

Anaxagoras on Matter: A Critical Study

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Abstract

The central theme of the present study is to explain and examine what Anaxagoras thought on matter. Seed, opposite and original mixture are the key concepts of his notion of matter. The seeds and opposite are the prime ingredients of the existing things of the phenomenal world. Opposites are not to be considered here as quality. The opposites are one of the prime ingredients of seeds as natural substances. Macroscopic things of the phenomenal world are the product of the seeds and opposites and are the miniature of the original mixture as well as seeds. All the macroscopic things of the phenomenal world have the portion of everything. To discuss Anaxagoras' notion of matter we find that he believed all the produced things were pre-exist in the seeds as well as original mixture. So, we critically examine whether Anaxagoras' notion of matter allows us to consider him a *satkārya-vādin* or not.

Key words: matter, seed, opposite, original mixture, *sāṅkhya satkārya-vāda*

Introduction

Anaxagoras' notion of matter has an immense value. By the grace of Anaxagoras, we get an opportunity to acquire the knowledge regarding the concept of matter in pre-Socratic era. He was the first pre-Socratic philosopher who tried to make a sharp distinction between mind and matter and introduced the concept of matter as well. The primary aim of this paper is to explain and examine what Anaxagoras thought on matter. In this connection we also discuss some other issues (such as do we call Anaxagoras a *satkārya-vādin*? etc.) related to his concept of matter. The scholars of the later pre-Socratics try to construct Anaxagoras' view on matter based on extant fragments as well as literature. We also follow the same path to achieve our aim. If we want to understand Anaxagoras' thought on matter, primarily we have to understand his views on original mixture (contain a share of everything), seed and opposite. The seeds and the opposites are the primary ingredients of the produced things. If we get to understand Anaxagoras' thought on original mixture, seed and opposite, we may infer what Anaxagoras thought on matter based on the understandings of the concept of original mixture, seed and

opposite. If we able to acquire the knowledge regarding the nature of the ingredients of the macroscopic things, we may get to understand the nature of the existing macroscopic things. So, we discuss the nature of the seed and opposites respectively.

In this regard, it is important to note that the nature of the produced things may not always be determined by the nature of its ingredients. For example, water, the gaseous ingredients (hydrogen and oxygen) mingle together and produce liquid water. However, the nature of the produced water is not like its ingredients. It is true that the nature of the produced things sometimes may not be determined by its ingredients. However, we have seen that sometimes the nature of the produced things is determined by its ingredients also, for example, gold jewellery. Goldsmith uses gold to make jewellery. After making the jewellery, the nature of the material cause (gold) of the produced jewellery is not changed. The produced jewellery is gold jewellery.

Nature of seeds

It is very difficult to mention what Anaxagoras thought on seed because Anaxagoras just used the term in his extant fragments. However, he did not discuss in detail the nature of the seed. Due to the lack of Anaxagoras' views on seed, some common misunderstandings have arisen on the notion of seed. The scholars of later pre-Socratics share their views on the nature of seed. They try to understand what Anaxagoras meant by seed and express their understanding about the seed. Waterfield (2000) expresses his understanding regarding Anaxagoras' notion of seed. He thinks "Although to us a 'seed' sounds like a discrete parcel of matter, it is more likely that Anaxagoras was merely trying to express, by a biological metaphor, the idea that the original mixture contained all things in potential" (Waterfield 117).

Waterfield (2000) suggests the two different states of the seed. One state of the seeds is in the produced things and other one is in the original mixture. He says that ". . . in the finished things of the world there are seeds with determinate qualities, infinite in quantity but only 'numerous' in quality, but in the original mixture there are seeds with no qualities" (Ibid). Did Anaxagoras believe in afore said states of seeds? Anaxagoras probably did not believe in afore said states of the seeds. Even the view of Waterfield is not consistent with fr.4. According to fr. 4, "Before these things were separated off, all things being together [*sc.* in the original cosmic mixture], not even a color was evident. This was prevented by the mixture of all things . . . seeds infinite in number, in no way like each other (fr. 4) (Furley 67). If the seeds have no determinate qualities, why did it claim in the fr. 4 that seeds are not like each other?"

Fr. 4 simply informs us that the seeds contained in the original mixture are not distinguishable. To explain why the ingredients (seeds) of the original mixture are not distinguishable, Waterfield (2000) says that seeds contained in the original mixture have no quality. But the explanation of the Waterfield may not be tenable.

If we are unable to distinguish the ingredients of the original mixture, it does not imply that the ingredients of the original mixture have no qualities. It may be that the ingredients of the original mixture are mingled in such a way that prevents us from identifying the individual ingredients of the original mixture as well as distinguishing them from each other. For example, if we mix coconut water and drinking water together, we cannot separate them. Do we claim that coconut water and drinking water have no determinate qualities?

If we try to understand why Waterfield thinks that the seeds of the original mixture have no qualities, we may get the possible answer to our question from the fr. 1. It is suggested in the fr. 1 that the ingredients of the original mixture are so small and are not visible (Burnet 258). As the ingredients are so small, they are not visible. As the ingredients of the original mixture are not visible, we may not be able to make the distinctions among the ingredients. Perhaps this is why some scholars like Waterfield think that the ingredients of the original mixture have no qualities.

Moreover, it is clearly said that the seeds are eternal and the seeds of bone do not transform into the seeds of flesh. It means the quality and quantity of seeds are not changeable. Perhaps this is why Weber (1897) says that “. . . they (seeds) change neither in quality nor quantity” (Weber 49). In addition to that, Furley (1987) also says “. . . Anaxagoras did not derive substances like bone, blood, skin, etc. from anything more primitive, but held that they are all equally primitive, all being ingredients in the original mixture” (Furley 68).

Sometimes the scholars of later pre-Socratics such as Freeman (1946) share their understanding regarding Anaxagoras' notion of the seed also. He says “He (Anaxagoras) seems to have given the name ‘seeds’ to all the particles of what he considered simple substances, organic or inorganic, transferring the natural from the former to the later” (Freeman 266). Freeman believes that Anaxagoras considered the simple substances as seed. But it is to be noted here that simple substance does not mean pure or unmixed substance. If we admit that simple substance means unmixed substance, it leads to against the philosophy of Anaxagoras as Anaxagoras himself admitted that there is a portion of everything in everything.

It is believed that although all the seeds contain opposites (the opposites are called in different names by scholars, such as Power or energy (Vlastos 42), quality-things (Cornford 87)), they are dissimilar because the ratio of powers is different in every seed (Vlastos 54). However, it is not the ultimate explanation of the dissimilarity of seeds. There are some scholars such as Fuller (1961) who also try to explain the dissimilarity of seeds in different way. Fuller (1961) says “. . . we have various sorts of seeds, whose different kinds are determined by the nature preponderant in them . . . ” (Fuller 79).

Vlastos (1950) says that all the seeds contain the same set of powers (opposites) but the ratio of powers is different in every seed. However, he claims that any seed contains any other (Vlastos 54). May we derive that all the seeds contain all others?

Perhaps we cannot do so because it is admitted that the ratio for each type of seed is different. If we admit Vlastos, it says that every kind of individual seed such as, flesh seed, bone seed etc. contains the ratios of opposites of all kind of seeds. Otherwise, we cannot claim that any seed contains any other. If we admit that a seed of flesh contains the ratios of powers of the seed of bone, bread, blood etc., how do we call the concerned seed a flesh seed? We may not call the concerned seed a flesh seed because it fails to fulfil the criteria of becoming a flesh seed and loses its own identity. Moreover, if we admit Vlastos, neither can we make any difference between the seed of flesh and bone nor explain the verities of corporeal things in the world in terms of seed.

If we admit Vlastos and believe that the nature of a seed is determined by the proportion of the opposites contained in the seed, how we explain that hairs, flesh absorb nutrition from bread. As the proportion of the opposites contained in the bread seeds is different from the seed of hair, flesh etc., the hair, flesh seeds etc. cannot absorb nutrition from the seeds of bread. If we admit that the proportion of the opposites contained in the seed is different for bread, hair, bone, flesh seeds etc., and hair, bone, flesh seeds receive nutrition from bread seeds, it says that hairs come from not hair. But we cannot say that hair comes out of not hair because it is completely denied in the extant fragments of Anaxagoras (Burnet 259). To overcome this problem we may propose that the ratio of the opposites of the bread seed is changeable and when the hair starts to absorb nutrition, the ratio of the opposites of bread seed changes and the bread seed transform into hair seed and hair absorb nutrition from the seed of hair. So, we may not say that hair come out of not hair. If we accept it, it says that the nature of the seeds such as the seed of hair, flesh etc. is conditional and changeable. The seeds sometimes transform into the seed of hair, flesh etc. according to the necessity of changing the ratio of the opposites contained in the seeds. However, it may not be acceptable because the seeds are not changeable.

One thing is clear that Vlastos believes the seeds only contain the opposites and the nature of the seeds is determined by the ratio of contained opposites. However, all the scholars such as Kirk and Raven (1957) do not think the same about the seeds. They think "The 'seeds' in fact contain, like the original mixture in which they were present, not only the opposites, nor only natural substances, but both together"(Kirk and Raven 380). Perhaps we do not face the above mentioned difficulties if we accept Kirk and Raven. Similar type of thought regarding the seed we notice in the writing of Peck (1931). He thinks

It is bone. It is hard. It is white. Then there is a greater portion of 'bone' in it, a greater portion of 'the hard' in it, a greater portion of 'the white' in it, than of other 'things'. And that is why it is hard white bone--and so with all the things it can truly be said to be. (Peck 116)

Like to like theory

It is accepted that the seeds and the opposites are the basic ingredients of the macroscopic objects of the phenomenal world. But how do these basic ingredients aggregate together? The scholars propose their own view concerning this issue. In most of the cases, the scholars propose the 'like to like' theory. According to this theory, the like particles (seeds) combine together and formed a distinct mass. To talk about the combination of like particles Cornford says

Anaxagoras further postulates a tendency (presumably due to the revolution operating like an eddy in a liquid) for like things to come together. This coming together of like particles is described as combination; its effect is that a mass so formed becomes distinct from other masses formed of different particles (Cornford 23-24).

Kirk and Raven explain with an example the like to like theory. They believe

When the bread (or wheat) is eaten, it is presumably broken up into its constituent 'seeds'; and since these are themselves infinitely divisible, some of them at least will probably be broken down, by the processes of mastication and digestion, into still smaller seeds. There upon those seeds in which flesh predominates proceed, by the attraction of like to like, to join the flesh of the body, hair joins hair, and so on (Kirk and Raven 386).

However, some of the scholars such as Peck (1926) do not think that Anaxagoras upheld 'like to like' theory. According to Peck, Anaxagoras did not maintain that like particles come together to form a visible large mass. He says

Now a thing grows out of a seed not by a mere process of collection or accumulation of more seeds similar to the original one, but by a process of natural and organic development. Thus Anaxagoras does not maintain that 'like joins to like' to form a mass that will be large enough to be seen: his terminology suggests something quite different and much more intelligent. (Peck 61)

It is true that we are unable to unearth in what sense Anaxagoras used the term 'seed' in his extant fragments. Still the scholars of later pre-Socratics are trying to understand the key concepts such as seed, opposites, mind etc. of Anaxagoras' Philosophy. If we very carefully notice the view of Peck, we notice that he only emphasises on the biological aspect of seed. Peck (1931) says "A Seed is a Seed in the ordinary sense, viz. a Seed of a plant or of an animal" (Peck 115). Perhaps, as he admits the biological aspect of Anaxagoras' notion of seed, he denies the like to like theory. There is no problem to admit that a seed of living creatures develops

by the process of nature and a living creature comes into existence and everybody accepts it.

We know that Anaxagoras tried to explain the diversity of the phenomenal world by using his notion of seed. But the living creatures are not the only existing things of this phenomenal world. There are non-living things as well. Is it possible to claim that a non-living thing such as bread comes into existence out of a single seed like living creatures? It would be better if we do not admit that a non-living thing such as bread comes into existence out of a single seed like living creatures as our experiences do not allow it. Perhaps, this is why the scholars of later pre-Socratics take the help of the 'like to like' theory. They probably think if we want to explain the origin of the existing non-living things of the phenomenal world by using Anaxagoras' notion of seed, 'like to like' theory is the only theory which can help us to explain how the existing non-living things of the phenomenal world are originated. So, the assertion of Peck is questionable.

Everything in everything

One of the most popular as well as well-known fragment in the philosophy of Anaxagoras is fr.11 (there is a portion of everything in everything). This fragment suggests that all the existing things are the miniature of the original mixture. It implies that all the individual objects (whether it is large or small) contain the portion of others like original mixture. It means if we explain a large piece of flesh and whatever ingredients we find in that piece of flesh, the same we find in a tiny piece of flesh. The same is true for other individual things also. Now the question is- if there is a portion of everything in everything, how the nature of an object is determined. We get the answer to this question from the theory of predominance. According to this theory ". . . "each thing is most manifestly those things of which it has the most". . ." (Vlastos 57). But Freeman thinks if we admit fr.11 (there is a portion of everything in everything), it leads to absurdity. He says

Yet each contains a portion of everything. This puzzling statement used to be taken to mean, not only that bread if analysed would be found to contain bits of bone, flesh, hair and so on, but that all substances if analysed would be found to contain bits of all other substances. This would reduce Anaxagoras' metaphysic to absurdity, for he would merely have postulated in the sphere of the elements the same diversity as is found in our world, without explaining either (Freeman 266).

The reason behind the doubt of Freeman is that Anaxagoras just suggested everything contains the portion of everything but did not explain how it applicable for both the seeds, opposites etc. and existing things of the phenomenal world. In most of the cases, it is a common problem of the pre-Socratic philosophy that the pre-Socratic thinkers did not elaborately explained everything. The scholars of the later pre-Socratics try to explain the thought of the pre-Socratic thinkers based on

extant fragments and literature. We notice the same thing in the philosophy of Anaxagoras also.

Anaxagoras said there is a portion of everything in everything. Freeman thinks this is a puzzling statement and it reduces Anaxagoras' metaphysics to absurdity because Anaxagoras ascribed the diversity of the phenomenal world to the sphere of elements. The objection of Freeman is questionable. Actually Anaxagoras introduced the notion of original mixture, seed and opposite to explain the diversity of the phenomenal world. We get to know from his philosophy that he did not give any special status to the original mixture, seed and opposite. However, we know that the predecessors of Anaxagoras such as Anaximenes, Heraclitus etc. gave special status to the fundamental principle such as air, fire etc. and they believed that the water, earth, stone, ice etc. are the transformation of the fundamental principle. Anaxagoras clearly mentioned in his fragments that the seeds of all the existing things are eternal. He never said that all the existing things such as bread, flesh, bone etc. of the phenomenal world are the transformation of the seeds or opposites. When the like seeds combine together, an object comes into existence. However, it does not mean that a completely new thing comes into existence. Actually invisible like seeds combine together and a visible thing which is naturally alike to the seeds components comes in to existence.

Moreover, if we very carefully notice the notion of seeds or opposites, we find that Anaxagoras did not consider them abstract as soul. As these (seeds or opposites) are not abstract and the parts of the phenomenal world and Anaxagoras tried to explain the diversity of the phenomenal world with the help of the parts (seeds and opposites) of world, so it may be claimed that the assertion (there is apportion of everything in everything) would not reduce Anaxagoras' metaphysics to absurdity.

Nature of opposites

Now we try to unearth the view of Anaxagoras on opposites. If we look at Anaxagoras' fragments, we find that he neither discussed what he meant by opposite nor how many opposites are admitted by him (Burnet 258). This is why we get so many interpretations of the concept of opposite suggested by the scholars. So, it is too difficult for us to find out which one is the correct interpretation of Anaxagoras' notion of opposites because the scholars express their views from their own standpoint. For this reason, sometimes everybody does not accept each other. For example, Cornford (1930) says "At Anaxagoras' date these qualities would be regarded not as mere qualities, but as things" (Cornford 92). Guthrie (1969) also informs us that Anaxagoras did not consider the opposites as qualities. He thinks ". . . I shall assume that for Anaxagoras the hot, the cold, the wet, the bright, the black, etc., were substance having these characteristics, substances on the same footing as flesh and bone, just as the small and the large obviously are in fr. 3" (Guthrie 285 - 86). Some other scholars also think so, for example Kerferd (1993), Warren (2007). Warren believes

The most austere conception of Anaxagoras' ontology holds that he considers only what we might call "the opposites" to be fundamental. These opposites would be things such as "the hot", "the cold", "the wet", "the dry", "the light", "the dark" and so on, as listed in the middle of this fragment. It might seem odd to class these as stuffs, that is, as physical constituents of the world, but such a view is not uncommon in ancient Greek texts . . . (Warren 122).

Kerferd also follows the same path. He declares that

Anaxagoras introduced infinite elements (or an infinite number of elements), namely *homoioimerē* and the Opposites. The addition of the phrase "and the Opposites" seems to suggest that the *homoioimerē* alone do not exhaust the list of Anaxagoras' elements, but that the Opposites functioned alongside them as some sort of additional elements out of which things are made (Kerferd 497).

Furley (1987) is another scholar who also believes that Anaxagoras believed in the substantive nature of the opposites like others. He thinks

Even primary perceptible qualities, such as colors, or hot and cold, are treated as substantive ingredients: the heat of a bath of hot water is not explained by the presence of fire in it, or by the motion or the shape or the properties of its particles, but is simply due to its containing a predominant amount of 'the hot'. (Furley 69)

There are some scholars like Marmodoro (2017) who try to understand the opposite in a different way. He says ". . . Anaxagoras's opposites are properties in space and time which do not qualify underlying characterless substrata of any kind, but which are primitively and eternally present in the world" (Marmodoro 20).

However, it keeps in mind that all the scholars do not think so. Lloyd (1970) is one of them who believe that the opposites are not considered as elements in the fifth and fourth century. He says the thinkers of the fifth and fourth century preferred to say that opposites are not elements themselves but are associated with the elements. Lloyd says "In other fifth and fourth-century texts these opposites are associated with elements, rather than named as elements themselves" (Lloyd 256). Barnes (1982) is another prominent scholar who believes that ". . . I (Barnes) side with Aristotle: according to him, Anaxagoras mistakenly treats properties, like 'the hot', as substances . . ." (Barnes 252). It seems that Barnes is right but he may not be right. Actually, Anaxagoras did not consider the opposites as qualities of something like us. Whatever the disagreements are there regarding the opposites, the important thing is that the opposites are as important as natural substances in the philosophy of Anaxagoras.

There are some scholars like Kirk and Raven (1957), who think that the status of the opposites is superior to natural substances in the philosophy of Anaxagoras. According to them (Kirk and Raven), “Anaxagoras did indeed regard the opposites as primary elements of superior status to natural substances” (Kirk and Raven 381). It is not that Kirk and Raven just express their views on the nature of opposites. They also try to explain why Anaxagoras admitted the opposites. They think “he merely regarded the opposites as providing the best illustration of his general theory that ‘in everything there is a portion of everything’” (Kirk and Raven 381).

The fr.6 declares the inseparability of things. Although it is not clearly mention what Anaxagoras meant by the term ‘thing’. Some of the scholars, such as Guthrie (1969) try to understand the meaning of the said term. Guthrie says “the ‘things’ or ‘factors’ referred to in the neuter expression παντός (of everything) are these opposites” (Guthrie 284). However, Burnet and others like Tannery think that by ‘things’ Anaxagoras did not mean corporeal substances. Burnet believes that by ‘things’ Anaxagoras meant quality (Burnet 263). This is why Guthrie criticises Tannery and says “Tannery was undoubtedly anachronistic in assuming that ‘the hot’ and ‘the cold’ were qualities for Anaxagoras in precisely the sense in which heat and coldness were understood in his own time” (Guthrie 284). There are some other scholars such as Freeman (1946) who also think like Burnet. According to Freeman “. . . it is clear from the fragments that by ‘things’ in this connection he means ‘qualities’, and is endeavouring also to express the relative nature of qualities” (Freeman 266).

It is admitted that Simplicius, Lucretius and most of the modern scholars believed that by ‘things’ Anaxagoras meant simply corporeal substances (Bailey 537). It seems that they were absolutely right. However, Bailey thinks that objections may rise against this straight- forward interpretation. He mentions that some possible objections may be raised against this interpretation. He says if we accept the meaning suggested by the scholars, we cannot explain some key concepts of Anaxagoras’ philosophy, such as everything in everything. If we accept the proposed meaning, it says that we will be able to get the pure form of all the objects after infinitely divide of an object (Ibid).

Moreover, if we can cut off an object which is pure from other object, it says everything is not in everything. As the claim is against the philosophy of Anaxagoras, the prominent scholars such as, Burnet etc. do not accept it. Burnet says “. . . we can never reach anything “unmixed”, so there can be no such thing as a particle of simple nature, however, minute” (Burnet 263). The question is what will happen if we admit that we will be able to get the pure form of all the objects after infinitely divide of an object. The simple answer of this question is that we cannot explain the nourishment of hair, nail, bone etc. out of food because he thought nothing which is can come into being out of which is not (Cornford 14).

Cornford (1930) considers the opposites as ‘quality thing’, Vlastos (1950) as ‘powers’ etc. However, some of the scholars such as Guthrie (1969) raise question

against Cornford. Guthrie (1969) opposes the views of Cornford. Although opposites are considered as 'substantial quality things' but it is said that none of the opposites can exist apart or 'by itself'.

Guthrie (1969) does not accept the view of Cornford regarding the nature of opposites. He directly opposes and questions "Why then should we suppose that when Anaxagoras speaks of 'the hot' and 'the cold' he means something of a different order of being, not hot or cold substances but 'quality-thing'?" (Guthrie 285). It is not that Guthrie just criticises others regarding opposites. He also expresses his view on opposites. According to him "'Opposites' is a neutral word which does not prejudge the question of whether they are qualities or material substances possessing the qualities" (Guthrie 284). Perhaps Guthrie is right because the thinkers of that time were not aware about the distinction between substance and quality. So, it would be better if we do not ascribe the thought of the later pre-Socratic scholars to the pre-Socratics. Guthrie thinks there is difference in the mode of the being between opposites and substances. He believes that "I (Guthrie) suggest (or rather I am convinced) that for Anaxagoras there was no difference in the mode of their being between the opposites (so called, but not by him as far as we know) and other substances like flesh and gold. Taking a first glance at fr. 4, we find him speaking of 'the mixture of all things, the wet, the dry, the hot, the cold, the bright, the dark, since there was much earth in it and an infinite number of seeds'". (Guthrie 285)

One thing is clear that there are disagreements among the scholars on the nature of the opposites, but everybody accepts that Anaxagoras admitted the opposites. Although there are disputes whether Anaxagoras believed in the substantive nature of the opposites or not, it may assume that the opposites were not considered the quality of something by the Anaxagoras. There are some fragments which suggest that Anaxagoras did not consider the opposites as quality like us. It is said "The dense and the wet and the cold and the dark came together here, where the earth is now, but the rare and the hot and the dry went out into the far reaches of the *aithēr*" (Mckirahan 196). If Anaxagoras considered the opposites as qualities like us, the earth may not have come into existence out of dense, wet, cold and dark. So, we may assume that Anaxagoras probably considered the opposites as fundamental elements like the natural substances such as wood, flesh etc.

It is said that Anaxagoras did not consider the opposites as qualities. Did he believe in the seed of opposites? We get to know from the writings of some of the scholars like Fuller (1961) that they believe in the seeds of opposites. Fuller says "... mixed with cold in the seeds of cold there is some hot ... (Fuller 79). Stamatellos (2012) also considers the opposites as seeds like Fuller. According to him, "For Anaxagoras, the original mixture is an all-inclusive pre-cosmic matter of homogenous parts; and these are the *ingredients* (B1–B4). The ingredients of the original mixture are an infinite number of 'seeds' – for example opposites like dry, hot and cold, bright and dark" (Stamatellos 26). The remark of Drozdek (2007) regarding the constituent of mixture proposes that the seeds of opposites are in the

original mixture. He says “. . . it (primal mixture) was a mixture, that is, its elements blocked one another” (Drozdek 89). It is said that the seeds of all things are present in the original mixture. If we do not admit that the opposites have seeds, how we explain the presence of opposites in the original mixture. Do we only consider the opposites to be parts of the seeds?

We get to know from the fragments of Anaxagoras that he expressed two different views on the separation of the pairs of opposites. He claimed in the fr.8 that the pairs of opposites are not cut off or separated off from one another with an axe. But Anaxagoras expressed completely opposite view in the fr.12. He claimed in the fr.12 that the pairs of opposites are separated off from one another. He says “. . . this revolution caused the separating off, and the rare is separated off from the dense, the warm from the cold, the light from the dark, and the dry from the moist” (Burnet 260). However, it is not clear what kind of separation Anaxagoras talked about. We do not know whether the separation of the opposites is partial or not. Even if some scholars of later pre-Socratics such as Cornford (1930a) etc. believe that Anaxagoras talked about the separation of the opposites but he did not talk about the complete separation of the pairs of opposites. (Cornford 86).

We notice a most interesting point in Anaxagoras’ concept of matter. It is said that Anaxagoras believed the derived things already pre-exist in the seeds as well as in the original mixture (Zeller 330). If we carefully notice, we find that this tenet is very similar to the tenet of *sāṅkhya satkārya-vāda*. According to *sāṅkhya* philosophers, “. . . it (effect) pre-exists in the cause and is only manifested by certain favourable conditions” (Chatterjee and Datta 294). Of course Anaxagoras did not use the terms ‘cause-effect’ as *sāṅkhya* philosophers but both (Anaxagoras and *sāṅkhya* philosophers) expressed the same thought in different language. Anaxagoras expressed his thought in the form of question. He asked “How can hair come from what is not hair, or flesh from what is not flesh” (Burnet 259). The comment of Vlastos on Anaxagoras shows that Anaxagoras was a *satkārya-vādin*. Vlastos thinks

Thus when Anaxagoras speaks of “seeds” of all kinds of things, pre-existing in the primitive mixture and persisting in each of its products, he must mean that all these things are contained in their causal antecedents, just as all the parts of a man are contained in the sperm and all the parts of a plant are contained in its seed (Vlastos 36).

So, we may call him a *satkārya-vādin* as *sāṅkhya* philosophers. In this regard, one thing is to be mentioned here that we are not going to search whether Anaxagoras was influenced by *sāṅkhya satkārya-vāda* or not.

Conclusion

It may be claimed after discussing Anaxagoras’ notion of matter that he was not a materialist as he did not define everything in terms of matter like modern materialist philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes, did. Actually he was a dualist

thinker. He just defined the existing things of the phenomenal world in terms of matter. However, he did not admit any fundamental principle such as air, fire, water etc. like his predecessors such as Thales, Anaximenes etc. to explain the diversity of the phenomenal world.

Anaxagoras' notion of seed suggests that all the existing things of this world exist in the form of seed. The seeds are eternal as well as invisible. We know that the invisible eternal seeds are the basic ingredients of the existing things. The like seeds combine together and the visible form of derived things comes into existence. It does not mean that like seeds such as hair seeds combine together and transform into a completely different thing such as bone. Actually invisible like seeds combine together and produce a visible thing. The nature of the produced visible thing is the same as its seeds (ingredients). Before the visible forms of the existing things such as hair, bone etc. come into existence these things existed in the form of seed. So, nothing new comes into existence in this world. Like seed does not mean pure seed of something such as pure seed of bread, pure seed of bone etc. The existence of pure or unmixed thing is completely denied. It is admitted that all the seeds have the portion of everything. The assertion (there is a portion of everything in everything) proves that Anaxagoras believed in unity in diversity.

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