Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ir.vidyasagar.ac.in/jspui/handle/123456789/7939
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dc.contributor.authorDas, Dr. Purnima-
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-11T11:08:06Z-
dc.date.available2026-06-11T11:08:06Z-
dc.date.issued2026-03-16-
dc.identifier.issn0975-8461-
dc.identifier.urihttps://ir.vidyasagar.ac.in/jspui/handle/123456789/7939-
dc.descriptionpp : 199-205en_US
dc.description.abstractImmanuel Kant’s moral philosophy asserts the “good will” as the only unqualified good, emphasizing the role of duty, intention and moral law in ethical actions. Kant argues that the moral worth of an action stems from the principle guiding it, rather than its outcome. This distinguishes his deontological ethics from consequentialist ones like utilitarianism etc. Kant’s central view is the categorical imperative, which demands that actions should be universally applicable having respect the rationality and dignity of all individuals. The primacy of the good will also connects to Kant’s notions of duty and autonomy, underscoring the capacity of rational agents to act based on moral principles. Kantian ethics has practical implications, promoting integrity, honesty, respect and fairness in both professional and personal contexts. By focusing on intention over consequences, Kant’s framework provides a consistent and principled approach to ethical decision-making.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherThe Registrar, Vidyasagar University on behalf of Vidyasagar University Publication Division, Midnapore 721102, West Bengal, Indiaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesVolume 28;18-
dc.subjectImmanuel Kanten_US
dc.subjectGood Willen_US
dc.subjectCategorical Imperativeen_US
dc.subjectAutonomyen_US
dc.subjectMoral Lawen_US
dc.titleKant’s Concept of Good Will: A Critical Estimateen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
Appears in Collections:Philosophy and the Life-world Vol 28 [2025-2026]

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