

Chapter-IV

India's Role in the Ethnic Crisis of Sri Lanka (1983-2009)

Map-3: Areas claimed by Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka



<http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v3/v3n3/articles/srilanka.html>

Chapter-IV

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Introduction

In terms of India's security perspective, Sri Lanka's presence in the Indian Ocean bears the actual pertinent factor. The ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka bore grave implications and provoked a chain of reaction for India on account of the existence of Tamil people in Tamil Nadu, who express sympathy with their members or brethren on the island. It is important to state that India's security issue in the Indian Oceanic area had been mostly determined and controlled by the political and military expansions in Sri Lanka. The ethno-national disturbances of Sri Lanka had its direct bearing on the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. In this connection, Kulandaswamy well-versed that the Tamil Nadu government and opposition political parties, on behalf of the Tamils people, had jointly put pressures on the Indian Government to interfere in ethnic problems of Sri Lanka and to make the arrangements for the peaceful-settlement in the state (Kulandaswamy, 2000: 59). Keeping this factor in mind, the New Delhi took the significant initiative into some sort of coalition and held bilateral negotiations with Colombo to establish a peaceful-settlement and to protect the interests of the Indian Tamils in the unitary state of Sri Lanka.

During the British colonial rule, an entire population amount of around about one million Tamils from India especially Tamil Nadu were brought in by the landlords for the plantation of coffee, tea, and rubber. The government of Sri Lanka did not enfranchise the Indian Tamils who had been working tirelessly in lieu of low-wages to promote the production of tea trade and business, which had a greater-share of GDP and also in the economic development of the state (Gunasingam, 2012: 84). India's functional role in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict needs to

be understood in the context of the accommodative strategies of nationalities adopted by the state as discussed in the previous chapter. During the 1980s, New Delhi diplomatically put pressure on Colombo to solve the ethno-national clash and helped in the peaceful settlement of the state and society (Upadhyay, 2007: 68). Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi firmly said that India cannot be an implicit spectator of the events in Sri Lanka and she also not allowed the secessionist activities of ethnic group or provide them state autonomy within the state. But she was completely conscious of the philanthropical negotiations of the ethnic glitches happening in Sri Lanka.

Indo-Sri Lanka's dialogue towards the accommodation of Tamil

On 18th January 1954, Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister, and John Katelawala, the then Sri Lankan Prime Minister had a dialogue and made the initial attempt to send a large part of the hill-country Tamils return to India. It was a treaty concerning the position of Indian-origin people settled in Ceylon (Rajasingham, 2001). But this attempt did not find any major development for the settlement of the above-mentioned problems of people. According to the provisions of the agreement, New Delhi theoretically tried to repatriate the Indian people lived in Ceylon. But Jawaharlal Nehru was in favour of wilful and self-imposed repatriation of the people. In this way, he wanted to repatriate those people who willingly desired to accept the citizenship of India. In this respect, Indian government did not agree with the recommendation of the Sri Lankan government that evoked exempting the citizenship of India to persons who would fail to attain the nationality of Sri Lanka (Gunasingam: 85).

Subsequently, the Shastri-Sirimavo Pact¹ was held in 1964. What constituted the central core of the pact pertained to the fact that the country would stand resolute in its commitment to granting the Ceylonese citizenship to 300000 Indian population domiciled in Sri Lanka coupled with the contrary fact that 525000 would confront repatriation to India. This was also taken

into account that the futuristic position of the outstanding 150000 of these persons would be the prime focus of a distinct treaty between the two states (Ministry of External Affairs...1964). Although the conditions of this pact did not undergo the proper execution in the true sense, they assisted as sufficient of a reason for the Sri Lankan police department to enclose thousands of upland Tamils of Sri Lanka as if they remained looking for the wild faunae. They were then forcefully transferred to India nightlong (Gunasingam: 85). In 1968, numerous Tamil people had to break away to the South, which was their homeland, where they were referred and involved in their daily business concern, to the Vanni region, in order to restructure their societal exists and attain certain economic constancy and solidity.



The Shastri- Sirimavo Pact of 30th October 1964.

<https://www.google.com/search?q=image+of+The+Shastri+Sirimavo+Pact+of+30th+October,+1964.&rlz=1C2CHBF>, [Accessed on 1/02/2015].

On the other hand, Indira Gandhi-Sirimavo Agreement² was held on 28th June 1974 for the resolution of unsettled people originating from in Sri Lanka. But, these agreements of the two states did not resolve the glitches of Indian migrants and the statelessness and persons displaced after 1981. In 1983, Indira Gandhi formulated a policy for regional security. The killing and bloodshed in Sri Lanka had soaked an Indian policy of provincial security. The policy received immediate unfettered and clear support of the regional as well as external ethnic-groups. There was no intention of India to interfere in domestic affairs and struggles of South Asian states and it sturdily confronted the interference by any state in the domestic affairs of any other

(Gupta, 1983: 92). According to Indira Gandhi, India would not bear with any outside interference in a struggle under any condition in any South Asian state if the interference had any absolute or obvious inference to the anti-India. No South Asian state could certainly seek the outside military support to be rendered with an anti-Indian prejudice from any state.

The Tamils had all the attributes of a distinct ethno-cultural national position or a separate group of people with their native-land, a separate linguistic, cultural-ethos, an incomparable economic motive and an extensive history that proceeded over three-thousand years. As separate ethnic-people, they had the definite and sovereign right of self-determination or autonomy. This right rendered it foreseeable for the community of the ethno-cultural group to exercise their freedom of choice to put forward their political position. In 1977, general elections, LTTE echoed that the Tamil people required the protection to safeguard their right to self-government and decided to fight for their sovereign status and political freedom. The LTTE's struggle was fought on the consent of Tamil people for self-government and self-autonomy clearly defining their political agenda. Its chief objective was to promote autonomy for the Tamil people. The sovereign right or demand for autonomy was the essential ground for the freedom struggle of the Tamils with regards to their political demands and security (Gunasingham: 77). The LTTE decided to form the ethnic nationality of Tamil people in the conventional motherland of Sri Lankan North-Eastern provinces.

Keeping in mind Sri Lanka's unity and territorial integrity, India put forth earnest efforts to encompass the peace-negotiations for the resolution of the ethno-national clash. So, India stood for the political agreement and settlement of ethnic clash occurring in the multi-cultural society (Assessment India's Principle Position...). On 12th August 1983 Smt. Gandhi imparted her commitment when she got the chance to assure Jayewardene that India stood in favour of the framework of political independence, unity, harmony and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.

India did not have any intention to intervene in the domestic activities of other states. But, due to the historical, ethno-cultural and such other friendly relations and connections between the persons of the two states, especially between the Tamil ethnic groups of India and Sri Lanka, India could not remain unaffected by such happening there. India did not want any division in Sri Lanka but India in the similar period could not put up with any strategy of Sri Lanka that created a threat that would be harmful to Indian security interests (Gunasingam, 93). On 25th August 1983, Narasimha Rao, India's External Affairs Minister of India and G. Parthasarathy, Policy Planning Chief of India were appointed by Indira Gandhi to hold a meeting with Jayewardene who was the then Sri Lankan President. She informed that India was not interested to interpose itself in the national matters and domestic activities of the island.

G. Parthasarathy, the Chief of Policy Planning, talked with the then Sri Lankan President and also continued to hold negotiations with the Tamil political leaders of Tamil liberation movements for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. On 23rd January 1984, an all-party meeting in Sri Lanka was held on the basis of his proposal. In this meeting, the recommendations laid down by G. Parthasarathy were additionally attached and projected (Gunasingam, 93):

1. In an all-party conference meeting, a recommendation was made to establish the provincial Councils which might be considered as an alternative form of the District Development Councils (DDC) as advocated in 1981. Special concessions were given and arranged for North and East areas. This indicated that the District Councils would be consolidated with the Provincial Council without any consent of the public referendum;
2. In this proposal, the power of Provincial Councils was enhanced and extended. Provincial Councils were empowered to make and enact laws in their periphery;

3. A Chief Minister would be the administrative head and a Council of Minister might be included to execute the rules and regulations in the respective areas;
4. The appointment of Armed forces and police forces would be based on the principle of proportionate representation of the people of several communities and communities residing in the provinces;
5. The land would be open for general access to all the nationals of Sri Lanka.

Tamils were not happy or satisfied with the above-proposals introduced in the all-party conference and this recommendation did not justify or embrace the aspirations of the Tamil nationals. There were no provisions for the North and East regions to be administered as an independent governing body. Ranasinghe Premadasa, the then Prime Minister, stood in complete opposition to this recommendation subsequently it did not indicate any strong strategy on the dexterous control of law, regulate the order and maintenance of peace or stability. President Jayewardene was in complete opposition to the bits of advice of Parthasarathy since he was persuaded his advisors that the bits of advices or suggestions afforded everything to the Tamils apart from a sovereign Eelam country. He stood conscious of the fact that approving such civil rights would only lead to the formation of the Tamil Eelam. Furthermore, Jayewardene persuaded the feelings and sentiments of the Sinhalese nationalists to confront this recommendation. He was also determined that this recommendation was not to be implemented as the people of the country did not accept and allow this proposal.

On 6th April 1984, while, talking in the Parliamentary functions of India, Shri P. V. Narashimha Rao, the then External Minister of India, expressed that India must support for an amicable solution and take the initiative for the peaceful settlement of the ethno-national struggle in the state of Sri Lanka. Furthermore, he asserted it was not only a strategy for Sri Lanka but India stood for peaceful resolution of disagreements wherever and whenever they

came up in any kind of way. He reaffirmed that India did not allow any kind of support or any secessionist or separatist tendencies in any South-Asian state. The parameters of India's policy were made clear and pursued on the basis of the principles of anti-separatist movement and, consequently, there was no question of taking cooperation on the separatist issue (Assessment India's Principled Position...).

Thimpu Talk



Inside the Meeting Hall-Phase I of Talks Tamil Delegation on Left and Sri Lanka Delegation on Rights.
(http://tamilnation.co/conflictresolution/tamilelam/85thimpu/thimpu_introduction.htm [Accessed on-15/07/2017])

The Indian government stressed on the peaceful-dialogue to resolve the conflict and struggle. Simultaneously, Indian government took two significant steps to resolve the ethnic conflicts: (i) Romesh Bhandari was appointed as India's foreign secretary in place of G. Parthasarathy. He, a representative of Prime Minister, was responsible and accountable to maintain cooperative relations with Sri Lanka. G. Parthasarathy was doubtful about the success of the peace and stability in Sri Lankan complications; (ii) Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi did not allow the Tamil radicals to conduct any revolutionary activities in India. On 3rd May 1985, Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, stated in Legislative Assembly that (Assessment India's Principle Position...):

“Our concern is for the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The concern to not only of people in the South but it is the concern of everyone in India. We have to see that the refugees go back, go back in honour, go back in safety, go back with the security of expecting and getting full freedom to express them, to work, to live within the integrity of Sri Lanka. We have made our position clear many times on this”.

In June 1985, Tamil revolutionary groups were involved in an armed fight to establish the independent state for Tamil people in the North-Eastern part of the island. The influential leaders of the Tamil movements in Sri Lanka decided an armistice at initial stage to make an amicable environment for peace dialogs. The first-round of the Thimpu Talks³ was held on 8th July 1985 and ended on 13th July 1985. The second-round of the discussions was started on 12th August 1985 and ended on 17th August 1985. The place of discussions was Thimpu, the Capital metropolitan of the Himalayan monarchy of Bhutan (Thimpu Talks...1985). In the first round of Thimpu Dialogue, Tamil leaders, who attended, were from several associations of Sri Lanka i.e. Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front⁴ (EPRLF), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation⁵ (TELO), Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam⁶ (PLOTE) Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students⁷ (EROS), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam⁸ (LTTE), and Tamil United Liberation Front⁹ (TULF). They were the associates and supporters of the Eelam National Liberation Front¹⁰ (Thimpu Talks...1985). In this round, Lawrence Thilagar and Anton of LTTE, Mohan and Charles Antonidas of TELO, A Varadarajah Perumal and L. Ketheeswaran of EPRLF, E. Ratnasabapathy and Rajee Shankar of EROS, R. Sampanthan, M Sivasithamparam, and Amirthalingam of TULF attended and represented the meeting for the peaceful solution of the ethno-national fighting in the united Sri Lanka.

During negotiation of the first-round, the Sri Lankan representatives took the decision and claimed that a resolution should respect the basic principles of sovereignty and maintain the integrity or unity of the state of Sri Lanka. But there was a difference in maintaining the unitary

character of the Sri Lankan constitution. The leaders of the Tamil political communities prepared a list of four demands for the political resolution. These were (Pfaffenberger, 1987: 156):

1. To recognize the Sri Lankan Tamils as a separate ethnic group;
2. To create the Tamil homeland by amalgamating together the other prevailing Northern and Eastern regions;
3. To assure the right to sovereignty and autonomy of the Tamil state;
4. To recognize the citizenship constitutional rights of all existing Tamils in the state of Sri Lanka.

But Jayewardene, the then President of Sri Lanka, did not accept these proposals made by Tamil political leaders. He claimed that the recommendations turned to separatism and home-rule. He made an argument that TULF and other community organizations would not be treated as proponents of Indian Tamils (Behera, 562). On 12th August 1985, the second round of the Thimpu dialog was held between the Sri Lankan members under the leadership of Jayewardene and Six Tamil communities' organizations including the TULF associates M. Sivasithamparam, A. Amirthalingam, and R. Sampanthan. The Sri Lankan government submitted a proposal which was far away from the Tamil apprehensions and desires. It operated on the functions of district councils which enjoyed the humble legislative and decision-making powers, fully dependant on the President of Sri Lanka and rejected Tamil's demand of the North-Eastern part of Sri Lanka as their separate homeland or state.

The government of Sri Lanka laid down the policy and systems of the sub-national components of a participatory structure of the state for the maintenance of the socio-political, and economic unity of the state. In this connection, A. D. Behera's revealing opinion seems to be apposite at this point. He contended that these components were (Behera, 562):

- (i) The Provincial Council would be established in every region;
- (ii) The District Council would be formed in all districts of the state;
- (iii) The Pradesheeya-Sabha would be organized with the rural representatives at the community level.

In December 1985, The TULF, on behalf of the Tamils, placed a proposal to form a Tamil state within the existing structure of the Sri Lankan constitution by which the Tamil state would enjoy the self-governing powers like the Indian states. They proposed four essential components of the Tamil state (Behera, 563):

- (a) To enjoy the administrative, legislative and judicial powers of the provincial Governors and the elected Provincial members;
- (b) To establish the provinces for the Tamil people in the North-Eastern areas;
- (c) To empower the Regional sovereignty in matters concerning to governmental and domestic law and order;
- (d) To ensure the Regional self-sufficiency in matters connecting to the distribution of property. The Mahaweli Ganga Project was adopted and included by the scheme of inter-province development in this regard.

Sri Lankan Government observed that Tamils' demand for the right to autonomy for their separate state and the separation of conventional native land were unpredictable with and contrary to a united-state, which remained the principal ground on which the Thimpu Talk started. During the discussion of Thimpu dialogue, it was reported that the Sri Lankan armed forces killed more than two hundred Tamils. On the basis of the news, the Tamil dominant leaders deferred the meeting and protested by laying down an argument that it was not possible to carry on the peace dialogues when there was neither harmony nor safety of for the Tamil

community in their motherland (Rahaman, 2000: 485). In this connection, Professor Mohammad Shariff Anees, Professor of Political Science, University of Colombo, told when the dialogue process for the search of peace was effectively collapsed due to the rise of violence and such violent activities had got out again in the various areas of the Sri Lankan social-order. Then again, India had tried to encompass the range of peaceful-negotiations to resolve the ethno-national struggle and supported the political resolutions to eliminate the conflict. It is pertinent to point here that different segments of Sri Lanka sect witnessed the outbreak of violence after the Thimpu peace talks were sabotaged.


In 1986 Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, appointed P. Chidambaram, Natwar Singh, and other spokespersons to hold fresh dialogues with Tamil revolutionaries after the collapse of Thimpu dialogue. The new-proposals were made on 19th December 1986 (19th December Proposals¹¹). These suggestions envisioned (Behera, 565):

- (i) That units of provincial councils would be formed for the devolution of power (an alternative form of the DDCs);
- (ii) Reformation of the Eastern-region to shape a Tamil majority part along with another, Jaffna;
- (iii) To consider the desires of concerned people for the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces;
- (iv) Provisions to be made for a sole Governor, the board of ministers, educational organizations and structures and High Court;
- (v) The power and authority of the central and provincial governments would be defined on the basis of the list of subjects- regional reserved and concurrent;
- (vi) The decentralisation policy to be included for the property settlement strategy and;

- (vii) Provision for the formation of the post of Vice-President, who must be from the minority groups.

With this background, New Delhi asked for the Tamil Eelam leaders to extend their support to the new proposals, but Sri Lankan administration and LTTE leaders did not accept the December 1986 proposals. Again, on 14th March 1987, Rajiv Gandhi asked LTTE leaders of Sri Lanka to accept these proposals for the nonviolent resolution of conflict and he sent Dinesh Singh, a great ambassador of India, to reconsider India's arbitrational spirits. But the Sri Lankan government abruptly started the strong-armed attack on 21st April 1987 when the LTTE bomb exploded at Pettah main bus stop in Colombo and consequently, 150 Sinhalese died (Times of India: 5, June 1987).

Changing role of India towards Sri Lanka since 1987



Looking back at the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord,
(<https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Looking-back-at-the-Indo-Sri-Lanka-Accord/article16214421.ece> [Accessed on-15/07/2017]).

In this regard, the Rajiv-Jayewardene Agreement was perhaps so determined in its capacity as it sought to address mutually all the three controversial problems between two states (Hariharan, 2010): (a) strategic benefits and securities; (b) Plight of persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka and (c) The rights of Tamil minority in the state of Sri Lanka. Its success was dependent on constant political patronage from both the states. Consequently, the Agreement

became side-lined when influential political leaders, who were pessimistic about the Agreement, came to power of authority in both states nearly at the same period of time. Consequently, the Tamil minorities, who had placed their trust in it, remained at the midpoint. According to Dr Mario Gomez, Executive Director, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, these extended developments veiled the comprehension of the constructive features of the agreement. Finally, this Agreement was made by Sri Lankan Tamils to arrange consideration of the political parties to affirm of their requirements of rights through the homeland within the framework of the Sri Lankan constitution.

The agreement displayed an explicit description regarding the observation of India about the functions of external powers in Sri Lanka. The main purpose of New Delhi in signing the agreement was to defend her national security benefits and sustain its leading positions and functions in the Indian Ocean. By signing this agreement, Sri Lanka acknowledged the India's functional role as a dominant regional power in south-Asia. The agreement had consequently inflicted severe limitations on Sri Lanka's foreign affairs (Behera, 569). It had acknowledged that the instability of Sri Lanka could not help in protecting the security interests of India. As a result, the agreement was redesigned to take care of the tendencies and orders of Indo-Sri Lankan relations.

In the same manner, the Annexure mentioned the security dreads of India stating that (Behera, 568): (a) Sri Lanka would not allow anybody establishment of any anti-Indian power-control at Trincomallee or any other seaport, which would be detrimental to India's interest; (b) Sri Lanka would not allow any foreign broadcasting services in her territory for the purpose of military or intelligence; and (c) India would not allow Indian region to be expended by Tamil secessionists to conduct their terrorist events on its part.

This agreement was not extraordinary as it was not a new beginning when compared with the war in Bangladesh. India's operations in Sri Lanka were more multifaceted and complex. The operation was taking place in Sri Lankan territory which had serious strategic constrictions. It was an eccentric conflict waged against a Tamil rebel group with a solid link of networks which were morally supported by the Tamil Nadu in India (Hariharan, 2010). It is significant to mention here that the development of India's military interference in support of the Agreement triggered a sensitive reaction and counterattack in contradiction of it in both states. In particular, India's military interference in Sri Lankan ethnic crisis had great involvement of India in India-Sri Lankan bilateral-cooperation.

Anton Balasingham stated in his book '*Porum Samaathanmmum*' that Prabhakaran and Thileepan and Yogi, the leaders of LTTE were all treated like detainees in Delhi. Prabhakaran told to Aton Balasingham that he was trapped once more. J.N. Dixit, an Indian political diplomat, met the LTTE dominant leaders in the Ashok Hotel, gave the ISLA documents and also explained in detail about the accord. After verification of the document related to the agreement, Prabhakaran did not accept the proposals of the accord. There were a heated-dialogues and controversies between Dixit and Prabhakaran. With this background, Rajiv Gandhi asked the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, M.G. Ramachandran, and requested him to negotiate with Prabhakaran for the acceptance of the proposal.

On 26 July 1987, Prabhakaran categorically clarified the complications of the agreement and emphasised that he was not willing to participate in passing the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. Prabhakaran specifically asserted that the purpose of the accord was to establish the provincial council. Prabhakaran argued that the proposed provincial council had extremely restricted and limited powers which could not satisfy and accomplish any of the desires of the Tamil person in Sri Lanka. It remained unsafe and threatening to provisionally unite the state with the Tamil

based on the process of a referendum of the public. Prabhakaran stated that as there was no lasting solution to the national aspirations of Tamil people and the Tamil motherlands were captured by the Sinhalese army and military, it was absolutely futile to ask them to hand over all their weapons and let their troops surrender.

M. G. Ramachandran, the then CM of Tamil Nadu, prudently analysed the components of the accord and understood that the ISLA¹² was made merely to satisfy the geo-strategically benefits and interests of India. On 28th July 1987 at night, Rajiv Gandhi, after the setback of all these phases, asked Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader, and his squad to his residence and made an arrangement for the last round of discussion with them. At that time, M.K Narayanan, the Head of Intelligence Bureau, and Ramachandran, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, were present and participated in that dialogue process. Rajiv Gandhi said Prabhakaran that he realised that Prabhakaran did not accept the ISLA and sought Prabhakaran to elucidate the inadequacies in the agreement. Prabhakaran asked Balasingham to translate his reaction into English (Balasingham, 2004: 179). In this regard, Balasingam interpreted the statement of Prabhakaran in English that the constitution of Sri Lanka remained very inflexible and composed of rules and regulations which Tamils could not be comfortable with what they deduced from it. Under the Sinhalese majority, it would not be possible to have any significant allocation of power and authority between the central government and the state government. The constitution of Sri Lanka was made of a rigid singular regulation system. The President, the head of the state, enjoyed the extensive or supreme executive rights in the rigid law of system. In such governmental administrative set-up, the central government accumulated all the administrative power and authority in such central system. The Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement formulated a particular rule completely and impartially. Henceforth, it would not be possible to make any essential modification to the existing political structure to allow the decentralisation of power. In the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, there was not outline and framework of the provincial council.

Its power and functions were not uniformly defined in the provisions of the accord. The December 19 solution had various drawbacks and disadvantages.

In response to the above, Prabhakaran responses were as follows:

“Before finding a permanent solution to the ethnic problems of Tamils, before having in place a suitable guarantee for the safety of Tamil people, it will not be fair in any way to force us to surrender the arms which are protecting the Tamil people”.

Accordingly, India neither wished success for the Sri Lankan military nor armed victory for the Tamil radical revolutionaries. But New Delhi supported the peaceful solution of the ethnic struggle and attempted to recognise the sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. Accordingly, India advocated the socio-political rights, representative democracy, and economic rights for the Tamils. It was the agreed view of many that the security interest of India brought a greater role in the agreement than the real tenacity of the ethnic clash. V. Prabhakaran, the then-dominant leader of Tamil rebellion armed group LTTE, openly declared that there was no alternative but to accept the accord, though it advocated the Tamil demands and hoped for India's apprehension (Reddy, 340). Prabhakaran was not satisfied with the impermanent nature of the amalgamation between the North-Eastern regions and he also expressed that a sovereign independent state would be the ultimate objective of LTTE.

Rajiv Gandhi told Prabhakaran that there were various drawbacks in the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement as he had exactly mentioned. He understood the problems associated in allowing the unity of North and East. He would negotiate with Jayewardene to implement it. Again, he informed that India worked to enhance the benefits and opportunities of the Tamil people. Rajiv Gandhi again told Prabhakaran that this agreement would attain the rights of the Tamil national and ensure their protection and security. He further requested Prabhakaran that if he supported this agreement, it would reinforce India's hands in helping to implement this agreement. As

soon as Rajiv Gandhi finished his dialogue, Prabhakaran laid down the arguments in a robust speech stating this agreement did not protect the interests of Tamil people and it obstructed the welfare of the Tamil people so he had rejected the conditions of accord (Gunasingam, 103). Rajiv Gandhi requested he did not have to alter his standpoint and it would be enough if he did not express his opposition to the accord. With this framework, the Indo-Sri Lankan peace-agreement was signed between New Delhi and Colombo which was held on 29th July 1987.

Rajiv Gandhi correspondingly intimated that: *“Regarding the issue of integrating the North and East, I will ensure that a referendum to hear the opinion of people of the East is not conducted. Hence North and East will be under your administration. Also, I urge you to step levying the tax in the Tamil regions. Instead, I will arrange for a monthly payment equivalent to that amount to be settled by the Indian government. Also, you shall surrender only a small share of your arms. I guarantee your safety and security. You can trust me on this”*.

The outcome of these developments resulted in the following (Gunasingam, 104):

- (i) The ISLA was primarily written for the protection of geopolitical benefits and security of India but it eclipsed the interests of Eelam Tamil people;
- (ii) Indian government did not stand by its argument before Jayewardene's ambidextrous policy and diplomatic strategy;
- (iii) India and Sri Lanka signed this agreement without the support of the Tamil persons and their diplomatic delegates and henceforth, appeared to be confinement for the Tamil people. Moreover, this agreement also undermined a fact of historical importance that the North-Eastern part of the island were the conventional birthplaces of the Tamils;

- (iv) It is amply clear that this agreement was an important apparatus obviously made by Jayewardene who decided to destroy or wipe out the armed conflict of the Tamil Tigers forever;
- (v) The Sri Lankan government turned out to be the actual recipients of the benefits of agreement than the Indian government.

There were three essential features of the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement (Behera, 568): *first*, the decentralisation of power to the North-Eastern regional unit through the peaceful settlement of ethnic conflict; *secondly*, the Indian government had undertaken the responsibility regarding the enactment and execution of the agreement; and *thirdly*, according to the exchange of letters in between two states, Sri Lanka made a pledge that it would not take any step detrimental to the interests or security and concern of New Delhi in the regional area.


It is significant to mention that both nations focused on the development of cooperative relations. They tried for progress and wellbeing of all groups within the existing constitutional framework of the island. It was palpable without any idea of the doubt for both states to maintain the sovereignty, harmony, and territorial unity of Sri Lanka which was the prime point of focus. J.N. Dixit, the former Indian foreign secretary, correctly pointed out that the Sri Lankan state had a small military force consisting of 15,000 associates. Therefore, they accepted assistance from extra-regional powers i.e. USA, Britain, Israel, and Pakistan etc. The government of Sri Lanka took a decision to form the modern observing arrangement called VoA (Voice of America) as per the proposal of the USA (Dixit, 2012). It might help to keep tabs and watch over the strategic impetuses of India with other states. India was against the VoA in Sri Lanka and did not accept this motivation because the establishment of VoA would be a security threat to India.

But then, Indo-Sri Lanka had the racial links and emotional relations through the Tamil national. This psychological link and sympathy forced New Delhi to chip in for the solution of the ethnic struggle. The government of Sri Lanka acknowledged that no foreign military tasks and intelligence activities would be allowed to use its land against Indian security interests and benefits. Sri Lanka decided to fulfil some of India's disquiets and apprehensions, which are enumerated as follows (Reddy, 2003: 338):

- (i) The fundamental idea about the importance and occupation of the foreign armed force and intelligence persons with an option to ensure that such existence would not mislead the Indo-Sri Lankan affairs;
- (ii) The government of Sri Lanka would not allow the usage of the Trincomallee region or any other harbour in the state of Sri Lanka for military purposes in any sense against India;
- (iii) India and Sri Lanka would assume the reinstatement and function of the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farmhouse;
- (iv) The agreement between Sri Lanka and the foreign broadcast medium agencies would be reviewed so that facilities and services established by them in Sri Lanka to be used only as public broadcast medium amenities and services not by any armed forces for intelligence reasons and purposes.

India's interference in Sri Lankan racial clash was actually a mediatory function. This clash had serious and important implications on the political systems of Tamil Nadu, and needed to reduce its impact on the provocative Tamil separatist attitudes. It was neither India's concerns, nor that of Tamil Nadu state to allow Sri Lanka to suppress the Tamil hostility and proclaim Sinhala domination and control over them. Due to this ethnic connection such kind of dominating condition in any part of Sri Lankan state was unacceptable and intolerable for

Tamils of India. Indian attitude of Tamil armed units had to be understood in this light and an effort to counter act an armed success by the government of Sri Lanka (Reddy, 338). L. R. Reddy, renowned writer, furthermore expressed that the Indian state itself was overwhelmed with the various nationalist and separatist conflicts in this milieu, the development of a small provinces in Northern areas of Sri Lanka would not have been a suitable precedent. It could likewise exercise an impact on the unstable opinion of Tamil Nadu; a sovereign Tamil state might have developed a striking characteristic for secessionist thoughts.



The ISLA was an attempt to stop the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka through constitutional arrangement and political settlement. The fundamental objective of Rajiv Gandhi was to prevent the ethnic clash and the ISLA would put India in an advantageous position post-civil warfare political course of Sri Lanka. The ISLA had two different objectives; firstly, the concept was to convince the contradictory ethnic people to link up with the majority politics and secondly, seek the political decentralization of power in Sri Lanka by changing the basic framework of the Sri Lankan constitution to achieve the socio-cultural sovereignty of the Tamil national people.

Responses in the Indian Parliament: There were mixed reaction to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord in the Indian Parliament. Opposition political parties were criticizing every section of the accord, only the leading political party was protecting it. Dinesh Goswami, the then Law Minister, claimed that this accord was India's prime mistake in the diplomatically and politically. This agreement as it then stood was not going to protect the interests and security of Tamil people. This agreement would be more in breach and would lead to instability and disturbance of peace. He considered that with this agreement, India, our country, had needlessly committed itself and its defence forces in the impulsive ethno-national crisis of a neighbouring state (Lok Sabha Debate, 1987...). Again, he raised a question in the Indian Parliament; under-what power did the Prime Minister of India gesture the treaty which was mainly a treaty on the domestic dilemma of Sri Lanka? This was a problematic issue between the military force of Sri Lanka, the national questions of Tamil people in Sri Lanka and the Government of Sri Lanka. He voiced that Rajiv Gandhi did not have the right or power to sign the agreement dealing with the domestic problem of Sri Lanka.

Further, Dinesh Goswami asserted that LTTE was one of the utmost vital rebellion associations in Sri Lanka and any agreement would be impossible without LTTE's support and consent. He told when LTTE's support was not imminent, we did not know under which power Indian Government undertook guarantee of full execution of the accord (Lok Sabha Debate 1987...). Once more, he argued that when the agreement was signed, the support of LTTE was not upcoming for this agreement. Prabhakaran, LTTE leader, who was confined to Ashoka Hotel and press-reporters or media-correspondents or anyone else, was allowed to meet him. It was clear that Prabhakaran was practically being forced to give his consent for the adoption of this agreement. Dinesh Goswami did not support the armed activities to resolve the domestic problem in the island (Lok Sabha Debate...1987). He also called it as the *diplomatic misadventure*.

On the other hand, no Tamil group supported the accord in this regard. But ultimately, the agreement was a major failure in the nation's strategy building and negotiation.

V. Gopalswami, Member of Rajya Sabha, said that the Prime Minister of India analysed this Agreement as an extraordinary one of in the 20th century as it was an extraordinary agreement for the reason that it was an agreement between the negotiator and the aggressor. It was not an agreement between the oppressors and oppressed. He was stunned to know that the LTTE was not considered as a party to the Agreement (Rajya Sabha Debate, 1987...:274). Prabhakaran was carried to India and he was confined in the Ashoka Hotel with restrictions. At that time, the Sri Lankan Radio broadcast reported that Prabhakaran had been detained under the defensive custody of India. V. Gopalswami informed in Indian Parliament that on 29th July 1987, he went to meet LTTE leader who detained at Ashoka Hotel in New Delhi and was confined in Room No. 518 at the 5th floor of the hotel with heightened security of the Indian black Cat forces (Rajya Sabha Debate, 1987...:274). He appealed that he produced his identity as a Member of Parliament but was not allowed to meet with Prabhakaran as he was detained in solitary confinement and was not in contact with any one for the explanations. Conferring to his info, he was carried at New Delhi trapped and fooled.

Concerning about the security of India, C. Madhav Reddi, M. P. of India and he was a member of Telugu Desam Party, criticised the accord when he said (Lok Sabha debates 1987...: 425):

“What prevented us from entering into an agreement in the past? Sri Lanka is your neighbour. You had your security concerns. You could have done that. But you have not done that. You have waited for an opportunity. When there was Sri Lankan internal trouble, you wanted to use this Tamilian agitation as a lever to face Sri Lanka to come to an agreement. That is very clear. Anybody will read in between the lines”.

Syed Shahabuddin, Member of Indian Parliament said that the Colombo was the major gainer of the agreement and state of affairs. He consistently raised a question that If Rajiv Gandhi was ready for the fight in contradiction of the LTTE for the reason that they did not lay down of their arms or unless they lay down their weapons, why did not the Sri Lankan state undertake the mission to eliminate the rebellion group like LTTE from its territory?

Replying to the dilemma in the House of Representatives of India i.e. Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, the ruling political party in the house supported the agreement by showing various significant opinions. As the Sri Lankan government failed to attain success through a military resolution for years, it approached India to resolve the problems and save the island. LTTE was attempting to resolve the problematic issue through military activities also. Bhagwat Jha Azad, Member of Parliament, made it clear that the IPKF was sent there to resolve the crisis at the diplomatic and political stage and not only in a military manner. The most important goal of the agreement was to safeguard the island from its fragmentations. India could not avoid the problem because the impact of the revolution can provoke the existing Tamil people who were conscious of their language and their autonomy. The spill-over effect could not be avoided.

In the meantime, K. C. Pant, Indian Defence Minister and Krishnaswamy Sundarji, Chief of Indian Army met Jayewardene, the then Sri Lankan President, with representatives of newspapers and media while attending at the dialogue. On this juncture, Jayewardene informed the subsequent conditions (Balasingham, 2004: 224): (a) Henceforth, no interim-administrative council or board would be established in the North-Eastern regions; (b) the LTTE movement was banned herewith; (c) Anyone apprehending or capturing Prabhakaran, rebellion leader of island, either animate or dead, would be given rupees ten lakhs; (d) Subsequently, the Sinhalese present in Eastern zone were not taken into confidence by the Indian armed forces, the Sri Lankan military would be sent to defend them so far; (e) The Indian Peace Keeping Force would then act and perform their work according to my directions.

The foremost objective of India's diplomatic engagement to send IPKF into the island was to make essential surroundings in which the terms of Indo-Sri Lankan accord could be properly implemented. According to the accord, the focal politico-military functions of the IPKF can be mostly synthesised as follows (Singh, 2007):

- (i) To assure and insist on the termination of aggressive fighting between the LTTE and SLAF;
- (ii) To make essential environments to enable Sri Lankan Tamils and threatened peoples to come back to their regions and homeland;
- (iii) To guarantee the security and protection of all nationalities in an integrated state;
- (iv) To confirm the laying down of weapons by the revolutionaries and;
- (v) To form essential human conditions for holding the democratic voting systems in which democratic rights and freedom would prevail in Sri Lankan state.

Role of IPKF: On that point of the pact, Rajeev Gandhi, positively intimated on 31st July 1987 in the Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha that IPKF¹³ was sent to Sri Lanka in response to the official appeal of the Colombo. The government of Sri Lanka implored compulsions and promises of India under the Indo-Sri Lankan accord and India emphasised on the promise to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of the state of Sri Lanka without interference in the national activities of the state (Kumar, 1988: 238). Therefore, the primary objective of the IPKF was to safeguard the Tamils who would no longer be punished and abused by the militant personnel in state of Sri Lanka and the state was ensured to be amalgamated and united. So, Tamil rebellion groups had to relinquish the notion for autonomy and self-determination. The purposes of the IPKF were as follows:

- (a) To oversee the surrender of all arms by the LTTE and other rebellion organisations in Sri Lanka;
- (b) To make sure to demolish SLAF campgrounds founded after May 1987;
- (c) To assist the local Tamil people to come back to their family-circles or their homeland so that they could remain in peace and enjoy their peaceful life in the social phenomenon.


On 9th October 1987, New Delhi lastly took the decision to forcefully unarm the LTTE who was the foremost radical revolutionary group. In order to overcome the barriers for the execution of the accord, India had undertaken the action and therefore established peace and harmony in Sri Lanka. The commanders of IPKF were asked to minimise the citizen losses and not to unnecessarily harm to the civilian or private properties in the state. Major General A. S. Kalkat affirmed it and he revealed that the IPKF had been instructed to unarm and demilitarise the Tamil revolutionaries, circumvent stimulating civic victims, safeguard communal integrity and create a condition of the environment in which popular democratic governance would prevail (Chattopadhyay, 1994: 109). Accordingly, the function of the IPKF was changed from peace-keeping force to peace-making force when IPKF started taking armed actions in contradiction of LTTE for the supportability of the state of Sri Lanka.

Structure of IPKF Arranged in Sri Lanka: A large-number of Indian soldiers positioned in Sri Lanka can be seen from the under-mentioned statistics brought out in *India Today*:

Table-6: Structure of IPKF Arranged in Sri Lanka

Date	Strength
15 th October 1987	8000
31 st October 1987	16000
15 th December 1987	29633
15 th February 1988	37000
15 th November 1988	60000

Source: India Today



While instituting comparison regarding the aforementioned formal-power of the IPKF, the *Sri Lankan Directorate of Military Intelligence* as executive board made an assessment and evaluated the capability of IPKF to about 100,000 (One lakh). Ravi Rikhye, an Indian security expert, looked into statistic of the Indian soldiers who were deployed in Sri Lanka and expected the deployment-strength was 105,000 (One lakh five thousand only) (Gunaratna, 1993: 249). Until October 1987, the strength basement was divided into three authoritative divisions (36th, 56th, and 57th Infantry Division), and one Infantry Divisions as well as supportive weapons and amenities (Singh, 2007: 75). The zone of functioning tasks was separated into two; the elephant pass of northern field (i.e. the Jaffna Battlefield) remained under 54th Infantry authoritative-division headed by Major General Harkirat Singh, an ex-officer of Indian Army and also the first commander of IPKF and the section, named Trincomalee Area under 36th Infantry Division.

In March 1988, the Area-wise Command structure of the IPKF on the island became as follows:

Division	Areas
54 th Infantry Division	Jaffna Peninsula
4 th Mountain Division	Vavuniya-Mannar-Killinochi
36 th Infantry Division	Trincomalee-Mullaitivu
57 th Infantry Division	Batticaloa-Amparai

(Singh, 2007: 75)

Geo-strategic importance of Sri Lanka occupies a very important part of India's security policy. Sea routes are increasingly becoming viable due to constant rise in India's export in recent years. Significant part of India's trade takes place through the Indian Ocean. Security of the sea-routes are therefore paramount importance to India. Sri Lanka's Geo-strategic position occupied a significant part of the security strategy of India. The Sea channels were gradually becoming effective owing to the continuous increase of Indian export since the post-cold war period (Yogasundram, 275). In the mid-1990s, India understood its strategic importance and pushed itself to maintain the relations with her neighbouring states that needed to be revised or changed. I. K. Gujral, Prime Minister of India, theorized the *Gujral Doctrine*¹⁴ (1996) in connection in connection with its neighbouring states. In a conversation at the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies at Colombo in January 1997, he stated his policy in five ways (Yogasundram, 278): (a) India did not ask for any mutual relations and disagreement with its neighbouring states of South Asia, but provided the virtuous reliance and confidence; (b) No South-Asian country should be permitted to use the territory in opposition to the another state in the regional areas; (c) No south-Asian state should intervene in the domestic matters of

another; (d) The national unity and sovereign-power of the South-Asian states would be maintained and respected; (e) The disagreement and clash of neighbouring states should be settled through diplomatic manners and mutual dialogues.

The above mentioned-decisions were taken to recover some of the preferential tariff profits beneficial to Sri Lanka as well as neighbouring states of India. Consequently, there was a paradigm shift in the Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral relations which were motivating well-adjusted development through the identity of various productions for exportations, business development procedures, conversation of allocations from business and commerce and the liberalisation of custom impediments (United Nations University...1993: 03). These principles unlocked new breadth of the potentials of mutual support and assistance in commercializing, progress and carry-across of tea business for the common shared profits.

Role of the Non-State Militant Groups

The Non-state Militant or armed groups had been determining factors for the transnational relationships. The development of these groups played a significant role in the cross-border linkages. Their autonomous identity provoked and motivated the functions of the non-state military or armed assemblies who stressed upon to keep up the strict or inflexible ethno-national elements that enhanced the linkages of transnational range of the regional area. With this background, the non-state militant groups could be analysed as a domestic threat and jeopardise of the nation-state. On the other hand, these aggressive groups had been considered as the persuasive managers for cross-border networks.

The *Non-State Militant Groups* had frequently originated from the coercion of the state domination and consequently, they sought to fulfil their socio-political demands and objectives in the political structures and arrangements. They were getting influential function in the state strategies. The appearances of the *Non-State Militant Groups* were escorted by the political

downgrading which stimulated the people for the armed-revolutions in the social order and country. The non-state militant violence could be realized in the discourse of the intra-state and inter-state armed struggle. The Intra-state armed struggle had been explained as a struggle between a government and a non-governmental political system without any intervention from any other states (Liyanage, 2011: 230). For this study, the intra-state armed conflict could be understood as a violent conflict between state and non-state armed groups. Intra-state conflicts had altered inter-state struggle as the leading form of global war; South Asia had mainly gone through an upsurge of the various level of intra-state clashes till the very end of the 1980s.

The LTTE founded two separate wings i.e.; (i) Political wings¹⁵ and (ii) Military wings¹⁶. These two separate sections were operated by the Central Governing Committee (CGM) led by Vellupillai Prabhakaran. He made all the rules and executive policies of the organisation on the island. Accordingly, the governmental works and armed activities were ruled and administered by the stratified-principles or the rules of hierarchy. The LTTE's political division set out the policies and supervised the governmental organs in certain zones through various organisational structures i.e. the Administrative workplaces, Courts of law, Police Department, Post-Office, Projecting Establishment, and broadcast medium, etc. One more significant aspect was that this group established the organisation of International Secretariat¹⁷ under the leadership of Veerakathy Manivannam Alias Castro for the external activities (Nathaniel, 2014). It expanded worldwide linkages and continued the external network-relations.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation of USA revealed and reported that the LTTE was looking to establish the night-sight spectacles, radio-set transmitter, missile-defence-system, AK-47s, and software system to observe and form the nuclear submarine and combat ship (Nathaniel, 2014). The LTTE's substantial help entailed of the gaining of armed devices, transportations policies and further machinery equipment, fund-raising efforts and concealing through front

benevolent establishments, and a numerous other illegal function, as well as scheme to kickback governmental bureaucrats, endeavouring to attain categorised reports and money laundering, amongst further criminal offenses.

It is important to mention that there were 232 *Non-State Militant Groups* in twenty-three states in Asian states from 1980 to 2016. Such groups consistently posed the main threat and menace of such groups' greatest systematic attitude was for the human protection of national non-combatant groups in lieu of the state military security. These non-state forearmed groups obviously had been considered as the threats to security of their particular state and administrations. According to the data, 171 out of 232 groups opposed the host government at the same time, which is over 70 percent. In spite of this, groups regularly continued to oppose the government, cessation of aggressions, and collaboration. These Groups remained in the vigorous struggle with governmental administration and regimes in only 53 percent of group-years (Englehart, 2016: 171). Among these *Non-State Militant Groups*, LTTE had become a unique organisation in its capacity and it occupied a different position in the sense that it had established its own Military Forces, Naval Forces, and Air Force. The District Court was established by LTTE for the redressal of grievances and complaints in North-Eastern parts of the landmass.



Kilinochchi District Court in LTTE-administered Tamil Eelam
(International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lankan.)

The LTTE was developed as a prominent rebellion actor or Group which took another tactic to counteract the *State-Military Forces* (Liyanage, 2011: 230).



Former US fundraiser for LTTE Danton Thurairajah and LTTE activist David Poopalapillai in Canada engaging in lobbying <https://www.mfa.gov.lk/tam/the-ltte-revives-its-us-network/> [Accessed on-12/06/2017]

The Military section constituted of various divisions: Black Tigers¹⁸, Elite guerrilla force¹⁹, Women's military wing²⁰, Naval wing²¹ as Sea Tigers who were responsible for the weapons acquisition network, Secretive Intelligence Group, Research and development wing, and Military Offences Group. The LTTE as a non-state militant group tried to provide the fundamental civilian requirements of Tamil people and carried out their administrative organizational purposes in the North-Eastern part of Sri Lanka. The LTTE was designed with three authoritative commands situated in the Vanni, and Jaffna Peninsula²², the East (Liyanage, 2011: 240).

It is significant to state that there were two important dominant secessionist rebellion assemblages in Tamil Nadu: (i) Tamil National Retrieval Troops (TNRT)²³; and (ii) Tamil Nadu Liberation Army²⁴ (TNLA). The Tamil National Retrieval Troops (TNRT) stood a secessionism revolutionary assemblage which was considered as an activity in the state of Tamil Nadu since the end of the eighties. It was set up by Ravi Alias P. Ravichandran who led the troops. It remained a minor radical-group of 30 associates. The TNRT was formed to establish a sovereign motherland for Tamils in India. The TNRT sought to create connections and linkages with other non-state militant or revolutionary groups who were compassionate to its thinking as well as those who could furnish logistician help and assistance. It continued the

adjacent connection with the LTTE of Sri Lanka and maintained the relations with Veerappan. Mostly, the people of the Vanniyar group joined in the trooper of TNRT. On the other hand, TNLA (Tamil Nadu Liberation Army) as ultra-left was established under the headship of Pulavar Kaliyaperuamal. It was a section of the Tamil Nadu Communist party-Marxist-Leninist²⁵ (TNCP-ML). In the 1980s, some Tamil nationalist activities started in the state of Tamil Nadu to protest against the existence of the IPKF in Sri Lanka (Liyanage: 271). The TNLF was an occurrence that was raised from the pro-LTTE thoughts flowing excessive in the state.

The main antagonism gatherings of Tamil Nadu formed an apparent movement through the establishment of Tamil Eelam Supporter's Organisation²⁶ (TESO) in 1986, which put extensive pressure and compelled the government of India. Likewise, on 4 May 1986, the political parties (AIDMK²⁷, DMK²⁸) of Tamil Nadu accordingly organized a conference to protect the Eelam Tamils. They sent a petition to the government of India to condemn the autocratic activities of the Sri Lankan government. Due to these activities, there was no alternative choice for India apart from getting directly involved in the affairs of Sri Lankan Tamils though it was an internal affair of the island. As a consequence, on 3 June 1987, India provided and supplied necessary commodities and food materials through 19 fishing-ships loaded with various products to the Jaffna area. But the government of Sri Lanka did not allow these ships in its territory. These ships were obstructed by the Sri Lankan administration. Due to this obstruction, India decided to launch *Operation Poomalai*²⁹ on 4th June 1987. India decided to use Air force flights to supply the necessary commodities and foods. This food supply process was called as the Operation Poomalai. The aeroplane departed from the airfield of Bangalore city and threw-down the foods and materials in the Jaffna gulf through the parachutes (Gunasingam, 100). On 5th July 1987, Ballipuram Vasanthan identified Leader Miller of the scoop Black Tigers squad propelled a motortruck overloaded with the explosive mixture into a Sri Lankan army box in

Nelliayadi assassinating more than 100 Sri Lankan militia men. This phenomenon shook or trembled the self-confidence of Jayewardene in his capacity to continue with his *Operation Liberation* aggressive attacks. Finally, Jayewardene, in a helpless condition, decided to stop the *Operation Liberation* in the island.

There was enough soft indication such as event-reports, meetings, newspapers, and articles that were not wholly proven but the existing combined-pictures made linkages and connections. The LTTE's connections with the Indian state (Centre, Intelligence agencies, Tamil Nadu state government) were well recoded (Liyanage: 277). But the linkages and connections with non-state equipped radicals were not accepted or given much consideration in India. The one justification was that this network did not qualify as a combined association, but it was far greater and further complicated provincial connections and linkages. At the particular level, the LTTE made a close connection with TNRT, ULFA, and TNLA and intensified its networks with other revolutionary groups in the region (Sharma, 1997).

According to Sanjay Hazarika, a renowned writer, there was a connection between LTTE and ULFA when the LTTE agents visited Assam in the early 1980s. In his seminal work on the North-Eastern uprising of India, he revealed the communications of the LTTE representatives to Assam to start the connections and make the relations with the ULFA. In 1990, Dinesh Kumar, LTTE functioning member, visited Assam and made to establish the linkages with radical group ULFA (Liyanage: 278). During this period of time, he made a statement in his work that ULFA arranged to host the LTTE activist, Dinesh Kumar. He remained Lakhpathar, a village of Dhemaji district of Assam, for one-night and remained in Assam for three or four daytimes before go back to Sri Lanka via Madras (Hazarika, 1994). However, beyond this point, there were some situations to a sustained even though the isolated linkages. For example, a report was published in The Indian Express in 1997 and this report revealed was stated that a

meeting of these two operative groups was held in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. The information correspondingly revealed that the guerrilla or paramilitary fighting exercise imparted by the LTTE to the ULFA units and corps in the early 1990s (Sharma, 1997).

The Jain Commission revealed and unearthed the linkages between ULFA and LTTE. This commission was looking into the murder of Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India. The Jain Commission Interim Report (1991) exposed that there were a link and connection between ULFA and LTTE. It had reported that three important government agencies i.e. the Intelligence Bureau, Army Intelligence, and Research and Analysis Wings - were all conscious about the attachments and connections between ULFA and LTTE and their actions in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. In 1991, the ULFA-LTTE connection matter was tabled in the Lok Sabha (Jain Commission Interim Report, 1991: Column 588-589...). As this point situation, Indian Prime Minister, Shri Chandra Shekhar expressed his opinions in the Lok Sabha as per the report provided by the government agents. He said that he, as a member of the Indian Parliament, sent a message to the home minister of India and informed about militant activities or movements of LTTE in Tamil Nadu. He informed not a lone nexus but there were close relations between ULFA and LTTE, and also close cooperation between them. Further, he stated that six centres of ULFA were established in Tamil Nadu and he pointed out that a couple of influential ULFA leaders were under detention from the Vellore Infirmary. But he did not give their titles and names. He made it clear that Tamil Nadu was the place where AK-47 rifles were purchased at the inexpensive price. Also, these centres were involved in selling and procurement of AK 47 for Naxalites in Andhra, for revolutionaries in Punjab as well as for ULFA group in Assam.

These studies exposed the connections and linkages of LTTE-ULFA. RAW³⁰ informed that there had been a close nexus between the ULFA and the LTTE as ULFA was in contact with LTTE to accumulate weapons. In fulfilment of this, the ULFA association was identified to be

in Tamil Nadu to discuss the terms and situations of the planned transaction in 1991 (Jain Commission Interim Report, 1991: Column 588-589...). The ULFA bought some arms from the LTTE for which the expense was made either in gold leaf or in narcotics/tranquillizers.

There appeared several other Non-state militants assemblies appearing in the Northeast areas of India and they had a nexus and close connection with LTTE. During Operation Rhino³¹, operated by the New Delhi to counter the ULFA in September 1991, B. G. Verghese, renowned author, elucidated the details of the textual or written document about the linkages of the LTTE with the National Security Council of Nagaland (NSCN³²). He specified that the LTTE documents and brochures were correspondingly found in the ULFA campgrounds. He also clarified that that these relations must be considered within the greater weapons-drugs-crime cooperation (Kinra: 280). The LTTE and the Indian rebellious groups, specifically those functioning in the Northeast areas of India, had close linkages and ties with the drug trading or transaction in the province.

The LTTE and Indian non-state militant groups, particularly in the North-Eastern states of India, had a nexus and close connection with drug trading in the province. The Moreh had been a small city at Chandel in the Manipur district. There were various communities in this region like Kukis, Marwaris, Nepalese, Punjabis and Tamils, who were involved in the secret and underground trafficking. It was governed and dominated by Tamils in this region (Liyanage, 280). There were 40,000 Tamils living in Moreh town in Chandel district of Manipur. This area was an anchorage of the gun and drug trafficking. The LTTE supposedly moved toward the Moreh Tamil inhabitants after the collapse of Jaffna. In the early 1990s when Tamil-Kuki conflict occurred in Moreh, the LTTE had purportedly interfered too. (Nepram, 2002: 161)

On the other hand, it is significant to mention that Tamil Nadu was the traditional supporter of LTTE. Whether it was used as an anchorage for arms-shipping from various sources, and a

transportation part for trafficking its heroin to global place and training exercise and backing non-state equipped assemblages were grounded there. However, Tamil Nadu was diplomatically and strategically critical for the LTTE. Tamil Nadu had been a small state but it played prominent part in the communication system for the transaction (Liyanage, 281). The LTTE's drug trafficking developed a major source of monetary support for its conflict. The LTTE's weapons collection and system of trafficking linkage were complicatedly connected with its smuggling, merchant-vessels, and systems of narcotizing inter-communicate. The LTTE was involved in weapons trading for its own monetary consumption as well as providing for non-state militant groups all over the world. The LTTE provided weapons, bullets, and capitals to peripheral assemblages or groups in Tamil Nadu like the TNLA and TNRF. These assemblages or groups were helpful to maintain the general community assistance for the LTTE in the nation-state and correspondingly kept up the regional network systems such as the Veerappan linkage. Consequently, there was a significant and considerable perception about the relations and connections between the TNRF/TNLA as rebellion groups and Veerappan since the mid-1990s (Liyanage, 282).




**Veerappan and Sethukuli Govindan, pay homage to Tamarasan,
The founder of the TNLA, on his 12th death anniversary
(September 1, 2002) under the common flange of the TNLA and the TNRF
<https://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2123/stories/20041119008201700.htm>
[Accessed on-12/06/2017]**

Concept of security became more complex and complexified with the development of non-state-armed groups and the expansion of their cross-border networks. Some stage of

idiographic nexus and linkages between the LTT E and non-state armed groups in India had affected on security inferences for both states. Consequently, the conception of the security was furthermore complexified with the outgrowth of Non-State Armed Groups (Kinra: 286). The emergence of these rebellion-groups had an impact on the domestic security of the state where they were involved in a conflict that challenged the authority of the state and triggered the national integrity or sovereign power over the people in its territorial boundary. Whether separatist or anti-governmental, the expansion of non-state armed-groups had enhanced the serious crisis in the nation-state. There was nexus and linkages among the non-state armed groups in one state fabricated and involved with *non-state armed groups* in other national-state. These relations were started largely for public desires and common requirements, although the militant groups could be united, sometimes antagonism, conceptual obligations and was made more practicable that allowed these groups to spread out their transnational relations and connections.

In India, the nexus between the LTTE and *non-state armed groups* had various consequences for both states at different stages. These relations guaranteed and made to ensure to provide arms for the LTTE as well by the LTTE to other assemblages. Subsequently, these groups continued their struggle against the state due to the exchange of weapons among them in an illegal manner. It is important to state that the LTTE's worldwide network of tranquillizers or narcotics and weapons smuggling made an annual income and profit of \$200 to \$ 300 million due to the larger connection and nexus among the *non-state armed groups* in Tamil Nadu and North-East areas of India (Kinra: 287). The nexus among the non-state armed groups provided the facility of trafficking and similarly provided the organisational assistance. This revenue produced from illegitimate sources was the accustomed fund and the cause of the clash for autonomous Tamil Eelam.



It was of concrete significance and implication to India that the LTTE expanded its large structure to supply and exchange arms among the non-state armed groups in India. The LTTE's narcotics trafficking and trading generated more than 40,000 drug addicted-people in the North-East areas of India (United Nations Office...:37). HIV/AIDS was extensive and became another nationwide threat to the security of India. Moreover, as the regional groups were accustomed to get their weapons supply on a systematic source the domestic security which was ever-changing in India was as multifaceted as the local. The linkages and inferences among *Non-state Armed Groups* had a dangerous effect on the security of both countries. Both Delhi and Colombo had been exaggerated by the appearance of reciprocated connections of these assemblages, both states called for a collective operative apparatus to counter the menaces or uncertainty in the society.

Trade relations between India and Sri Lanka (2001-2008)

This was a period during which business and commercial relationship between New Delhi and Colombo escalated at an outstanding amount. Subsequently, in the late 1990s, India stressed on the expansion of its business and trade relations with Sri Lanka. In this context, *The Indo-Sri Lankan Free Trade Agreement (ISLFTA)* was negotiated at the topmost political dialogue in December 1998 and its consequent application on 1st March 2000. This precise concept

stands established by M. S. S. Perera's concept of trade and business. He explored that the *ISLFTA* agreement was a significant landmark in Indo-Sri Lankan commercial cooperation particularly, such as transforming the rich economic consolidation and solidifying the monetary transaction (Perera, 2008). It allowed the quantitative and calculable evaluation of the *ISLFTA* which focused on the trade variables, wellbeing, and productivity of the Sri Lankan economic system.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement³³ (*ISFTA*) provided wide tax-free exemptions of goods and services traded between the two states. Subsequently, the Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement as mutual trade and business accelerated the innovative compulsion and during the year 2000-2002, the trade value between two states attained US\$1,003.5 million. India became the foremost origin of Sri Lankan trade and imports. The total trade was estimated at about 15 percent (*Indo-Sri Lanka Trade...*). In this connection, Nath Yogasundram's revealing statement seems to be germane here. He claims that India was Sri Lanka's third major destination in terms of exports. Pondering the variance in the context of the binary finances, Sri Lanka had been only a minor marketplace for India explaining about double per hundred of India's overall exports and one percent of its imports (Yogasundram, 281). At the same time, Sri Lanka's capital-investments in India were inconsequential, but India had financed approximately US\$450 million dollars in state of Sri Lanka as well. India was considered as the 4th major financier in the landmass.

In 2001, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the then President of Sri Lanka, and Lakshman Jayakody, Minister for Buddha Sasana, Culture & Religious Affairs, Sri Lankan Leader, paid an official visit to New Delhi. They also were attracted by the main sections of India's investment like cement, elastic goods, steel, tourism management, CPU & software system of computer, training of Information Technology and other specialised training

facilities (Upadhyay, 2007: 205). And they welcomed India's tactful and ethical backing to Sri Lanka. In 2004, Dr. Manmohan Singh, Indian Prime Minister, stated publicly that New Delhi would help Colombo in return and reclamation attempts. Consequently, the Indian Navy began to launch *Operation Rainbow*³⁴ and a medicinal specialist was sent to Sri Lanka for the arrangement of medical treatment and the first Indian maritime Dornier containing 650 kg of medicinal materials (Sultana, 2011: 334). Nearly at the same time, four Indian maritime vessels with various airplane on board were guided for concentration instantaneously to the seaports of Galle and Trincomalee.


Whereas New Delhi was a significant port of origin of imports equal antecedent to the FTA, it was not a foremost export marketplace, and in 2000 it was hierarchical 14th in the relation to export directions. By the time of 2005, the exports of Sri Lanka to India arrived at US\$ 559.26 million, a ten times multiple upsurge compared to 2000. In this way, India was the fifth major target for the exports of Colombo in 2008 (Kelegama, 2014: 4). The two states stimulated towards consultations on the *Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement*³⁵ (CEPA) 2008 for allow for supplementary bazaar accession to one another.

Table-7: Trade between Sri Lanka and India (2000-2008)

Sl. No.	Year	SL Exports to India	Indian Export to Sri Lanka	Total Trade
1.	2000	55.6	600.0	655.6
2.	2001	70.1	601.50	671.50
3.	2002	168.8	834.70	1,003.5
4.	2003	241.1	1,076.2	1317.3
5.	2004	385.50	1358.0	1743.5
6.	2005	559.2	1440.4	1999.6
7.	2006	494.0	1822.07	2316.07
8.	2007	516.40	2749.6	3266.0
9.	2008	418.0	2848.4	3266.4

Indo-Sri Lankan Free Trade Agreement, Colombo, Sri Lanka

<http://www.srilankabusiness.com/pdf/indosrilankaedbfinal.pdf> [Accessed on- 28/12/2018]



Subsequently, the Bilateral Free Trade Agreement was recognized in 2000 and by 2002, the business and trade value between India and Sri Lanka was US\$ 1,003.5 and by the year 2006, it had doubled which reached US\$ 2316.07. By 2000 and 2004, India increased its commercial exports to Sri Lanka US\$ 1358.5 million whereas Sri Lanka developed its marketable goods to India from 55.6 million to \$385.5 million. India's commercial exportations were extended from US\$ 600 to US\$1358.0 million from 2000 to 2004. Simultaneously, Sri Lankan marketable exportations to India were enhanced from US\$ 55.6 million to US\$ 385.50 million in due course of time.

On the other hand, on 29th December 2006, both states decided to sign the contract between the *National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd* of India (NTPC) and the Government of Sri Lanka (Swamy, 2012). On the basis of the contract, The *National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd* (NTPC) of India contracted a contract with the *Ceylon Electricity Board* (CEB) of Sri Lanka to establish a 500 MW coal-based energy plan in the eastern harbour metropolitan of Trincomalee (Kelegama, 2014: 4). The Power Secretary of India, R. V. Shahi said that the plan involved an investment of finance of 500 million dollars and was executed by a combined project corporation to be shaped with a stake of 50 percent respectively by NTPC Ltd and CEB. The two countries had gone to great length towards every direction in this regard.

Conclusion

India's interference in the Sri Lankan national crisis was not a premeditated intentional one. The worrying conditions that sustained in Sri Lanka after 1983 created the circumstances for the interference. India, reacting to its particular geo-political apprehensions in the province, was playing an influential role in ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and mediated to resolve the ethnic crisis in a peaceful manner. Its exact attachment and implication in the ethnic contradictions were headed by a sequence of dialogues and discussions which sought to establish the peaceful coexistence in the existing set of social order.

The Sri Lankan government tried to enforce an armed resolution upon the LTTE. As apparent from its armed attacks obligated India to transform its mediatory role to direct involvement in the conflict. The acceptance of the agreement, supplying the food at the time of crisis and the deployment of the IPKF in Sri Lanka were proposed in that background. There had been passionate hostility to the agreement and approximately all Sri Lankan professionals accused India of the failure of the agreement. Tamils' security became vital for the implementation of the agreement. The 29th agreement remained a significant landmark to develop cooperative relations between the two states. This pact was made without violation of the sovereignty, social unity, and national integrity system of Sri Lanka.

On the other hand, the emergence of the non-state militant groups motivated the greatest systematic root of uncertainty or unrest. These struggles were lethal and made sure to access the arms for mass devastation. The mainstream of the struggles sustained viciousness in society. The condition became more multifaceted and complex with emerging connections and nexus between *non-state armed groups*. Subsequently, the trans-national linkages stimulated and fuelled the social instability within these areas. The interplaying network of the non-state militant organisations in the state of Sri Lanka acted threat to the general harmony and security

of the province. As the adjoining nation India could not float free from the internal turmoil corroding the basic fabric of Sri Lanka and was socketed by the undercurrent of militancy. More importantly, India had been largely affected by the spill-over effect of the Sri Lankan ethno-national struggle.