational values can be found in Cohen J. (Ed.) (1996) *For Love of Country : Debating the limits of patriotism*, Boston, Beacon Press.
5. For an elaborate discussion on this point, see R.M. Hare (1972) *Applications of Moral Philosophy*, The Macmillan press, London, pp.71-89.
6. For Gandhi, violence or non-violence to one's own conscience makes sense. See M.K. Gandhi(1927), *An Autobiography*, Translated from Gujarati by Mahadev Desai, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, p.345.
7. Of course, majority is not the standard to measure morality. As Gandhi puts it, "It is a superstition and ungodly thing to believe that an act of a majority binds the minority... All reforms owe their origin to the initiation of minorities in opposition to majorities. If among a band of robbers a knowledge of robbing is obligatory, is a pious man to accept the obligation ?" M.K. Gandhi (1909)"Hind Swaraj", *The Penguin Gandhi Reader*, P. 49.
8. If most of us are civilized and, at the same time, non-vegetarian, then, the killing of animals does not create any disturbance in our social life. Even if there is any disturbance, it is quite bearable. Otherwise, if killing or indirect help of killing animals amounts to violence (in the above sense), what a shame to us !
9. If we systematically make such moves, it inherits the danger of ruining our civilization. If whatever one does is right for him, there is no sense of right or wrong for him. The same is true of the majority. If for the majority of human beings right and wrong make no sense, destruction of human civilization is not far away.
10. *Hind Swaraj*, p.35.

HUMAN CLONING : SOME BIOETHICAL QUESTIONS

D. N. TIWARI

The technological era of ours has compelled us to accept that man can't live not only without techniques but even without technology also because it, in new millennium, has got an inevitable place into the very structure not only of our social but of our cultural life also. Technology has almost become the synonym of our entire advancement influencing ways of life and the life-style of the people of the millennium. The technological society of ours, unlike the 19th century European industrial society, considers that machines segregate man from society but technology integrate machines with society. Machines, when integrated with society, help us in getting rid of our backwardness in different aspects of our lives. I am not going to push this issue in further detail and like to confine my reflections on the Bioethics of some technological inventions like human cloning.

Bioethical concepts are getting more importance with the advanced inventions in the field of Biotechnology. The basic ethics lying behind Biotechnology is to serve the humanity in a way to save the life of human beings and to insure the means so as to enable them to live a complete life-span free from diseases and to preserve their capacity. Ultimately, its main objective is to save the rationality/wisdom and excellences on the earth. I confine my reflections, in this paper, to disclose the bioethical problems of human cloning and even so with few instance from Indian scriptures.

It is evident from the scriptures that Vedic India was highly developed in the field of spiritual knowledge and spiritual technique but there is no historical evidence to accept that she was civilized more than the present world of science and technology. The seers considered the realization of spiritual powers assigned naturally to individuals as the supreme goal for the realization of which they sacrificed their whole life. It was the power of realization which made them capable of knowing everything unknown to others. The spiritual techniques they invented for the welfare of the life on the earth were of more importance for the development and growth of human life, civilization and culture. As seers were of strong

will and indefatigable devotion, it was not difficult for them to do anything successfully they willed. The successful accomplishment of anything implies restless concentration and methodical search without which doubt persists in finding the required result.

Modern scientists, of the continents other than Asia or even of Asia, may deny any influence of prehistoric inventions found in the scriptures and they may claim the originality of their inventions but it cannot be denied that technological achievements of today are pre-requisitely progressively gradual in which the preceding inventions confer favor for progressive succeeding inventions. This may not be similar in case of prehistoric inventions of the seers which were new beginnings out of no material, no instrument or data available beforehand. They, as scriptures say, got the techniques as direct flashes of their super mental vision. Their vision is remarked as that in which the differences of subject and object are fused in a unity of the vision. A vision in which the perceiver does not stand apart from and at a distance from the thing perceived. The existential identity and epistemological difference of the both the subject and the object, at that moment, is transcended in the visionary concentration of truth which is neither a subject nor an object but knowledge itself. They practiced what they realized for the welfare of the life on the earth. Their experiences are preserved in the scriptures. Now-a-days, it is easy to understand that a serious researcher of any corner of the world keeps himself well aware of the informations belonging to any tradition and more than that it is not an exaggeration to say that the lives of those sacrificing themselves for the cause of scientific and technological inventions are not radically different from those of seers who sacrificed their lives for truth of the human persons and made it applicable to the welfare of them on the earth.

Cloning with some Instances from Indian Scriptures

In Skandha 9, Adhyāya 13, of Srimadbhāgavat, it has been mentioned that when his excellency Nimi was dead the seers by process of *Mantha*, perhaps, human cloning in modern idioms, of his body created a new baby. The baby was called *Janaka*, as it was out of (mantha) cloning of his father. It was called *Videha*, as it was not born from a mother but out of a non-sexual process. As the baby was born out of a process of mantha it was called '*Mithila*' and his kingdom was named *Mithilā* (*Janmana janakah so 'bhud vaidehastu videharjah. Mithilo mathanajjato mithila yena nirmata*). The questions arise : whether the *mantha karma* is the same that we know today by the word human cloning, whether the process adopted by the seers was the same that is applied by the technologists today and whether the

ethics lying behind it was the same. I am unable to say anything on those questions except on the last because I have knowledge neither of Mantha karma nor of human cloning. However, it is interesting to mention the morality lying behind *Mantha* — *Karma* as the epic itself has specified it. The morality then was not to save the excellence and order only but to check the mayhem to be caused out of its deprivation also.

Proving the existence of God, Rene Descartes, a Rationalist Philosopher, gave an argument that man cannot make himself. Had he made himself he would have made him God. New technology of cloning has come with an imagination that man can make himself and even so in his own imagination.

'Clone' is a Greek term for twin identical, genetically and physically, from the male or female from which it is derived. The derivation of Dolly, a lamb by Dr. Ian Wilmut of Scotland, Neti and Ditto, kids of monkey, by Oregon Regional Primate Research Centre of America have experimented that by transplanting D.N.A of any animate, in ovary, clone can be prepared. The creation of animal clone paved the way of materialization of the fascination of technologists to prepare human clones.

Very recently, when I read in the newspapers that Advanced Cell Technology (ACT), a company of America, has prepared human clone by the name 'Stem cell', I recalled the epic story of hundred sons of Gandhari, the mother of Kauravas, born out of a stem cell prepared by the seer Veda Vyāsa. Not only that but, the invention of 19 clones of human embryo by Advanced Cell Technology of America has also actualized the possibility of birth of 19 babies if all those clones are implanted in separate 19 wombs. ACT is claiming that stem cells will be most useful for cure of diabetes, heart diseases, cancer, aids, loss of memory and inherited diseases. This advancement in clone technology is suspected as the beginning of the big plants of human clones. Not only Psychologists and Philosophers but political, social and religious leaders have also started crying it immoral entombment of the natural order. I shall describe the bioethical issues of human cloning after few steps but before that I want to remark that it is by these inventions that we have come to believe that seer's speculations are myths no longer but are truths that can be worked out even today by technological inventions.

Transplantation of Embryo

The first surgeon, in the history of human life who successfully transplanted the embryo formed in the womb of Devaki, the mother of Krishna, the God of the epic

Mahabharata, in the womb of Rohini, another wife of Vasudeva, the father of Krishna, was, as the epic says, a pre-historic she-deity named Yogamāyā . *Srimadbhāgavat Gita, Adhyaya 2, Skandha10.*

A revival of that pre-historic event is evidenced by the world recently with a successful transplantation of the embryo of a daughter in the womb of her mother by a team of doctors in U.S.A.

Rejuvenation

The story of old seer Cyavana enjoying juvenility even in very old age, as mentioned by *Veda Vyāsa* in *Srimadbhagavad, adhyaya 3. skandha 9*, was considered, till very recently, only a myth but with recent technological invention of gene therapy by *Dr. Lee Swine* of University of Pennsylvania, has come to a truth.

As our body is completely controlled by genes any mutation or change in vitality of gene occurs in proportion to the increasing of age and, consequently, changes in muscles is naturally observed. These changes vary in case of our childhood, adulthood and old age. If we allow the change of gene from childhood to the youth, as the maturity of mind takes place only in youth, and after youth if we stop, for a possible period, the rate of change in gene, the duration of youth will be prolonged and, thus, the individual may achieve desired achievement of his life without feeling any fatigue and with all juvenility as well. This very mystery is successfully experimented by *Dr. Lee* through gene therapy.

Technology, including Biotechnology, is value free; it is neither good nor evil in itself. It gets value as good or evil when associated or applied in society. For instance, the idea before the terminator gene technology was to yield best possible production of grains and, hence, it is valued as good but, as we know the farmers of the State of Andhra in India committed suicide out of distress not only of getting no production out of sowing the seeds produced by those hybrid seed crops, but of getting the soil deserted also. This technology proved evil not only for them but for those who do not want to use those terminator gene seeds but whose crops in the fields, close to the field with the crops using those seeds, are inflated due to open natural pollination, also. Any technology, if there is possibility of causing wreckage by it, can't be pushed to flourish on the name of technological advancement. The basic ethical idea, not only before the ancient inventions, as mentioned in the scriptures, but before the recent technological inventions also, is to preserve the excellence on one hand and to meet with threats that may cause anarchy and disorder in the society.

I may be charged of being a conservative of a type who opposes all steps for novelty and progress in the beginning with a fear of a risk against traditional order and values. One may also say that it is foolishness to criticize a move not materialized so far. It is reasonable to say let the human clone be created then observe its excellence and behaviour and then evaluate it. If, otherwise, it will be only a guess work and, hence, unsteady. These all charges don't ? My views in the paper if I clarify that my analysis , in the paper, is the analysis of the concept formed in my mind by informations I acquired from different sources. However, I don't think that others will agree with my views in full but one can't deny the labor I have taken in exposing the ethical issues of human cloning .

Advantage of Cloning

- a. Stem cell which is prepared by cloning, as claimed by technologists, is the only fit remedy for getting rid not only of some of the diseases ? to one by heredity but for other diseases concerning cancer, heart, lung, liver, etc, in which replacement of healthy cells on the place of damaged cells are inevitably needed.
- b. Those pairs having no child will be privileged of getting a child out of the genetic material of their own by the cloning technology.
- c. Those pairs suffering from genetic diseases, which have made them physically and mentally incapable of getting birth of a child, may get relief by the human clone technology.

Cloning, from the scientific point of view, is a very splendid invention of the technology, It is a technological device and comes, in the society, with the ethics to preserve the life and great and sublime qualities/rationality on the earth on one hand and to help to remove our backwardness in the field of scientific knowledge on the other and, thus, it has a great value. But the question arises : Cloning for what purpose ? If, it is confined to grow human cells for cure of different inherited diseases, it must be welcome but if it is for creating a clone human being for preserving some excellence the question under consideration becomes more important. A task for the preservation of some excellence on the earth can't , ethically, be wrong. But it may be estimated useless, as the same may be preserved even by promoting gene therapy. I don't, only technologists know and can say, authentically, something about it. However, I propose to furnish few comments of my own just after few paragraphs but before that I want to say that human cloning, when evaluated connectedly with society we, apart from its all-scientific and technological importance, find it not only paradoxical but with nothing to live for also. Here below, I am giving reasons, given from different point of views but related to the

ethical issue of human cloning, for proving my statement —

1. Deformation of human nature

- A. Human being is a unique combination of rationality and animality. If, in the process of nurturing the clone, of a male, after and before its transplantation in the womb of a woman, the excess of Y chromosomes are artificially destroyed in order to balance the desired proportion of both of the chromosomes bearing supra and infra qualities, undoubtedly, super excellent/super rational beings, will be born but then they will be deprived of those excellences to be acquired by a mother. Not only that but he will be a particular excellence of a person of which it is a clone. In such a circumstance, it will not be different from a machine of a particular excellence and, thus, there is a possibility of destruction and deviation of rest of the qualities by that of particular quality.
- B. There must be danger of losing self-identity of clones also. It will be difficult to differentiate not only the clone from the person of which it is a clone but several clones of the same person also, if they appear, think and do alike. Not only that but the question of self-identity of the individual clones will arise which may, perhaps, lead to abnormally abuse of and confusion in between the clones also.
- C. The use of a clone, by the person of which it belongs, as means to his ends, can also not be denied. Claudia, a super model of Germany wishes to have two clones of her own to use them for getting herself free from her own burden of meeting to her numerous aspirant. Will it not be against the identity and freedom of an individual and, hence, immoral to use the human clones as one's means ?
- D. Clone-technology is not sure on the subject of the mutation like forming of tumor and other unknown diseases that may unusually be caused by the artificial killing of the excess of Y-chromosomes during processing clones.

2. Non-sexuality and lack of emotional attachment

- A. If animality is utterly neglected from the human person as in the cases of clones, there will be no possibility of proper imagination that arise in the mist of fascination, passion, emotion and other sublime human qualities. In lack of these human qualities there will not only be the question of isolation and danger of deformation of the clone person but of survival also.
- B. If the person of which the clone is prepared, is an underaged, there may be a risk of not getting maturity of mind till death and if it belongs to a person of over aged there is all risks of getting elderly soon as we find in the case of Dolly. Not only that but there will be the problem of relation of the person with his clone because of the reason that the stem cell will be prepared from the same genetic

source and, thus, the relation of the persons with their clones in respective cases will be of brothers/sisters and not of father/mother and, thus, there will be cases of identity of relation and possibility of dehumanization.

- C. A person may have a number of his clones at a time and, thus, it will be an unwanted and very dangerous cause of high rising population. Not only that but if the cloning, as industry is established, there will be cases of hiring wombs and that will not only be immoral but irreligious also.
- D. The clone person, I am not sure on the issue, is, perhaps, a being of a non-sexual category. In that case he/she will be of a non-sexual temperament and isolated from emotional attachment. He/She may get depressed in the absence of these human qualities which are causes of attraction that makes life worth-living. In his attachmentless life he may think of his life incomplete, purposeless and isolated and that may lead him to self-suicidal.

3. Deformation of family

- A. No family is possible without marriage and no genius person will like to enter into family by marrying a wife of different level brilliance as he may think of uncertainty of the quality of the offspring to be born out of their conjugal relation. Rather he/she will prefer to get an identical clone of his/her own and thus, there will be a case of deformation not only of the family but of the whole hereditary system also.
- B. In the cloning system women will be privileged because they are genetically fit self-creators. If it is so, there is no need of men for the birth of a clone baby but similar is not the case in vice-versa as man's cloning requires egg that can not be possible without a women. There will be no need of a male member in the family and, thus, there will be the cases of rise in the disproportionate population of female and desertion of males and thus, imbalance not only in the proportion of the two but in the nature itself also.

4. Division and moral deformation of society

- A. The society will, then, obviously be divided in two categories of the clone class and of the lower class. The former will be a category of highly genius supermen while the latter of deprives. The former will occupy all high positions, services of high ranks and power and the latter will be unable to compete them. Deprived category of persons, for their survival, may get perversion and may cause violence in the society. The clones will not mix with the rest on the ground of the principle of inequality and the rest will be deprived and disregarded.
- B. The morality in society will also be divided into the morality of the clones and that of the rest that is, herd or utilitarian morality. The clones, like Friedrich Nietzsche's superman, may claim that the utmost duty of the society is to rear

- clones who only have the right to live on earth. The morality of the clones based on the idea 'all that proceeds from the power is good and all that springs from weakness is bad' will upset the moral aim of equality and peace in the society.
- C. As the cloning of man inevitably requires women's egg, of which the nucleus is taken out, there will be a dependency on women but in the vice versa there is no requirement of sperm, the very presence of men will be needless and, therefore, existence of men will be questioned that would lead to disorder in the society.
 - D. The uniqueness and diversity of the qualities of human person in the society will be affected very badly as there will be a flood of the clones having uniformed qualities.
 - E. The number of orphan children will not only be rapidly raised high but there will be no solution to the problem of orphan adaptation also because the orphan-adopters of today would like to have a clone of their own rather than to adapt an orphan.

5. Deformation of democracy

Insisting on trans-valuation of the values the clones or super-rationals will distinguish themselves from the herd with an unbridgeable difference and inequality. In that case equality will be a synonym of weakness, a moral standard for the herd or mediocre, who have no right to live in the kingdom of ends, while inequality will be natural in the eyes of the clones. We know that equality is the basis of democracy and, thus, the acceptance of inequality as natural will disintegrate the democratic pattern and behavior.

6. Killing of embryos

In the process of cloning a number of embryos has to be slayed which is not only an immoral act but is irreligious sin also.

A substitute

According to the recent technological inventions the excess of Y-chromosome in the embryo, in mother's womb, destroys chromosomes bearing superman qualities and promotes the chromosomes causing perversion. Modern technology has invented such rays that can effectively destroy the excess of Y, in the womb of the mother herself, and this confers favor in promoting chromosomes bearing superman qualities. On account of this process a woman longing for birth of a child endowed with superman qualities can get relief that she would have not to suffer the life of severe sanctimonious and austerity for more than nine months as prescribed by Indian scriptures.

In order to insure that superman qualities can only develop and the inhu-

man and the anti-human qualities cannot, the Indian scriptures have prescribed some disciplines regarding the *sātvika* meal and healthy thoughts promoting *sattva* in parents before their intercourse with a desire to have such a child and after the fertilization as well. They prescribe certain norms for controlling sexual and other senses and concentration for sublimation of thoughts, their daily routine of eating, drinking, thinking and doing during pregnancy for the flow of *sattva*, in the baby in mother's womb in a natural way. This flow of *sattva* is effective in balancing the qualities 23-23 and, thus, making them stronger than Y chromosomes bearing deforming qualities and, consequently, leads not only to a total implantation of chromosomes bearing virtuous qualities but also in making them stronger than those of opposites, on account of which the advent of superman as evidenced by scriptures, is made possible.

Gunasutras 23-23, in number, combined in embryo, may be such that -

- 1- The number of chromosomes bearing superman qualities is more than those bearing infra qualities which cause the birth of superman.
- 2- The number of chromosomes bearing infra qualities is more than those bearing superman qualities which cause the birth of an individual of perverted or deformed nature.
- 3- Chromosomes bearing superman qualities are stronger than those bearing infra qualities which cause the birth of an individual of excellent qualities .
- 4- Chromosomes bearing infra qualities are stronger than those bearing superman qualities which cause the birth of a deformed person.
- 5- In cases when the number and strength of chromosomes bearing those separate qualities are, approximately equal, there is possibility of an ordinary individual. Clone baby, as I know (and I very quickly add that I do not know it) will be different from all of those possibilities. If I create my clone, my good qualities will be restored in it but the good qualities of my wife will not. But if the excellent qualities of both of the mother and the father are restored, as it occurs in some cases of heredity, and then if by technology we destroy the negative qualities of the parents in the embryo, there is possibility of creation even of **super** super-man and even so without disturbing the genetic system. In this way it is ethically neither needed nor preferable to change in heredity and social structure, based on it, by human cloning and with the help of technology a baby in a genetically manner, with out cloning, may be created by destroying the bad qualities, highly unwanted, of the parents in embryo itself. Different from it, if all negative qualities of a person are destroyed, as it is done in cloning, the person will not be different from a machine. There is every possibility of mutant and other atypical diseases in clones also.

Conclusion

There are only two alternatives. First-that human cloning is to be totally banned and second that it is restricted only to some cases. In the former case we will be technologically backward and in the later other aspirants will be deprived for no dissimilar reason which is also a kind of backwardness. I am in a position, here, to conclude the discussion by the statement that cloning-technology, ethically, leads to a paradox that if society is technologically advanced, it is muddled with evil and if, technologically, backward, it is also evil.

However, it can be said safely, as we have discussed earlier, that bioethical values can well be preserved and superman can be produced even in genetic system by applying the bio-technology of destroying chromosomes bearing qualities, highly unwanted, and promoting the chromosomes bearing excellence in embryo in the mother's womb. Promoting *Sattva* by adopting proper disciplines and sublimating thoughts, for making the chromosomes, bearing excellence, more dominant, is highly secured and non-risky. This way, there will be no fear of losing identity and freedom of a clone different from the person of which it is a clone' of deformation of the human nature and of moral and social values, as observed earlier, based on hereditary system.

Before concluding the discussion, in this paper, I think it is obligatory on my part to consider the ethics of bio-technology and the morality of the Biotechnologists and Bioengineers involved in cloning. It can not be a devil's task because they are also mene of our society and, hence, cultured and knowledgeable peresons in the world. While indicating to the nature, field, scope and aim of the bioethics, I, in the beginning of my paper, have already told that the morality of the bio-technologists and engineers is to preserve any excellence and to manifest the human reason and power, assigned to them, to its highest extent and, thus, estimating from this point of view, their task of cloning cannot be termed immoral.

Human cloning is not against the religious faith that God is the only creator because I find a basic difference between the creation by God, as some of the religions accept, and the human cloning by the bio-scientists. Those religions themselves accept that God creates everything out of nothing but in human cloning bio-technologists and engineers create clones not out of nothing but in human cloning bio-technologists and engineers create clones not out of nothing but out of the genetic material to be precise, cells of the human body. Not only that but those religions may not deny that the power and excellence of the bio-technologists and engineers are also assigned naturally to them by God and they are ordained to manifest them to the highest extent.

MORAL JUSTIFIABILITY OF VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA

PADMABATI RAKSHIT

Though euthanasia has a long history, only in recent times it has drawn wide public attention. Contemporary advances in medical sciences, along with bio-medical technology, have made it possible to prolong human life in such ways that were not even dreamt of by our past generations. As a result it has not been unusual to find human beings 'living', incapable of functioning in recognizably human fashion anymore. Although their biological existence continues, the meaning of existence as human person has virtually lapsed. A human individual who is in irreversible coma is reduced to vegetative existence. Some patients may be alternating inescapably between excruciating pain and drug-induced stupor, losing all human capacities, like intellectual pursuit, creative activity, etc. Religious people pray, and non-religious people hope, that death will come quickly to themselves. The prevalence of this attitude supports the view that some human beings are 'better off' dead, rather living. This attitude virtually leads us to the issue of euthanasia.

The word 'euthanasia' derives from Greek words (*eu* = easy, *thanatos* = death) meaning 'an easy, painless death'. But now-a-days it is used to refer to all types of killing, or letting die, of those human beings who are incurably ill and in great pain and distress, in order to spare them from further sufferings. In this extended sense, there are different types of euthanasia : *Voluntary* euthanasia, in which the person assisted to die is a autonomous moral agent who decides himself for his own ; *involuntary* euthanasia, in which the person killed, though capable of consenting to his own death, does not in fact do so, either because he is not asked, or he rather chooses to go on living. There is, again, *non-voluntary* euthanasia in which the human being is incapable of understanding the choice between life and death. e.g., when a seriously handicapped, both physically and mentally, infant is given a lethal dose of injection, the doctor is performing a non-voluntary euthanasia. Another type of distinction is made depending on the modality of performance, omission or commission : *passive euthanasia* and *active euthanasia*. In passive euthanasia the doctor does not do anything to bring about the patient's death, but the patients dies in natural course as treatment withheld. In active euthanasia, on

the contrary, the physician does something to bring about the patient's death, he 'kill's him, so to say. The doctor who gives a cancer patients a lethal dose of injection is doing active euthanasia.

However, each type of euthanasia raises some specific moral issues, though there is a common core of issue. In this article we have chosen voluntary euthanasia for discussion, and as such we shall overlook the distinctive moral issues that non-voluntary or involuntary euthanasia raise. Also we shall not attend the distinctive issues that may arise from the distinction between killing someone and letting someone die, upon which the division of active and passive euthanasia is based.

I

In order to clarify the nature of voluntary euthanasia we should say some few words more. Voluntary euthanasia is a deliberate and intentional attempt of taking the life of a presumably hopeless person. Voluntary euthanasia is carried out at the request of the person himself when the person concerned is capable of consenting, and does in fact, consent. Peter Singer, the leading exponent of practical ethics movement, points out¹ that euthanasia can be voluntary even if a person is not able to indicate the wish to die right up to the moment, e.g., when the lethal dose of injection is pushed. A person may, while in good health, make a written request to the effect that, if, through accident or illness, he should come to be incapable of making or expressing a decision to die because of severe pain or complete collapse of his cognitive facilities, he may be killed. In killing a person who has previously made such a request and has reaffirmed it from time to time, and who is now in unresponsive stage, one could claim to be acting with his consent.

On the empirical side, it may be noted that there is at least one country in which euthanasia has been legalised and it is Netherlands. Dutch doctors can carryout euthanasia, of course, under certain restrictions,² and can report this on the death-certificate without fear of prosecution. More than two and half thousand deaths are being reported annually that are results of voluntary euthanasia assisted by doctors.

II

First we want to state and explain the principal arguments that are generally adduced in favour of voluntary euthanasia, and, at the sametime, attempt to evaluate their moral worth from a holistic point of view.

In the first place, we have the *Argument from Mercy* : Most of the terminally ill patients suffer pain and distress so horribly that it is beyond the comprehension of those who have not actually experienced it. Their sufferings can be so

terrible that we do not like to read about it or think about it. The argument from mercy says that euthanasia in these cases is justified as it provides an end to their pain, distress and indignity.

To illustrate, the great Irish satirist Jonathan Swift took eight years to die, while in the words of Joseph Fletcher,³ 'His mind crumbled to pieces'. At times the pain in his blinded eyes was so intense that he had to be restrained from tearing them out with his own hands. Knives and other potential instruments of suicide had to be kept away from him. For the last three years of his life he could do nothing but sit and drool, and when he finally died, it was after convulsions that lasted for thirty-six hours.

Let us now consider how far the argument is morally justified. Though on the common parlance actions done from mercy are regarded morally right, we, the student of philosophy, have some points to make against this argument. Moral philosophy teaches us that mercy and morality are not the same thing. An action may be merciless, but morally commendable. Telling the truth often seems to be a pitiless act, but it is not morally wrong. Some philosophers, e.g., Immanuel Kant, contend that any action done from mercy or sentiment is devoid of any moral worth. Kant characterized such actions as 'pathological' action. Such compassionate acts may have other values, but are devoid of moral worth.

Secondly, there is an *Argument from the Principle of Classical Utilitarianism*: An action or policy is to be judged right or wrong exclusively according to whether they cause pleasure (happiness) or pain (misery). An action is morally justified if and only if it brings about greater balance of pleasure over pain. The classical utilitarians consider all the actual and possible consequences of the action performed in terms of pleasure or pain, and weigh their overall utility. (It is to be noted that though the terms 'pleasure' and 'happiness' lack precision, it is clear from the writings of J.S. Mill, Jeremy Bentham and Henry Sidgwick that they refer to something that is experienced or felt.) The supporters of voluntary euthanasia argue that when judged by this standard, euthanasia turns out to be morally justified. The argument may be stated as follows:

- 1) Any action or policy is morally right if it serves to increase the overall amount of happiness in the world or to decrease the amount of misery;
- 2) The policy of killing or letting die hopelessly ill patients with their consent who are suffering from great pain decreases the amount of misery in the world;
- 3) Therefore, a policy of euthanasia is morally right. Obviously, if a terminally ill patient is allowed euthanasia we could decrease the misery and pain both for the individual level and for the society at large.

Let us now consider whether this argument is satisfactory . The major premise (1) of this argument states the principle of utility, which is the basic utilitarian assumption. Most of the contemporary philosophers think that this principle is wrong, as the utilitarians hold that the promotion of happiness and the avoidance of misery are the only important things. Happiness, the critics claim, is the only one among such things. To illustrate, people might be happier if there is no freedom of religion, for, if everyone adheres to the same religious beliefs, there would be greater harmony among people. But the fact is that even freedom of religion, as people have a right to make their own choice. Thus we find that the major premise of the utilitarian argument is not acceptable.

In this connection we may recall Kant who clearly refuses the principle of happiness : ' It is not necessary that whilst I live I should live happily ; but it is necessary that so long as I live I should live honourably. Misery gives no right to any man to take his own life'⁴.

On the other hand, the classical utilitarians must concede the possibility of cases in which it would better not to respect a person's desire to continue living for the sake of overall social benefits. Peter Singer advises 'us to overlook this objection as it does not apply killing that take place only with the genuine consent of the person concerned. But we should remind him that this does not demonstrate the validity of the utilitarian argument for euthanasia.

Thirdly, the *question of Right* : We have a right to our own life and this right cannot be traded off against the preferences or pleasures of others. And it is an essential feature of a right that one can waive one's right if one so chooses. e.g., I may have a right to privacy ; but if I wish I can tell my daily details to my neighbours, and thus waive my right. In the same way, to admit that I have a right to life is also to admit that I can waive my right to life, and then can request my doctor to end my life.

The argument from the question of right may seem *prima facie* satisfying. But a little reflection shows the irrationality inherent in the question of right to life. First, all rights are not of the same type. We cannot equate the right to one's own life to one's right to property. There is an important difference — I may very well waive my right to property, if I do wish, and may later re-claim the same if I so choose. But the right to life or death is irreversible. The whole meaning of existence is involved here. To be or not to be is not a mere matter of choice. There must be a limit to right, and attempt to suicide is that limit. Secondly, if we consider my

existence from a comprehensive outlook, we may find that human beings are the trustee of his self, while nature is its real possessor. The religious people refer to God as the owner of the whole existence, along with myself. We have no absolute right to our life and so cannot waive that right in order to embrace death. Kant says, "Humanity is one's own person something inviolable; it is a holy trust; man is master of all else, but he must not lay hands upon himself. A being who existed of his own necessity could not possibly destroy himself."⁶ It seems that those who advocate euthanasia seek to give the widest interpretation of right which makes it impossible to execute.

Fourthly, the *Argument from Personal Autonomy* : The principle of individual autonomy tells us to allow a rational person to live his own life according to his own autonomous decision, free from coercion or interference. Now, if a rational person chooses to die, then the respect for personal autonomy leads us to assist him to do so.

To this contention it may be added that the autonomy referred to here is not real autonomy. Before establishing the point let us first take note of the interconnected notion of 'personhood'. Philosophers like Joseph Fletcher have compiled⁷ a list of indicators of personhood that include self-awareness, self-control, a sense of future, a sense of the past, the capacity to relate to others, concern for others, communication and curiosity. Peter Singer has proposed⁸ to use 'person' in the sense of rational and self-conscious being in order to capture those elements of human beings that are not covered by all members of the species 'Homo sapiens'. According to him, personal autonomy derives from these two characters of self-consciousness and rationality.

But the fact is that person as envisaged by the supporters of euthanasia is not really autonomous : the person who chooses to die is conditioned by the adverse situation he is in. It is the then circumstances lead him is making such a crucial decision. And if there is no genuine autonomy, one's cannot be morally certified. It seems that the philosophers of practical ethics movement conceive of autonomy as the empirical capacity of choosing one thing from many. Following Kant we may contend that the so called autonomy of a person who decides to die is a case of heteronomy,⁹ rather than autonomy. Only that actions which are done with autonomy according to reason's Categorical Imperative have moral worth. The person who thinks of suicide is a slave of the situation mixed with self-love. His decision follows from the promptings of desire and laws of empirical nature; it has as its guide, in satisfying them, a principle or maxim whose content is the

condition of an act of choice and directed by a hypothetical imperative. We may again quote from Kant '...morality vanishes as soon as we see that man's freedom cannot persist except on a condition which is immutable. This condition is that man may not use his freedom against himself to his own destruction but, that, on the contrary, he should allow nothing external to limit it.'¹⁰

III

Let us now consider the other side of the story, the arguments generally given against euthanasia.

First, the *Argument from Nature* : Every human being has a natural inclination to continue living. Our reflexes and responses fit us to fight attackers, flee wild animals, and dodge out of the way of trucks. In our daily life we take utmost care for self-preservation. Our body is also structured for survival right down to the molecular level. When we are invaded by bacteria, antibodies are produced to fight against the alien organisms and their remains are swept out of the body by special cells designed for clean-up work.

Euthanasia, of whatever kind it may be, does violence to this natural goal of survival. It is literally against nature, as all processes of nature are bent towards the end of bodily survival. Euthanasia defeats these subtle mechanisms in a way that a disease or an injury, e.g., might not.

Furthermore, in doing so, euthanasia does violence to our dignity. Our dignity comes from seeking our ends. When one of our goals is survival, and actions are taken that eliminate that goal, then our natural dignity suffers. Unlike animals, we are conscious through reason of our nature and our ends. Euthanasia involves acting as if this dual nature — tendency towards survival and awareness of this as an end — did not exist. Thus voluntary euthanasia denies our basic human character and requires that we regard ourselves as mere means. The person who proposes to destroy himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses himself merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition upto the end of life. But in doing so he refuses himself as an end in himself.¹¹

Secondly, the *Argument from Self-interest* : As death is final and irreversible, euthanasia contains within itself the possibility that we will work against our interest if we practice it, or allow it to be practised on us. Contemporary medical science has made a tremendous progress, but still we could not say that it possesses perfect and complete knowledge. A mistake in diagnosis is possible, both humanly and medically. Consequently, we may believe that we are dying of a disease when,

as a matter of fact, it is really not. We may think that we have no hope of recovery, when, as a matter of fact, we have a chance. Some miraculous recovery actually occurs. Now if euthanasia is permitted, there is a genuine risk of loss of interest .

Peter Singer thinks¹² that against a very small number of unnecessary deaths that might occur, if euthanasia is legalized, we must place the very large amount of pain and distress that will be suffered, if not legalized, by patients who really are terminally ill.

But we think that Singer's view is not convincing . It fails to make a difference between prudence and morality. Mere prudence is not morality. Again, it violates the principle of justice as fairness. John Rawls has shown¹³ that since each individual person desires to protect his own interests, no one has a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order to bring out a greater net of balance of satisfaction. A person would not accept a decision imposed upon him merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages irrespective of its permanent effects on his own basic rights and interests.

Thirdly, the *Argument from Practical Effects (or the Slippery Slope Argument)* : The medical professionals are committed to saving lives. A life lost is, for them, a personal failure, an insult to their skills and knowledge. Euthanasia as a practice might well alter this. It could have rather a corrupting influence so that in any case that is severe, doctors and nurses might not try hard enough to save the patient. They might decide that the patient would simply be 'better off' dead and take the steps necessary to make that come about. This attitude could then carry over to their dealing with patients less seriously ill. The result would be an overall decline in the quality of medical care. Not only that, if euthanasia is legalized, the worst motion of physicians and family will take over, and all decisions will be made for the sake of money or convenience of the family, not for the interest of the dying patient.

Furthermore, if euthanasia is permitted, the social practice of killing will snowball . Once physicians become accustomed to killing terminally ill patients, they will accept killing less ill patient. In a famous article Leo Alexander, who witnessed the Nuremberg trials of the Nazi, has warned us against this practice. "The destructive principle once unleashed is bound to engulf the whole personality and to occupy all its relationships. Destructive urges and destructive concepts arising there cannot remain limited to, or focussed upon, one subject or several subjects alone, but must inevitably spread and be directed against one's entire surrounding world."¹⁴

IV

In the preceding two sections we have examined the pros and cons of euthanasia, particularly voluntary euthanasia. We see that, although there are some rationale and points of prudence to make in favour of euthanasia, none of the arguments are morally convincing. A community or a state can think of legalization of euthanasia as a practical measure ; but, theoretically considered, euthanasia is inherently wrong, as it violates the nature, sanctity and dignity of human beings.

We again refer to Kant who has aptly shown the internal incoherence and wrongness of such actions as suicide and euthanasia. He suggests that a terribly ill person who thinks of euthanasia is still in possession of his reason that can ask himself whether it could be consistent with his duty to himself to take his own life. From self-love I may adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction; but to be a moral law it must be universalizable. Then we must consider whether this principle founded merely on self-love can become universal law. We may see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself, and consequently, inconsistent with the supreme principle of morality, viz., the categorical imperative.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Peter Singer : *Practical Ethics* Cambridge University Press (1st Indian Edition, 2000), P.178.
2. The Courts of Netherlands have formulated in following guidelines to restrict unwanted death :
 - i) It is carried out by a physician.
 - ii) The patient has explicitly requested euthanasia in a manner that leaves no doubt of the patient's desire to die.
 - iii) The patient's decision is well-informed, free and durable.
 - iv) The patient has an irreversible condition causing protracted physical or mental suffering that the patients find unbearable.
 - v) There is no reasonable (from the patients point of view) alternative to alleviate the patient's sufferings.
 - vi) The doctor has consulted another professional who agrees with his or her judgement. See Peter Singer : *Practical Ethics* , op.cit., p. 196.
3. Joseph Fletcher : *Morals and Medicine*, Boston : Beacon Press, 1960, p. 174.
4. Imanuel Kant : 'Suicide' in *Lectures on Ethics*, Harper Torchbooks, Newyork , 1963, p. 152.

5. Peter Singer : *Practical Ethics* , *op.cit.*, p. 194.
6. Imanuel Kant : 'Suicide' in *Lectures on Ethics*, *op.cit.*, p.151.
7. See Peter Singer : *Practical -Ethics* , *op.cit.*, p. 86.
8. *Ibid*, p. 87.
9. Imanuel Kant : *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals* (translated by T.K. Abbot) in *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, Longmans Green and Company Ltd., London, 1959, p.39.
10. Imanuel Kant : 'Suicide' in *Lectures on Ethics*, *op.cit.*, p. 153.
11. Imanuel Kant : *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, *op.cit.*, p. 47.
12. See Peter Singer : *Practical Ethics*, *op.cit.*, p. 197
13. See John Rawls : 'A Social Contract Perspective' (Abridged from his *A theory of Justice*, Harvard University Press, 1971) in *Contemporary Ethics : Selected Readings* (ed) James P. Sterba, Prentice. Hall, Englewood cliffs, New Jersey, 1989, p. 177.
14. Leo Alexander : 'Medical Science under Dictatorship' in *New England Journal of Medicine* (242 : 47). See also *Ethics in Practice : An Anthology* (ed) Hugh la Follette, Blackwell, 1997. p.28.

THE BIOLOGICAL MODEL OF THE RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND BODY : IS IT SATISFACTORY ?

SHAMPA BHATTACHARYA

One of the most crucial problems of the Philosophy of mind is the relation between mental states and physical states of the body, generally referred to as "the mind-body problem". It is a problem of such a great magnitude that it has foiled the attempts of various philosophers to find a satisfactory solution to it. While dualists admit both mind and body and strive to show a relation between them, identity theorists reduce mind to body. Both these solutions seem to me unsatisfactory . What has inspired me to choose "The Biological model of the relation between Mind and Body : Is is satisfactory" as a topic of discussion is a completely new kind of solution suggested by John Searle. Searle tries to solve the problem without denying the existence of mind or that of body and this is where he deviates from identity theory and its difficulties. Nor does he approve of the relation between mind and body as conceived by the dualists, e.g., Descartes . Thus his position is also free from the the vice of traditional dualism. The aim of this paper is to explore the biological model suggested by Searle and see whether he has been able to come out of the impasse created by the views of the monists and the dualists.

The question of the relation between mental phenomena and physical phenomena emerges as a problem because of the properties which mental phenomena themselves possess. When we reflect on mental phenomena we find that it is impossible for us to deny their two sets of properties : one set which inclines us to make a distinction between the mental and the physical; the other set which impels us to keep the mental within the physical world. The properties included under first set are consciousness, subjectivity, intentionality, rationality and self-awareness . None of these properties is found in the world of mere matter and so we tend to think that the mental is something quite distinct from the physical . But, on the other hand, we have to recognize another set of truth about the mental : that mind cannot be located completely outside the physical world. We cannot be located completely outside the physical world. We cannot conceive mind as an abstract entity, which has no connection with body. Our notion of mind is always a disembodied mind. Furthermore, all of us, more or less recognize that there are

various kinds of causal connections between the mental and the physical ; that the brain itself a physical organ of the body, is closely related to mental activity, and that the integrity and functioning of the brain is essential to the integrity and functioning of the mind. All of these considerations naturally lead us to think that the mental is somehow physical, because only something physical can have causal connection with physical phenomena, and, moreover, if the functioning of the brain which is a part of the physical body is essential to the functioning of the mind, then how can mind be something more than physical object?

The problem which arises from the opposing sets of properties possessed by the mind is that while the one set of property inclines us to accept the mental over and above the physical, the other makes us accept the mental as nothing other than the physical . How both the sets of properties of mind can be accommodated in an account of the relation between mind and body really causes a lot of tension among the philosophers. And it is this tension which makes the mind-body problem worthy of philosophical interest.

Any satisfactory solution to the problem would obviously include both sets of properties of mind. Simple elimination of one set or the other can of course lead to a solution. But such a solution is beset with many difficulties. There are indeed philosophers who attempt to solve the problem only by accepting one set of property and discarding the other. Thus, on the one hand, there are dualists who treat mind and body as essentially distinct from one another : mind and body are two independent substances, somehow related to one another. On the other hand, there are monist who hold that there is only matter and no mind : they try to reduce mind to body or to some property of body. Both the dualists and the monists face a number of difficulties. The main problem for the dualists is how to account for the relationship between two entirely distinct entities. Though this particular problem does not arise for the monists since they admit only the existence of matter, they too face many problems. Here I will not discuss the problems which the monists and the dualists face; for here our main aim is to explore the solution suggested by Searle and see how much it is satisfactory.

One important thing which I must point out at the outset is that unlike dualists, by "mind", Searle does not mean any substantive entity like self or ego but a sequence of thoughts, feelings and experiences. Mind to him is synonymous with mental states and events which have four features of consciousness, Intentionality, subjectivity and mental causation. Intentionality is one of the most important features of mental states. The intentionality of a mental state is a property in virtue of which

it can represent object and state affairs of the world. Belief, for instance, is intentional, for if I have a desire, I must have a desire for something. So Intentional mental states which are not intentional, pain, aches, tickles, some cases of anxiety, depression are all instances of mental states that are not intentional. They are not intentional because they are not directed to anything. Every intentional mental state, Searle holds, has a representative content and a psychological mode. If, for example, I believe that Mt. Everest is the highest peak in the world then my belief is the psychological mode and "that Mt. Everest is the highest peak in the world" is the representative content. It is the representative content of an intentional state that determines its conditions of success and this is what makes it a representation of a state of affairs. Conditions of success are those conditions under which intentional states are satisfied. Intentional states like beliefs are satisfied only if they are correct, desires are satisfied only if they are fulfilled, intentions are satisfied only if they are carried out. Another characteristics of intentional state is that they have a direction of fit either from "mind-to-world" or from "world-to-mind" . Intentional states like belief have the "mind-to-world" direction of fit and some like desires, intentions have "world-to-mind" direction of fit. Belief has the "mind-to-world" direction of fit, because if belief turns out to be a false belief, it is the belief and not the world which is responsible for its falsity. One can change one's belief in order to cope with the world but one cannot change the world in order to cope with one's belief. Beliefs can be true or false . But desires, intentions cannot be true or false. They can only be fulfilled or carried out. Desires, intentions have the "world-to-mind" direction of fit, because when desires or intentions are not fulfilled or carried out, it is not they themselves but the world which is responsible for their remaining unfulfilled or for not being carried out. However, there are some intentional states which do not have any direction of fit — neither from "mind-to-world" nor from "world-to-mind" . If for example I am happy at the grand success of my friend in a tough examination, then it goes without saying that my happiness is accompanied with the belief that my friend has made a grand success and a wish that my friend made the success. But still my happiness cannot be true or false like belief nor can be fulfilled like desire . Happiness, pleasure, sorrow have no direction of fit.

According to Searle, every intentional state with a representative content and a direction of fit is a representation of some object or state of affairs. The representational properties of an Intentional state are inherent in the nature of intentional state itself. For every intentional state, some state of affairs would count as satisfying the representative content of the intentional state, and what state of

affairs that is depends on the representative content of the intentional state. Thus, Searle holds, the representative content of an intentional state determines its conditions of success and every intentional state is thereby said to **represent** a state of affairs. So intentionality of a mental state is a property which it has inherently in virtue of its own representative content. Searle believes that mental states can be characterized as intentional even when there exist no objects or states of affairs to satisfy the representative contents of the mental states. Whatelse is required to show that Searle admits the autonomy of mind ? The implication of admitting intentionality as an intrinsic property of mental states and events is that Searle believes in the real existence of mental states and events.

But though Searle admits the autonomy of mental states and events, he is not a dualist. Unlike the dualists he never regards mind and body as two **distinct** entities. In his approach to give a solution to the mind-body problem he does not deny the real existence and causal efficiency of mental states and events nor does he maintain a dualism between mental states and events. The model he suggests for showing how mental phenomena are related to physical phenomena is a biological one. According to him, mental states and events are real and they are real in the sense in which any biological phenomena like digestion, lactation, etc. are real. He holds that mental phenomena, like biological phenomena, are caused by the processes occurring in the brain. To quote him, "Mental phenomena, all mental phenomena whether conscious or unconconscious, visual or auditory, pains, tickles, itches, thoughts indeed all of our mental life, are caused by processes going on in the brain"¹. I our sensations of pains, for example, are caused by the firings of a large number of neurons at large number of synapses. Let us describe it in detail. When, for instance, a child being quite ignorant about the fury of the fire puts his hand into it, what happens is that the impulses are carried from sensory nerve endings to the spinal cord by a kind of fibre called Delta C fibre. In the spinal cord, the sensation passes through a region known as the tract of Lissauer and terminates on the neurons of the cord. From the spinal cord the sensations enter into the brain through the burning pain pathway. There are two pathways — one for prickling pain and another for burning pain. Both these pathways pass through the thalamus, but while the prickling pain pathway is situated backwards in the somato-sensory context, the burning pain pathway take the sensation not only to the context at the upper part of the brain but also to the hypothalamus and other regions at the base of the brain. For these differences we can easily locate where one sticks a pin but not where we exactly feel burning sensation. Our sensations of pain, then, are caused by the functioning of the brain in response to external stimulus. What Searle wants to emphasize is that like pain all other mental phenomena are caused by processes inside the brain. To be mental is to be caused by the brain.

Furthermore, mental phenomena are not only caused by biological phenomena but they themselves also cause other biological phenomena. As Searle says : "...mental states are caused by biological phenomena and in turn cause other biological phenomena. If one wanted a label one might call such a view" biological naturalism". 'Willing to raise my arm', is for instance a mental state. When I wish to raise my arm, a number of processes occur in my brain. Brain activity causes bodily movements by physiological processes. Both Descartes and Searle agree on the point that mind and body interact. But there is a disagreement between them. While Descartes regards mind and body as two distinct entities Searle never thinks them to be so.

But Searle's view that mental states are caused by physical states and in turn cause other physical states has raised an immediate objection : How can Searle speak of causal relation between two completely different kinds of things ? Mental entities belong to one category and physical entities, to another . But causal relation cannot obtain between two ontologically different categories . So if Searle admits a causal relation between the mental and the physical then he will have to face the following dilemma : If, on the one hand, Searle admits the relation between the mental and the physical as causal then causal relation will turn out to be completely mysterious, and if, on the other hand, Searle admits an ideal account of causation according to which the events which are causally connected are governed by causal laws and causal laws are always physical laws then mental states and events will lack causal efficiency. Either one will advocate dualism and, therefore, have a mysterious notion of causation or one will have an ideal account of causation and, therefore, have to give up the idea that mental states and events have causal capacity.

According to Searle, the objections which have been raised against him would really be quite significant for him if the mental and the physical were two separate entities for him. But he holds that there is no dualism between mind and body, for mental states and events are caused by the brain processes and at the same time are realized in the brain. And if we can understand how mental states are caused by and realized in the brain, then we can overcome the specific difficulties of dualistic account.

To explain how mental states are caused by brain processes and are also realized in the brain he refers to some sort of causal relationship in nature. Any physical system has global or surface feature and micro-level elements. He cites the example of water. Water is composed of H₂O molecules. The liquidity of water is surface or global feature and H₂O are micro-particles. Global features are those which are formed from combination of micro-level elements. The liquidity of water

is formed as result of combination of H_2O molecules. So the relation between the H_2O molecules and the liquidity of water is clearly causal. Thus the liquidity of water is caused by the behaviour of micro-elements, and at the same time is a feature of the very system in question . When we say the water is liquid we do not mean to say that the H_2O molecules perform a special type of function. Rather by describing the water as liquid we just describe the molecules at a higher level than that of the individual molecule. Moreover, the liquidity of water also functions as cause. Since water is liquid, we can drink it, we can wash clothes in it, and so on. But here one may ask ; " How can there be a causal relation between the H_2O molecules and the liquidity since water is both liquid and a combination of H_2O molecules ."? According to Searle, it is wrong to think that there can be a causal relation only between two distinct events; causal relation can obtain between two phenomena belonging at different levels even within the same underlying stuff. The solidity of the door too is an example of global feature which is both caused by behaviour of elements at the micro-level and is realized in the system made up of micro-elements. As Searle says "...two phenomena can be related by both causation and realization provided that they are so at different levels of description."³

Now if we apply the analogy of water to the study of mind, we find that just as the liquidity of water is a global feature which is both caused by the micro-level elements and is realized in the system made up of micro-level elements, so the mental states and events are global features which are both caused by micro structures of the brain and are realized in the system made up of micro-structures. Out of the combination of neuron-frings in the synapses mental states and events are formed. So the relation between micro-structures of the brain and mental states is clearly causal. Our sensations of pains, as we have seen, is caused by a number of processes that begin at free nerve-endings and end in the brain. But wherein this causal account is the pain located ? It is right there in the brain where these processes are taking place. That is, the pain is both caused by the processes occurring in the brain and is realized in the structure of the brain. Thus just as the liquidity of water is caused by the elements at the micro-level, and is a feature realized in the system made up of micro-elements, so the mental states and events are caused by micro-structures of the brain and is a feature realized in the brain made up of neurons. And like the liquidity of water mental states and events too have causal capacity. Just as the liquidity of water is caused by the interaction of H_2O molecules and in turn also functions of cause, so the mental states and events are caused by brain states and in turn also cause further brain states.

But the question which arises is how mental states can have causal

efficiency. Even if it be granted that mental states are caused by and realized in brain processes, how can mental states themselves function as cause? When a person wills to raise his hand what happens is that his hand goes up. But his hand goes up only due to contraction of muscles which are caused by the firings of a large number of neurons at large number of synapses. So why should the movement of the arm be an example of a physical event caused by a mental event? In order to answer this question Searle takes the help of an analogy — the analogy of explosion in the cylinder of a four-cycle internal combustion engine. In the cylinder of a four-cycle internal combustion engine the explosion is caused by the spark plug firing through both the explosion and the spark plug firing are caused by behaviour of elements at the micro-level and are realized in the micro-elements structure. In exactly the same way, the movement of the arm is caused by willing though both the movement of the arm and the willing are caused by brain-processes at the neuron level and are realized in the system made up of neurons. Let us describe both the cases in detail. The explosion in the cylinder is caused by the spark-plug firing which in turn is caused by the rise in temperature between the electrodes to the kindling point of airfuel mixture. So it is this rise in temperature which is causally responsible for the explosion in the cylinder. But this rise in temperature is caused by the movement of molecules and is realised in the molecular structure. Moreover the explosion is caused by the oxidization of hydrocarbon molecules and is realized in the structure made up of hydrocarbon molecules. Now if we consider the case of the movement of arm, we find that the movement of the arm is caused by muscle-contraction which in turn is caused by the firings of a large number of neurons at large number of synapses and realized in the system made up of neurons. Moreover, the willing is caused by the neural processes at the micro-level and is realized in the system made up of neurons, and it is these resultant neural processes which cause the movement of the arm. Thus there is no difficulty in supposing the causal capacity of mental states and events. The mental states and events are caused by brain processes and in turn cause further brain states.

Searle holds that we do not have a perfect knowledge about how the brain works and so we do not know in exact terms how mental phenomena are caused by brain processes at the neuronal level and how they are realized in the structure of the brain. And it is for this reason that we face many difficulties in describing the relation between the mental and the physical phenomena. But these difficulties are, according to him, only empirical or conceptual; there are really no logical metaphysical difficulties. So Searle holds that we can in no way deny the real existence and causal efficiency of mental phenomena. Like any biological phenomena they are real and are capable of functioning causally. As Searle puts it

: "My own speculation, and at the present state of our knowledge of neurophysiology it can only be a speculation, is that if we come to understand the operation of the brain in producing intentionality, it is likely to be on principles that are quite different from those we now employ, as different as the principles of quantum mechanics are from the principles of Newtonian mechanics; but any principle to give us an adequate account of the brain, will have to recognize the reality of, and explain the causal capacities of, the intentionality of the brain."⁴

Now though Searle tries to find a solution to the mind-body problem by introducing a biological model of mental states and events he is not very successful in his attempt to solve the problem. We have no doubt that his attempt in this direction is laudible. The clarity, elegance and informality of his exposition, the fresh insight and depth that he exhibits are greatly simulating. Yet there are some difficulties which arise from his view of how the mind belongs to the brain.

There can be two different interpretations of the relation of mind to brain. One is *event interpretation* and the other is *property interpretation*. According to *event interpretation*, mental states and events are something like events that go on in the brain. This becomes clear from Searle's remark: "People actually think, and thinking goes on in their brains."⁵

According to the *property interpretation* mental states and events are properties of the brain. And this is also clear from Searle's own remark: "consciousness...is a real property of the brain."⁶ It is further evident from the analogy drawn by him between the liquidity of water and the mental state and event. Just as the liquidity of water is a property of water, so the mental state is a property of the brain.

But neither of these interpretations is free from troubles. One problem for both of these interpretations is that mental events (e.g. sensations and the like) occur in some particular part of the body and not in the brain. Tooth-ache, for example, is a pain which occurs in the tooth and not in the brain. So how can it be either event or property of the brain? Another problem for these interpretations is that we ascribe most mental states and events to a person and not to his brain. For instance, we say that Tom is because he is a creature with a brain which functions in the normal way. But does it follow from this that mental events are properties or events of the brain?

One can say that neither of these two problems is very serious. So far as the first problem is concerned, there is, of course some plausibility in saying that

whenever we have tooth-ache we feel pain in the tooth and not in the brain. But why do we feel pain at all? We do so because of the working of the brain. Since the brain works, we feel pain. Or we may say, since the brain represents the sensation to occur in the tooth, we feel pain in the tooth. So we have to distinguish between two places, one place in which the pain literally takes place and the place in which it is represented as taking place.

The second problem too can be answered with the help of two arguments. The first argument is of the following kind : There is actually no conflict between the sayings "Tom is thinking " and "Tom's brain is thinking". Is there any difficulty when we say "Tom is eating his afternoon meal?" The answer is "No". If no difficulty arises when we ascribe eating to Tom knowing quite well that eating is an activity of Tom's mouth then why should difficulty arise in case of thinking ? Just as eating is an activity of Tom's mouths so thinking is an activity of Tom's brain. When Tom eats, some activities go on in his mouth; in the same way when Tom thinks, some activities go on in his brain. Thus why should there be any contradiction between sayings " Tom is thinking" and "Tom's brain is thinking".

The second argument is as follows : If Tom's brain and nervous system are separated from his body and kept alive in vat and then if his brain is stimulated then Tom would respond in the same way as he had responded earlier. So, according to this argument, in principle all that is required for mental state to occur is the brain. The other parts of the body are required to keep the brain alive. Thus if this argument is accepted, there can be no conflict between the two sayings already quoted.

But there are other more serious problem particularly the problem of the "double-life" theory. Searle's claim that the mental states are features of the brain indeed is another version of the double-life theory. If mental states are features of the brain and all of our overt expressions of thought as writing, reading, speaking and other forms of conduct are caused by brain activities then does not it follow that they are all accompanied and caused by covert mental states which occur in the brain ? Just as Descartes has been criticized for the double-life theory, so Searle can too be criticized for his revival of another version of double-life theory.

One problem for the double-life theory is that it does not get support from introspection. The implication of Searle's version is that all overt expressions of thought are caused by thinking to oneself or a kind of thinking which we may call brain-thinking . But when we introspect we do not always find that there is silent brain thinking corresponding to all of our overt acts of thought. Moreover, sometimes

it happens that our vague and incoherent inner thinking becomes clear only in the very act of expressing them . So how can an overt expression of thought be accompanied or caused by an act of brain-thinking of the same thought ?

Another support for the double-life theory comes from Searle's theory of Intentionality. According to Searle, mental states have intrinsic intentionality and words and sentences have derived intentionality. Internal to every intentional state, Searle holds, there is the intentional content which determines its conditions of success. So intentionality is a property which a mental state has inherently in virtue of its own intentional content. But words and sentences, on the other hand, have physical level of realization which cannot have intrinsic intentionality; their intentionality is derived from the intentionality of mental states. The source of derived intentionality is always something that possesses intrinsic intentionality. From this it follows that intentionality of overt expressions of thought cannot be intrinsic but must be derived : it is derived from mental states that are intrinsically intentional. And so, in order to have intentionality all overt expressions of thought must be accompanied and caused by covert mental states — brain-thinking.

There are several difficulties of this argument. Firstly, many mental states like thoughts, desires, emotions cannot have intrinsic intentionality. When, for example, we think to ourselves or desire within ourselves, we use words. Without using words how can one think to oneself or desire within oneself? So not all mental states have intrinsic intentionality; at least some of them have derived intentionality.

Secondly, the speaker's covert mental states do not play any role in causing the derived Intentionality or normal reference of words and sentences. If, for example, I say " Jack is an honest man" then the reference of the word "Jack" does not depend on my mental states. Of course, I may have some wrong belief about the reference of "Jack", and may utter "Jack" with the intention to refer to a person other than "Jack". The standard or conventional reference of any word is not dependant on our present or past mental activity. So if the derived Intentionality of words mean the normal reference of words then the speaker's mental states have no essential causal role.

Another objection is based on an apparent contradiction between the two claims made by Searle. In his book *Intentionality* Searle, on the one hand, claims that he is concerned not with any ontological question but with a logical analysis of intentional states, for what makes a mental state an intentional state is not its ontological category but its logical properties . The question " How are intentional states realized ?" is an ontological question and such question, according to Searle,

is irrelevant to its logical properties . On the other hand he claims that mental states are higher order biological phenomena " Because mental states are features of the brain they have two levels of description' a higher level in mental terms and a lower level in psychological terms " So there is an apparent contradiction between his two claims . As soon as he says that mental states are biological phenomena, he is concerned with an ontological question but only with a logical analysis of intentionality of mental states ?

There are still other difficulties . We have seen that one of Searle's main thesis is that the conscious mind is a biological phenomenon. But the questions which strike us are : How does Searle, in the first place, speak of causal relation between the mental and the physical especially when the former is characterized by the temporal and horizontal character ? And, in the second place, why does Searle hold that mental states are realized in only brain processes? we will discuss these two questions in succession.

All intentional mental states have temporal and horizontal character. An intentional state, according to Searle, cannot determine its conditions of success individually, for in order to have an intentional state the subject concerned must also possess some other intentional state. An intentional state cannot be individuated exclusively from other intentional state. So if we want to determine the conditions of success of an intentional state, we can never determine it independently but always have to depend on other intentional state. Intentional mental states must always be embedded in a system of intentional state. No intentional mental state can be obtained singly divorced from a historical temporal background. Whenever we get any intentional state we get it as characterized by temporal and horizontal character. But if intentional states are characterized by this sort of temporality and horizontality then how can they be caused by physical states or brain states ?

Moreover, we cannot even conceive of mental states as without any cause, because if we think that mental states, within the causal order of nature, evolve without any cause that would be a miracle. Thus if mental states are thought to be parts of this nature, they must also be subject to some or other sort of causal law. But how can they be ? While mental states are transcendental' causal laws are mundane. If there exists no world, causal laws cannot operate. But an Intentional state can in principle be meaningful even if there exists no world. Therefore mental states cannot belong to the causal order of nature.

Now, we will concentrate on our second question : Why does Searle hold that mental states are realized in only brain processes ? What is there in the mind

that prevents it from being realized in non-biological system? In fact this is the very point on which proponents of strong artificial intelligence (AI) lay emphasis, because it is they who compare human brain with a digital computer. According to strong AI "the brain is just a digital computer and the mind is just a computer programThe mind is to the brain as the program is to the computer ."8 So one consequence of strong AI is that "there is nothing essentially biological about the human mindOn this view, any physical system whatever that had the right program with the right inputs and outputs would have a mind in exactly the same sense that you and I have minds". 9

Searle's answer to this view depends on the fact that the symbols employed in computer operations are purely syntactic. But mental states, on the contrary, are by definition, semantic. The mind has more than a syntax, it has a semantic. So the mind can never be a computer program. To illustrate this point Searle gives a Chinese room argument . Let us suppose that a person, who does not understand the Chinese language is locked in a room and supplied with some rules for producing appropriate Chinese output after receiving Chinese input (to him both input and output are mere formal symbols) . He does so in such a skilful way that people outside the room do not understand that he is quite ignorant about the Chinese language. Then in this situation even though the person behaves as if he is understanding Chinese, he, in fact, does not understand chinese . From this argument what Searle wants to say is that even if a computer responds appropriately to a certain given input, it does not follow that (computer) understands it. For Searle "Understanding a language, or indeed, having mental states at all involves more than just having a bunch of formal symbols. It involves having an interpretation or a meaning attached to those symbols"¹⁰ This argument, according to Searle, rests on a very simply logical truth, namely, syntax alone is not sufficient for semantics.

However William J. Rapaport one of the AI researchers, is of the view that for the purpose of understanding syntax is sufficient for semantics . To have semantics, according to him, means one of two things, either to (1) "be able to associate ...internal formal symbols with external objects ...or (2) ...be bale to associate ...internal formal symbols with other internal former symbols ...The closest we come to doint (1) is by doing (2) ; by associating one set (better, one interconnected network) of internal symbols with another. The first network of symbols might be linguistic while the second might be internal representations of external sensory input (visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory or combination of these). That, is a linguistic string by itself has no meaning; but a string in a context — a network of other strings, linked to direct causal representations of the world — does have a meaning ... Now, these correlations among internal symbols are

methodologically solipsistic, but they are also all that's needed for the appropriate semantics."¹¹

Searle however responds to this argument by saying that the sounds of the robot omit lack meaning and or reference since the robots have no mind and therefore do not represent the word-world connections to themselves. To quote him, "As long as I have the symbol with no knowledge of its causes or how it got there, I have no way of knowing what it means. The causal interactions between the robot and the rest of the world are irrelevant unless those causal interactions are represented in some mind or other."¹²

And this, Searle argues, cannot be done only syntactically . But why not ? Correlation among symbols is a form of mere symbol manipulation. And there is no reason why the robot cannot have symbols representing the source of other symbols.

Now, even if we grant Searle's argument from semantics still then he cannot escape criticism. In his book *Minds, Brains and Science*, at the end of chapter 2, Searle says "Anything else that caused minds would have to have causal powers at least equivalent to those of the brain."¹³ That is anything causing minds must have the power to cause intentionality exhibited by the mental states in the brain. Now, our question is how Searle can say that only biological systems have such powers ? Even though upto the present date only biological systems have the power to cause minds, it does not follow logically that such powers are confined only to biological systems. That is, even if mental phenomena are biological phenomena, it does not follow that they are essentially biological . Furthermore, even if we grant mental phenomena as essentially biological then also we do not understand how what is biological about them explains what is mental about them. They are biological in virtue of being caused by the neuron-firings in the brain and realized in the brain. But they are mental in virtue of having such features as intentionality, subjectivity and consciousness . And we do not understand how neuron-firings can have any bearing on them. It seems that neuron-firings must have strange causal powers indeed if they can cause brain states to have such mental features. So Searle cannot claim that mental phenomena are biological phenomena.

Thus though Searle tries to find a solution to the mind-body problem from a neurophysiological point of view, he has not been able to come out of the impasse created by the views of the monists and the dualists. His biological model cannot be regarded as a satisfactory solution to the said problem.

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TRUTH AND DESIGNATION

MAMATA BANDYOPADHYAY

Frege uses a special assertion sign '⊢', which when prefixed to a sentence indicates that the sentence is asserted. Sentences have various uses and the most conspicuous use of a sentence is to make an assertion. Assertion of a sentence, in Frege's logic, is the expression of the recognition of its truth. The constituents of the assertion sign '⊢' are the horizontal stroke '—' and the vertical stroke '⊢'. The horizontal stroke, which Frege calls the content stroke, represents a function whose values are only truth-values. This function is symbolized as '—x'. The value of this function, according to Frege, shall be the True if the true is taken as argument, and that contrariwise, in all other cases the value of this function would be the False, i.e., both when the argument is the False and when it is not a truthvalue at all'. Thus '—1+3 = 4' is the True, Whereas both '—1+3 = 5' and '—4' are the False. The vertical stroke '⊢', which precedes the horizontal, indicates that we are not writing a truth-value, but asserting something. The expression '⊢—1+3 = 4', does not designate a truth-value, it asserts something. The horizontal within the assertion sign helps Frege to fill up truth-value gaps within a two-valued logic, sentences which are neither true nor false are reduced to false ones when combined with the horizontal.

Dummett uses the notion of assertion to explain the speaker's mastery of a given language, he also explains the notion of truth in terms of warranted assertibility and uses this notion of assertibility to fill up truth-value gaps.

To the question : what semantic knowledge suffices for the mastery of a given language, the Fregean answer is that it is the knowledge of the truth-conditions of its sentences. This Fregean answer has also been adapted by the truth-conditional theory of meaning, which is a realist theory of meaning according to Dummett; it is the theory that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-conditions. Dummett points out that the realists allow someone to have a conception of a sentence's being true even in the absence of the evidence on the basis of which he could be said to have the knowledge of the truth-conditions of the sentence as obtaining. The truth-conditions of a sentence, which are taken to be giving its meaning according to them, is recognition-transcendent or verification-transcendent, while truth is

something absolute and not relativized to an interpretation or a model. It is the characteristic of such a theory that it endorses the principle of bivalence — the principle that every statement (of the disputed class) is determinately either true or false .

Dummett opposes this view and replaces it by his antirealist thesis that to know the meaning of a sentence is to know the conditions that warrant the sentence's assertion (or denial). He thinks that learning a language is learning a practice, learning to respond verbally or non-verbally to utterances and to be able to make appropriate utterances in appropriate circumstances. Learning this practice also includes being able to recognize utterances of sentences as correct or as incorrect. But this is different from knowing the conditions which must obtain if a sentence is to be true. It can not even be said that what a person does when he understands a sentence manifests his knowledge of such (truth) conditions. Dummett admits that in the case of some sentences, which do not raise any difficulty, e.g., in the case of sentences belonging to 'Lower Storeys' of our language it is possible for us to grasp their truth-conditions in 'some more direct way'², in their case the conditions for their truth and the conditions for their correct assertibility coincide. We assume, by analogy, that all sentences of our language are determinately either true or false, which is actually not the case. Dummett speaks of three principal sentence forming operations - the subjunctive conditional, the past tense and quantification over unsurveyable or infinite totalities³ — which allow us to frame undecidable sentences, i.e., sentences which do not have any recognizable truth-value. Dummett points out that such sentences are meaningful and we can make significant assertions by using them, though we do not have any effective means at present by which we can determine them to be true or false.

Dummett explains the notion of truth as related primarily to the linguistic act of assertion. An assertion is either correct or incorrect, the correctness or incorrectness of an assertion being related to the content of the assertion, i.e., to what is said by means of the assertion. To grasp the content of an assertion is to know in what circumstances its assertion is to be judged correct and in what incorrect. For example, a person who knows the content of the assertion 'A.B' knows that its assertion is correct when both 'A' and 'B' are true, and incorrect in all other three possible cases. The conditions for the correct or incorrect assertibility of a sentence must be jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive if the sentence is not ambiguous, i.e., the assertion has a definite content. But this is not to say that the notion of truth, as used by the realists, always coincides with the notion of correctness of an assertion. A distinction is to be drawn here between the truth of what someone says

and the ground for his thinking it true⁴. Dummett makes a distinction between the different ways in which the assertion of a sentence may be correct and the different ways in which it may be incorrect corresponding to which we have different types of truths and different types of falsehoods. These different types of truths and falsehoods are, according to Dummett, different designated and different undesignated values. He writes,

The elements of the valuational system are taken as truth values, it being assumed that each sentence has determinately exactly one of these truth-values. The content of an assertion of any sentence then amounts to claim that the sentence has a designated value. If we use the words 'true' and 'false' as corresponding, respectively, to 'has a designated value' and 'has an undesignated value', then the different designated values become different ways in which a sentence may be true, the different undesignated values become different ways in which a sentence may be false⁵.

The distinction thus drawn between different designated and undesignated values helps Dummett not only to fill up truth-value gaps, but also to justify his acceptance of multivalence instead of bivalence for sentences.

In this connection we may refer to Dummett's distinction between two different notions of truth-values depending on the two different ways in which a sentence may be used. i) A sentence may be used as a complete utterance by means of which a linguistic act may be effected. A sentence may be used as a correct or an incorrect assertion by itself. (ii) A sentence may be used as a constituent part of another sentence and thus may have a semantic role in determining the assertibility conditions of the corresponding compound sentences.

The notion of truth-value as associated with the use of a sentence by itself, according to Dummett, is primarily connected with the assertoric use of language — whether we make a correct or an incorrect assertion by using a sentence — we do not need, at this level, to make any distinction between the different ways in which the assertion may be correct (or incorrect). For example, the assertion of the sentence

The man living in that house died yesterday

may be incorrect, either because there is no man in the house (i.e., the sentence contains a description without a bearer) or because of the fact that the man did not die (i.e., the predicate does not apply to the subject). In this regard, Dummett thinks, there is no difference in the assertibility conditions of the following two sentences

The man living in that house died yesterday
 and
 There was a man living in that house and he died yesterday.

Both Frege and Strawson are of the opinion that of these two sentences, the former would be neither true nor false and the latter, simply false if there was no man in the house. But Dummett's point here is that in asserting anyone of the above two sentences the speaker does not allow either that the house was empty or that the man living in that house did not die. Hence, if anyone of these states of affairs obtains, an assertion of any of these sentences would be incorrect, i.e., both the sentences would have some undesigned value. Here Dummett, instead of distinguishing between a sentence's being false and its being neither true nor false, distinguishes between two different ways in which sentences may have undesigned values. The different ways in which a sentence may have a designated or an undesigned value, however, does not affect the assertion of a sentence occurring by itself. Thus as long as we are concerned with the assertibility conditions of a simple sentence, i.e., a sentence which does not contain another sentence as its part, we need not know what type of designated value (or undesigned value) the sentence has, we need to be concerned simply with the question whether the sentence has a designated value or an undesigned value.

The former notion i.e., the notion of truth-value associated to a sentence assertible by itself differs, according to Dummett, from the notion of truth-value of a (simple) sentence which is required to determine the truth-value of a logically complex sentence containing it, because in the case of the latter we have to make a distinction between different designated and undesigned values that the subordinate sentences have. Dummett thinks that there is no a priori ground for assuming that these two notions of truth-values should coincide⁶.

The distinction between these two notions of truth-values, made by Dummett, may be regarded as an expression of his antiholistic doctrine of molecularism, viz., the doctrine that 'the unit of discourse is the sentence'⁷. According to this doctrine the meaning of a simple or an atomic sentence is determined completely by the meanings of its component expressions without appeal to other sentences of the language. The assertibility condition (or the truth-value) of a compound sentence, therefore, depends on the type of assertibility condition(s) that the component sentence(s) has (have). This profit may be explained after Dummett with the help of some examples.

One way of making a compound out of a simple sentence is by negating the original one. Under the interpretation provided by Dummett, to negate a sentence

is not simply to reverse the conditions of its correct assertibility. Rather we have to make a distinction between the different ways in which the assertion of the sentence is correct (or incorrect). An obvious example is provided by sentences containing empty singular terms. Assertions of such sentences as well as their denials are equally incorrect. We have, therefore, to make a distinction between, for example, an assertion's being correct (or incorrect) for containing a name without a bearer, and it's being correct (or incorrect) in any other way. Thus we have to distinguish between the different ways in which a sentence may be true and the different ways in which it may be false. A sentence, for example, may be false in the sense that its assertion is incorrect though it does not contain any empty singular term; it is then false in the first way (False1). The negation operator converts such a sentence, according to Dummett, as to have the value True, as it converts a True sentence to a False 1. But when a sentence is false for making an incorrect assertion as it contains a name without a bearer, it is false in the second way (False 2). The negation of such a sentence also has the value False 2, according to Dummett. That is, in such cases, the assertion of a sentence as well as its negation are both incorrect. So we have one three-valued truth-table for negation.

P	¬P
T	F1
F1	T
F2	F2

in which F1 and F2 mark two different undesigned values. Similarly a conditional statement may have two different designated values depending on whether its antecedent is true or not. If, for example, a conditional statement is true when its antecedent is also true, the statement is true in the first way (True 1). If, on the other hand, it is true when its antecedent is false, it is true in the second way (True 2). Now the negation operator is to be taken in a way as to convert a True 1 sentence to a False and a False sentence to a True 1 sentence, but a True 2 sentence to a True 2 one. Hence another three-valued truth-table for negation is

P	¬P
T1	F
T2	T2
F	T1

in which T1 and T2 mark two different designated values. These two truth-tables for negation explain how, according to Dummett, in order to derive the truth-conditions of compound sentences we have to be able to make a distinction between different designated and different undesigned values of the constituent sentences as the semantic roles of the sentential operators are given by truth-tables which relate to the individual values and not just to the distinction between a designated and an undesigned value⁸.

Dummett's theory that the truth of a sentence is its warranted assertibility has been criticized on the ground that the conditions which warrant the assertibility of a sentence may change, and the sentence which was correctly assertible (true) for a person at one time may fail to be so (may be false) at a later period, hence truth can be 'lost'⁹. Davidson also thinks that Dummett fails to give a clear idea of how warranted assertibility can at the same time be a fixed property of a statement as well as a property that depends on the speaker's actual ability to recognize that certain conditions are satisfied. Actual abilities of persons may change, but truth cannot¹⁰.

No doubt the notion of truth considered by Dummett is a relativized notion of truth as opposed to the absolute notion of truth. The absolute notion of truth is that sentences are 'made' true by some recognition-transcendent states of affairs. Dummett's point is that since 'we cannot get outside our skins', a theory of truth should be formulated in terms of states of affairs as perceived or conceptualized. According to this theory sentences are 'made' true on the basis of some recognizable grounds or evidence for asserting them. Such a theory should specify what justifies an assertion. Dummett holds as opposed to Quine that the simple sentences of our language are tested first, on the basis of which other sentences of our language get tested, but he agrees with Quine at least in holding that our language faces the tribunal of experience (though not as a whole), the meanings of the sentences belonging to our language are ultimately derived somehow from experience. Of course, this is not to say that through experience we come in direct contact with the (verification-transcendent) reality. To quote Dummett,

True statements must comprise, though they are not necessarily confined to, all those which would have been established as true had the relevant observations been made; 'observation' is, ...not to be taken as mere passive exposure to sense experience but to include physical and mental operations and the discernment of structure (of patterns)¹¹.

The success of a meaning theory, according to Dummett, is to be estimated on the basis of whether it does or does not provide a workable account of a practice that accords with what we in fact observe. This practice that Dummett talks about here, is no doubt a general linguistic practice, and Dummett's explanation of truth in terms of recognition of the assertibility conditions of a sentence is not relative to the recognizing capacity of an individual speaker. This is also evident from his consideration of different types of designated and undesignated values of constituent sentences for determining the assertibility/ truth conditions of logically complex sentences. For the way in which he conceives the relation between assertibility /

truth and designation is not the only way of looking at it. Another way of looking at the same is one in which the construction of a truth-table is quite independent of characterizing its values as designated or undesignated. Of course, such a characterization is needed for the completion of the truth-table. On this consideration the question of marking some values as designated and some values as undesignated comes after the construction of the truth-table. After constructing the truth-table we may adopt different systems of designation according to our purpose, and we shall get different results corresponding to the different systems of designation adopted. For example, the following truth-table may be constructed without considering any of the values '1' or '0' as designated or undesignated.

p	q	p,q
1	1	1
1	0	0
0	1	0
0	0	0

This truth-table would be one of conjunction or disjunction depending on which value we choose to designate. If in the table, '1' is marked designated and '0' undesignated, we would have a truth-table for conjunction; but if '0' is marked designated and '1' undesignated then the same table would be one for (inclusive) disjunction. Rescher, for example, adopts a new system of designation in order to make the set of tautologies of Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic(3) equivalent to the set of tautologies of classical two-valued logic (C2), and also the set of contradictions of 3 equivalent to the set of contradictions of C2. Rescher expresses his opinion in this connection that '...it makes a great difference for determining the accepted theses (i.e., tautologies) of a many-valued system which truth-values are selected for "designation"¹². Herzberger also is of the opinion that designating the values is not necessary for the construction of a truth-table. For him in the case of many-valued logic a truth-table is first constructed, and then a secondary two-valued structure is superimposed over the primary many-valued structure, which is called designation¹³.

According to Dummett, designated values mark sentences which are assertible. In order to grasp the content of a particular assertion all that is necessary is to know for the sentence to have a designated value¹⁴. Dummett would reject the theory that we may adopt any system of designation depending on our purpose or choice. For him the system of designation, being intimately connected with the notion of assertibility, is a matter of general linguistic practice and is governed by objective conditions of correctness.

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QUANTIFICATION OVER POSSIBLE-WORLD : A MODAL INTERPRETATION

KANTILAL DAS

SECTION-I

The concept of possible-world, from a logical point of view, is predominantly concerned with the concepts of possibility and necessity. The concepts of possibility (in symbol \diamond) and necessity (in symbol \square) are thought to be the distinctive operators of modal logic. These operators are neither to be regarded as truth-functional, nor to be regarded as quantificational; but simply to be considered as modal operators as they are kindred with mode or manner in contrast to substance. The main burden of my paper is to show how quantifier acts over possible-world. Before entering into this problem, let me focus on two other related problems ; such as : (i) why modal operators are not rated as truth-functional operators ?; and (ii) if modal operators are supposed to be non-truth-functional, then how the truth values of modal propositions, viz., 'it is necessary that...', 'it is possible that ...' are to be determined? The relevant answer to these problems will give rise to a clue to determine the burden of my paper. Let me first explain these two problems in turn.

Answering to question (i), it can be said that like truth-functional operators, viz; '!', 'V', 'D', '≡', '~', we cannot determine the truth-value of modal operators. In truth-functional logic, if we know the truth value of p, we can ipso-facto determine the truth value of $\sim p$. Likewise, if we know the truth value of p and q in isolation we can determine the truth value of 'p q', 'pVq', 'p D q', 'p ≡ q'. We do, simply because we have a mechanism of *decision procedure* by which the unique truth value of a compound proposition can be ascertained. But this would not be the case which actually happens always in modal logic. Here if we know the truth-value of p, it would not be possible for us at times to fix conclusively what would be the truth-value of $\square p$. As modal operators are dealing with mode or manner of expression, we do not have any decision procedure in determining the unique truth value of $\square p$ or $\diamond p$. In sentential logic, we have four distinct truth-functions of p. They are : (i) p itself; (ii) the negation of p ; (iii) the truth-function of the conjunction of both p and not p; and (iv) the truth-function of the disjunction of p and not p. Symbolically, we have i) p; ii) $\sim p$; iii) $p \cdot \sim p$ and iv) $p \vee \sim p$. The truth-value of these

propositions can be determined by the following truth-table :

p	$\sim p$	$p \cdot \sim p$	$p \vee \sim p$
T	F	F	T
F	T	F	T

Now, if the modal operator, say \Box , is thought to be a truth - functional operator, then at least one of the following equivalences comes out true.

- a) $\Box P \equiv p$
- b) $\Box P \equiv \sim p$
- c) $\Box P \equiv (p \cdot \sim p)$
- d) $\Box P \equiv (p \vee \sim p)$

Let us examine each of them in turn truth-functionally :

- a) $\Box P \equiv p$

This is logically equivalent to :

- a') $(\Box p \supset p) \cdot (p \supset \Box p)$

Here the first part of (a') is true unquestionably as if p is necessarily true then p must be true too. But what we think about the second part of (a') ? Can we assert that p is necessarily true from merely knowing that p is true ? In modal logic the proposition p can be true in two senses, such as, either p can merely happen to be true or bound to be true. So when it is said p is true, it is not at all clear whether p merely happens to be true or bound to be true. If it is supposed that 'p is true' means 'p merely happens to be true', then $p \supset \Box p$ does not hold good truth - functionally. So also (a).

- b) $\Box p \equiv \sim p$

This is logically equivalent to :

- b') $(\Box p \supset \sim p) \cdot (\sim p \supset \Box p)$

Here the first part of (b') is obviously false as if p is necessarily true then P can never be false. So (b'), being a conjunctive proposition, is false . So also (b).

- c) $\Box p \equiv (p \cdot \sim p)$

This logically equivalent to :

- c') $[\Box p \supset (p \cdot \sim p)] \cdot [(p \cdot \sim p) \supset \Box p]$

Here the first part of (c') is obviously false as if P is necessarily true then 'p · ~p' must be false . So (c') is false and so also (c).

- d) $\Box P \equiv (p \vee \sim p)$

This is logically equivalent to :

- d') $[\Box p \supset (p \vee \sim p)] \cdot [(p \vee \sim p) \supset \Box p]$

Here the first part of (d') is obviously true. But what we think about the second part of (d')? If 'PV - P' is true, (of course, it is true without exception), then it does not mean to say that $\Box p$ must be true too. The proposition 'pV -p' will remain as true when ps is supposed to be false and $\sim p$ is supposed to be true. In a situation like this $\Box p$ must be false. $\Box p$ can remain as true if p remains as true in every possible situation. Thus (d') comes out as false and so also (d).


SECTION - II

So far I have taken part in examining why modal operators are thought to be non-truth-functional. But an immediate problem may crop-up at this point which leads me to examine the second part of my paper. The problem is : if modal operators are rated to be non-truth-functional, then how the truth- values of modal propositions are determined ? In our daily interaction one may conveniently utter the modal propositions, viz; 'it is possible that such and such is true', 'it is necessary that such and such is true', etc. If the modal propositions are already at hand, then in what sense is one enabled to arrive at a decision of their truth or falsity ? Of course, there underlies a process through which the truth-value of modal propositions can be grasped. But what is the process ? It is held that the truth-value of modal propositions is determined with regard to the concept of possible-world (situation). But what does a possible-world mean ? A possible - world cannot catch on in isolation. A possible-world can only be comprehended in terms of an actual-world. An actual-world is the basic world. By an actual-world we do not mean just the planet on which we live; rather we mean the universe as a whole which contains everything that really exists. The concept of actual-world is made clear by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*² when he goes on to say that the world (actual) is the totality of facts or facts in **Logical Space** are the world. An actual-world includes all that was, is or will be. It is presupposed that every world is the possible-world of itself. The reason is simple as if something actually exists than it must possibly have existed . That is why in modal logic $p \supset \Diamond p$ holds good necessarily. But we do not have any possible-world independent of any actual-world. So the concept of possible-world can be explained only in terms of an actual-world. An actual-world, so to speak, is the paradigm of a possible-world. One aims at to fix the truth-value of modal proposition in an actual-world. But the concept of possible-world comes into being in modal logic simply for determining the truth value of modal operators. One can easily appraise the truth value of p in an actual-world. But in fixing the truth value of $\Box p$ or $\Diamond p$ in an actual-world, one has to appraise each and every possible-world of an actual world. But how many possible-worlds an actual-world possesses ? As the concept of possible - world is an intuitionistic concept, the answer should be comprehended in an intuitionistic level. Since an actual-world is the possible-world

of itself, an actual-world must possess at least one possible -world. But intuitively there is no upper limitation of possible-world of an actual-world; an actual-world may possess logically innumerable possible - worlds.

Let me pass on to fix the truth - value of modal proposition in an actual - world. It has already been pointed out that the modal proposition $\Diamond P$ stands for 'p is possibly true'; and the modal proposition $\Box p$ stands for 'P is necessarily true'. $\Diamond P$ is to be true in an actual-world when P will remain as true in at least one possible-world of an actual - world; otherwise $\Diamond P$ is to be false. Again, $\Box p$ is to be true in an actual - world when p will remain as true in every possible - world of an actual - world; but $\Box p$ is false otherwise. Let me examine the following diagramme:

D-1




Look at D-1. Here W_1 is the actual - world and there is no other possible - world of W_1 except W_1 itself. (Where every actual - world is the possible - world of itself). P is true in W_1 , so also both $\Diamond P$ and $\Box p$. P may remain as false in W_1 . If so, then $\sim p$ is found in W_1 and in such a case both $\Diamond P$ and $\Box p$ have to be false in W_1 . Again consider the following diagramme :

D-2




Modelwise, D-2 is different from D-1. D-2 has two worlds, viz., W_1 and W_2 . The ' \rightarrow ' sign in between W_1 and W_2 acts as a mark of an accession indicating W_2 as a possible-world of W_1 . When we consider W_1 , W_1 is the actual-world. There are two possible-worlds of W_1 , viz., W_1 itself. But $\Box p$ is false in W_1 as p is false in W_2 and W_2 is the possible-world of W_1 . Again, when we consider W_2 , W_2 is the actual-world. There is no other possible-world of W_2 except W_2 itself as there is no mark of accession from W_2 to any other world. P is false in W_2 , so also both $\Diamond P$ and $\Box p$. Again look at another diagramme :



Modelwise, D-3 is different from D-1 and D-2. D-3 has three worlds, viz, W_1 , W_2 and W_3 . There is also a mark of an accession from W_1 to W_2 ; and from W_2 to W_3 . Accordingly, the possible-worlds of W_1 are W_1 and W_2 and W_2 and W_3 ; and the possible-world of W_3 is W_3 itself. $\Diamond P$ is true in W_1 as P is true in W_2 ; $\Diamond P$ is true in W_2 as p is true in W_2 and $\Diamond P$ is false in W_3 as p is false in W_3 ; and $\Box p$ is false in W_3 as p is false in W_3 .

D-4



Modelwise, D-4 is completely different from all other models discussed above. Here we see two accession marks of W_1 of which one points from W_1 to W_2 and the other points from W_1 to W_3 . Accordingly, the possible-worlds of W_1 are W_1 , W_2 and W_3 ; the possible-world of W_2 is W_2 itself; the possible-world of W_3 is W_3 itself. $\Diamond P$ is true in W_1 as P is true in W_1 ; $\Diamond P$ is false in W_2 as P is false in W_2 ; $\Diamond P$ is true in W_3 as P is true in W_3 . $\Box p$ is false in W_1 as P is false in W_2 ; $\Box p$ is false in W_2 as P is false in W_2 ; $\Box p$ is true in W_3 as P is false in W_3 .

SECTION - III

Uptil now, I have examined in what sense the truth value of modal proposition can be determined. Let me pass on to the main objective of my paper. The main yearning of my paper, as I have already mentioned, is to show in what sense *quantifier acts over possible - world*. Here I wish to claim that if the modal concepts of 'possibility' and 'necessity' apprehend with regard to the concept of possible-world for determining the truth-value of modal proposition in an actual-world, then it will be possible for me to show that there underlies an obvious parallelism between the quantifiers (viz, '(x)' and ' \exists s') on one hand and the concepts of possibility (\Diamond) and necessity (\Box) on the other. Let me examine in what sense the supposed parallelism is made possible.

I have already stated that the concepts of $\Box P$ and $\Diamond p$ cannot be equated with the quantifiers, viz, '(x)' and ' \exists x)' as they denote class or quantity, whereas modal operators are related to mode or manner of expression. But the supposed parallelism is made possible if the truth-value of modal propositions are determined

with regard to the concept of possible-world. Let me show how ?

- I) $\Box p$ [$\Box p$ is true when P is true in every possible-world of an actual-world]
 $\leftrightarrow (x) (W_x \rightarrow P_x)$ [For any values of x if x is a world then p is true in x]
- II) $\Box -p$ [$\Box -p$ means p is necessarily false in every possible - world of an actual -world or it is impossible that P is true in at least one possible-world of an actual-world] $\leftrightarrow (x) (W_x \rightarrow -P_x)$ [For all values of x if x is a world then p is not true in x or it is not the case that there is at least one x such that x is a world and p is true in x]
- III) $\Diamond P$ [$\Diamond P$ is true when p is true in at least one possible-world of an actual-world] $\leftrightarrow (\exists x) (W_x . P_x)$ [There is at least one x such that x is a world and p is true in x]
- IV) $\Diamond - p$ [$\Diamond - p$ means p is false in at least one possible - world of an actual-world]- $(\exists x) (W_x . -P_x)$ [There is at least one x such that x is a world and p is false in x]

What I have asserted above can be logically demonstrated in the following :

- a) $\Box p \leftrightarrow (x) (W_x \rightarrow P_x)$
 b) $\Box -p \leftrightarrow (x) (W_x \rightarrow -P_x)$
 c) $\Diamond P \leftrightarrow (\exists x) (W_x . P_x)$
 d) $\Diamond - p \leftrightarrow (\exists x) (W_x . -P_x)$


In quantification (predicate) logic we have the following equivalences :

- i) $-(x) (W_x \rightarrow P_x) \leftrightarrow (\exists x) (W_x . -P_x)$
 ii) $-(x) (W_x \rightarrow -P_x) \leftrightarrow (\exists x) (W_x . P_x)$
 iii) $-(\exists x) (W_x . P_x) \leftrightarrow (x) (W_x \rightarrow -P_x)$
 iv) $-(\exists x) (W_x . -P_x) \leftrightarrow (x) (W_x \rightarrow P_x)$

Likewise in modal logic we have the following equivalences :

- i) $-\Box p \leftrightarrow \Diamond -p$
 ii) $-\Box -p \leftrightarrow \Diamond p$
 iii) $-\Diamond p \leftrightarrow \Box -p$
 iv) $-\Diamond -p \leftrightarrow \Box p$

Apart from the above, let me focus on another important parallelism between quantifiers and modal concepts. Ensuing the above observation, I do claim that **The Square of Opposition**³ which we have in traditional logic can equally be applied in modal propositions. Let me draw the diagramme :



The contradictory relation between $\Box P$ and $\Diamond -p$; and $\Box -P$ and $\Diamond p$ holds good. $\Box P$ claims that P is true in every possible - world of an actual-world whereas $\Diamond -p$ claims that P is false in at least one possible - world of an actual - world. Again $\Box -P$ says that P is false in every possible - world of an actual-world whereas $\Diamond p$ says that P is true in at least one possible-world of an actual - world. Accordingly if $\Box -P$ is supposed to be true, then $\Diamond p$ must be false; and vice-versa. The contrary relation also holds good as both $\Box P$ and $\Box -P$ cannot be true together. $\Box P$ says p is true in every possible - world of an actual-world; whereas $\Box -P$ asserts just the opposite. But both $\Box P$ and $\Box -P$ can be false together if the world under consideration does not exist at all. The sub-contrary relation has also been fulfilled. In the sub-contrary relation both $\Diamond p$ and $\Diamond -p$ cannot be false together; but both of them can be true together. Suppose there is an actual - world having two possible-worlds (see D-2) in which P remains as true in one and false in another. In a situation like this both $\Diamond p$ and $\Diamond -p$ hold good. $\Diamond p$ says P is true in at least one possible-world of an actual-world and $\Diamond -p$ says that P is false in at least-one possible -world of an actual-world. The sub-alternation also holds good as $\Box P$ logically entails $\Diamond -p$; and $\Box -P$ logically entails $\Diamond -p$; but not vice-versa. If P is necessary true then P must be possibly true; and again if P is necessarily false then P must be possibly false. As far as truth is concerned $\Box P$ is more stronger than $\Diamond p$; and as far as falsity is concerned $\Box -P$ is more stronger than $\Diamond -p$. Thus it is proved that the **Traditional Square of Opposition** is fulfilled by modal propositions if the truth - values of modal proposition are determined by the concept of possible-world.

Again we find another important analogy between quantifiers and modal operators. In modal logic we find conjunctive truth-functional force in $\Box P$ and disjunctive truth-functional force in $\Diamond p$ when their truth-values are determined with regard to the concept of possible-world. If W_1 is an actual -world having three possible-worlds, viz, W_1, W_2 and W_3 then $\Box P$ is to be true in W_1 when p remains as true in W_1, W_2 and W_3 . So the truthvalue of $\Box P$ in W_1 is determined by the conjunctive truth - value of W_1 's possible - worlds. On the other hand, $\Diamond p$ is to be true in W_1 if

P is true in at least one possible - world of W_1 . This makes sense to say that $\Diamond p$ is to be true in W_1 if P remains as true either in W_1 or in W_2 or in W_3 . So the truth-value of $\Diamond p$ is determined in W_1 by the disjunctive truth value of W_1 's possible-worlds.

Quantification logic equally does the same job like $\Box P$ and $\Diamond p$. The proposition $(x)(W_x \rightarrow P_x)$ can be logically paraphrased as : For any values of x if x is a world then P is true in x. Here we find the logical force of $\Box P$. Suppose W_1 is an actual - world having three possible-worlds viz; W_1, W_2 and W_3 . With this assumption the proposition under consideration can be truth -functionally paraphrased as :

$$(W_1 \rightarrow P_1) \cdot (W_2 \rightarrow P_2) \cdot (W_3 \rightarrow P_3).$$

It means to say that if W_1 is a world then P is true in W_1 and if W_2 is the world then P is true in W_2 and if W_3 is a world then P is true in W_3 . In this sense we can say that P is true in every possible - world of W_1 . Thus $\Box P$ is logically equated with $(x)(W_x \rightarrow P_x)$.

The proposition $(\exists x)(W_x \cdot P_x)$ asserts that 'there is at least one x such that x is a world and P is true in x'. Here we get a logical parity between $\Diamond p$ and $(\exists x)(W_x \cdot P_x)$. Let me suppose W_1 as an actual-world having three possible-worlds, viz; W_1, W_2 and W_3 . Under this presupposition $(\exists x)(W_x \cdot P_x)$ can be logically paraphrased as:

$$(W_1 \cdot P_1) \vee (W_2 \cdot P_2) \vee (W_3 \cdot P_3).$$

It means to say that either W_1 is a world and P is true in W_1 or W_2 is a world and p is true in W_2 or W_3 is a world and p is true in W_3 . This makes sense to say, alternatively, that p is true in at least one possible-world of W_1 . In this regard $\Diamond p$ is logically equated with $(\exists x)(W_x \cdot P_x)$

The proposition $(x)(W_x \rightarrow -P_x)$ asserts that "for all values of x if x is a world then p is false in x". Here we get the logical parity between $\Box -P$ and $(x)(W_x \rightarrow -P_x)$. With the help of the same assumption considered above the proposition $(x)(W_x \rightarrow -P_x)$ can be logically paraphrased as :

$$(W_1 \rightarrow -P_x) \cdot (W_2 \rightarrow -P_x) \cdot (W_3 \rightarrow -P_x)$$

It means to say if W_1 is a world then P is false in W_1 ; and if W_2 is a world then p is false in W_2 ; and if W_3 is a world then p is false in W_3 . So p is false in every possible-world of an actual-world. So $(x)(W_x \rightarrow -P_x)$ can be logically equated with $\Box -P$.

Finally, the proposition $(\exists x)(W_x \supset \neg P_x)$ can be equated with $\Diamond \neg p$. The Proposition $(\exists x)(W_x \supset \neg P_x)$ asserts that "there is at least one x such that x is a world and p is false in x". Accordingly, under the same assumption taken above, the proposition under consideration can be logically paraphrased as :

$$(W_1 \supset \neg P_1) \vee (W_2 \supset \neg P_2) \vee (W_3 \supset \neg P_3)$$

It means either W_1 is a world and P is false in W_1 or W_2 is a world and P is false in W_2 or W_3 is a world and p is false in W_3 . This makes sense to say, alternatively, that P is false in at least one possible-world of W_1 . In this regard $(\exists x)(W_x \supset \neg P_x)$ is equated with $\Diamond \neg p$.

So far, I have discussed all the issues what I have proposed to do. From this prolonged discussion, it seems clear in what sense quantifier acts over possible-world and also in what sense the logical parity between quantifiers and modal operators has been set up.

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MILL AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS

R. N. KARANI

I

Mill's Utilitarian ethics represents a type of ethical naturalism, a view like that of classical Greek philosophers many of whom believed that our knowledge of the good life, of how a man ought to live, is derived from the observation of human nature and of the human situation. This line of thinking led Philosophers like Aristotle to seek the psychological foundation of the traditionally recognized virtues. That this point of view is far from dead may be witnessed from the comment of an influential contemporary philosopher who remarks : 'It is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that it should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking.' (Anscombe, 175); and she goes on to explore the psychological notions of 'wanting', 'needing' and 'flourishing'. Another important feature of this naturalistic approach in Greek thought is the stress on the social context of human life, the fact that man is a social being. The 'good life' cannot be conceived in abstraction from the individual's numerous and varied social ties, because without these integral ties with other individuals there is no recognizable *Human* nature, no *human* being, no *human* existence. We find in classical Greek naturalism a tendency to seek a knowledge of values by discovering its foundations in psychology (observed *facts* about human nature) and in sociology (observed *facts* about human associations, groups and institutions). To draw attention to a point of great philosophical and logical import : it is implied by the notion of 'foundation' that *values* cannot be understood in separation from *facts* ; that there is some necessary and vital connection between facts and values, between what *is* and what *ought* to be, between how a man *ought* to live and what a human being *is* in his or her psycho-social constitution. The good life is the manifestation of the purposive to satisfy wants and desires in interaction with each other.

Whatever be the strength or weakness of this approach, at the moment it is only pertinent to observe that J.S. Mill's Utilitarian ethical theory is a clear exemplification of a naturalistic approach to the theory of values. Briefly and baldly stated, in Mill's exposition of the ethical principle of 'general happiness' as being the *summum bonum* of human existence, there is the recognition of the fact of the

universal desire for happiness as a basic psychological motive, as also of the fact that the pursuit of happiness is a social pursuit. And in his (much castigated) 'equivalents of proof' for Utilitarianism, Mill can be seen to be exploring and tracing intrinsic values back to the foundation of natural facts about human psychological nature, and the social setting of human life. It cannot be denied that Mill's enterprise is marred by some imprecision and muddled argument, if not in its entirety, at certain crucial points. But regardless of whether Mill succeeds in making out a clear and rigorous case for his thesis, it is unquestionable what his aim is : to establish values upon a foundation of empirical facts — facts about human desires and wants, and the collective nature of the goal. I would like to suggest, and, of course, to argue that these are central insights about the nature of morality which are , in spite of defects in the details of Mill's analysis, and of weak and faltering arguments on the part of Mill, eminently sound, reasonable and defensible. And such a defence is the theme of the paper.

Naturalism in ethics seems to arise spontaneously from a characteristic world-view or perspective — what is called 'the humanistic' perspective. This perspective, which is usually contrasted with a 'religious' or 'theological' world-view, asserts, with Marx, that 'man is the highest being for man', and that all values are human values, not necessarily in the sense that they are created or invented by human thought and decision, but in the wider sense that their existence, application, and justification would be inconceivable without reference to human needs, concerns and purposes. Human needs and wants are facts which are intrinsically and centrally relevant to moral life, and indeed to all judgements of value, and values and moral rules and institutions are always human responses to the deepest human needs. In contrast, a religious world-view is 'one in which man occupies a subordinate position in the universe, owing submission to forces or purposes which transcend him. ...grounded in a ...generalized sense of the insignificance of human projects and aspirations ...' (*norman*, 237).

And unfortunate source of confusion regarding the notion of naturalism in recent ethics has been thrown up by Moore's theory of 'the naturalistic fallacy'. Moore, in his strenuous insistence upon the autonomy of ethics, understands 'natural facts' in a wide and ecentric sense to cover not only the biological, psychological and social properties and facts concerning human life, but also properties like, 'fulfilling the will of Gods. Thus, for Moore, a system of moral values having its basis in a religious or theological world-view should be classified as a species of naturalistic ethics — and which, of course, would, therefore, invite the criticism of committing 'the naturalistic fallacy'. This, as I have remarked, is an unnecessary

and unfortunate twist since it obscures an important conceptual distinction between systems which seek to derive values from some transcendental source and those which relate values to facts and elements within the confines of the natural system investigated by science. What is more, Moore's terminology is unnecessary : he could have, without any prejudice to his thesis , spoken of 'the definist fallacy' (as suggested by some writers) instead of the misleading, 'naturalistic fallacy'. At any rate, in my defence of Mill, I shall understand by 'ethical naturalism' a view which presupposes a humanistic world-view, and one which would reject the relating of values to something beyond nature and its processes — a view which implies some form of positivism. (As we shall see later a part of Hume's ethical views involves the contrast between a naturalist and a religious foundation of values.)

II

A naturalistic theory of ethics, like Mill's Utilitarianism centers round the assumption that there is some non-contingent connection between values and morality, on the one hand, and certain relevant natural facts about man and society.

However, this assumption immediately comes up against a powerful, destructive challenge from a logical principle, variously called, 'Hume's Law'(Hare), or 'Hume's Guillotene' (Black). The following oft quoted passage from Hume's *Treatise* underlies the principle : ' In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs ; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with a *ought*, or an *ought not*. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this *ought* or *ought not*, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.'

This passage, in its simplest terms, is interpreted as expressing Hume's view that *ought* cannot be derived from *is* ,that *value-judgments* cannot be derived from *statement of facts*, exclusively. In other words purely from the consideration of how things *are*(facts), one cannot logically infer or derive how things *ought to be* (values).

The remarkable influence exercised by Hume's Law , may be gauged from

the fact what most major developments in 20th. century ethical theory endorse, and take as their point of departure, Hume's logical principle. Intuitionism, particularly in one formulation of the Moore's, 'naturalistic fallacy' (that it is a fallacy to definitionally identify ethical concepts with non-ethical concepts), implicitly reiterates Hume's logical point. Then, non-cognitivist theories, both Emotivist and Prescriptivist while rejecting Moore's notion of non-natural facts, elucidate the non-descriptive logic of value-judgments in such a way as to throw into sharp relief the gulf between statements of fact and value-judgments. Hare agrees with Popper in the latter's conclusion about Hume's Rule that it is 'perhaps the simplest and most important point about ethics'. Popper has said : 'Perhaps the simplest and most important point about ethics is purely logical. I mean the impossibility to derive nontautological ethical rules — imperatives ; principles of policy; aims; or however we may describe them — from statements of facts. Only if this fundamental logical position is realized can we begin to formulate the real problems of moral philosophy, and to appreciate their difficulty' (Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1948, p. 154 — quoted, Max Black)

Hare's formulation of Hume's autonomy principle adapts it to reasoning involving imperatives : imperative conclusions cannot be validly inferred from premises that do not contain at least one imperative. Nowell-Smith follows Hume when he maintains that an inference which reaches an ethical conclusion from factual premises 'must be illegitimate reasoning, since the conclusion of an argument can contain nothing which is not in the premise, and there are no "oughts" in the premises' (*Ethics*, 1954, page 37). All these philosophers seem to agree that only statements of fact can follow from statements of fact.

Enough has been said to show that Mill's naturalistic ethics which presupposes the soundness of reasoning from psychological and social facts to justified conclusions about moral value, faces a tremendous challenge in the form of Hume's law. And since the Law forms and important element of contemporary noncognitivism, Naturalism has to come to grips with the essentials of noncognitivist ethics, specially in the account of practical reasoning. In the sections which follow I shall examine the arguments in some recent discussions aimed at taking a critical look at, and questioning, what has almost assumed the form of a dogma, viz. that it is illogical to reason from an 'is to an **ought**, from **facts** to **values**. The views I am going to discuss (those of A.G.MacIntyre, Max Black, Phillipa Foot, and Anthony Quinton), no doubt constitute only a minority opinion, but what is important is that without adopting any formal labels, these philosophers have at least succeeded in reviving a philosophical interest in naturalistic ethics; to the extent that now the

term, 'neo-naturalism' is acquiring a place in the survey of contemporary ethical theories.

III

Let us begin by studying the account of practical and moral reasoning provided by those recent philosophers who adopt Hume's logical principle of autonomy : that there is a unbridgeable logical gulf between *is* and *ought* . Hare, for example, does not deny the role of reasoning or inference in relation to moral judgments — on the contrary. Moral agents are rational agents, and moral judgments are directed to people as rational agents, and moral judgments are directed to people as rational agents. There is a correct and even valid procedure of practical reasoning : a reasoning or inference where a practical conclusion (and, in particular, a moral conclusion) is reached validly from premises, some of which are factual statements. But the practical inference, though it reaches a practical /moral conclusion from a factual premise, is not really *valid* if the conclusion is drawn solely from that premise, since the factual premise is not sufficient to *entail* the moral conclusion. For example the practical inference :

You have been drinking . (Factual Premise)

You ought not to drive your car. (Moral Conclusion)

is not a valid inference, the premise does not entail the conclusion. It can only be taken to be treated as valid by supposing that it is an enthymeme with a suppressed major premise which, when explicitly supplied, throws the inference into a syllogistic form :

Major Premise : You ought not to drive your car when you have been drinking.

(General Moral Rule)

Minor Premise : You have been drinking. (Factual Statement)

Conclusion : You ought not to drive your car. (Practical, Moral Judgment).

Now, according to Hare, the inference is perfectly valid as a form of a Practical Syllogism : the relation between premises and conclusion is *entailment* . So to the question how can we pass from *is* to *ought* , from a factual statement to a moral judgment, Hare's method would be as follows : treat the moral statement as the conclusion of a syllogism, and the factual statement is to be taken as a minor premise; to make the transition, now all that we want is a moral rule or principle as the major premise. The moral principle (in the major premise) has a *practical* character or function, it is *action-guiding* : it guides people's actions when they are addressed to people as rational agents and *telling* them what to do. Thus, for Hare the role of reason in ethics is to derive moral judgments from other moral judgments of wider scope, (not from statements of fact).

Essentially the same pattern is presented by Nowell - Smith. Referring to the attempts of theologians to establish Christian ethics upon the foundation of the doctrine of God the Creator, Nowell-Smith comments that the doctrine, by itself, does not suffice to validate the ethics. The argument, 'God created us, therefore we ought to obey him' is defective and incomplete and invalid; it becomes valid when the suppressed major premise is supplied, viz. 'we ought to obey our creator'.

The upshot of this seems to be that the philosophers who endorse Hume's Law are contending that if a practical inference is to be acceptable it must take the form of deductively valid syllogism, where the premises **entail** the conclusion. But this contention requires looking into. A.C. Mac Intyre observes, rightly, that this position makes sense only 'if there is an assumption that arguments are either deductive or defective' (MacIntyre, 37). But what is the force of this assumption? Is it not connected with Hume's controversial scepticism about induction? But, after Strawson, are we compelled to buy that scepticism? Strawson has shown what lies behind a Humean scepticism regarding induction — a misconceived demand: 'there arises the demand for a justification, not of this or that particular belief which goes beyond what is entailed by our evidence, but a justification of induction in general. And when the demand arises in this way it is, in effect, the demand that induction shall be shown to be really a kind of deduction; for nothing less will satisfy the doubter when this is the route to his doubts.' (Strawson, 250)

Such a demand is, indeed, implied when Hume argues from the premise 'there can be no **demonstrative** argument to prove, that those instances of which we have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience' to the conclusion, 'it is impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we should extend that experience beyond those particular instances which have fallen under our observation' (Hume, 89, 91).

Strawson also has something instructive to say about the formalist gambit of trying to explain 'the apparently non-deductive soundness of the arguments' by treating them as enthymemes — i.e. 'by saying that they were **really** deductive arguments with a suppressed premise' (s.235). For example the non-deductively sound argument, 'The kettle's been on the fire for the last ten minutes, so it should be boiling by now.'⁸ This argument is, though not deductively valid, perfectly sound. It is true that we can construct a corresponding and valid deductive argument by introducing the fresh premise, 'kettles always boil within ten minutes of being put on the fire'. But as a manoeuvre to justify induction, it is hardly effective. 'But by regarding these general statements as suppressed premises of arguments ...we do

not get rid of the general problem of explaining how we can reasonably draw conclusions from premises that do not entail them. We merely shift its emphasis to the narrower question : How do we establish general propositions such as these ? For these are not logically necessary propositions.' (Strawson, 235).

So, in any case, it boils down to accepting that conformities within our past experience, under certain conditions, provide a rational basis for *predicting* their repetition within future experience. Past experience does not *entail* that the sun will rise tomorrow, but as *evidence* provides *good reason*, even, conclusive evidence for the prediction that it shall. The confusion of the formalist seems to be his assumption that the question. 'Is it reasonable to infer B from A ?' must always finally mean, 'Does A entail B?' . But this is a confusion which misconceives the different aims and procedures of deductive and inductive argument. We must reject the assumption that arguments must be either deductive or defective; inductive arguments while not being deductive or demonstrative, can nevertheless be assessed as rational or reasonable — in Strawson's words : 'not as deductively valid, but as somehow sound, or correct or reasonable', (236) and always in relation to purposes of prediction, 'practical decision and action' (248)

What bearing has all this on the question of moral or practical reasoning ? On the question of *is* and *ought* ? Of facts and values ? Well, for one thing, the refutation of the assumption that arguments must be deductive or defective, provides sufficient ground for at least this limited conclusion : that inferences from *is* to *ought* cannot be dismissed as illogical *solely* on the ground that the *factual* premise does not *entail* the *value/moral* judgment. It would be a complete misunderstanding of the case being presented that it is being supposed or claimed that practical moral inferences *are* inductive arguments, or some species of inductive arguments. All that is being argued is that the analysis of induction has shown that it is not the case that in all rational, sound or correct argument the relation between the premise / evidence/data ground and the conclusion has to be the relation of logical necessity or entailment. As Strawson observes :

'Deductive standards are not the only standards of good argument ; for deductive reasoning is not the only kind of reasoning.' (233-34). Though there is no intention of assimilating moral practical arguments to inductive models, nevertheless both types possess a common feature : the relation between premise and conclusion is not an entailment relation. 'The kettle's been on the fire for the last ten minutes' does not entail 'it should be boiling by now.' Nor does, 'You have been drinking' entail 'You ought not to drive your car'. It should not be surprising (by a natural extension of Strawson's analysis) to find that there is indeed more than one type of non-deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning being only one such type.

Moral practical reasoning could be another legitimate form of reasoning distinguished by its own appropriate method, purpose and subject matter. The method of inductive argument (on Strawson's view) is appropriate to the activity of predicting contingent events, and in induction 'our assessment of evidence is an activity undertaken primarily not for its own sake, but for the sake of *'practical decision and action'* (emphasis added). This last phrase 'practical decision and action' suggests some interesting parallels with the aim of moral reasoning and of moral judgments as *action-guiding*. Philosophers like MacIntyre, Foot and Warnock in elucidating the character of moral (non-deductive) reasoning identify certain 'bridge notions' which link up non-contingently the gap between *is* and *ought*, facts and values. These strategically important 'bridge notions' are the concepts of 'wanting', 'needing', 'desiring', 'satisfaction', 'happiness'. Certain statements of fact by themselves provide reasons for acting, guide action, indicate what ought or ought not to be done. But not *any* matter of fact will serve for this practical function, only those facts which involve human wants, needs or desires, that is, pervasive psychological facts about human nature, facts, which ethical naturalists like Mill, identify as the foundation of all values, including moral values. This is consistent with the Aristotelian tradition according to which ethics cannot be investigated without doing moral psychology. Morality is unintelligible unless it is grounded in human nature. That this Aristotelian tradition is far from dead is witnessed by the pronouncement of a contemporary philosopher who says, 'it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that it should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking' (Anscombe, 1975), and she goes on to explore notions such as 'wanting', 'needing', 'flourishing'.

IV

Max Black suggests that one reason why 'modern readers' are 'predisposed to endorse Hume's Guillotine' may be 'the widespread and mistaken view' that no term may occur in the conclusion of a valid argument unless it occurs somewhere in the premise. In Hume's well-known passage the assumption is clearly there; referring to the copulation of *ought* or *ought not* in the transition, he points out that this 'expresses some new relation or affirmation' which cannot be a deduction from other relations 'entirely different from it'. And Black is right in maintaining that modern philosophers who endorse Hume's logical point go along with him in making the assumption. Nowell-Smith declares the illegitimacy of an argument from factual premises to an ethical conclusion on the ground that 'the conclusion of an argument can contain nothing which is not in the premises, and there are no "oughts" in the premises' (*Ethics*, p.37). Black challenges the assumption and sets out to show its untenability. Let us, first, take the following syllogism.

ARGUMENT I

Vivisection causes gratuitous suffering to animals.
 Nothing that causes gratuitous suffering ought to be done.
 ∴ Vivisection ought not to be done.

This is a valid practical syllogism and does not offend against Hume's Law, and though *ought not* occurs in the conclusion, it also occurs in the premise. But it is a principle of elementary logic :

If P, Q λ R then P λ If Q then R

Applying this principle to ARGUMENT I we get the following equivalent argument:

ARGUMENT II

Vivisection causes gratuitous suffering to animals.
 ∴ If nothing that causes gratuitous suffering ought to be done, vivisection ought not to be done.

This second argument is valid and yet does proceed from *is* to *ought*, and the conclusion does contain an *ought* not contained in the premise. In this argument the *ought* conclusion is complex. Black therefore turns to a case where 'the normative conclusion is free from sentential connectives.' He invokes the bridge notion of *wanting* to show how *ought* can be derived from *is*. Referring to a game of chess which is in progress the following argument can be formulated :

Fischer *wants* to mate Botwinik.

The one and only way to mate Botwinik is for Fischer to move the Queen.

∴ Fischer *should* move the Queen.

In this argument both premises state matters of fact; the conclusion is non-factual ('ought' could also have been used, since the difference between *should* and *ought* is immaterial here). And the factual premises provide *conclusive* reasons for urging the described action. Preempting a possible line of objection Black stresses the performative aspect of the utterance in the conclusion, 'Fischer should move the Queen'. A critic might object that the correct conclusion is really factual, viz. 'Fischer's best move is the Queen move', or, 'The one and only way in which Fischer can win is by moving the Queen'. Black counters the suggestion by drawing attention to the performative aspect of the utterance of the conclusion. Black writes : 'In saying that there is a performative aspect to saying "Fischer should move the Queen", I mean that a speaker who uses this form of words counts as doing something more than, or something other than, saying something having a truth value. He is not just saying something that is true or false, but is doing, and counts as doing, something more than that.' (Black, 104) What more the speaker is doing may be roughly characterised as something with an evaluative and imperative force : 'to urge the

hearer to adopt a course of action selected by the speaker as preferable, optimal, or correct'. (Black, 105).

In a more generalized form any argument exemplifying the following pattern would count as a sound practical inference from factual premises to a non-factual conclusion :

You *want* to achieve E.
 Doing M is the one and only way way to achieve E.
 ∴ You *should* do M.

V

'The ethical theory of this century' says Quinton, 'has been dominated by the idea of a philosophically fundamental cleavage between natural fact and value' (p.351). This acts as the basis of 'antinaturalist ethics' both in Moore's intuitionistic critique of naturalism, and the noncognitivist insistence on 'a logical dualism of statements a and evaluations' (p.35).

Quinton directs his critical attack primarily against the noncognitivist bifurcation of *statements* and *evaluations*. And by destroying this proposed logical dualism Quinton attempts to reinstate a naturalistic ethics which is substantially identical with Mill's doctrine of Utilitarianism. The logical dualism of the noncognitivist derives from the notion of the *practicality* of value : 'the idea ... that there is a special relationship or connection between judgments of value and conduct that does not obtain in the case of statements of fact'. (Quinton,355). A statement of fact provides a reason for belief, 'but to address a judgment of value to someone is to provide him with a reason for action'. (355). But how precisely is *practicality* of an utterance to be defined, when a special relationship between value judgments and conduct is claimed ? A connection, furthermore, which is supposed not to obtain in a theoretical utterance of a statement of fact ? Quinton reviews and dismisses as inadequate for the purposes of establishing the alleged dualism, certain criteria proposed by the emotivists : in terms of *causation* and *intention* . The former defines the connection in terms of 'a predominating tendency to cause emotion and action'. The latter in terms of the *intention* to cause emotion or action. Quinton has no difficulty in producing examples of *statements of fact* which satisfy the proposed criteria of practicality and hence undermine 'the presumption that there are two kinds of utterance that are basically distinct in principle.'(355). The prescriptivist analysis of Hare (with one modification) is, however found acceptable as 'the most satisfactory account of the distinction between practical or conduct-related and theoretical or merely belief-related discourse.'(356).

Thus an utterance is practical if its sincere acceptance by someone to whom it is addressed commits him to acting in certain ways. Hare is right in characterising imperatives and value judgments as having practical or prescriptive force as defined. Except that Hare is too rigid in treating this commitment to action as absolute. Quinton allows for the implied commitment to be defeated and overridden in some special circumstance, without the possibility of defeasibility as negating the practicality of the utterance — but sincere acceptance is stressed as 'essential to a definition of practicality'.

Now the principle of practicality is invoked by the noncognitivist as entailing the logical duality between statement of facts (as always and *only* theoretical), and judgments of value which, since they are admittedly practical, must be non-statements and noncognitive (since statements are always theoretical). Thus is naturalism refuted.

But Quinton is quick to expose the gap in the above reasoning, a gap filled in by an uncritical and questionable presumption. He writes: 'The assumption that remains to be vindicated, if the practicality of value is to disprove naturalism, is that no statement of facts are practical'. (359) Again, 'In order to use this distinction to refute naturalism one further assumption needs to be made; that all statements of fact, true or false, are theoretical.' (358). The noncognitivist position seems to rest on some confused thinking involving a defective analogy. Imperatives and value-judgments, it is being argued, are both practical, (which is true). Imperatives are non-statements or noncognitive, neither true nor false, (which also is correct). But are these two claims sufficient to establish that value-judgments are noncognitive (some kind of disguised imperatives)? Evidently they are not without the substantiation of the assumption questioned above. At least one thing is clear: post-Moorean antinaturalism has failed in its enterprise of establishing a decisive, clear cut logical duality of statements and evaluation *solely* from the principle of practicality. The assumption has to be justified that 'if an utterance is a statement of fact it must be theoretical and cannot be practical.' (360) And the onus of proof is on the noncognitivist.

To prevent a misunderstanding, it may be pointed out naturalism for its vindication, does not require the claim that all statements of fact are practical; there is no reasonable doubt that most factual statements do not have a practical force (as earlier defined), As we have found in earlier discussion) naturalistic ethics seeks its foundation in a special class of natural facts, viz. the psychological facts about certain basic features of *human* life: wants, needs, desires, satisfaction, happiness. So we find Quinton offering to show the untenability of the noncognitivist assumption, 'by producing a kind of utterance which is at once unquestionably factual and yet at the same time practical. ... The type of utterance I have in mind

for this purpose is what I shall call an appetitive utterance, an utterance about what someone likes or dislikes, enjoys or suffers from, is pleased or satisfied by, is displeased or repelled by'(360).

For a proper assessment of Quinton's theory of 'appetitive' utterances (which he goes on to develop into a systematic theory of 'appetitive naturalism'), the following must be noted. Appetitive utterances are clearly statements (true or false). — they state facts about what someone likes, dislikes, etc. Hence they are statements about empirical facts : psychological facts pertaining to human nature. And what is more the utterance of appetitive statements have practical force (according to the definition of the principle of practicality). To support this last claim consider someone asking for practical guidance of what he should do in some given situation, and you say, 'you will like (enjoy most) doing X'. Now if the person agrees that he/she will indeed like most doing X, and there are no defeasibility conditions preventing him from doing X , then the sincerity of his agreement is brought in question. He does not do therefore the utterance of 'You will like doing x the most' in the given context is an appetitive statement of fact which is at the same time practical in its force, it is conduct-related . The appetitive theory is, after all, expressing a not surprising truth that what people like or dislike, enjoy or suffer from are mental facts which act as *reasons for action* ; just as in our earlier discussion we had presented the psychological facts of desiring and wanting as effective reasons for actions. To take Quinton's example. A person who is visiting my town asks for guidance about the hotel he should stay at. I might say, 'The Crown is the quietist/largest/oldest hotel in town' (a purely theoretical descriptive statement). Or, I might say, 'You will like the Crown most' (appetitive statement). Both utterances are statements of fact; but the first, the descriptive, theoretical does not satisfy our criterion for practicality. Because, as Quinton points out, 'The descriptive observations are relevant only under the assumption that the questioner likes or values hotels with the qualities in question, which he may well not do. But in the appetitive case there is no substantial assumption that he likes or values what he likes. If a man stays away from the hotel which he has accepted as the smartest or oldest this casts no doubt on the sincerity of his agreement. But if he stays away from the hotel he agrees he would like the most then the sincerity of his agreement is brought in question in default of some explanation, such as that it is too expensive'(361).

I should like to point out that this is just the first stage in Quinton's arguments defending a system of 'appetitive naturalism' which he acknowledges is, in substance, Mill's Utilitarianism, But considering the limited scope of this paper, viz hopefully to weaken, if not to refute the hostile impact of Hume's Law on an attempt to do naturalistic ethics, Quinton may have helped in taking the first step.

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BHĀ VA-RŪPA : AN ANALYSIS

BIJAYANANDA KAR

Professor R. Balasubramanian is undisputably one of the foremost text-based authentic Advaita scholars of recent day. His deep study of the śāṅkarite works, particularly the *Taittirīyopaniṣad Bhāṣya - Vārtika* of Sureśvara is commendable. He, while giving introduction to the text of Sureśvara, has elaborately discussed the salient features of Advaita Darśana, the special contribution made by Sureśvara to the understanding of Ācārya śāṅkara's philosophic formulation of Advaita and also Sureśvara's own distinctive view-points towards enriching the Advaita darśana. Professor Balasubramanian's presentation is quite scholarly, forceful and persuasive.

Here, in this short paper, I would like to discuss the term *bhāva-rūpa* often used by the śāṅkarites (Sureśvara included) while explaining the concept of *Māyā/avidyā*. Though śāṅkara has not coined the term : *bhāva-rūpa* in his own works and has not distinguished between *māyā* and *avidyā* (also *ajñāna*), his later followers have made move in this direction. Though some post-śāṅkarites interpret *māyā* to be cosmic and *avidyā* to be individualistic, Sureśvara has followed śāṅkara in treating these concepts almost as synonymous. With regard to the explanation of the concept of *māyā/avidyā*, it has been held by Suresvara, Citsukha and others that it is *bhāva-rūpa*. The modern writers including Professor Balasubramanian have treated it as something positive and existent .¹

Now, it can be evident that literally the term : *bhāva-rūpa* is understood as *rūpa* of *bhāva* (*bhāvasya rūpaḥ bhāva-rupaḥ ṣaṣṭi-tat-puruṣasamāsa*). It is thus, clearly not *bhāva*. If *bhāva* means something positive, then surely *avidyā/māyā/ajñāna* can never mean something positive as per the direct meaning is taken into account. So, *bhāva-rūpa* can be treated as semblance of *bhāva* or that which appears as *bhāva* but really is something other than *bhāva*. And, if *bhāva* is understood as something positive, then *avidyā* as *bhāva-rūpa* can never be something positive.

It may be said that though literally *bhāva-rūpa* is not *bhāva*, in the context of the Advaita notion of *avidyā*, it requires a different reading. Since it has an appearance of *bhāva*, it can never be *abhāva*. It does occur or it does happen; and, it is through *vidyā*, it ceases (*Vijñānena vilīyate*). The stock ordinary example is often cited in this context. The rope appears as snake. It is the rope which actually is present on the occasion and is mistakenly treated as snake. But it can be seen here that the snake that is perceived is only a mistaken cognitive judgement. The snake that is perceived on the occasion is not present there actually. Nor even it is thought to be present somewhere else, in some other time. It is simply a matter of perceptual confusion or malobservation. The question of its positivity or negativity does not arise. The "apparent snake" is neither *bhāva*, nor *abhāva* but only a semblance of *bhāva*, i.e. it appears to be there but actually it is not. Of course, it is true that the judgement . "This is X" is a positive judgement and "This is not X" is a negative judgement. But here the analysis is on the point of rope appearing as snake. While the rope appeared to be a snake to a perceiver (by mistake, of course), the concerned perceiver never took it as apparent snake. In that case, there would not have been any error. He took it as actual snake and only on subsequent occasion, it was revealed to him on the basis of some further tests, that the object before him was not snake. Then what is withdrawn? *Only the judging of rope as snake*. The judgement which is found to be misjudgement is withdrawn, not any existent snake. The positive or affirmative judgement "This is snake" is corrected as "This is not snake" is corrected as "This is not snake" and is replaced by another positive judgement "This is rope".

It thus becomes clear that *avidyā* is an instance of confusion. It is a phenomenon in the empirical sense and it need not be construed as either a negative or a positive entity. But the modern writers seem to have been insisting on the point that *avidyā/māyā* in the generic sense, not confirming to any particular case of misperception, can be regarded as an entity ontologically. As the rope is mistaken as snake, so also Brahman is misconstrued as the manifold world due to *adhyāsa/avidyā/māyā/ajñāna/mithyā-jñāna*. Here *ajñāna* is not simply absence of knowledge but a positive misconstruction, i.e. taking something as something else (*atasmin tadbuddhi*).

Now, even if one concedes this argument of the analogical foundation, it does not follow that the appearance of Brahman as *jagat* is positive (*bhāva*). It only aims at directing the significant point at the epistemic front that Brahman is not known. It is due to *māyā*, Brahman is misconstrued as *jagat*. Here *jagat* is not the world of matter of fact. The world of actual existence is not replaced; only the

world-view or *sāmsārika dr̥ṣṭi* that is engulfed with overdose of sensualities, selfishness and self-possessiveness as the only ideal of valuational concern and there is nothing else, is critically viewed. It is indicated clearly that one has to become critical about this radical move ; for it generates both self-egotism (*ahamābhimāna*) and unwarranted self-possessive tendency (*mamābhimāna*). To Sureśvara, *jagat* has no being of its own (*anātmakam*) but it is due to the basis of craving (*mohamūlam*)². And it is the self-centered egoity which breeds hatred, jealousy, and vanity, is criticised and avoided in this set up. Value-awareness is surely not empirical in the sense it is sense-experienced as the factual judgements are. But that does not mean that values are not at all of empirical concern. To have a better harmonious, reasonably peaceful social living is very much a matter of empirical necessity. The ideal of *Brahmāvagati* (awareness of Brahman) is thus quite plausible in thid valuational framework.

So, the error which the Advaita darśana emphasises seems to be not of transphenomenal but of valuational type. Though the point is initially developed from the instance of rope-snake confusion of *the factual* origin, it is directed precisely to a defect at the valuational type. And that message is quite significant at the moral front. The practical impact of moral reasoning is fully secured here. it need not be defended by any course of pure reason, to borrow the Kantian expression. Thereby it would lead to unnecessary, unfruitful speculative surmises. Hence, the questions : what is *avidyā* in the transphenomenal sense, what is its locus in the ontological context, how is *avidyā* related with the Brahman need not be entertained as indispensable. A transphenomenal, nonmenal, ontological rendering, from this point of view, seems to be unwarranted. It is misleading to suggest that if something is not positive, it must be negative. Mistaking itself, is beyond this characterisation. And, that is why the śāṅkarites coin the expression *bhāva-rūpa* neither filling to *bhāva* nor to *abhāva* in the ontological sense.

It is remarked that "*avidyā*, like the world is dependent on Brahman which is the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*)"³. But what is meant by locus here ? Does it have the implication of substantive basis ? If that is, then it can be said that one is unnecessarily led by the pseudo-material mode of speech. Matchsticks are inside the match-box and hence those are not seen ; but when match-box is opened and sticks are brought out, those are seen. Once the covering is taken out, the hidden material is exposed and is seen as it is. But *ajñāna* is not likewise a covering in the literal sense. Snake does not cover the rope. *Adhyāsa* need not be construed in the physicalistic pattern. It is cognitive misconstruction. True, śāṅkara himself has remarked that *avidyā* or *ajñāna* conceals the nature of *Ātma-jñāna*⁴. But that need not suggest

that *avidyā* / *ajñāna* literally covers the Atman. The expression is to be understood contextually. It only means that mistake is replaced by correction. Mistake does not exist, it occurs. There is significant distinction between 'occurent' expression and 'is' expression. Of course, as hinted earlier, mistake is viewed in the Advaita context from the valuational standpoint. And there is no disregard for the operation of specific type of reasoning which is suitable in that context.

To Sureśvara, *avidyā* is opposed to *vidyā*. But this does not suggest, as Professor Balasubramanian thinks, that *avidyā* does not convey absence of knowledge and is something positive and existent. It is not clear as to how *avidyā* is treated as not absence of knowledge. Surely, if *vidyā* occurs then there is the non-presence of *avidyā* and so also *vice-versa*. Either a judgement is true or it is false. Being true, it gives knowledge, otherwise it imparts falsity. In fact, Śaṅkara also uses the terms: *satya* and *anṛta/asatya* in this exclusive sense. Both of them are characterisation of judgement/proposition. That is either the statement is true or it false. It does not make sense to say that a thing (*vastu*) is either true or false. A thing exists and that is the end of the matter. A non-existing thing is not having a peculiar form of existence. It also is neither positive nor negative. It is simply odd to think that there are both positive nor negative. It is simply odd to think that there are both positive things and negative things. Such kind of speculative surmises only breed confusion and obscurities. Absence of knowledge (*avidyā*) and wrong knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna*) are quite intelligible within the epistemic framework and any kind of ontologising of such concept leads to vagueness. Perhaps that is the reason why "Suresvara does not admit the existence of negative entities at all. What is called *abhava* is only imagination (*kalpanāmātram*)"⁶. That means, *avidyā* as absence of knowledge (*jñāna-bhāva*) is not negative entity. Precisely speaking it is not an entity at all. It is phenomenon which just occurs and is subsequently corrected when there arises knowledge.

It is interesting to find that Professor Balasubramanian, towards the end of his discussion under reference, comes very near this conclusion while he holds that strictly speaking *avidyā* is neither existent nor non-existent, but is an illusory appearance (*Mithyā-rūpa*)⁷. Being an appearance, it neither affects the real, nor is caused due to real. The falsity lies with the cogniser who relates or couples the *satya* and the *anṛta*. The *anṛta* itself is not wrong (*mithyā*) but its being coupled with *ṛta* or *satya* is falsification (*mithunīkaraṇa*). Hence *bhāva-rūpa* is neither to be treated as positive nor is to be regarded as existent. It is neither *bhāva* nor *abhāva*. It is simply appearance of *bhāva* and nothing else.

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পঞ্চপাদিকাবিবরণম্

(প্রথমং বর্ণকম্)

মূল, বঙ্গানুবাদ ও বিবৃতিসহ

অমরনাথ ভট্টাচার্য

PAÑCĀPADIKAVIVARAṆA
(Varnka I)
Text with translation and exposition in Bengali
AMARNATH BHATTACHARYA

মূল

পালনে বিমলসত্ত্ববৃত্তয়ে, জন্মকর্মণি রাজাজুষে, লয়ে ।

তামসায় জগতঃ, পরাকৃতদ্বৈতজালবপুষে নমঃ সতে ॥১॥

অনুবাদ

জগতের সৃষ্টিতে যিনি রাজাগুণবিশিষ্ট হন, পালনে যিনি (রজঃ ও তমোগুণের দ্বারা অনভিভূত) শুদ্ধ সত্ত্বগুণেপ্রতিবিস্তিত হইয়া থাকেন এবং প্রলয়ে তমোগুণায়িত হন, সকল দ্বৈত বস্তুর অভাব যাঁহার শরীরে আছে (অথবা, যাবতীয় দ্বৈতবস্তুর নিষেধই যাঁহার শরীর) এইরূপ ‘সৎ’ - বস্তুকে (অর্থাৎ ঈশ্বরকে) নমস্কার (করিতেছি) ॥১॥

বিবৃতি

আধ্যাত্মিক, আধিভৌতিক ও আধিদৈবিক এই ত্রিবিধ বিঘ্ন বিনাশ বা নির্বিঘ্নে গ্রন্থপরিসমাপ্তির জন্য আন্তিক গ্রন্থকারগণ গ্রন্থের প্রারম্ভে মঙ্গলাচরণ করিয়া থাকেন । মঙ্গলাচরণ একপ্রকার শিষ্টাচার । কোনও অবিগীত শিষ্টাচারই নিষ্ফল নহে । মঙ্গলাচরণও শিষ্টগণের অবিগীত আচরণ বলিয়া উহার ফলসম্বন্ধে কোনও সন্দেহ নাই । তবে কেহ কেহ বলেন, বিঘ্ননাশের মাধ্যমে সমাপ্তিই মঙ্গলের ফল । কেহ বা বলেন, বিঘ্ননাশই মঙ্গলের ফল । গ্রন্থকারের ব্যুৎপত্তি, প্রতিভা, অনুশীলন প্রভৃতির ফলে গ্রন্থের সমাপ্তি ঘটে । কায়িক, বাচিক ও মানস এই ত্রিবিধ মঙ্গলাচরণের মধ্যে বাচিক মঙ্গলাচরণই প্রশস্ত । সুতরাং টীকাকার প্রকাশাত্মা শিষ্যশিক্ষার জন্য টীকার প্রারম্ভে বিস্তৃতভাবে মঙ্গলাচরণ বিধৃত করিয়াছেন ।

গুরুশুশ্রূষা, প্রভূত ধন ও বিনয়ান্নঃ এই তিনটিই বিদ্যালান্তের প্রসিদ্ধ উপায়। কিন্তু ঈশ্বরের অনুগ্রহ ব্যতীত পরাবিদ্যা অধিগত হয় না। ব্রহ্মোপনিষদে আশ্রিত হইয়াছে ‘যমৈবেষ বৃণুতে তেন লভাঃ’ (১/২/২৩) অর্থাৎ পরমাশ্রা যাহাকে বরণ করেন, সেই তাহাকে জানিতে পারে। দাক্ষিণাত্যের শ্মার্ত্ত অষ্টভেদবাদীরা বলেন, ‘ঈশ্বরানুগ্রহাদেবা পুংসামষ্টভেদবাসনা’ অর্থাৎ ঈশ্বরের অনুগ্রহের ফলেই পুরুষের অষ্টভেদতত্ত্ব জানিবার ইচ্ছা হয়। সুতরাং পরাবিদ্যা লাভ ঈশ্বরের অধীন বলিয়া টীকাকার এই মাস্কলিক শ্লোকটিতে পরদেবতার বন্দনা করিয়াছেন।

শ্লোকটিতে ‘সতে নমঃ’ কথা দুইটির অর্থ বিশ্লেষণ করা প্রয়োজন। এখানে ‘সৎ’ শব্দটির অর্থ জীবাত্মা বৃক্ষিলে প্রশ্ন হইবে, ঐ নমস্কার্য জীব নমস্কর্তা জীব হইতে তিন্ন বা অভিন্ন? অভিন্ন হইলে নমস্কারই সঙ্গত হইবে না। কারণ একইব্যক্তি নমস্কর্তা ও নমস্কার্য হইতে পারে না। ঐ নমস্কর্তা ও নমস্কার্য জীব ভিন্ন হইলে পুনরায় প্রশ্ন হইবে, ঐ ভেদ তাত্ত্বিক অথবা অতাত্ত্বিক? উভয়ের তাত্ত্বিক ভেদ স্বীকার করিলে দ্বৈতাপত্তি হয়। যদি নমস্কর্তা ও নমস্কার্য এই দ্বিবিধ জীবের অতাত্ত্বিক ভেদ স্বীকার করা হয়, তাহা হইলে ভেদ অতাত্ত্বিক বলিয়া নমস্কারও অতাত্ত্বিক হইবে। যদি অষ্টভেদবাদী বলেন, ব্রহ্ম এখানে ‘সৎ’ শব্দের অর্থ, তাহাও সঙ্গত হইবে না। কারণ, নির্গুণ, অদ্বিতীয় ব্রহ্মের নমস্কার কোনমতেই সম্ভবপর নহে। তাহা ছাড়া, অদ্বিতীয় ব্রহ্মের নমস্কার স্বীকার করিলে দ্বৈতাপত্তি হয়। অখণ্ডানন্দ ‘তত্ত্বদীপন’ টীকায় বিরুদ্ধবাদীর এইরূপ সঙ্গাবা আপত্তি উদ্ভাবন করিয়াছেন।

বিবরণ সম্প্রদায়ের টীকাকারগণের মত অনুসরণ করিয়া আমরা বলিতে পারি যে, ‘নমঃ’ শব্দের অর্থ অনুসন্ধান। কষ্ণরী যুগ যেমন নিজের সুগন্ধি নাতির উৎস সন্ধানে ধাবিত হয়, তেমনই মুমুক্শু জীবের পক্ষে অষ্টভেদ ব্রহ্মের অনুসন্ধান করা অষ্টভেদ সিদ্ধান্তের বিরোধী নহে। অথবা, এখানে ‘সৎ’ শব্দের দ্বারা মায়া প্রতিবিশ্বিত চৈতন্য বা ঈশ্বরই বিবক্ষিত হইয়াছেন। অজ্ঞানের শুদ্ধসত্ত্ব, রজঃ এবং তমোগুণে প্রতিবিশ্বিত হইয়া যে চৈতন্য বিশ্বপ্রপঞ্চের সৃষ্টি, স্থিতি এবং লয় পরিচালনা করেন, ঐ পরমেশ্বর পারমাথিক দৃষ্টিতে জীব হইতে অভিন্ন হইলেও ব্যবহারিক দৃষ্টিতে জীব হইতে ভিন্ন হওয়ায় নমস্কর্তা জীবের পক্ষে পরমেশ্বরের উদ্দেশ্যে এই ব্যবহারিক মঙ্গলাচরণ সঙ্গতই হইয়াছে।

আমাদের মনে হয়, এখানে সাক্ষী চৈতন্যই ‘সৎ’ শব্দের অর্থ। ধর্মরাজ অক্ষরীশ্র ‘বেদান্তপরিভাষা’ গ্রন্থে জীবসাক্ষী ও ঈশ্বরসাক্ষীভেদে সাক্ষীর অবান্তর ভেদ স্বীকার করিয়াছেন। (বেদান্তপরিভাষা পৃ. ১০২-১০৫, বোধেশু সং শক ১৮৩৩)। কিন্তু অষ্টভেদ বেদান্তের আকর গ্রন্থে সাক্ষীর ভেদ স্বীকৃত হয় নাই। মধুসূদন সরস্বতী ‘সিদ্ধান্তবিন্দু’তে সাক্ষীর উপাধিক ভেদও স্বীকার করেন নাই (সিদ্ধান্তবিন্দু পৃ. ১৩৫, ১৩৭ পূনা সংস ১৯৬২)। শুদ্ধচৈতন্য যখন মূলাজ্ঞানের দ্বারা উপহিত হন, তখন তাকে সাক্ষীচৈতন্য বলে। শুদ্ধচৈতন্য ও সাক্ষীচৈতন্যের মধ্যে মূলতঃ কোন ভেদ নাই। তবে ব্যবহারিকালে মূলাজ্ঞানের নিবৃত্তির পূর্ব পর্যন্ত অষ্টভেদবেদান্তসিদ্ধান্তে সাক্ষীচৈতন্য স্বীকৃত হইয়াছেন। সাক্ষীচৈতন্য জ্ঞাতসত্ত্ব ও অজ্ঞাতসত্ত্বাক উভয় পৃকার বিষয়েরই প্রকাশক। যথার্থ জ্ঞানের বিষয় জ্ঞানের পূর্বে অজ্ঞাত অবস্থায় থাকে। ভ্রমজ্ঞানের বিষয় ভ্রমের পূর্বে অজ্ঞাত অবস্থায় থাকে না। সাক্ষীচৈতন্য যথার্থ জ্ঞানের বিষয়কে অন্তঃকরণবৃত্তির মাধ্যমে এবং

ত্রমজ্ঞানের বিষয়, স্মৃতির বিষয়, সুখ এবং দুঃখকে অবিদ্যাবৃত্তির মাধ্যমে প্রত্যক্ষ করেন। এই অভিপ্রায়ে প্রকাশাত্মা বলিয়াছেন - “সর্বং বস্তু জ্ঞাততয়া অজ্ঞাততয়া বা সাক্ষীচৈতন্যস্য বিষয় এব” (বিবরণ পৃ. ৯৯, মেট্রো সং ১৯৩৩) এই মাস্তুলিক শ্লোকে “সৎ” শব্দের অর্থ সাক্ষী বুলিলে শ্লোকটির সামগ্রিক অর্থের সহিত সামঞ্জস্য রক্ষিত হইবে। অজ্ঞানোপহিত এই বিশ্বচৈতন্য অজ্ঞানের রজোগুণে প্রতিবিস্তিত হইয়া জগৎ সৃষ্টি করেন, অজ্ঞানের বিমল সত্ত্বগুণে প্রতিবিস্তিত হইয়া জগৎ পালন করেন এবং অজ্ঞানের তমোগুণে প্রতিবিস্তিত হইয়া জগৎ বিনাশ করেন।

বিবরণকার এই মাস্তুলিক শ্লোকে নির্গুণ ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপলক্ষণ ও তটস্থলক্ষণ প্রদর্শন করিয়াছেন। “তটস্থলক্ষণং নাম যাবল্লক্ষ্যকালমনবস্থিতত্বে সতি যদ্ব্যবর্তকং তদেব” (বেদান্তপরিভাষা পৃ. ৩৪৩, বোম্বে সং, শ. ১৮৩৩)। লক্ষ্যবস্তুর যাবৎকাল না থাকিয়া যাহা লক্ষ্যাতর বস্তু হইতে লক্ষ্যবস্তুর ভেদক হয়, তাহাকে তটস্থলক্ষণ বা উপলক্ষণ বলে। “স্বরূপমেব লক্ষণং স্বরূপলক্ষণম্” (বেদান্তপরিভাষা পৃ. ৩৪১, বোম্বে সং) অর্থাৎ যাহা বস্তুর অসাধারণ ধর্ম হইয়া তদভিন্ন বস্তুর ভেদক হয়, তাহাকে স্বরূপলক্ষণ বলে। অত্যন্ত সূক্ষ্ম বা সর্বথা অজ্ঞাত বিষয়ের প্রথমে তটস্থলক্ষণ ও পরে স্বরূপলক্ষণ দেওয়া হয়। তটস্থলক্ষণের দ্বারা অত্যন্ত বিজাতীয় বস্তু হইতে লক্ষ্যবস্তুর ভেদ নির্নীতি হয়। স্বরূপলক্ষণের দ্বারা স্বজাতীয় বস্তু হইতে লক্ষ্যবস্তুর ভেদ সিদ্ধ হয়। এই শ্লোকটির প্রথম তিনটি চরণে জগতের সৃষ্টি, স্থিতি ও লয়ের কর্তারূপে যে মায়াবচ্ছিন্ন চৈতন্যের উল্লেখ করা হইয়াছে, উহা নির্গুণ ব্রহ্মের তটসহ লক্ষণ। শ্লোকটির অন্তিম চরণে নির্গুণ ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপ লক্ষণ নিরূপিত হইয়াছে। সৎ, চিৎ এবং আনন্দ নির্গুণ ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপ। নিষেধমুখে এই স্বরূপের তাৎপর্য বুলিতে হইবে। এখানে অসদৃশ ‘সৎ’ শব্দের অর্থ, শুদ্ধ সৎ নহে।

পরাবিদ্যার নমস্কারের মাধ্যমে সকল দেবতার অভিবাদন সিদ্ধ হইলেও বিশেষ বিশেষ ফল লাভের উদ্দেশ্যে টীকাকার সরস্বতী, গণেশ প্রমুখ দেবগণের বন্দনা করিতেছেন -

মূল

যস্যাঃ প্রসাদমবলম্বা জগদ্গুরুণা—

মপ্যম্বলদ্ববহুগুণাঃ প্রসরন্তি বাচঃ।

সা বেদশাস্ত্রপরিনির্মিত বন্দ্যাদেহা

ভূয়াৎ সমগ্রবরদৈব সরস্বতী নঃ ॥২॥

অনুবাদ

যাঁহার অনুগ্রহ অবলম্বন করিয়া বিদ্যা বাচস্পতিগণেরও (শ্লেষ, প্রসাদ, সমতা প্রভৃতি) বহুগুণ সমন্বিত অমোঘ বাক্যরাশি প্রবৃত্ত হয় (ঋগাদি) বেদ ও (মহাদি) ধর্মশাস্ত্র যাঁহার শরীর রূপে আরাধিত হইয়া থাকে, সেই সরস্বতী আমাদের সকল প্রকার অতীষ্ট প্রদান করুন।

বিবৃতি

ভারতে বৈদিক যুগ হইতেই সরস্বতীর আরাধনা হইয়া আসিতেছে। এই সরস্বতী কখনও নদীরূপে, কখনও বা বাগধিষ্ঠাত্রী শরীরিনী দেবীরূপে বর্ণিতা হইয়াছেন। সরস্বতী বৈদিক আৰ্যগণের প্রিয়তমা নদী। হিমালয়ের প্লক্ষ প্রস্রবণ হইতে ইহার উৎপত্তি। বর্তমান যুগে গঙ্গার যেমন মহাত্ম্য, বৈদিক যুগে সরস্বতীর গৌরব ততোধিক ছিল। সমুদ্রের সহিত মিলিত হইবার জন্য উহার প্রবল ধারা যেভাবে প্রবাহিত হইত সেইরূপ কোন বেগবতী নদী তৎকালে ভারতবর্ষে ছিল না। সরস্বতীর পূর্বাংশ কুরুক্ষেত্রের স্থানুতীর্থে আজও দেখা যায়। উদয়পুর, মেরাড় ও রাজপুতনার পশ্চিমপ্রান্তের মরুদেশে আসিয়া উহা অন্তঃসলিলা হইয়াছে। পুনরায় উদয়পুরের পশ্চিম-দক্ষিণ সিঙ্গাপুর পাটনা অর্থাৎ মাতৃগয়ার নিকট ইহা প্রবাহিত হইয়া কচ্ছ ও দ্বারকার নিকট সমুদ্রের সহিত মিলিত হইয়াছে। তাহা ছাড়া, প্রয়াগে গঙ্গা, যমুনা ও সরস্বতীর সঙ্গমে যুক্ত ত্রিবেণী হিন্দুগণের এক তীর্থস্থান। হুগলীর নিকটে ত্রিবেণীতেও সরস্বতী নামে একটি নদীর উল্লেখ আছে। আৰ্যগণ সরস্বতীর পূণ্যতীরে বাস করিতেন। বেদে বহুভাবে সরস্বতী নদীর প্রশমিত করা হইয়াছে।

ঋগ্বেদে সরস্বতী নদীরূপে কীর্তিতা হইলেও ‘বাগ্ বৈ সরস্বতী’ ইত্যাদি ব্রাহ্মণবাক্যে (শতপথ ব্রাহ্মণ ৩/৯/১/৭) সরস্বতী বাগধিষ্ঠাত্রী দেবীরূপে স্তত হইয়াছেন। দ্বিভূজা শ্বেতবর্ণা বীণাবাদনরতা হংসবাহনা সরস্বতীর পুসিদ্ধি থাকিলেও কোনস্থলে ময়ূরবাহনা, কোনস্থলে মেঘবাহনা, কোনস্থলে আবার সিংহবাহনা সরস্বতীর উল্লেখও পাওয়া যায়। হিন্দু তান্ত্রিকগণ আদ্যাশক্তি দুর্গাকেও অষ্টভূজা মহাসরস্বতীরূপে কল্পনা করিয়াছেন। বৌদ্ধতন্ত্রেও পঞ্চাননা ষড়্ভূজা মহাসরস্বতী জ্ঞানের দাত্রীরূপে আরাধিত হইয়াছেন। কোনও কোনও শ্বেতাম্বর জৈন সম্প্রদায় জৈন ধর্মপ্রণালীতে সরস্বতীর অর্চনা করিতেন। এইভাবে হিন্দু, বৌদ্ধ ও জৈনধর্মে সরস্বতী অর্চিতা হইয়াছেন। আজ ভারতের সর্বত্র সরস্বতীর আরাধনা হয়। শুধু ভারত কেন, তিব্বত এমন কি সুদূর জাপানেও সরস্বতী পূজার প্রচলন আছে। জাপানে সর্পবাহনা সরস্বতী বা বেন্তেন্ সৌভাগ্যদেবী বা সিচি ফুকু-জিন-রূপে পূজিত হইয়া থাকেন। তোকিওর উয়েনোতে সিনোবাজু পুষ্করিনীর নিকট সরস্বতীর প্রসিদ্ধ মন্দির আছে। এনোশিমা, চিকুবুশিমা ও মিয়জিমা এই তিনটি দ্বীপে জাপানীগণ সমারোহে সরস্বতীর অর্চনা করেন। জাপানে বেন্তেন্ বিচারবুদ্ধির মহাদেবী - নদী, বাগ্নিতা ও ধনের অধিষ্ঠাত্রী। এই বাগ্দেবীর প্রেরণায় একটি পদ একটি বিশেষ অর্থ প্রকাশ করিতে সমর্থ হয়। যে বৈখরী বাগ্ ব্যবহারের দ্বারা দৈনন্দিন লোকব্যবহার নির্বাহ হয়, পদের অভিমানিনী জ্যোতিঃপুঞ্জরূপা পরা বাগ্দেবীর প্রেরণা ইহার মূল উৎস। সুতরাং নিজস্ব বাক্যবিন্যাস যাহাতে পাঠকের মনে যথাযথ অর্থ উৎপন্ন করিতে পারে সেই উদ্দেশ্যে গ্রন্থকারগণ গ্রন্থের প্রারম্ভে বাগ্দেবীর বন্দনা করেন।

মূল

বিদ্যাভিতাপমপহত্য মদীয়কৃত্ত

বীজং প্রবৃদ্ধমদনুগ্রহবর্ষপাতৈঃ।

সংপ্রার্থিতঃ সিততরোহপি গণেশমেঘঃ

সিঞ্চনভীষ্টফলমংকুরয়ত্বমোঘম্ ॥৩১॥

অনুবাদ

প্রচুর বর্ষণের দ্বারা উত্তাপকে প্রশমিত করিয়া (ভূমিতে উপ) বীজকে সেচন-পূর্বক মেঘ যেমন অব্যর্থভাবে অঙ্কুর উৎপাদন করে, তেমনই (ভক্তগণ-কর্তৃক) আরাধিত গণেশ শুভ্রবর্ণ হইয়াও (মেঘের ন্যায়) প্রভূত অনুগ্রহ পূর্বক (গ্রন্থ প্রণয়নে সম্ভাব্য আধ্যাত্মিক, আধিভৌতিক ও আধিদৈবিক এই ত্রিবিধ উত্তাপকল্প) বিঘ্ন বিনাশ করিয়া আমার এই (চিকীর্ষিত) গ্রন্থের মাধ্যমে (ভাষ্য ও পঞ্চপাদিকা টীকার তাৎপর্যার্থ পাঠকগণের বোধরূপ) অতীষ্টফল যাহাতে অদ্রাস্ত হয় এমনভাবে প্রদান করুন।

বিবৃতি

পুরাণে গণেশ বিশ্বেশ্বর বলিয়া প্রসিদ্ধ। বিঘ্ননাশের জন্য বিনায়ক বিশেষভাবে পূজিত হইয়া থাকেন। গণেশকে শ্রেষ্ঠ বোদ্ধা বলা হয়। তিনি দেবগণের মধ্যে সর্বপ্রথম সকল শাস্ত্র পারায়ণ করিয়াছিলেন। এইরূপ প্রসিদ্ধি আছে যে, বেদব্যাসের প্রণীত মহাভারত তিনি অর্থবোধ-পূর্বক লিখিয়াছেন। অর্থবোধ এবং গ্রন্থ লিখনে তিনি এত পারদর্শী ছিলেন যে, তাঁহার গতি সংযত করিবার জন্য বেদব্যাস “ব্যাসকূট” রচনা করেন। সুতরাং কেবলমাত্র বিঘ্ননাশের জন্য নহে, শাস্ত্রের তত্ত্ব বুঝিবার নিমিত্তও গণেশের স্তুতি করা হয়। এইজন্য টীকাকার শ্লোকটিতে বিঘ্ন-বিনাশ এবং শাস্ত্রার্থ অবগতির জন্য গণেশকে বন্দনা করিয়াছেন। এখানে মেঘের সহিত গণেশের তুলনা করা হইয়াছে। মেঘ যেমন বর্ষণের মাধ্যমে প্রথর উত্তাপকে প্রশমিত করিয়া ভূমিস্থ বীজকে অঙ্কুরিত করে, তেমনই বিনায়কও গ্রন্থরচনায় সম্ভাব্য বিঘ্নবিনাশ করিয়া গ্রন্থের প্রতিপাদ্য তত্ত্বাবগতিরূপ ফল উৎপাদন করিয়া থাকেন। মেঘের সহিত গণেশের যেমন মিল প্রদর্শিত হইয়াছে, সেইরূপ উভয়ের মধ্যে অমিলও রহিয়াছে। প্রসিদ্ধ মেঘ নীলবর্ণ, কিন্তু গণেশ শ্বেতবর্ণ। পুরাণে গণেশের শ্বেতবর্ণের উল্লেখ আছে। এরূপ প্রসিদ্ধি আছে যে, দশভুজ জার সহিত অসুরনিধনে লিপ্ত হইবার সময় গণেশ সাময়িকভাবে ব্রহ্মার বরে ক্রোধানলে উদ্দীপ্ত হইয়া রক্তিমবর্ণে রঞ্জিত হন। পরবর্তীকালে অনেকে এই রক্তবর্ণবিশিষ্ট বিনায়কেরই আরাধনা করেন। বস্তুতঃ তাঁর নিজস্ব বর্ণ শুভ্র। গণেশের ধ্যানে তাঁহাকে কর্পূরের মত শুব্রবর্ণবিশিষ্ট বলা হইয়াছে। সুতরাং বর্ণের দিক হইতে মেঘের সহিত গণেশের অমিল থাকিলেও টীকাকার পুকাশাস্ত্রা এখানে উভয়ের মিলের দিকটার প্রতি দিয়াছেন।

মূল

শ্যামোহপি শ্ৰুতিকমলাবোধরাগঃ

শান্তঃ সন্নয়তি তমো বিনাশমন্তঃ।

নীরূপং প্রথয়তি যোহপি গোসহশ্ৰৈঃ

তং ব্যাসং নমত জগতাপূর্বভানুম্ ॥৪॥

অনুবাদ

পদ্মের বিকাশের কারণ সূর্য যেমন অন্ধকার দূর করিয়া সহস্রকিরণরাশির দ্বারা (রূপবান্ বস্তুকে) প্রকাশ করে, (সেইরূপ) শ্যামবর্ণ হইয়াও (সূর্যের ন্যায় কমল কল্প) উপনিষদ্ বাক্যের তাৎপর্য অবধারণে যিনি পিন্ধপাত, (উত্তপ্ত সূর্য হইতে বিসদৃশ) শান্তস্বভাব হইয়া যিনি আন্তর অন্ধকার (অর্থাৎ অজ্ঞান) দূর করেন

এবং যিনি উপনিষৎ-পদকদ্বয়ের দ্বারা নির্বিশেষ ব্রহ্মকে প্রতিপাদন করেন, জগতে অপূর্বসূর্য্যপ্রতিম সেই ব্যাসদেবকে (আমার অন্তঃকরণ) নমস্কার করুক ।

বিবৃতি

ব্রহ্মসূত্রের প্রবর্তক কৃষ্ণদ্বৈপায়ন বাদরায়ণের অনুগ্রহ ব্যতীত ব্রহ্মসূত্রের যথাযথ অর্থ নিশ্চিতভাবে হৃদয়ঙ্গম করা দুঃসাধ্য ইহা বুঝিয়া টীকাকার এই শ্লোকটিতে সূত্রকারের উদ্দেশ্যে প্রণতি জানাইতেছেন । এখানে “নমত” এই ক্রিয়াপদটির কর্তা বস্তুতঃ টীকাকারের অন্তঃকরণ, অন্তঃকরণাবচ্ছিন্ন চৈতন্য নহে। এস্থলে করণ কর্তারূপে ব্যবহৃত হইয়াছে । কাজেই ‘আমার অন্তঃকরণ ব্যাসদেবকে প্রণতি জ্ঞাপন করুক’ — এইরূপ অর্থ করিলে ‘নমত’ এই ক্রিয়াপদের সহিত সামঞ্জস্য রক্ষিত হইবে ।

শ্লোকটিতে সূর্য্যের সহিত ব্যাসদেবের তুলনা করা হইয়াছে । সূর্য্যের উদয়ের ফলে অন্ধকার দূরীভূত হয় এবং উহার সহস্র রশ্মির সংস্পর্শে অশ্মুটিতে পদ্মপুষ্প পুষ্পিত ও বিকশিত হয় এবং উহার সৌরভে চারিদিক সুরভিত হয় । উহার কিরণরাশির আলোকেই রূপবান্ প্রতিটি জাগতিক বস্তু উদ্ভাসিত হয় । গ্রন্থকারের দৃষ্টিভঙ্গীতে সূর্য্যের এই কার্যকলাপের সহিত সূত্রকার ব্যাসদেবের বহুলাংশে মিল রহিয়াছে । যেখানে মিল ও অমিল উভয়ই থাকে এবং ভেদের প্রাধান্য থাকে, সেখানেই উপমার প্রয়োগ হয় । এইজন্যই বলা হইয়াছে — ‘ভেদপ্রাধান্যে উপমা’ । সুতরাং উপমাস্থলে উপমান এবং উপমেয়ের মধ্যে ভেদজ্ঞান এবং ভেদের প্রাধান্য থাকা সত্ত্বেও উভয়ের সাধারণ ধর্ম বিবেচিত হয় । এই শ্লোকটিতেও প্রকাশাত্মা ব্যাসদেবের সহিত সূর্য্যের ভেদ নির্দেশপূর্বক উভয়ের অভিন্নধর্মের উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন । সূত্রকার বাদরায়ণের রূপ ছিল কৃষ্ণ, কিন্তু সূর্য্যের রূপ শুক্লভাস্বর । সূত্রকার শান্তস্বভাব, কিন্তু সূর্য্যদেব উগ্রস্বভাব, তথাপি গ্রন্থকার বিভিন্ন দিক হইতে উহাদের মধ্যে সাদৃশ্য প্রতিপাদন করিয়াছেন । উপনিষদরূপ অপ্রস্ফুটিত পদ্ম ব্রহ্মসূত্র জ্ঞানরূপে প্রস্ফুটিত হইয়াছে । সূর্য্যের ন্যায় তিনি শ্রুতিবাক্যের অর্থপ্রকাশে পারদর্শী । অন্ধকারপ্রতিম অজ্ঞান দূরীকরণে তিনি নিষ্ণাত । সূর্য্য রূপবানবস্তুকে প্রকাশ করিলেও সূত্রকার উপনিষদ্বাক্যরাশি হইতে নীরূপ নির্বিশেষ পরব্রহ্মের স্বরূপ প্রতিপাদন করিয়াছেন । সুতরাং গ্রন্থকারের মতে ব্যাসদেব জগতে একটি অদৃষ্টপূর্ব সূর্য্য ।

মূল

উদ্ধৃতা বেদপ্রয়সঃ কমলামিবাক্তে —
 রালিঙ্গিতাখিলজগৎপ্রভবৈকমূর্ত্তিম্ ।
 বিদ্যামশেষজগতাং সুখদামদাদ্ য —
 স্তং শঙ্করং বিমলভাষাকৃতং নমামি ॥৫॥

অনুবাদ

নিখিল বিশ্বের উৎপত্তির কারণ (বিষ্ণুর) শরীরকেই যিনি আলিঙ্গন করিয়াছেন এইরূপ লক্ষ্মীকে সমুদ্র হইতে উদ্ধার করিয়া (বিষ্ণু) যেমন জগৎবাসীর কল্যাণার্থে সমর্পণ করিয়াছিলেন, তদ্রূপ সমগ্র জগতের (বিবর্ত্ত) কারণীভূত (ব্রহ্মের অদ্বিতীয়) শরীরেই পরিব্যাপ্ত হইয়া আছেন, বিশ্বমানবের আনন্দদাত্রী সেই ব্রহ্মবিদ্যাকে যিনি বেদরূপ সমুদ্র হইতে উদ্ধার করিয়া (সকলের হিতার্থে) বিতরণ করিয়াছিলেন, (শব্দ ও অর্থ উভয়দিক হইতে) দোষরহিত ভাষ্যের প্রণেতা সেই শংকরকে (আমি প্রকাশাত্মা) নমস্কার করিতেছি ।৫।

বিবৃতি

ভাষ্যকার শঙ্করের অনুগ্রহ ব্যতীত শংকরভাষ্যের ও উহার টীকা পঞ্চপাদিকার তাৎপর্যা অনুধাবন করা সম্ভবপর নহে। এইজন্য টীকাকার ভাষ্যকারের অনুগ্রহ লাভের জন্য তাঁহার স্তুতি করিতেছেন। এখানে নারায়ণের সহিত শংকরের তুলনা দেওয়া হইয়াছে। সমুদ্রমন্ডনকালে নারায়ণ যেমন সমুদ্র হইতে উথিতা লক্ষ্মীকে সকলের কল্যাণার্থে অর্পণ করিয়াছিলেন, সেইরূপ আচার্য শঙ্করও উপনিষদবাক্যসমূহ মন্ডন করিয়া ব্রহ্মবিদ্যার স্বরূপ উদ্ঘাটন করিয়াছেন এবং উহা জগৎবাসীর কল্যাণার্থে ব্রহ্মসূত্রভাষ্যে বিধৃত করিয়াছেন। সুখদা কমলা যেমন কেবলমাত্র নারায়ণকেই আলিঙ্গন করিয়া অবস্থান করেন, সেইরূপ পরাবিদ্যাও কেবলমাত্র ব্রহ্মকেই বিষয় করিয়া থাকে। শঙ্কর তাঁহার ব্রহ্মসূত্রভাষ্যে সকল উপনিষদ বাক্যের নিঃশূণ, অদ্বিতীয় ব্রহ্মে তাৎপর্যা প্রদর্শন করিয়াছেন। শঙ্করের ভাষ্য প্রসাদগুণযুক্ত এবং অর্থ গাভীর্থাপূর্ণ। ইহাকে অর্থপ্রধান গ্রন্থ বলা চলে। শব্দপ্রধান গ্রন্থে অর্থের অপ্রাধান্য, আর অর্থপ্রধান গ্রন্থে শব্দের অপ্রাধান্য থাকে। তবে শঙ্করের ভাষ্যে অর্থের প্রাধান্য এবং শব্দের অপ্রাধান্য থাকিলেও এই ভাষ্যে শব্দ এবং অর্থ উভয়ই দোষমুক্ত। ইহা বুঝাইবার জন্য টীকাকার শংকরকে ‘বিমলভাষ্যে’র রচয়িতা বলিয়াছেন।

মূল

বন্দে তমান্সসমুদ্রমন্ডনব্রহ্মাববোধতঃ ।
অর্থতোহপি ন নান্নৈব যোহনন্যানুভবো গুরু : ॥৬॥

অনুবাদ

স্বপ্রকাশ ব্রহ্ম বিষয়ে যাঁহার অনুভব হইয়াছে, (আমার) যে গুরু কেবল নামে নহেন, অর্থের দিক হইতেও অনন্যানুভব (অর্থাৎ ব্রহ্মভিন্ন অন্য বিষয়ে যাঁহার কোন অনুভব নাই), তাঁহাকে (আমি প্রকাশাত্মা) বন্দনা করিতেছি।

বিবৃতি

পরাবিদ্যা লাভের জন্য পরদেবতার মঙ্গলাচরণের দ্বারা অতীষ্টসিদ্ধ হইলেও বিশেষ বিশেষ ফললাভের জন্য গণেশাদি দেবতার স্তুতি যেমন আবশ্যিক, তেমনই গুরুর বন্দনাও একান্ত অপরিহার্য। শ্রুতিতে বলা হইয়াছে

“যস্য দেবে পরাভক্তির্যথা দেবে তথা গুরৌ।

তস্যাতে কথিতাহার্থাঃ প্রকাশন্তে মহাত্মনঃ ॥”

অর্থাৎ দেবতার প্রতি যাহার ভক্তি আছে, মণীষিগণ তাহার জন্য এই অধ্যাত্মবিদ্যা ব্যক্ত করেন। শুধু তাহাই নহে, ধর্মশাস্ত্রেও বলা হইয়াছে - “শিবেরূপে গুরুস্তাতা গুরৌরূপে ন কশ্চন”। অর্থাৎ মহাদেব রূপে হইলে গুরু তাঁহার শিষ্যকে রক্ষা করেন, কিন্তু গুরু কুপিত হইলে অন্য কেহ তাহাকে রক্ষা করিতে পারে না। সুতরাং টীকাকার গুরুর অনুগ্রহ লাভের জন্য তাঁহার বন্দনা করিয়াছেন। তাঁহার গুরুদেবের নাম ছিল অনন্যানুভব। তিনি অস্বর্নামা ছিলেন। স্বপ্রকাশ ব্রহ্মবিষয়ে তাঁহার অপরোক্ষ অনুভব হইয়াছিল। ব্রহ্ম ব্যতীত অন্য কোন লৌকিক বস্তুর জ্ঞান তাঁহার ছিল না। তাঁহার সর্বদা অভেদপ্রতীতি হইত। বিবরণকার এইভাবে তাঁহার গুরুর উৎকর্ষ প্রদর্শন করিয়াছেন।

মূল

প্রকাশনায় যতি সম্যক্ প্রাপ্তবিদ্যাশুশুংসয়া ।
যথাশ্রুতং যথাশক্তি ব্যাখ্যাস্যে পঞ্চপাদিকাম্ ॥৭॥

অনুবাদ

(পূর্বাচার্য্য হইতে) লব্ধ ব্রহ্মবিদ্যা শোধনের নিমিত্ত (আচার্য্যমুখ হইতে) যেভাবে শ্রুত হইয়াছে সেইভাবে নিজের শক্তি অনুসারে (আমি প্রকাশনায় শংকরভাষ্যের টীকা) পঞ্চপাদিকার ব্যাখ্যা করিব ।

বিবৃতি

পদ্মপাদাচার্য্য শংকরের শিষ্যগণের মধ্যে সর্বাপেক্ষা ভক্তিমান্ ছিলেন । তাঁহার নাম ছিল সনন্দন । একদা ভক্তিবিনশ্র পদ্মপাদ পুষ্করিণীর অপরপার হইতে শংকরের আস্থান শুনিয়া শীঘ্র গুরুর সমীপে পৌঁছিবার জন্য পুষ্করিণীর জলের উপর দিয়া হাঁটিতে থাকেন । তাঁহার প্রতিটি পদক্ষেপে একটি করিয়া পদ্মফুল প্রস্ফুটিত হয় । এইজন্য শংকর তাঁহাকে “পদ্মপাদ” নামে ভূষিত করেন । শংকরের শিষ্যগণের মধ্যে একমাত্র পদ্মপাদই ব্রহ্মসূত্র শংকরভাষ্যের উপর টীকা রচনা করেন, যাহা “পঞ্চপাদিকা” নামে প্রসিদ্ধ ।

পঞ্চপাদিকা টীকার নামকরণ লইয়া কিছু কিংবদন্তী আছে । পদ্মপাদ টীকাটি মাতুলের কাছে গচ্ছিত রাখিয়া কর্মব্যপদেশে দেশান্তরে গমন করেন । তাঁহার মাতুল প্রভাকরমতাবলম্বী ছিলেন । ঐ টীকাটিতে প্রভাকরের মতবাদ অকাটা যুক্তিতে খণ্ডিত হইয়াছে দেখিয়া তিনি ক্রুদ্ধ হইয়া গৃহদাহের ছলে পাণ্ডুলিপিটি ভস্মীভূত করেন । দেশান্তর হইতে প্রত্যাগমনের পর পদ্মপাদ এই বৃত্তান্ত শ্রবণ করিয়া অবসন্নচিত্তে আচার্য্য শংকরের শরণাপন্ন হন । সম্ভবতঃ পদ্মপাদ দ্বিতীয় অধ্যায়ের প্রথম পাদ পর্যন্ত শংকরভাষ্যের উপর টীকাটি রচনা করিয়াছিলেন । কিন্তু তিনি আচার্য্যকে চতুঃসূত্রী পর্যন্ত তাঁহার টীকাটি শুনাইয়াছিলেন । শংকর তাঁহার স্মৃতি হইতে চতুঃসূত্রী পর্যন্ত উহা পদ্মপাদকে বলেন এবং পদ্মপাদ উহা পুনরায় লিপিবদ্ধ করেন । পাঁচটি পাদ পর্যন্ত উহা রচিত হইয়াছিল বলিয়া টীকাটির পঞ্চপাদিকা নামকরণ করা হইয়াছে । মতান্তরে, পঞ্চপাদিকা নামটি একপ্রকার বিশেষ ব্যাখ্যার বোধক । বিশেষ ব্যাখ্যার লক্ষণে বলা হয় —

“পদচ্ছেদঃ পদার্থোক্তি বিগ্রহো বাক্যযোজনা ।

আক্ষেপস্য সমাধানং ব্যাখ্যানং পঞ্চলক্ষণম্ ॥”

অর্থাৎ পদের বিশ্লেষ, পদার্থনিরূপণ, বিগ্রহবাক্যপ্রদর্শন, বাক্যপ্রয়োগ ও আক্ষেপের সমাধান এই পাঁচটি লক্ষণ ব্যাখ্যাতে থাকে । এখানে “পাদ” শব্দটি অংশবাচী । পদ্মপাদের টীকাতে উক্ত পাঁচটি অংশ থাকায় ইহাকে “পঞ্চপাদিকা” বলে । অথবা, বিস্তারার্থক পচি ধাতু হইতে নিম্পন্ন “পঞ্চ” শব্দটি এখানে ব্যবহৃত হইয়াছে । ইহার অর্থ বিস্তৃত । ‘পাদ’ শব্দের অর্থ অংশ । ইহা শংকরভাষ্যের অতি বিস্তৃত টীকা বলিয়া ইহার নাম পঞ্চপাদিকা দেওয়া হইয়াছে ।

শংকরভাষ্যের উপর অনেক টীকা, বৃতি ও প্রকরণগ্রন্থ প্রণীত হইলেও পদ্মপাদের পঞ্চপাদিকাই সর্বাপেক্ষা প্রামাণিক ব্যাখ্যা বলিয়া বিদ্বৎসমাজে সমাদৃত হইয়াছে । কারণ ইহা শংকরের সাক্ষাৎ শিষ্যকর্তৃক

রচিত হইয়াছিল। ইহার উপর ‘পঞ্চপাদিকাদর্পণ’, ‘তাৎপর্যার্থদ্যোতনী’, ‘প্রবোধ-পরিশোধিনী’ প্রমুখ টীকা থাকিলেও প্রকাশাত্মা যতির ‘পঞ্চপাদিকা বিবরণে’ মীমাংসকাদি সকল বিরুদ্ধবাদীর মত খন্ডনপূর্বক পঞ্চপাদিকার নিগূঢ় অর্থ বিশ্লেষণের মাধ্যমে শংকর সিদ্ধান্ত যেভাবে প্রতিষ্ঠিত হইয়াছে তাহা অন্য কোন টীকাগ্রন্থে হয় নাই। এইজন্য ইহা আকরগ্রন্থরূপে গণ্য হইয়াছে এবং ইহার নাম অবলম্বনেই গ্রন্থটির নামকরণ করা হইয়াছে। এই বিবরণ গ্রন্থানের সকল গ্রন্থ বেদান্তপাঠের যোগ্য অধিকারী সন্ন্যাসী সম্প্রদায়ের মধ্যেই সীমাবদ্ধ ছিল।

মূল

বিদিতসকলবেদৈর্ন প্রশংসন্তি লোকে
প্রথিতমপি মহদভিঃ কিংপুনর্মাংশেন।
ইতি বিফলসমেশ্মিন্ বাধ্যয়েহহং প্রবৃত্তঃ
স্বমতিবিমলতায়ৈ ক্ষুদ্রমহন্তি সন্তঃ ॥৮॥

অনুবাদ

আমার (ন্যায় ব্যক্তির) দ্বারা (প্রণীত গ্রন্থ) তো দূরের কথা, সকল শাস্ত্রে পারদর্শী মহান্ ব্যক্তিগণের দ্বারা রচিত গ্রন্থ ও (ঈর্ষাবশতঃ) অনেকে সমাদর করে না। এইরূপ প্রায় নিষ্ফল বাক্যব্যয়ে (অর্থাৎ গ্রন্থরচনায়) আমি নিজের বুদ্ধি বৈশদের জন্য প্রবৃত্ত হইয়াছি; (সুতরাং) সজ্জনগণ (আমাকে) ক্ষমা করিতে পারেন।

মূল

প্রারিস্কিতস্য গ্রন্থস্যাবিয়েন পরিসমাপ্তি
প্রচয়গমনাভ্যাং শিষ্টাচার পরিপালনীয়
চাভিলম্বিত দেবতাপূজা নমস্কারঃ কর্তব্যঃ
শাস্ত্রার্থশ্চ তত্ত্বংপদার্থবিবেকোপায়লভ্যঃ
প্রত্যক্রম্ণোরেকত্বলক্ষণঃ সংক্ষেপ তো
দর্শনীয়ঃ কৃৎসস্য ভাষ্যস্য
ব্রহ্মাষ্টকভে তাৎপর্যমত্র দর্শিতম্ ;
উত্তরত্র বিভাজ্য তাৎপর্যাদর্শনাৎ ।

অনুবাদ

চিকীর্ষিত গ্রন্থের নির্বিঘ্নে সমাপ্তি, দ্রুত গ্রন্থ রচনা এবং শিষ্টাচার পালনের নিমিত্ত ইষ্ট দেবতার স্তুতিপূর্বক নমস্কার (অবশ্য) করণীয় এবং (শংকর প্রণীত) সমগ্র ভাষ্যের সেখানে (অর্থাৎ জীব ও ব্রহ্মের অভেদপ্রতিপাদনে) তাৎপর্য বলিবার জন্য “তৎ” ও “ত্বম্” পদার্থের জ্ঞান হইতে লভ্য জীব ও ব্রহ্মের অভেদরূপে বেদান্তের প্রতিপাদ্য বিষয় (গ্রন্থের প্রারম্ভে) সংক্ষিপ্তভাবে প্রদর্শন করা উচিত; (এইজন্যে টীকা

করে পদ্যপাদ প্রথম মাস্তুলিক শ্লোকে নমস্কার ও বিষয়) এই উভয়শ্রৌত ও আর্থিক অর্থের দ্বারা সংক্ষিপ্তভাবে দেখাইতেছেন — ‘অনাদি আনন্দস্বভাব, অপরিণামী, জ্ঞানস্বভাব ও অনন্ত সংস্বভাব সকলপ্রকার ভেদরহিত ব্রহ্মস্বরূপ সাক্ষী চৈতন্যকে নমস্কার (করিতেছি)’। এখানে (এই শ্লোকটিতে) জীব ও ব্রহ্মের ঐক্য স্থাপনে সমগ্র ভাষ্যের তাৎপর্য প্রদর্শিত হইয়াছে; যেহেতু পরবর্তী (ভাষ্য) গ্রন্থে (লক্ষণাদির মাধ্যমে) অবান্তর তাৎপর্য আলোচিত হইয়াছে।

বিবৃতি

পদ্যপাদ গ্রন্থসমাপ্তি, দ্রুতগ্রন্থপ্রণয়ন এবং শিষ্টাচার পালনের জন্য প্রথম মাস্তুলিক শ্লোকে সাক্ষীচৈতন্যকে বন্দনা করিয়াছেন এবং ইহার মাধ্যমে প্রতিপাদ্য বিষয়ের ইঙ্গিতও দিয়েছেন। প্রাচীনগণের মতে বিপ্লবশেষের মাধ্যমে পরিসমাপ্তি মঙ্গলের ফলরূপে স্বীকৃত হইয়া থাকে। গ্রন্থের অন্তিমবর্ণের প্রাগভাবের বিনাশকে সমাপ্তি বলে। বর্তমান বিঘ্নের বিনাশ এবং আগামী বিঘ্নের অনুৎপত্তি এই উভয় হইল সমাপ্তির ব্যাপার। মঙ্গলাচরণের ন্যায় বিষয়বস্তুর নির্দেশও প্রায়শঃই মাস্তুলিক শ্লোকে বিবৃত হইয়া থাকে। গ্রন্থপাঠে পাঠকের প্রবৃত্তির জন্য শাস্ত্রের প্রারম্ভে বিষয়বস্তুর নির্দেশ করা হয়। এইজন্য পদ্যপাদ পঞ্চপাদিকার মাস্তুলিক শ্লোকে নমস্কার এবং বিষয়বস্তুর নির্দেশ উভয়ই করিয়াছেন। সকলপ্রকার ভেদরহিত সাক্ষীচৈতন্যই এস্থলে নমস্কার্য। নির্গুণ, নিরাকার শুদ্ধচৈতন্য হইতে সাক্ষীচৈতন্য ভিন্ন নহেন। সাক্ষীচৈতন্য উৎপন্ন নহেন, ইহা বুঝাইবার জন্য তাঁহাকে “অনাদি” বলা হইয়াছে। ঐ অনাদি সাক্ষী দুঃখাভাবস্বরূপ হইতে পারেন, এই শঙ্কা বারণের জন্য “আনন্দ” বিশেষণটি সংযোজিত হইয়াছে। ভাস্করাচার্য প্রমুখ যে সকল বেদান্তী ব্রহ্মকে পরিণামী উপাদান কারণ বলেন, তাঁহাদের মতের বিরুদ্ধে ব্রহ্মকে “কূটস্থ” অর্থাৎ অপরিণামী কারণ বলা হইয়াছে। অদ্বৈতমতে জ্ঞান আত্মার গুণ নহে, আত্মা জ্ঞানস্বভাব ইহা বুঝাইবার জন্য “জ্ঞান” শব্দটি প্রদত্ত হইয়াছে। ঘটজ্ঞান, পটজ্ঞান প্রভৃতি লৌকিকজ্ঞান হইতে শুদ্ধচৈতন্যের ভেদ প্রদর্শনের জন্য উহাকে “অনন্ত” বলা হইয়াছে। আত্মা মাধ্যমিক বৌদ্ধগণের শূন্য নহেন ইহা বুঝাইবার জন্য আত্মাকে “সৎ” বলা হইয়াছে।

পঞ্চপাদিকার উক্ত মাস্তুলিক শ্লোকে “সাক্ষিণে ব্রহ্মণে নমঃ” এই অংশের দ্বারা সাক্ষীচৈতন্য ও শুদ্ধচৈতন্যের অভেদ প্রদর্শিত হইয়াছে। “তত্ত্বমসি” (ছা. উপ. ৬/৮/৭) ইত্যাদি মহাবাক্যে ‘তৎ’ পদের দ্বারা মায়াবচ্ছিন্ন ঈশ্বরচৈতন্য ও “ত্বম্” পদের দ্বারা অন্তঃকরণাবচ্ছিন্ন জীবচৈতন্য অভিহিত হইলেও তাৎপর্যবোধের জন্য উভয়পদে ভাগভাগলক্ষণা স্বীকার করিয়া জীব ও ব্রহ্মের অভেদ বুঝিতে হইবে। আচার্য শংকর তাঁহার “বাক্যবৃত্তি” গ্রন্থে উক্ত মহাবাক্যস্থ প্রত্যেকটি পদের অর্থ নিপুণভাবে বিশ্লেষণ করিয়া মহাবাক্যটির অন্তর্গত “তৎ” পদের বাচ্যার্থ ঈশ্বর ও “ত্বম্” পদের বাচ্যার্থ জীবের অভেদরূপ অখণ্ডার্থে তাৎপর্য দেখাইয়াছেন। (বাক্যবৃত্তি ৬, পৃ. ৪২৪, শংকরাচার্য প্র.মা., ২য় খণ্ড) কিন্তু “বাক্যসুধা” গ্রন্থে শংকর পারমার্থিক, ব্যবহারিক ও প্রতিভাসিক এই তিনপ্রকার জীব স্বীকার করিয়াছেন এবং সাক্ষীকে অবচ্ছিন্ন বা পারমার্থিক জীব বলিয়াছেন। তিনি আরও বলিয়াছেন, সাক্ষী ও ব্রহ্মের অভেদ “তত্ত্বমসি” প্রভৃতি মহাবাক্যের দ্বারা লক্ষণার মাধ্যমে বোধিত হইতেছে। (দ্রষ্টব্য বাক্যসুধা, কারিকা ৩২-৩৪, পৃ. ২৪-২৫, বেনারস্ সং.সি.নং ৫৬, ১৯০১) আমাদের মনে হয়, ‘তত্ত্বমসি’ মহাবাক্যের দ্বারা সাক্ষী ও ব্রহ্মের অভেদ বিবরণকারেরও অভিপ্রেত। মহাবাক্যটির অভিপ্রেত অভেদ বা ঐক্য একপ্রকার অখণ্ডার্থ। যদি অনেকগুলি অপরিণামী শব্দ মিলিতভাবে একটি অর্থপ্রকাশ করে, কিম্বা যখন একটি উচ্চারিত প্রাতিপদিক নিয়মিতভাবে

কোন অর্থকে বোঝায়, তাহাকে অখণ্ডার্থ বলে। চিৎসুখীতে বলা হইয়াছে — “সংসর্গাসঙ্গিসম্যাক্ধীহেতুতা যা গিরামিয়ম্। উক্তাহখণ্ডার্থতা যদ্বা তৎপ্রতিপদিকার্থতা” ॥ (চিৎসুখী, ২য় পরি. শ্লো. ১৯, পৃ. ২৮৮, চৌ. সং.সংস্থান) এইভাবে এখানে বেদান্তের বিষয় জীব ও ব্রহ্মের অভেদ সূচিত হইয়াছে।

এখানে মনে হইতে পারে যে, এই শ্লোকটিতে বেদান্তের প্রতিপাদ্য বিষয়ের উল্লেখ থাকা সত্ত্বেও গ্রন্থে পুনরায় বিস্তৃতভাবে জীব ও ব্রহ্মের অভেদ প্রতিপাদন করা পুনরুক্তি হইয়াছে। কোন কোন স্থলে আবার বিরোধও ঘটিতে পারে। বিবরণকারের মতে পরবর্তীগ্রন্থের সহিত এই শ্লোকের কোনও পুনরুক্তি বা বিরোধ নাই। কারণ ব্যাখ্যা দুইপ্রকার — সাধারণ এবং বিশিষ্ট। কুমারিল শ্লোকবার্ত্তিকে বলিয়াছেন -

“সাধারণী বিশিষ্টা চ সূত্রব্যাখ্যা দ্বিধামতা।

বিশিষ্টা প্রতিসূত্রং যা সর্বার্থা ত্বিয়মুচ্যতে ॥”

(মী.সূ. ১.১.১, শ্লো. বা. ৯) এই শ্লোকটিতে টীকাকার সাধারণভাবে বেদান্তের বিষয় আলোচনা করিয়াছেন এবং মূলগ্রন্থে লক্ষণ, প্রমাণ প্রভৃতি নিরূপণের মাধ্যমে অবান্তর তাৎপর্য প্রদর্শন করিয়াছেন। সুতরাং এই মাস্তলিক শ্লোকের সহিত মূলগ্রন্থের কোন বিরোধ নাই এবং কোন পুনরুক্তিও হয় নাই।

মূল

অথ দেবতাগুরুবিষয়া পূজানমস্কারাদাপবুংহিতা
ভক্তিবর্কুরুক্তপ্রয়োজন সম্পাদিন্যপি শ্রোতৃগামপি
বিদ্যাঙ্গভাবং প্রতিপদ্যত ইতি বাঙমনঃকায়প্রণিধানৈঃ
গুরুনভিপূজয়তি - “নমঃ শ্রুতিশিরঃপদ্মঘণ্ডমার্তওমূর্ডয়ে”
ইত্যাদিভিঃ (ত্রিভিঃ) শ্লোকৈঃ। যৎকার্যমুদ্दिश्य मङ्गलाचरणं
सम्पादितम्, तन्निदिशति — “पदादिवृत्तভারেণেতি”।

অনুবাদ

স্তুতি, নমস্কার (ধ্যান) প্রভৃতির দ্বারা সংকলিত দেবতা ও গুরু বিষয়ে ভক্তি (গ্রন্থের বাহিরে অনুষ্ঠিত হইলেও) বক্তার (বিঘ্ননাশ ও আগামী রিষের অনুৎপত্তি-রূপ) উক্ত প্রয়োজনের সাধক হইলেও (অন্যমনস্ক) শ্রোতৃবৃন্দও (যাহাতে ভক্তিকে) বিদ্যালাতের অঙ্গরূপে জানে (সেজন্য) এখানে (গ্রন্থমধ্যে) (পদ্মপাদ) ‘উপনিষৎকল্প পদ্মসমূহের বিকাশে নিষ্ফাত সূর্যের ন্যায় যাঁহার শরীর, তাঁহাকে (অর্থাৎ শান্তম্বভাব বাদরায়ণ মুনিকে) নমস্কার করিতেছি’ ইত্যাদি (তিনটি) শ্লোকে বাক্য, মন ও দেহের একাগ্রতার সহিত গুরুকে বন্দনা করিতেছেন। যেরূপ ফলের উদ্দেশ্যে মঙ্গলাচরণ অনুষ্ঠিত হইয়াছে, (টীকাকার পদ্মপাদ) ‘পদচ্ছেদ প্রভৃতি (অর্থাৎ পদার্থোক্তি, বিগ্রহ, বাক্যযোজনাও আক্ষেপের সমাধান এইরূপ) বৃত্তের ভারে গাস্তীর্ষপূর্ণ (যে প্রসন্নগস্তীর শংকর ভাষ্য, উহার ব্যাখ্যা শঙ্কর সহিত আরম্ভ করিতেছি’) এই শ্লোকে উহার নির্দেশ করিতেছেন।

মূল

ননু নেদং ভাষাং ব্যাখ্যানপদবীমুপা — রোষুমহতি; ভাষ্যলক্ষণাভাবাৎ, ‘সূত্রার্থো বর্ণ্যতে যত্র বাকৈ: সূত্রানুকারিভি: । স্বপদানি চ বর্ণ্যন্তে ভাষাং ভাষ্যবিদো বিদুরি’তি হি ভাষ্যলক্ষণং বদন্তি । তত্রাত্যতো ব্রহ্মজিজ্ঞাসে’তি সূত্রেহনুবাদপরিহারায় শাস্ত্রে পুরুষ প্রবৃত্তিসিদ্ধয়ে চ কর্তব্যোতি পদমথ্যা হর্তব্যাম্ । তত্র জিজ্ঞাসাপদেন অন্তর্নীতং বিচারমুপলক্ষ্যানুষ্ঠানায়োগ্যতয়া সাধন চতুষ্টয়সম্পন্নস্য ব্রহ্মজ্ঞানায় বিচার: কর্তব্য ইতি সূত্রবাক্যস্য শ্রৌতোহর্থ: সম্পদ্যতে । অর্থাধিকারি বিশেষণমোক্ষ সাধনং ব্রহ্মজ্ঞানমিতি সিদ্ধান্তি, সন্নিক্ষিপ্যাদ বেদান্তবাক্যবিচার:, ইতি শ্রুতার্থাভ্যাং সাধনচতুষ্টয়সম্পন্নস্য মোক্ষসাধনব্রহ্মজ্ঞানায় বেদান্তবাক্যবিচার: কর্তব্য ইতি সূত্রবাক্যস্য তাৎপর্যেণ প্রতিপাদ্যোহর্থোহবগত: । তত্রৈদং ভাষাং ন সূত্রার্থকলামপি প্রতিপাদয়তি, অতো ন ব্যাখ্যানার্থম্ ।

অনুবাদ

আচ্ছা বলি, এই (অধ্যাস) ভাষ্যটি ব্যাখ্যার উপযুক্ত নহে, যেহেতু (উহাতে) ভাষ্যলক্ষণের অভাব আছে। ‘সূত্রের অর্থ যেখানে সূত্রানুসারী বাক্যের মাধ্যমে বিশ্লেষণ করা হয় এবং (ভাষ্যকারগণের) নিজেদের পদসমূহ (যেখানে) বিশ্লেষণ করা হয়, ভাষ্যকারগণ উহাকে ভাষ্য বলেন’ — (মণীষীগণ) ভাষ্যের এইরূপ লক্ষণ দিয়া থাকেন । এইরূপ ভাষ্যলক্ষণ ব্যবস্থিত হইলে ‘অনন্তর সেইহেতু ব্রহ্মকে জানিবার ইচ্ছা’ (ব্রহ্মসূত্র ১ / ১ / ১) এইসূত্রে অনুবাদদোষ পরিহার ও শাস্ত্রে পুরুষের প্রবৃত্তি জন্মাইবার জন্য ‘কর্তব্য’ এই পদটি অধ্যাহার করিতে হইবে । এইসূত্রে (কর্তব্যপদের সহিত জিজ্ঞাসাপদের অর্থ সম্ভব না হওয়ায় এবং জ্ঞান বিচারসাধ্য হওয়ায়) জিজ্ঞাসাপদের দ্বারা (জানিবার ইচ্ছা এইরূপ অর্থে ব্যবহৃত জিজ্ঞাসা শব্দটির) অন্তর্বর্তী বিচাররূপ অর্থ লক্ষণার মাধ্যমে বুঝিয়া সাধনচতুষ্টয় সম্পন্ন ব্যক্তির পক্ষে ব্রহ্মজ্ঞানের জন্য বিচার কর্তব্য সূত্রবাক্যের এইরূপ আক্ষরিক অর্থ পাওয়া যায় । (মুমুক্শু) অধিকারীর বিশেষণ মোক্ষের সাধন ব্রহ্মজ্ঞান ইহা অর্থত: সিদ্ধ হয় এবং সান্নিধ্যবশত: বেদান্তবাক্যের বিচার ইহা সিদ্ধ হয় । এইভাবে আক্ষরিক এবং আর্থিক অর্থের মাধ্যমে সাধনচতুষ্টয়সম্পন্ন মুমুক্শুর পক্ষে মুক্তির সাধন ব্রহ্মজ্ঞানের জন্য (ব্রহ্মজ্ঞানরে উপায়) বেদান্তবাক্যের বিচার কর্তব্য সূত্রবাক্যটির এইরূপ প্রতিপাদ্য অর্থ তাৎপর্য অনুযায়ী বুঝিতে হইবে । সূত্রের এইরূপ অর্থ নিরূপিত হইলে এই (অধ্যাস প্রতিপাদক) ভাষ্যটি জিজ্ঞাসাসূত্রের (আক্ষরিক বা আর্থিক) কোনরূপ অর্থ বিন্দুমাত্র প্রতিপাদন করে না, সুতরাং (এই অধ্যাস ভাষ্যটি) ব্যাখ্যার যোগ্য নহে । (টীকাকার পদ্বপাদ ‘ভাষ্যব্যাখ্যা করিবেন’ এইরূপ প্রতিজ্ঞা করিয়াছেন । সুতরাং অধ্যাসভাষ্যের উপর পঞ্চপাদিকা টীকা প্রণয়ন করিলে টীকাকারের প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি হইবে ইহাই আক্ষেপের ফলিতার্থ ।

বিবৃতি

আচার্যশঙ্কর নির্গুণ অদ্বৈতবাদের দৃষ্টিভঙ্গীতে ব্রহ্মসূত্রের উপর ভাষ্য প্রণয়ন করিয়াছেন । তাঁহার মতবাদ অধ্যাসকে কেন্দ্র করিয়া গড়িয়া উঠিয়াছে । অধ্যাসকে অদ্বৈতসৌধের ভিত্তিপ্তস্তর বলা চলে । বেদান্তের বিষয়, প্রয়োজনে, এমনকি অদ্বিতীয় নির্গুণ ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপ বুঝিতে হইলে অধ্যাসের জ্ঞান আবশ্যিক । ব্রহ্মসূত্রের উপর ভাষ্যরচনার পূর্বে আচার্য শঙ্কর ‘অধ্যাসভাষ্য’ নামে একটি উপক্রমণিকা ভাষ্য রচনা করিয়াছেন এবং উহাতে অধ্যাসের স্বরূপ, অধ্যাসস্বীকারে প্রমাণ প্রভৃতি বিধৃত করিয়াছেন । টীকাকার প্রকাশাত্মা অধ্যাসভাষ্য এবং ঐ ভাষ্যের অন্তর্গত পঞ্চপাদিকা টীকা ব্যাখ্যা করিবার সময় প্রথমেই পূর্বপক্ষীর একটি আক্ষেপ উদ্ভাবন করিয়াছেন, যাহা এই আলোচ্য সন্দর্ভে ব্যক্ত হইয়াছে ।

প্রতিপক্ষীগণ বলিতে পারেন, পদ্যপাদ অধ্যাসভাষ্যের উপর যে টীকা প্রণয়ন করিয়াছেন, উহা সঙ্গত হয় নাই। কারণ পদ্যপাদ তাঁহার মঙ্গলিক শ্লোকে বলিয়াছেন, তিনি শংকরপ্রণীত ভাষ্যের টীকা রচনা করিবেন। কিন্তু অধ্যাসভাষ্যকে ভাষ্যই বলা চলে না; যেহেতু উহাতে ভাষ্যলক্ষণের কোন সঙ্গতি নাই। সূত্রের আক্ষরিক এবং তাৎপর্যার্থ যেখানে সূত্রানুসারী বাক্যের মাধ্যমে বিশ্লেষণ করা হয় এবং ভাষ্যকারগণের নিজেদের বাক্য যেখানে ব্যাখ্যা করা হয়, উহাকে ভাষ্য বলে। বার্তিক-গ্রন্থে সূত্রের উক্ত, অনুক্ত বা দুরুক্ত অর্থ আলোচিত হইলেও সূত্রানুসারী বাক্যের মাধ্যমে ইহা করা হয় না। ভাষ্যকারগণ ভাষ্যমধ্যে নিজেদের পদের ব্যাখ্যা করিলেও সূত্রার্থের সহিত উহার সঙ্গতি থাকে। কিন্তু পূর্বপক্ষী বলিতে চাহেন, অধ্যাসভাষ্যের সহিত “অথাতোব্রহ্মজিজ্ঞাসা” এই ব্রহ্মসূত্রটির আক্ষরিক বা তাৎপর্যার্থের কোন মিল নাই। ভাষ্যকার শংকর জিজ্ঞাসা সূত্রটি ব্যাখ্যা করিবার সময় একটি “কর্তব্য” পদ অধ্যাহার করিয়াছেন। ইহা অধ্যাহার না করিলে সূত্রটি অনুবাদদোষে দুষ্ট হইত। নিষ্প্রয়োজন জ্ঞাত বিষয়ের বোধক বাক্যকে অনুবাদ বলে। অনুবাদের স্বার্থে প্রামাণ্য থাকে না। ইহার ফলে সূত্রটি নিরর্থক হইয়া পড়ে। সুতরাং সূত্রটিকে অনুবাদক না বুঝিয়া “কর্তব্য” পদটি অধ্যাহার করিয়া বিধায়ক বুঝিতে হইবে। তাহা ছাড়া, শাস্ত্রে পুরুষের প্রবৃত্তি সাধনের জন্যও “কর্তব্য” পদের অধ্যাহার আবশ্যিক। বিধি থাকিলেই প্রবৃত্তি হয় এবং প্রবৃত্তির বিষয়কে পুরুষার্থের সাধন কল্পনা করা হয়।

এখন প্রশ্ন হইতে পারে, “কর্তব্য” - পদটি অধ্যাহার করিলেও “জিজ্ঞাসা” শব্দের সহিত উহার অন্বয় হইবে কিভাবে? কারণ জিজ্ঞাসা পদটির আক্ষরিক অর্থ “জানিবার ইচ্ছা”। কাজেই জিজ্ঞাসা এই যৌগিক পদটির অবয়ব দুইটির অর্থ জ্ঞান ও ইচ্ছা। জ্ঞান ও ইচ্ছা বস্তুতন্ত্র, কৃতিসাধ্য নহে। জ্ঞানের কারণ থাকিলেই উহা উৎপন্ন হয়। মন বা বাহ্য ইন্দ্রিয়ের সহিত জ্ঞেয় বস্তুর সন্মুক্ত হইলেই জ্ঞান উৎপন্ন হয়। জ্ঞান যেমন প্রমাণের অধীন পুরুষের প্রযত্নের অধীন নহে, সেইরূপ ইচ্ছাও পুরুষের ক্রিয়াসাধ্য নহে। এইটি আমার সুখের সাধন এইরূপ জ্ঞান হইলেই আমাদের ইচ্ছা উৎপন্ন হয়। জ্ঞানও ইচ্ছা দৈহিক প্রযত্নের দ্বারা উৎপন্ন হয় না। সুতরাং “কর্তব্য” পদের সহিত জ্ঞান ও ইচ্ছার অন্বয় হইতে পারে না। বিবরণকার বলেন, অন্বয়ের অনুপপত্তির জন্য জিজ্ঞাসা পদটিতে লক্ষণা স্বীকার করিতে হইবে। কোনও বিষয়ে ইচ্ছা হইবার পর বিচার করিলে জ্ঞান উৎপন্ন হয়। ইহাই হইল ‘সন্দংশ’। এই সন্দংশ ন্যায় অনুসারে জিজ্ঞাসা পদটির বিচারে লক্ষণা করিতে হইবে। জানিবার ইচ্ছা হইলে বিচার হইয়া থাকে এবং শেষে জ্ঞান উৎপন্ন হয়। ইহাই হইল, ইচ্ছা ও জ্ঞানের সহিত বিচারের সন্দংশ। জানিবার ইচ্ছা হইলেও বিচার ব্যতিরেকে জ্ঞান উৎপন্ন হয় না বলিয়া জিজ্ঞাসা পদের শকার্থ্যের সহিত বিচাররূপ লক্ষ্যার্থের নিয়ত সন্মুক্ত আছে ইহা বুঝিতে পারা যায়। সুতরাং জিজ্ঞাসা পদের “বিচার” অর্থে লক্ষণা স্বীকার করিলে উক্ত অনুপপত্তি নিবারিত হইবে।

“বিষং ভুঙ্ক্তে” ইত্যাদি বাক্যে যেমন উভয়পদে লক্ষণা করা হয়, তেমনই জিজ্ঞাসা পদের উভয় অবয়ব - জ্ঞা-ধাতু ও ইচ্ছার্থক সন্ প্রত্যয়ে লক্ষণা করিতে হইবে। বিবরণোপন্যাসের প্রণেতা রামানন্দ সরস্বতী জ্ঞা ধাতুতে অজহল্লক্ষণা এবং সন্ প্রত্যয়ে অজহল্লক্ষণা মানিয়াছেন। জ্ঞা- পদের উপনিষদ্ বাক্যজন্য সিদ্ধাবস্থা জ্ঞানে ও সন্ প্রত্যয়ের বিচারে লক্ষণা বুঝিতে হইবে। এখানে জহৎ স্বার্থ লক্ষণার দ্বারা বিষয়রূপ অনুবন্ধ ও অজহৎ স্বার্থ লক্ষণার দ্বারা ব্রহ্মজ্ঞানরূপ ফল সূচিত হইয়াছে। বেদান্ত বাক্য ব্যতীত অন্য বাক্যবিচার হইতে ব্রহ্মজ্ঞান উৎপন্ন হয় না। সুতরাং এখানে যে বিচারের কথা বলা হইতেছে উহা বেদান্তবাক্যসমূহের বিচার বুঝিতে হইবে।

সূত্রস্থ ‘অথ’ শব্দটি হইতে সাধনচতুষ্টয়সম্পন্ন বেদান্তপাঠের যোগ্য অধিকারী সূচিত হইয়াছে । মোক্ষ ঐ মুমুক্শু অধিকারীর বিশেষণ । ব্রহ্মজ্ঞান অর্থাৎ ব্রহ্মাকার অন্তঃকরণবৃত্তি ব্যতিরেকে মোক্ষ হয় না বলিয়া ব্রহ্মজ্ঞানকে মুক্তির সাধন বলা হইয়াছে । বেদান্তপাঠের ফল বা প্রয়োজন দ্বিবিধ - মুখ্য প্রয়োজন মোক্ষ ও গৌণ প্রয়োজনে ব্রহ্মজ্ঞান । অদ্বৈতমতে মুক্তি বলিতে অজ্ঞাননিবৃত্তি ও ব্রহ্মজ্ঞান বলিতে ব্রহ্মাকার অন্তঃকরণবৃত্তিকে বুঝায় । অদ্বৈত বেদান্তীরা বৃত্তি বা প্রমাণকে লাক্ষণিকভাবে জ্ঞান বলেন । গুরুমুখ হইতে বেদান্তবাক্যের অর্থবিচারের মাধ্যমে উহাপোহরূপ তাৎপর্যবধারণ, পরে যুক্তির দ্বারা শ্রুত পদার্থের নিজেতে পুনঃ প্রতিষ্ঠা এবং পরিশেষে অনবরত নিরবচ্ছিন্নভাবে অনুশীলনের ফলে ব্রহ্মাকার অন্তঃকরণবৃত্তি উৎপন্ন হয় । ইহারই দ্বারা ব্রহ্মবিষয়ক মূলাজ্ঞান দূরীভূত হয় । এইভাবে সূত্রস্থ পদসমূহ হইতে সাধনচতুষ্টয়সম্পন্ন ব্যক্তির পক্ষে ব্রহ্মজ্ঞানের নিমিত্ত বিচার কর্তব্য এইরূপ শ্রৌত অর্থ নির্ণীত হয় । আর তাৎপর্য হইতে সাধন চতুষ্টয় সম্পন্ন মুমুক্শুর পক্ষে অজ্ঞাননিবৃত্তিরূপ মুক্তির সাধন ব্রহ্মজ্ঞানের জন্য বেদান্তবাক্যসমূহের বিচার কর্তব্য এইরূপ আর্থিক অর্থ পর্যবসিত হয় । পূর্বপক্ষী বলিতে চাহেন — জিজ্ঞাসাসূত্রের এই শ্রৌত বা আর্থিক কোনও অর্থের সহিতই অধ্যাসভাষ্যের মিল নাই । কারণ অধ্যাসভাষ্যে চিদাত্মা ও অনাত্মার মধ্যে পারস্পরিক অধ্যাসের সম্ভাবনা, অধ্যাসের লক্ষণ ও উহার প্রমাণ আলোচিত হইয়াছে । সুতরাং অধ্যাসভাষ্যকে ভাষ্য বলা সংগত হইবে না । কাজেই টীকা প্রারম্ভে ‘ভাষ্যের ব্যাখ্যা করিব’ এইরূপ প্রতিজ্ঞা করা সত্ত্বেও পদ্যপাদ যে অধ্যাসভাষ্যের উপর টীকা প্রণয়ন করিয়াছেন উহা সমীচীন হয় নাই — বিরুদ্ধবাদীর এইরূপ আপত্তি উক্ত বিবরণ সন্দর্ভে বিবৃত হইয়াছে ।

(ক্রমশঃ)

অখ্যাতিবাদ — একটি অদ্বৈতবাদী সমীক্ষা

মৃদুলা ভট্টাচার্য

AKHYĀTIVĀDA : A STUDY FROM ADVAITA APPROACH
MRIDULA BHATTACHARYA

ভ্রমীয় মতবাদকে খ্যাতিবাদ বলে । খ্যাতি শব্দের অর্থ প্রতীতি । বাদ শব্দের অর্থ বিচার । অখ্যাতিবাদকে খ্যাতিবাদের একটি অবান্তর ভেদ বলা হয় । প্রভাকরমীমাংসকগণ অখ্যাতিবাদের সমর্থক । কিন্তু তারা ভ্রমজ্ঞান স্বীকার করেন না । কাজেই অখ্যাতিবাদকে খ্যাতিবাদের প্রকারভেদ না বলে খ্যাতিবাদও অখ্যাতিবাদ এই দুই শ্রেণীর ভ্রমীয় মতবাদ স্বীকার করাই যুক্তিযুক্তি হবে । প্রভাকরগণ ভ্রান্তজ্ঞান স্বীকার না করলেও ভ্রমীয় ব্যবহার স্বীকার করেন । এই প্রবন্ধে আমরা প্রভাকরমীমাংসকগণের সম্মত অখ্যাতিবাদের সংক্ষিপ্ত পরিচয় দিয়ে বিদ্যারণ্যমুনির দৃষ্টিভঙ্গীতে তা সমীক্ষা করব ।

প্রভাকর মিশ্র, কুমারিল ভট্টের শিষ্য । কিন্তু তিনি অনেকস্থলে কুমারিল ভট্ট হতে স্বতন্ত্র মত প্রকাশ করেছেন । প্রভাকরের অনুগামীরা, তাঁকে অনুসরণ করে এক নতুন প্রস্থান গড়ে তোলেন । একে মীমাংসা দর্শনে ‘প্রভাকর পুস্থান’ বলে । প্রভাকরগণ সকল জ্ঞানকেই যথার্থ বলেন । তাঁরা বলেন, অযথার্থজ্ঞান স্বীকার করলে সর্বত্র জ্ঞানের প্রামাণ্যে সংশয় দেখা দেবে । তবে তাঁরা দৈনন্দিন অভিজ্ঞতালব্ধ ভ্রমকে ব্যাখ্যা করতে গিয়ে অখ্যাতিবাদ প্রবর্তন করেন । অখ্যাতিবাদীর মতে, ভ্রমস্থলে দুটি যথার্থজ্ঞান থাকে, তাদের বিবেক বা ভেদের অগ্রহের ফলে ভ্রম হয় । যেমন শুক্তিতে রজতের ভ্রান্তস্থলে শুক্তির প্রত্যক্ষ ও রজতের স্মৃতি হয় । শুক্তি ও রজত উভয়েই সত্যবস্তু । তাদের জ্ঞান যথার্থ । উভয় জ্ঞানের মধ্যে দুস্তর ভেদ আছে । দুটি জ্ঞানের বিষয়, দেশ, কাল, জ্ঞানত্ব জাতি ও জ্ঞান উৎপত্তির প্রক্রিয়া ভিন্ন ভিন্ন । উভয় জ্ঞানের এই ভেদকে ‘বিবেক’ বলা হয়, তার অগ্রহ অর্থাৎ জ্ঞানাভাবের ফলেই ভ্রম হয় । স্মৃতিতে তৎ- তৎ অংশের প্রমোষের ফলে ভেদগ্রহ হয় এবং ভেদগ্রহের জন্যই ভ্রান্ত ব্যবহার হয়ে থাকে । বাধক জ্ঞানের দ্বারা ব্যবহার বাধিত হয়, জ্ঞান নয় ।

অখ্যাতিবাদী প্রভাকরগণ স্মৃতির বিষয়কে স্মর্যমান বলেন । ইহা তৎকালে উৎপন্ন নিকটস্থ কোন রজত নয় । যেহেতু চক্ষু প্রভৃতি ইন্দ্রিয়ের সাথে ঐ রজতের সন্নির্কর্ষ হয় না, সেজন্য উহাকে স্মর্যমানই বলতে হবে । প্রভাকরগণের এই মত খণ্ডন করার অভিপ্রায়ে বিদ্যারণ্য তার বিবরণ-প্রমেয়সংগ্রহে বলেছেন, ভ্রমস্থলে রজতাদি ভ্রমীয় বিষয় পুরোবর্তী, স্মর্যমান নয় । অদ্বৈতবাদীরা শুক্তিরজতস্থলে -তৎকালে উৎপন্ন অনির্বচনীয় রজত মানেন । ঐ রজত কখনও - স্মৃতির বিষয় হতে পারে না । ইহা নিকটে অবস্থিত বলে প্রতীত হয়ে থাকে । প্রভাকরগণ এখানে বলতে পারেন, ইদম্ অংশই পুরোবর্তীরূপে ভাসমান হয়, রজত নয় । জ্ঞানের রজতাংশ স্মর্যমাণ বলেই প্রতীত হয় । এর উত্তরে বিদ্যারণ্য বলেন, যথার্থ এবং অযথার্থ উভয় জ্ঞানের স্থলেই সামান্য অংশ ও বিশেষাংশ সংস্কৃতিরূপে জ্ঞানে ভাসমান হয় । ‘এটি রজত’ এই যথার্থ জ্ঞানস্থলে

যেমন সামান্যাংশ ইন্দ্রা ও বিশেষাংশ রজত সংস্কৃষ্টিতে প্রতীত হয়, তেমনি ভ্রমস্থলে সামান্যাংশ ইন্দ্রা ও বিশেষাংশ রজত সংস্কৃষ্টিতে প্রতীত হয়। এস্থলে প্রভাকরগণ বলতে পারেন, সামান্য 'ইন্দ্র' অংশ ও বিশেষ রজত অংশ দুটি পৃথক জ্ঞানে প্রকাশিত হয়। একই সময়ে ঐ দুটি জ্ঞান উৎপন্ন হয় বলে 'এটি রজত' এরূপ ব্যবহার হয়ে থাকে। এই ব্যবহার কখনও সামান্য ও বিশেষের সম্বন্ধের ফলে হয় না।

অখ্যাতিবাদের এরূপ বক্তব্যের বিরুদ্ধে বিদ্যারণ্য বলেন, সত্যরজতস্থলে আমাদের যে জ্ঞান এবং মিথ্যা রজতস্থলে আমাদের যে প্রতীতি হয় তাদের মধ্যে কোন বৈলক্ষণ্য প্রতীত হয় না। পুরোবর্তী রজতের অভাবকে ন্যূনতা বললে প্রশ্ন হবে, অখ্যাতিবাদী ভ্রান্তিস্থলে যে অভাব নিশ্চয়ের কথা বলেন উহা কি রজতের প্রত্যক্ষজ্ঞানের অভাব হতে জানা যায়, অথবা 'এটি রজত নয়' এই বাধকজ্ঞানের দ্বারা জানা যায়? বিদ্যারণ্যের মতে প্রথম বিকল্পটি গ্রহণযোগ্য নয়। কারণ ভ্রমস্থলে আমাদের রজতের প্রত্যক্ষজ্ঞান হয়ে থাকে। আর রজত না থাকার জন্য রজতের অপরোক্ষজ্ঞান হয় না একথাও অখ্যাতিবাদী বলতে পারবেন না। কারণ, ভ্রমস্থলে রজতের নিশ্চয়ের অভাব আছে বলেই রজত নেই যেমন নিশ্চিত হয়, তেমনি রজত নেই বলেই রজতের প্রত্যক্ষ হয় না। এরফলে অন্যান্যশ্রয়দোষের প্রসঙ্গ হয়। এজন্য বিদ্যারণ্য বলেন, ভ্রমস্থলে রজতের অপরোক্ষ অনুভব হয় বলে পুরোবর্তী রজতের সত্তা স্বীকার করতে হবে।

এখানে অখ্যাতিবাদী বলতে পারেন, জ্ঞানের নিশ্চয়, অর্থের নিশ্চয়ের অধীন। অর্থের সত্তা নিশ্চিত হলেই জ্ঞানের সত্তা নিশ্চিত হয়। বিদ্যারণ্য বলেন, এরূপ স্বীকার করলে অনবস্থা এসে পড়ে। জ্ঞানের নিশ্চয় যদি অর্থের নিশ্চয়ের অধীন হয় তাহলে ঐ অর্থের নিশ্চয়ও জ্ঞানান্তরের অধীন হবে। এজন্য অদ্বৈতবাদী বিদ্যারণ্য বলেন, জ্ঞানের নিশ্চয় স্বতঃসিদ্ধ এবং অর্থের নিশ্চয় জ্ঞানধীন।

অখ্যাতিবাদী অগত্যা দ্বিতীয় বিকল্পটি অবলম্বন করতে পারেন। দ্বিতীয়কল্পে বলা হয়েছে, 'এটি রজত নয়' এই বাধক জ্ঞানের দ্বারা পুরোবর্তী রজতের অভাব জানা যায়। ভ্রান্তিস্থলে রজতজ্ঞানের ইহাই ন্যূনতা। এই কল্পটিও বিদ্যারণ্যের কাছে গ্রহণযোগ্য নয়। 'এটি রজত' ইহা পূর্ববর্তী জ্ঞান, আর 'এটি রজত নয়' ইহা পরবর্তী বিরুদ্ধজ্ঞান। পূর্ববর্তী জ্ঞানকে বাধা দেবার সামর্থ্য পরবর্তী বিরুদ্ধজ্ঞানে থাকে না। বিদ্যারণ্যের বক্তব্য, অখ্যাতিবাদের মতে ভ্রান্তিস্থলে ইন্দ্রা ও রজতের অসংসর্গের জ্ঞান না থাকায় যেমন 'এটি রজত' ব্যবহার হয়, তেমনি রজতের নিষেধের সাথে ইন্দ্রার সংসর্গের অভাব আছে এই জ্ঞান না থাকায় 'এটি রজত নয়' এরূপ ব্যবহার হতে পারে। প্রভাকর মতে ভ্রান্ত ব্যবহারের স্থলে ইন্দ্রাকার ও রজতাকারের অবিবেক যেমন কল্পিত হয়, তেমনি নিষেধস্থলেও ইন্দ্রার সাথে রজতনিষেধের অবিবেকই কল্পিত হোক। রজতের নিষেধের সাথে ইন্দ্রার সংসর্গ মানার আবশ্যিকতা কি? আর যদি অখ্যাতিবাদী বলেন, ভ্রান্তিস্থলে সংসর্গের অগ্রহ ভ্রান্ত ব্যবহারের কারণ হলেও প্রমাণস্থলে সংসর্গের জ্ঞান ব্যবহারের কারণ। যেহেতু 'ইহা রজত নয়' এরূপ ব্যবহারজ্ঞান অন্যেরও হয়ে থাকে। সুতরাং বাধক জ্ঞানে সংসর্গ ভাসমান হয় ইহা সংবাদজ্ঞানের দ্বারা জানা যায়। বিদ্যারণ্য বলেন, অখ্যাতিবাদী যদি বলেন, ব্যবহার-জ্ঞান বা সংবাদজ্ঞানের দ্বারা নিষেধ সংসর্গের জ্ঞান হয়, তাহলে নিষেধস্থলে সংসর্গের জ্ঞান সংবাদজ্ঞানের অধীন হয় বলে প্রভাকরগণ জ্ঞানকে স্পষ্টপ্রকাশ বলতে পারবেন না। অথচ প্রভাকর মীমাংসকগণ জ্ঞানকে স্পষ্টপ্রকাশ বলেন। তাঁদের মতে জ্ঞান জ্ঞেয় বিষয়কে বেদ্যরূপে, নিজেকে জ্ঞানরূপে এবং জ্ঞাতাকে জ্ঞানের আশ্রয়রূপে

প্রকাশ করে। আর যদি অখ্যাতিবাদীরা বলেন, ভ্রান্তিস্থলে রজত উপস্থিত থাকে না ইহা সকল সম্প্রদায়ই মানেন, সুতরাং আমরাও স্বীকার করি, এরূপ মতও যুক্তিসঙ্গত নয়। কারণ, অদ্বৈতবেদান্তী ভ্রমস্থলে অনির্বচনীয় রজত স্বীকার করেন। কাজেই ভ্রমস্থলে ভ্রমীয় বিষয় উপস্থিত থাকে না, একথা সর্বসম্মত নয়। এভাবে বিদ্যারণ্য দেখিয়েছেন, ভ্রমের বিষয়টি কোনমতেই স্মর্যমাণ হতে পারে না।

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Mittal Publications, New Delhi - 110059 (India), 2000, pp. vii-viii, 1-159
Price Rs.350.**

The work entitled '*Value Perspectives In Indian Philosophy*' by Bijayananda Kar is a philosophical exercise on the notion of value in Indian Philosophy. The book contains eighteen scholarly research articles on the views on different values expressed by classical and contemporary philosophical thinkers of India. Its articles contain different popular, important and burning issues on value etc. In the first article entitled '*A look on Indian Philosophy-Past and Present*' he attempts to show that traditional Indian Philosophy is *darśana* in nature but not philosophy with a note on the distinction between *darśana* and philosophy. An attempt has been made to relate *dharma* with *darśana*. Here he presents different senses in which the concept of God has been used in so-called orthodox traditions like Mimāṃsā, Advaita Vedānta, Sāṃkhya and Nyāya. He says that as in outside, so in India philosophical discussions have been carried in the same intellectual or theoretical platform and the deciding factor is in both case reason. According to him, Indian philosophers at least in the traditional sense of the term are engaged in certain issues which have developed in their intellectual tradition, a parallel of which may not be easily located in the western approach.

Prof. Kar has made some comparative remarks on the Indian approach of philosophy with its western counterpart. He comments that traditional Indian *darśana* is not necessarily unphilosophical. Like Western philosophy, Indian philosophy also analytical and reflective. One should not think that this analytic method has been blindly echoed the foreign source. He rightly establishes that freedom of philosophic enquiry will be hampered if one demands a philosopher to stick to certain particular ideology. He gives emphasise that philosophy must have societal role through which human interest is directly or indirectly fulfilled.

The second article entitled '*National Integration, Secularism and Advaita Philosophy of Value*' is a burning issue in the present Indian scene. He

beautifully clarifies the concepts of national integration, secularism and value after Advaita philosophy . The author is completely aware of the present - day position of India which consists of multilingual, multi-racial, multireligious, multi-ethnic and multi-political groups of individuals. Because of this diversity the conflict and disharmony arise frequently in different parts of the country. He attempts to give a solution so that all conflicts are replaced by peace and harmony.

The scheme of value advocated by Shankara, he thinks, though of great significance from normal religious standpoint, does not perhaps become effective in accelerating the cause of national integration because of its vagueness etc. to general people in some cases. To him national integration remains in the understanding of the essence of all religions attached to the citizens of a nation and there is a role of religion for national integration.

In the third article entitled '*Shankara Advaita on Truth, Reality and value*' it is said that Brahman is truth and reality itself. To him the knowledge of Brahman after Shankara means Brahman itself which is grounded upon the valuational postulate : *sarva-bhūtāntarātmā*. The sense of oneness means the sense of fellow feeling . Here he nicely clarifies the vedic concept of *rta* and this way *svakalyāna* and *janakalyāna* are appropriately integrated . The knower of Brahman brings a harmony between the egoistic and altruistic tendencies by means of a balanced intellect (*sama-buddhi*) and hence adopts a state of compositeness (*sthitaprajñatā*).

. The author has rightly pointed out that Shankara did not adopt a method of *suskatarka* regarding the realisation of Brahman. He establishes that *śreya* is the enlightened one in contrast with the *preya*. It would have been better if the author had taken some pain in quoting the original texts in support of his statements instead of the secondary ones.

In the article '*Valuational Significance of Shankara Vedānta*' the author clearly and lucidly explains the significance of Shankara's view 'Brahman alone is real and *jagat* is unreal' (Brahma satyam jagamithya) is the main problem faced by us in our life because generally the world in which we live cannot be false to us. Prof. Kar advocates, supporting Prof.

K.C. Bhattacharya, that *Pratibhāsikasattā* of Shankara Vedānta is 'no fact'. It seems to be real for the time being but afterwards disappears when real thing is known. Here he states that when someone realises Brahman he will have a cognition of sameness in all.

In the article '*Moksa As Value and Jñāna As Method In Shankara Vedānta*' the statement, i.e. "...it (*Brahmāvagati*) being sought by human beings is humanistic" (purusenarthamanatvāt purusārthaiti yuktam - p. 53) is based on Bhāmati, Original Sanskrit commentary on the Brahmasūtra. Some other statements have been supported by some important secondary books and national journals. The presentation of this paper being clear and lucid will help the researchers on a topic related to liberation.

In the article entitled '*Karmayoga in Gita - Its Valuational Framework*' the author rightly points out that a great deal of discussion has already been made regarding the nature of the philosophy of activism as advocated by the *Gītā*. There is a variety of opinions among the commentators of the *Gītā* with regard to the nature of *karmayoga*. Some remarks that the *Gītā* supports a philosophy of *karma* based on knowledge and devotion, some (Sāṅkhya) emphasises on *atmānatma-viveka-jñāna* which is found to be incompatible with the *Gītā*'s *samatva-budhirūpa-karmayoga*, some (Shankara) on *jñāna*, some (Ramānuja) on *karma-jñāna* integration, some (Chaitanya) on *bhakti*. The way in which the disinterested action has been advocated in the *Gītā* is lucidly and clearly stated by him. The ethics found in the conception of *Karmayoga* is, he thinks, humanistic and never supra-humanistic.

In '*The Dharma in Jainism*' it is said that Jainism can be viewed in two ways : *dharma* and *darśana*. Some of its cardinal virtues like self-effort (*atma cestā*), adherence to truth (*satya*) and non-violence are greatly relevant in the society. Here the author has referred to other related concepts e.g., religion, God, morality, *karma*, theology and God-head. The whole discussion has been arranged in the following way : I. *Dharma and Religion*, II. *The Idea of God and the Doctrine of karma*, III. *Theology and God-head* and IV. *Jaina Dharma as Spiritualistic Humanism*. The paper is based on original texts and other important authentic books on Jaina Philosophy.

'*Karma in Bauddha Darśana*' is a scholarly article and a good contribution in this area. According to him, what the Bauddha emphasises is

not the cessation of suffering in a transempirical dehumanised mystical platform. He explains that there is no difference between world and *nirvāna*. The world does not vanish; only a change of attitude and understanding are found. He rightly establishes the Bauddha contribution in correcting human attitude in the personal or individual level.

Though the paper entitled "*The Gandhian Approach on Individuality and Social Change - Its Valuational Perspectives*" is very short, it is very interesting. In this short article, he attempts to establish that the Gandhian approach of individuality is more useful than Marxist approach of that for the welfare of any society because permanent solution of the problem of the society is possible by the former. His presentation and argument are lucid and valid respectively.

In the article '*Swami Vivekananda and Interfaith Dialogue*' he advocates that Vivekananda could appeal for unity among all religions and it is called by him 'Universal Religion'. The concept of 'Universal Religion' was propagated by his contemporaries such as Sri Aurobindo and Rabindranath Tagore but they adopt different terminologies like 'religion of humanity' and 'religion of man' respectively. Perhaps any attempt for interfaith dialogue is to take note of all the issues like the number of ultimate reality, i.e., God etc., universal peace and understanding etc. specially when we consider Swamiji's suggestion for universal religion.

In the article '*Tagore on Religious Value*' Rabindranath's concept of religion is nicely indicated by Prof. Kar. Rabindranath has shown, he states, disinclination for any sort of supra-human, transcendental theistic entity. His (RT's) conception of God is non-theological and areligious in the usual traditional meaning of the term. Here he explains what Rabindranath means by spiritualism. Though he refers to 'Surplus in Man' or 'Universal in Man' in course of his discussion, he does not explain the two concepts. For Rabindranath spirit does not mean some form of disembodied being, but it is the personality of man. And God is never conceived as something beyond man. So if we read this short essay we can attain a good idea of Rabindranath's concept of religion.

In the article '*Radhakrishnan and Secularism*', secularism, Radhakrishnan's concept of secularism, difference between religion and

secularism are nicely and lucidly explicated by Prof. Kar. Radhakrishnan appears to be a critic of secularism after him.

'*Radhakrishnan on Intuition*' is a short article which deals with Radhakrishnan's concept of intuition, difference between intellect and intuition. A researcher on intuition will be benefitted by it.

The main tenets of Prof. Nayak's 'commonism' has been analytically described in the article '*Commonism : An Analytical Review*'. The statements of this article have been supported by many authentic reference books and scholarly articles and the discussion of such a burning topic will be appreciated by the social thinkers.

Now we turn to the article '*Nationalism and Humanism*.' Nationalism and humanism are very important issues in the present position of India. In this brief article, the meaning and significance of the words 'Nationalism', 'Humanism' and 'internationalism' and the relation among them have been beautifully interpreted.

'*On Humanistic Ecology*' is an article on Environmental Study which shows the author's keen interest in the field of environment.

Articles like '*Religious Integration and Social Justice*' perhaps should be written and read frequently for social harmony and national integration of our country. Much emphases should be laid upon, Prof. Kar thinks, the integration of all religions particularly in Indian context where people belonging to different religions have settled down through ages. Gandhiji has advocated the idea of identity so far as the Hindu concept of *Iśwara* and the Islam concept of *Allah* are concerned. It is the basis of religious integration so that Indian concept of secularism has been developed. In a country like India where people of different religious reside, secularism can be accepted as the proper political ideal where there is no scope for religious communalism and fundamentalism. So politics must be free from religions fanaticism. And social justice is possible through this move.

Attempts for religious integration in India have been made by many great men and saints, e.g., Akbar, Kavir, Swami Vivekananda etc. But their attempts or movements have not achieved considered amount of success in

failure which have been discussed in his article .

The last article "*The Vedānta Concept of Puruṣārtha : A Philosophical Appraisal*" is, in other words, deals with the aim or goal of man. Here *purusa* traditionally means man. A threefold classification i.e. *Kāma* , *artha*, *dharma* has been recommended with regard to purusārtha . These are considered to be basic human values which are usually sought. *Kāma* means desire for pleasure - both sensual and refined. The very desire to attain highest perfection in moral sense in an instance of *Kāma* (most refined). *Mokṣa* also which has been added to the tripartite classification at a subsequent period is said to be due to desire of a special kind (*mumukṣā*). *Artha* or wealth is an instrumental value both for *Kāma* and also for *dharma* . Dharma is that underlying principle which works towards the stability of human society. Neither *Kāma* alone nor *artha* alone nor *dharma* alone are considered as effective human goals, but the harmonious, conjunction of all the three requires to be emphasised for attaining human goal. But later on *mokṣa* has been added to the threefold classification quoted above and that also has got the classical recognition. Even *mokṣa* is regarded as the best of all four values. *Mokṣa* is the *parama puruṣārthā* after the Vedānta . It is the absolute value while the rest three are relative values. *Mokṣa* is not the fourth category. But it is meant to balance, regulate and coordinate the demands and expectations of *Kāma* , *artha* and *dharma* so that the real meaning of humanity becomes manifested. In this context Prof. Kar refers to Professor Rajendra Prasad's view on *purusārthas* and his (RP's) concept of *sarva-mukti* (liberation of all) as the liberation of cosmic soul.

The book would have been more appealing, had Professor Kar devoted some more time to clarify certain concepts like the concept of value in Indian Philosophy, the gradation in our value system etc. Apparently it seems to me, he has emphasised on the value in the sense of *dharma* and *mokṣa*, but Indian tradition says that there are also values in the forms of materialistic or economic value (*artha*), *Kāma* etc. How can we forget the humanistic appeal of our ancient divine teacher, who confesses, '*Dharmāvīruddhah Kamo'smi*' (I am the desire as unopposed to *dharma*) In the same sense , Kautilya and others have emphasised on *artha* in the sense of social and economic wellbeing, which is not ignorable.

However, in present Indian context, such a valuable book on value deserves wide circulation.

BHUPENDRA CHANDRA DAS

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