Objects of Perception: Some Issues

Abstract

The supremacy of pratyakṣha pramāna is accepted by most of the schools of Indian Philosophy. Though all schools accept pratyakṣa as a pramaṇa, there is a difference in opinion in the question regarding what we get in perception. Here from the Indian perspective, we discuss the different views; namely the view of Nyāya, Bauddha, grammarian school etc. The focus here is on the nature of the object of the perceptual cognition. In Western epistemology also perception has a central role. We generally believe that the knowledge which we acquire in perception must be true. It is commonly believed that perception is the mirror of the world. Naive realists have also said that, in perception, we know objects as they truly are. But a problem arises here. The problem is: if we are directly aware of real objects in perception then how can an illusion or hallucination take place? Naive realists have no answer to this question. This is the major fault of this theory. So it can be said that it is wrong to say that perceptual cognition is always veridical. Some arguments are being presented here to prove this view. These arguments are – the argument from perspectival variation, the argument from illusion, the argument from hallucination etc. I also investigate the Sense Datum Theory, Indirect Realism, Phenomenalism, Adverbial Theory and finally Disjunctivism. I will also try to make a comparison between the Indian and Western traditions in this article.