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Philosophy and The Life-world

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**THIS VOLUME
IS DEDICATED TO**

**KARL RAIMUND POPPER
THE BRITISH PHILOSOPHER OF SCIENCE AND
SOCIAL SCIENTIST**

AND

**T.R.V. MURTY
THE INDIAN BUDDHIST SCHOLAR**

**AS A MARK OF TRIBUTE TO THEIR MEMORY
IN THE BIRTH CENTENARY IN 2002**

OBITUARY

We deeply mourn the sad demise of Professor Mrinal Kanti Bhadra, a Veteran Scholar of Philosophy and Existentialist thought which occurred at Calcutta on June 8, 2002. He was 72. He was active till the end. He was an honourable member of the Advisory Board of this Journal. It was a great shock to learn that he would not be with us. In fact, Professor Bhadra's passing away will cast deep shadows for long on the intellectual life of west Bengal.

Born in 1929, Professor Bhadra had a distinguished academic life. He obtained his Ph. D. Degree from Oklahoma University working on the Philosophy of J.P. Sartre. After serving in Bankura Christian College and Bangabasi College, Calcutta he joined the Department of Philosophy, Burdwan University and retired as Vivekananda Professor of Philosophy. He was also honoured as National Professor by the U.G.C.

Though an all-rounder in Philosophy he was recognised as a specialist in the Philosophy of Existentialism. 'A Critical Survey of Phenomenology and Existentialism' and 'A Critical Study of Sartre's Ontology of Consciousness' were his two invaluable contributions.

He whole-heartedly desired that the writings of western and continental philosophers should be translated into Bengali. He himself translated Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* and *Nausea*. He translated *The Flies*, the play by Sartre. He translated some short stories written by Sartre. Also he translated Kant's *The Critique of Pure Reason*.

As a person he was simple and unbelievably great. He had kindness of heart in all human and social affairs.

In his death, Bengal has lost one of its intellectual stalwarts, a philosopher, a writer and a great champion of human values.

May his memories and work continue to inspire us in our intellectual pursuits!

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THE LIFE - WORLD (*LEBENSWELT*) AND THE ETHICS OF INDIAN DALITS

RAMKANT SINARI

The concept of 'Life-World' (*Lebenswelt*) was introduced into philosophy by Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, in order to suggest that every individual and every society can claim to have pre-predicative, pre-thematic, or pre-given experience as the foundation of the theoretical constructs, scientific models, explanatory schemes that individual or society builds up. It is the Life-World we are in touch with as we live in the world and react to situations offered to us by forces about which we know very little. The whole edifice of science, Husserl thought, is thus grounded in the Life-World of mankind, the impetus of whose mind is not only to 'naturally' respond to the world but also to explain it, and to control it by inventing technologies based on mankind's scientific knowledge (*scientia*). Thus the Life-World is the experiential, immediately and directly available to consciousness; it is the *lived* world, it is the ultimate frame of reference for all theoretical schemes, it is the world Husserl referred to in his *Ideas I* as the 'world of experience' (*Erfahrungswelt*) and elsewhere as the 'home - world' (*Heimwelt*).

What will be demonstrated in this paper is that Dalits in India (literally, the word 'Dalit' means the depressed) are a formidably large community whose life, since the Vedic time four thousand years ago, has been of servitude, exploitation, squalor, illiteracy, poverty, hunger, landlessness, and consistently cruel oppression. This has been Dalits' Life-World for centuries, and it is impossible to read what is labelled as Dalit literature (it is in many senses the counterpart of Black literature in America) without recognizing the fact that it is the mirror of a group mind, which, instead of manifesting the signs of integration with its parental Hindu mind, nourishes a hatred toward the Hindu mind and invites hatred from it in return. There appears to be no ethical breakthrough in this situation of hatred. Mahatma Gandhi, who was always moved by the plight of Dalits, wooed them by calling them 'Harijans' (God's

children) and in some quarters of Indian society they are still so called. The social fact that Dalits were 'untouchables' in the eyes of the rest of the Hindu society was one of the greatest eyesores to Gandhi.

It is well-known that in the Indian tradition, since the time of its oldest composition, the *R̥g Veda*, the division of the Indian society into four classes (*Varṇas*) had been accepted : the *brāhmaṇas* formed the highest social order - the core class known to include intellectuals, priests, *r̥shis*, thinkers, law-givers, judges; the *varṇa* called the *kshatriyas*, to whom belonged kings, warriors, fighters and guardians of the state; the *vais'yas*, that is, the class which included merchants, land-lords, moneylenders, industrialists; and the fourth class was called *shūdras* whose main duty was to serve the three upper classes and remain humble and submissive in their presence. No where is any vivid description of the *shūdras* 'rights mentioned. The line dividing the society into three upper classes on the one side, and the class of *shūdras*, on the other side, has been so rigid in the history of Indian society that most abominable punishments were reserved for those *shūdras* who dared insult or humiliate any member of the upper classes, or occupied seats by his side. What is interesting is that the social partition was given a religious sanction by scriptures under the name of *dharma* (the code of ethico-religious imperatives of the Vedic origin). The *shūdras*, for instance, were not supposed to perform the thread ceremony for their children, a ceremony performed by the members of the upper classes for the entry of their child into the fold of the *varṇa* in which the child was born. Although there is no historical evidence for the origin of *varṇas*, i.e., how and for what purpose the ancient Aryan society introduced the system of *varṇas*, the system was a *fait accompli* in the Vedic times, propagated by the authors of various scriptures and celebrated by Manu in the *Manu - Smṛiti* (Law book of Manu), the compendium which belongs to the time between the second and the first centuries B.C.

What one must not ignore is the fact that it is *brāhmaṇas* who have been the authors of the Vedas, the Upanishads, the *Smṛtis*, the *Sūtras*, the *Bhāṣyas*, and all other forms of ancient Sanskrit literature. The *brāhmaṇa* was looked upon as the embodiment of Brahman, of the knowledge of the transcendental reality, of the knowledge of the spiritual foundation of the universe. As a *Varṇa* or class, therefore,

brāhmaṇa perceived, understood and interpreted have called a certain 'prejudice,' i.e., from the point of view that their power of wisdom and insight as regards the social goals were never fallible. Being, again, the highest order in the society, they were attentively listened to and their advice was heeded as an expression of cocksureness. It is *brāhmaṇa* who defined *dharma* (called *varnāshramadharma*). The class which suffered most in the exercise of the prescription of *dharma* was of *shūdras*, whose single duty according to Manu was to serve the other classes.

Manusmṛiti, composed by Manu, himself a *brāhmaṇa*, set *brāhmaṇas* on the highest pedestal. Manu said that *brāhmaṇas* originated from the best limb of the Cosmic Person (*Puruṣa*); they were the preservers of the Vedas, and thus ought to be regarded as almost gods of creation. Consequently, *brāhmaṇas* were not to be punished, or were to be punished leniently, if they happened to commit an offence. *Brāhmaṇas* were to be excluded from punitive measures, such as, payment of a fine, infliction of corporeal pain, banishment from the particular locality, etc. What we call today as hermeneutical jurisprudence must have prevailed during these times with the tribunal completely under the control of the *brāhmaṇa* judges interpreting *dharmas* (statutes) for different classes differently. Manu prescribed to *brāhmaṇas* the duties of 'studying and teaching, performing sacrifices, giving and receiving gifts'; to *kshatriyas* the duty of protecting people, studying, doing sacrifices; to *vais'yas* the duty of breeding cattle, farming the land, pursuing commerce, lending money, etc. The state *shūdras* must have been pathetic, since no duty was prescribed to them that could be seen as their contribution to the well-being of the society - they were supposed to be servile to the rest of the people. All the sociological evidence that we have about the structure of the Aryan society shows that *shūdras* were not taken in by it as a part of Aryan race - they were many a time regarded as non-Aryans.

Everything that we know about the Life-World of *shūdras* comes to us from the writings of *brāhmaṇas*, and therefore there is every reason to suppose that the latter's description of the *shūdras*' life in the Indian community is not as authentic as it should have been. There were no *shūdra* writers in Indian until the first half of the nineteenth century when Jyotiba Phule, periyar (his original name was E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker) and Babasahab Ambedkar², the highly educated statesman in

British India and the unflinching angry champion of *shūdras* ' economic and social uplift, came on the scene. In absence of the reliable sociological and anthropological data regarding the exact difference between the class of *shūdras* and the classes of non-Aryans, aboriginals and tribals present in India when *brāhmaṇas*, the most intelligent Aryan class, composed the original scriptures, it would not be wrong to believe that there must have been constant interminglings among these untouchables or "*chandālas*" (so called by *brāhmaṇas*). These inter-minglings are not different from the ones we witness today in India under the label "Dalits". The portrayal available to us of the condition of the untouchables or *chandālas* is, as we have already said, from the *brāhmaṇas* ' perspective. This perspective would not reach so far into the life-experience of the untouchables as to capture their inner psyche. There must have been such a thing as the experience of being a *shūdra*, an untouchable, a *chandāla*, one whose sole role in the society was to serve the three higher classes. It would be pertinent to read, for setting a comparison, what one of the renowned African writers of our time says about the basic African experience, which it would be impossible for the Africans' white masters to intuit. Kwame Anthony Appiah, the African writer, says : ³

I'm an Ibo writer, because this is my basic culture; Nigerian, African and a writer no, black first, then a writer. Each of these identities does call for a certain kind of commitment on my part. I must see what it is to be black - and this means being sufficiently intelligent to know how the world is moving and how the black people fare in the world. This is what means to be black. Or an African - the same : what does African mean to the world? When you see an African what does it mean to a white man?

Consistent with Appiah's insight into 'what it would be like to be a black,' the Dalit writers have always hinted at the impossibility of a non-Dalit to feel what it would be like to be and untouchable, a *shūdra*, in a society dominated by the upper classes.

One of the curious happenings in the early history of the Indian society is that from *varṇas* emerged clans, largely united by profession, many a time by inter-marriage, and still many a time by the geographical regions they occupied. These

clans were castes. Whatever may be the *raison d'être* of these castes, there is no doubt that they gradually proliferated into a considerably large number and blended with the main *varṇa* stream of *shūdras*. Although in ordinary parlance the term caste is used even for the three upper *varṇas* - *brāhmaṇas*, *kshatriyas* and *vais'yas* yet as a label it stands for the multiple groups into which *shūdras* were divided over centuries.

A highly integralist hypothesis stating that the original Aryan race was one united class, everyone being a priest or a soldier, a tradesman, or a tiller of the soil, is put forth by Radhakrishnan.⁴ Radhakrishnan argues that it is a matter of complexity of the social life following the Aryans' conquest of the aboriginals in India that the conquerors looked upon the conquered as slaves (*dasyus*), the fourth class. There is also the possible conjecture, Radhakrishnan remarks, that Aryans, before they entered India, perhaps had among them the class of the downtrodden, the *shūdras*. No single hypothesis concerning the origin of the caste notion appears to be conclusive.

No work, sacred, celebrated and holy, gave such a great ethico-religious status to the caste system as the *Bhagavadgītā* (3rd century B.C.). The *Bhagavadgītā*⁵ speaks of the divine origin of the theory of duties of four *varnas*, emphasizing the fact that God, who has a total perception of society and its preservation, ordained the division of society into castes, each caste having its own inviolable obligations. Soon castes became a mark of one's birth and also of one's station in life.

Ambedkar (1891-1956), born into the caste of *mahārs*, dedicated himself to the emancipation of the *shūdras* from the condition of slavery. He, along with Phule and Periyar, thought that *shūdras* were immersed in slavery from the inception of the Hindu society. It is with the rise of Ambedkar as the patriarch of the untouchables in the twentieth century that the *shūdra* awareness that as a class they were as distinct economically and culturally, though not ethnically as a non - Aryan and non-Hindu community augmented to its maximum limit. Ambedkar was not an ordinary leader of Dalits. Before he stepped into the movement of reforming his fellowmen, he had returned to India with the degrees of M.A. and Ph. D. from Columbia University, a D.Sc. from London University, and passed the bar from Grey's Inn in London and

become a barrister-at-law. Everything that he said and wrote would capture the attention of the most prominent leaders of the Indian society of his time. It had a tone and nuances much distinct from the tone and nuances of Mahatma Gandhi's utterances concerning the duties of Indians and concerning the legislative changes of the Indian government for the improvement of the *shūdras* ' condition. Ambedkar's works on the Dalit Life-World - *The Caste in India, Who Were Shudras?, The Untouchables - Who Were They? Annihilation of Caste, The Freedom of the Untouchables and Gandhi*, etc. - had a tremendous impact on politicians' and reformers' mind in India. These works are not only some of the best analyses of the Dalit community and of the Dalit consciousness but also rip open what their author called the 'hypocrisy' of the Hindu leaders' pretended concern for the welfare of the untouchables. Ambedkar had something vituperative to write against what he thought was Gandhi's adherence to the tenets of Hinduism stated by the *shāstras*, the source-books of Hinduism. Ambedkar writes :⁶

All that Gandhism has done is to find a philosophic justification for Hinduism and its dogmas. Hinduism is bald in the sense that it is just a set of rules which bear on their face the appearance of a crude and cruel system. Gandhism supplies the philosophy which smoothens its surface and gives it the appearance of decency and respectability and so alters it and embellishes it as to make it even attractive.

Indeed, Gandhi and Gandhians were quick to argue that what Ambedkar was talking about was the early adherence of Gandhism to Hindu *dharma* and that Gandhism later on had come to see the necessity of re-defining this *dharma* in recognition of the misery of the untouchables. Ambedkar reacted to this aggressively thus :⁷

There is new Gandhism, Gandhism without caste. This has reference to the recent statement of Mr. Gandhi that caste is an anachronism. Reformers were gladdened by this declaration of Mr. Gandhi. And who would not be glad to see that a man like Gandhi having such terrible influence over the Hindus, after having played the most mischievous part of a social reactionary, after having stood out as the protagonist of the caste system, after having beguiled and befooled the unthinking Hindus with arguments which made no distinction between what is fair and foul

should have come out with this recantation? ... (But) does it change the nature of Gandhism? ... Those who are carried away by this recantation of Mr. Gandhi, forget two things. In the first place, all that Mr. Gandhi has said is that caste is an anachronism. He does not say it is an evil. He does not say it is anathema ... Mr. Gandhi does not say that he is against the *varṇa* system. And what is Mr. Gandhi's *varṇa* system? It is simply a new name for the caste system and retains all the worst features of the caste system.

The main strength of Ambedkar's reasoning on the miserable condition of *shūdras* must be attributed to the fact that as a child in the *mahār* family he had had a Life-World which he had *felt* directly. He was the fourteenth child of his parents and had grown up in a village where the status of his family and society could not bear any recognition from any peers. His faith in parliamentary democracy, like that of the American Black leader, Martin Luther King, was absolute. The peculiar Life-World that had bound him to his depressed inmates would not enable him to respect the view the non-*shūdra* leaders of the Indian society had about the fate of the depressed. The peculiar characteristic of the Life-World of an individual or of a community is that it is, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty points out, the 'pre-objective world' and bestows on the objective world affective and interest-dominated meanings. The affective and interest-dominated meanings are responsible for the dynamics which one's reflection on and verbalization of the objective world, i.e., the world *there* for everybody to read, incorporate. As it was already shown, the notion of Life-World refers to one's commonsense, everyday life, directly and immediately encountered by one; what one is familiar with by one's natural operation in the mundane world, what is intertwined with one's beliefs and interests and feelings; what one discovers in one's pre-scientific and pre-theoretical dialogue with the physical and human culture one is thrown into.

Ambedkar and hundreds of thousands of the members of his caste and other castes (the governmental name for all these castes of the untouchables has been 'Scheduled Castes') shared a Life-World which non-*shūdra* observers could look at only from a distance. Thus, in his time Ambedkar was the only erudite and westernized Dalit who could know what it was like to be a Dalit, a *shūdra*, an untouchable.

The indignation that Ambedkar developed toward the entire Hindu community and its Hindu religion or *dharma* had to end up with his renunciation of the very religion he was born into and with his decision to embrace Buddhism. In *Mukti kon pathe?* he had asked :⁸

Why should you remain in a religion that does not let you get water to drink?
 Why should you remain in a religion that does not let you become educated? Why
 should you remain in a religion that bars you from good jobs? Why should you
 remain in a religion that dishonours you at every step?

There has not been in the whole history of Hindu culture an event so tremor-like as one which Ambedkar produced when in 1956 he formally announced his entry into Buddhism. And over the next few years he was followed by over four million members of the scheduled castes who formally accepted Buddhism as their faith. Ambedkar had visited several Buddhist countries and observed the social structure there before he embarked upon this decision. What he found extremely striking about the Buddhist states is their egalitarian functioning in all important domains of social life. He was full of praise for this functioning and wrote profusely about it. This was the point when because of his impetus the Republican Party was born and the Dalit Panther Movement, similar to the American Black Panther Movement, came into existence.

To Ambedkar's perception, the community identified now (with the mass conversion of the untouchables into Buddhists) as Nava-Buddha (New Buddhists) is a conglomerate of a large number of tribes, aboriginals, castes, all of which groups are covered by the title "Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes." There is something unique about the social condition of these people which is comparable to primarily the life of the black in Africa. Viredu, in his scholarly study⁹ of African culture, points out that the unique practices, assumptions, beliefs, and aspirations present in the life of Africans have constituted some sort of raw material for the sociological study in the West. These practices, beliefs, assumptions, and aspirations might in their archaic state seem to be the primitive religion and mythology of Africa. But there is no doubt that even if they are taken as the religious-mythological sediments of Africans, as the primordial, here given constituents of their Life-World, they mirror the direct experiences of the entire black community of a Continent who for a long

time were supposed to have theoretical paradigm of their own. The whole oral tradition of the African people reflects their Life-World, however out-of-the-way the concepts and beliefs in this tradition may appear to a Western observer. One has to grant that the Life-World of the African people, like the Life-World of the Nava-Buddha in India, manifests their casteist, tribal, aboriginal mythologies, subterranean layers of their feeling of nature, destiny and God, and their most spontaneous psycho-physical habits.

Dialogues with spirits, i.e., those invisible agencies which are supposed to determine the good and the evil in human life, are central to the day-to-day behavior of Africans, just as they are central to the rural life of Indian tribes. There are unsophisticated ways by which certain chosen members of these African and Indian folks are able to enter into a communion with these spirits. Every single item which these few members wear on their bodies while performing sacrifice or while appealing to gods and goddesses can be a subject for interpretation - it conceals meanings of which the performers may not be aware but which may form the subject of hermeneutics. Unusually intricate and winding rituals that may seem to be unlikely to produce any results constitute an essential part of the religion cultural Life-World of these folks.

There are two kinds of investigation (both of them eminently hermeneutical) a reflective thinker or a theoretician will have to conduct in order to understand a totally alien culture : one must try to bring forth the meanings of the beliefs, rituals, myths, symbols, images, and constructs lying concealed in that culture or in the behavior of the people who belong to it; and one must see how all these were used by these people to meet the problems of their everyday life. These investigations happen to objectify the Life-World of the people of the alien culture. Such an objectification occurred when the non-*shūdra* observers studied the Life-World of the *shūdras*, who by their very life-style were alien to them, and the white writers analysed the Life-World of the black, whose feeling of "being black" the white writers could not get into. A hermeneutical study of any cultural group would consist of a phenomenological search directed toward the subterranean, the pre-reflective, and the pre-linguistic experience-tiers that group has accumulated in the course of its being *in* and *with* the world and with its social culture. A hermeneutic study of the

Life-World of the African or Indian folks has to construct, deconstruct, and again construct what is uttered by their spokesmen. The oral tradition of Africa reflects the African experiences of living in the world socially and technologically shaped by the white, just as the similar tradition of the Indian folks can be seen to manifest their elan to live in the face of unfavorable circumstances the world might produce for them. However, Ambedkar and the Dalit writers (some contemporary ones among whom will be referred to later) and the black writers, like Appiah, Paulin Hountondji, Martin Luther King, Kwasi Wiredu, *lived* the situation of the untouchables and the whites' gaze-at-the-black respectively in which they were born and grew up. Therefore the urge with which they describe, without any theorization about it, how they *lived* has something first-hand, subjective, authentic, inwardly felt, behind it.

Kwasi Wiredu, the author of the highly insightful paper entitled "How Not To Compare African Thought With Western Thought"¹⁰ says very aptly that if we wish to look for the spirit of African literature we must not approach it from the critical vantage-point having its roots in the European culture, that is, the culture which enslaved Africans. We could remark, by adopting the same wave-length, that if we wish to look for an authentic narration of the Life-World of Dalits we must not approach it from the vantage-point of the non-Dalit writers, that is, the writers from the community which has enslaved Dalits from the dawn of India's history and has been responsible for their condition of deprivation of basic human rights and for their suffering. Wiredu aims at a certain kind of African-Universal, or Ghanaian-Global synthesis of understanding in which what he would be doing as an African is an interpretive study of the cultural space in which his people live, and simultaneously would try to locate this study of his in the domain of more expansive universal or universalist philosophy. This task, which he surely realized as any phenomenologist-hermeneutician would realize, is difficult since the typical African facts of life may be so deeply interred in the African soil and African ethos that the moment one begins to translate them into a universal theoretical idiom their pre-thematic meanings would be obviously distorted. Widely read Marathi works of contemporary Dalit writers,¹¹ such as Daya Pawar, Laxman Mane, Raja Dhale, Sada Karhade, have one thing in common: they share the same Life-World, the same Marathi language in which they have portrayed this Life-World and which is not as refined and elegant as the language of *brahmana* writers. The condition of misery and social marginalization

they have portrayed in their writings has been their day-to-day experience, and there is at times an overt and at times a hidden spite in their writings directed toward the non-Dalits and particularly toward *brāhmaṇas*.

As a matter of fact, it has been repeatedly said by Dalit writers that it is only they who can understand the inner self of the Dalit community and that it is only they who can transmit the real condition of that community. Dalits have extensively written in Marathi and been bold to violate the norms of the so-called decency and aesthetic quality in that language : they have used occasionally foul expression to condemn those in power - landlords, non-Dalit bureaucrats, *rājās* (kings), vassals. Since Ambedkar's time Dalits' writings have emerged from their life-experience¹² which they have felt and appropriated and this fact explains why they have taken extraordinary liberty with the idiom.

The peculiar nature of the "lived time" has been recently recognized as giving rise to a form of language to which the set rules of language are not applicable. The notion of lived time is so finely blended with the individual psyche, with the subjectivity of the individual, that any attempt toward its objectification is bound to elicit an impersonal, measurable, and empirically analysable temporality. The situation of servitude, socially sanctioned exploitation, powerlessness, violence, and the rejection from the Hindu social ethos to which Dalits have been exposed would remind one of the lived time of women through history. As Simone de Beauvoir, the famous French existentialist feminist pointed out, the lack of freedom which women all over the world experience is uniquely *felt* by them and not so much felt by men. "What sort of transcendence could a women shut up in a harem achieve?," she asked, surely with a view to emphasizing that the authenticity with which the female Life-World is experienced by a woman is not accessible to a man.¹³ Actually the cultural imperialism of the male which feminists talk about is connected with the women's lived time: women's lived time is merely objectified by male writers, just as the non-Dalit writers' portrayal of the Dalits' life-experience could not transmit the intentionality of the Dalit writers' portrayal of their own community's life-experience. The spirit of the lived time entails the fact that an individual's psycho-physical being is so deeply colored by it that it endows upon that individual an identity ir-replaceable by an factor outside his or her being.

The lived time and the lived space form the integral structure of our experience in the world.¹⁴ Just as 'before,' 'now' and 'after' constitute the parameters within which our subjectivity moves, here, there, above, below, far, near, etc., are the spatial references which make sense when taken in relation to the point one occupies. Time and space, when regarded objectively, as they are regarded in science, do not legitimately allow designations such as the past, the present, the future, and far, near, above, under, etc., respectively. Indian Dalits' Life-World has always been from the beginning of the history of Hindus, interwoven with their village habitat where the scarcity of drinking water, the ruthless authority of landlords, the illiteracy, absence of medical facilities, and exploitation have been a day in and day out scene. It is a Life-World in which Dalits' lived time and lived space are seen to be united with the self or each one of the individual Dalits, and his or her existence is ontologically bound by them. This does not happen when non-Dalits, however sympathetic their views may be towards the condition of misery in which Dalits live, describe the Dalit condition. The time-space horizons of Dalits have developed an idiom which is not therefore governed by the rules of artfulness, decorum, standardized style of Marathi language, or by a culture whose history is largely dominated by the *brāhmaṇas* in authority. There was a time when Dalits' works, like the black literary works in the West, could not find publishers. The culture of literature, in print largely, was so set and rigid that it was difficult to Dalit writers like Daya Pawar, Laxman Mane, Raja Dhale, Keshav Vishram, and others to penetrate through it and persuade publishers to bring out their prose or poetry.

We have to speak of the history of the Life-World of Dalits in India. It is a history which no individual Dalit could escape, since the whole process of his or her acculturation, in which his or her outlook and language feature prominently, was shaped by it.

What Gadamer very suggestively calls "effective historical consciousness"¹⁵ accounts for the way in which the past history of Dalits influenced every individual Dalit, whether he was aware of it or not. It is this history, to use Gadamer's insights, that generated in the Dalit consciousness certain prejudices (the word "prejudices" is to be taken in a neutral sense, according to Gadamer) that would determine the meaning-seeing activity of that consciousness. The Dalit Life-World could move

only within certain horizons which are definitely open, but not so open that the Dalit Weltanschauung could totally free itself from these horizons. What Gadamer says about the understanding and the interpretation of a text is relevant to the understanding and interpretation of the situation of life one falls into. In the case of both, the horizons impose a limit to the very acts of understanding and interpretation. The Dalits' Life-World is confined to the specific horizons. For understanding and interpreting their place in the Hindu community, i.e., in the history of this community, the Dalits have developed certain prejudices which it would be impossible for them to transcend.

Gadamer, following Heidegger, has pointed out that in our pre-thematic "worlding of the world," reality, language, understanding and history go together. None of these can be separated from the rest. The Dalit consciousness must be taken as synthesizing all these four elements. The horizons of Dalits' language and understanding are governed by the reality and the history which have totally overshadowed them. There is thus a complete fusion of Dalits' reality, their understanding the meaning of this reality, and their language. However, to any outsider observing the life-experience of Dalits this fusion is to be objectively analysed and not taken as something in toto. The reason for this difference in the outlooks is that while Dalits' understanding of their own history, i.e., the history of their misery, servitude, and helplessness, and their understanding of the reality of their situation emerge from the point of view of their total subjectivity and from their lived time and lived space, the understanding which the upper caste viewers (however seemingly sympathetic these viewers may be) of their fate could claim is from a position "outside" the Dalit historicity and the Dalit reality. There have been umpteen socio-political reformers in Maharashtra and other states of India who wrote extensively, denouncing the treatment met by Dalits from the hands of *brāhmaṇas* and other privileged classes. But, to use the Gadamerian paradigm again, none of the denouncing works they printed could have horizons overlapping the horizons in the language of Dalit writers, particularly in the language of their first and finest leaders : first, the 19th century Marathi reformer and rebel writer, Mahatma Jyotiba Phule, second, the highly intellectual statesman and revolutionary, Dr. Babasahed Ambedkar, and third, Periyar. Periyar, unlike Phule and Ambedkar, had travelled all over India in the guise of a religious mendicant, witnessed the exploitation of the Dalit masses by *brāhmaṇas*, and declared that casteism and *brāhmaṇism* are one and the same thing. Periyar

condemned *brāhmaṇas* for introducing in India a social system divided into Aryans and non-Aryans (the latter term, he said, comprehends *Shūdras* and Dravidians). Periyar, like Phule and Ambedkar, stood for a cultural revolution that could establish a just Indian society, although nothing much is mentioned about his involvement in essentially an ethical fight against the injustice meted out by *Shūdras* at all levels in the Indian social life.

Mulk Raj Anand, one of the well-known Indian novelists of our time, puts the following pithy utterance of self-condemnation in the mouth of the main Dalit character, Bakha, in his novel *Untouchables*. When Bakha's father Lakha tries to make his son aware of the social reality of his time, Bakha says :¹⁶

But they think we are mere dirt, because we clean their dirt.

And Mulk Raj Anand adds :¹⁷

He (Lakha) never throughout his narrative renounced his deep-rooted sense of inferiority and the docile acceptance of the law of fate.

The belief in the law of fate (or, what the Hindu tradition named as the law of *karma*) was deeply ingrained in the Dalit consciousness. Phule, Ambedkar and Periyar had to fight against this belief and impress upon the Dalit psyche that it is by action that they could bring about a change in the entire social structure in India. Ambedkar was a scientific rationalist, totally committed to parliamentary democracy and, as a wizard of the British law and as one absolutely dedicated to the political and social liberation, shunned fatalism. The principal task before Phule and Ambedkar was to educate Dalits to be individuals of self-respect, independence and self-realization. Phule¹⁸ trusted that in modern India there would be the dawn of a 'new age for the common man,' for the downtrodden, for the underdog. He was remarkably convinced that such an age would bring about to everyone dignity, human rights, and would spread the culture of religious tolerance. Indeed, Phule's attack on *brāhmaṇism* which, according to him, was mainly responsible for the suffering of the untouchables, was verbal. Behind this attack there was the pathos of his and his inmates of being born as *shūdras*. What cannot be connived at is the phenomenon

that *shūdras* ' indignation toward their condition could not make them angry and make them rebel against the agencies responsible for their condition but invariably made them allude to their "*daiva*" or "*prārabdha*" as something which they had no guts to question. Ambedkar, himself an extraordinarily suave and democratic fighter, could not jump into Marxist ideology, but instead sought solace in Buddhism. Indeed, he was not prepared to follow Buddhism as the traditional adherents to it followed it. One would wonder why Ambedkar could not succumb to communism or socialism and seek an economic solution to the suffering of the millions who followed him. When he made up his mind to embrace Buddhism by abandoning Hinduism, he was true to his original dictum "I shall not die a Hindu." He advised his followers not to worship Hindu deities, and to be dependent on solely themselves. The mental stress which Ambedkar was having at this stage could be gauged by the representatives of several other religions in India - particularly of Islam, Christianity and Sikhism - why were ever ready to receive him into their own fold. But his faith in the Buddhist *dhamma* was unfaltering.

Ambedkar was not a philosopher. But as an activist his single vision was to create a society in India in which freedom from social and economic injustice was the ethics for all times. As one who got the inspiration for his total cultural revolution from Phule, he was convinced that Indian society cannot continue to exist unless it got rid of the caste system, which for him was the greatest evil that threatened the very foundation of India as a nation. The transformation of the Dalit mind, its awakening and education, its preparedness for the confrontation with the bitter reality of the *brāhmaṇas* ' chronic hatred toward the *shūdra* community, were the preoccupation of several *brāhmaṇa* reformers of his time. Vishnushāstri Chiplunkar, Gopal Agarkar, Krishnaji Keshav Damle, Hari Narayan Apte and Shivram Mahadev Paranjape were busy doing radical work, through their writings and speeches, to change the *brāhmaṇas* ' outlook toward the downtrodden - Dalits and women. Although they wrote and spoke in Marathi, their word could reach the whole of the Indian populace. Dalits and women (the latter were described by some of them as "the poor dumb animals") became aware by their electrifying writings on the atrocities committed against them by the orthodox *brāhmaṇas*.

The most admirable feature of Ambedkar's style of thinking was that he had

a consistently strong commitment to fundamental ethical values and principles, such as freedom, justice, equality, and compassion for the underdog. These values and principles which provided planks to his socio-politico-cultural reforms had been digested by him while he lived and studied in England. No force in British India and no amount of economic and social suffering he witnessed among his Dalit fellowmen could push him close to the Marxist ideology. What he was convinced of was a peaceful revolution among the untouchables. His interpretation of the Buddhist ethics, which was for him the ethics for the world, is worth to be looked into.

Perhaps the most incisive ethico-religious book Ambedkar began to write but could not finish before he died is *Buddha and His Dhamma*. The book was posthumously published in 1957. In this book Ambedkar restructures some of the key concepts in Buddhism : the central soteriological term *nirvāṇa* , and the terms *prajñā* (transcendental knowledge), *karuṇā* (compassion), and *Bodhisattva*. Ambedkar repudiated the Buddhistic ethics of the withdrawal from the worldly affairs and release from *samsāra* (the worldly situation). For Ambedkar, the soteriological ideal which Buddhism consistently emphasized must be taken as a social and political ideal, i.e., the ideal of salvation which is to be gained as a result of the fulfilment of the values of social justice and social equality and not as a result of the ascetic way of life for the attainment of enlightenment. Ambedkar was a rationalist and could not move away from the material values dominated by equality, fraternity and liberty. he therefore defined *Prajñā* and *karuṇā* as the habit to adhere to rational thinking and to love one's fellowmen with the intent to emancipate them from the tangles of the caste-ridden society respectively. He could not, because of his down-to-earth collective interests, laud the *Bhikshu* way of self-denial but looked upon this way as a means which the reformers of the society should adopt for achieving its betterment. The traditional version of salvation (*nirvāṇa*) as the extinction of one's urge to live could not arouse his sympathy.

In one of the hermeneutically significant pictures of Ambedkar displayed by Dalits in their homes and workplaces, he is shown as wearing a flashy blue business suit, heavy-rimmed glasses covering his eyes, and holding a large book in his hand. This picture is in contrast with the picture of Buddha, sitting crosslegged, journeying across deep meditation under the *bodhi* tree, and experiencing enlightenment. Tartakov

interprets the contrast between two pictures as suggesting that the transcendental flight of the Buddha did not impress Ambedkar at all. On the other hand, what he wanted to assert was the material value, i.e., the improvement of people's state of living in the world; the book he has held symbolizes not only the need for education but also the Constitution of India which he framed and which had the foundation of the values of egalitarianism, democratic freedom and social justice. As regards the highest ideal of *Bodhisattva*, Ambedkar defined it as the most enlightened one whose attainment subordinates one's own personal liberation to the quest for democratic freedom for the realization of human rights and justice for the oppressed community. A *Bodhisattva* has to fight against the condition of injustice and against the violation of human rights.

Times have changed and with the change of times the Dalit Life-World has undergone drastic transformation. Since the independence of India five decades ago, the implementation of the major laws in the constitution of India, which Ambedkar authored with extraordinary insights, has changed the face of Dalit community all over India. Although the community still remains poor, illiterate, and oppressed in rural India, the degree of injustice that had once upon a time been legitimised and accepted by the society as the state of affairs fitting into the Indian tradition is far less today. There is a very visible awakening on the part of *brāhmaṇas* and bureaucrats in every organ of the society that Dalits and women are in no way unequal to the members of the rest of the society and that for the total development of the Indian nation, and for what Sartre calls the "integral humanity", concrete freedom of every individual, i.e., the value which is basic to the existence and self-promotion of every individual, is a prerequisite. And yet the fact does remain that there is still a casteist and sectarian attitude among a large number of members of the chauvinist groups who arouse disgust in those who clamour for egalitarianism. There are incidents, however sporadic they may be in their appearance, which warrant on the part of the reflective observers a doubt regarding whether by mere legislation and ethical education the integration of the Indian community would take place. The Times of India²⁰ recently flashed the following news :

A judicial officer belonging to a scheduled caste has knocked at the supreme court's door for justice. He is aggrieved by the Uttar Pradesh government's order

for compulsorily retiring him on a spate of charges pressed in the aftermath of a bizarre incident in which the entire courtroom and its furniture he once used were reportedly washed with 'Gaṅgā jal' by his so-called upper caste successor. ... Newspaper reports.... said that (the upper caste successor) had got the entire chamber and its furniture washed with 'Gaṅgā jal' because it was previously occupied by a judicial officer belonging to a scheduled caste.

This paper was presented and discussed at the Afro-Asian Philosophy Association Conference in New Delhi some time ago.

Notes and References

1. The biblical root of the term "Dalit" is *dall*. *Dall* means to be weak, to hang down, to be meek or low or feeble or languid. The word *dall* describes the state of certain groups of people, "the poorest people of the land." As Elsa Tames, a liberation theologian, points out, the word *dall* was originally used in two senses : physically weak and occupying an insignificant position in society. (See Massey, James : *Towards Dalit Hermeneutics : Re-reading the Text, the History and the Literature*, ISPCK, Delhi, 1994, pp. 3-4.) In its current sense, however, the concept of Dalit comes down from the writings of two great Indian personalities, the 19th century Marathi reformer Mahatma Jyotiba Phule, and Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar, the greatest architect of the Dalit Movement.
2. It is Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar who asserted in his *Who Were The Shūdras?* (1947) and *The Untouchables* (1948) that Dalits are Aryans and that there is no racial difference between the Hindus and the untouchables (the Dalits).
3. Appiah, Kwame Anthony : *In My Father's House : Africa In The Philosophy of Culture*, London, 1992, p. 116.
4. Radhakrishnan, S. : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Oxford, 1997, pp. 111-112.
5. See *Bhagavadgītā*, IV, 13. Krishna tells Arjuna that He alone is the creator of four *varṇas*.

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- A circular stamp with a thick black border. Inside the border, the word "WYOMING" is at the top. Below it, the words "LIBERATION?" and "BOMB" are written in a stylized font. At the bottom, the word "DATE" is followed by a small star symbol.

Dialectic, trans. J. Bien, Evanston, 1973, p.198.

15. Gadamer, H.-G. : *Truth and Method*, 2nd Ed., trans. by J. Weinscheimer and D. Marshall, New York, 1989, pp. 34 ff. See also Warnke, G. : Gadamer : *Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason*, Stanford, 1987, pp. 112 ff.
16. Anand, Mulk Raj : *Untouchable* (a novel), Reprinted, Bangalore, 1981, p. 39.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
18. Keer, Dhananjay : *Mahatma Jotirao Phule*, Bombay, 1964, pp. 54 ff.
19. Tartakov, G.M., "Art and Identity : The Rise of New Buddhist Imagery" in *Art Journal*, Winter Issue, 1990, pp. 409-16.
20. *The Times of India*, Bombay, August 6, 2000, p. 8.

PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY

KANCHAN MAHADEVAN

“...One cannot conceive of objectivity without subjectivity. Neither can exist without the other, nor can they be dichotomized.”

- Freire, 1971, 27.

The National Policy on Education wishes to infuse students with a sense of values, in the light of its, “...growing concern over the erosion of essential values and an increasing cynicism in society has brought into focus the need for readjustments in the curriculum in order to make education a forceful tool for the cultivation of social and moral values (1986,21).” Interestingly alongside its concern for value-orientation, the Policy is also committed to a value-neutral notion of science and technology whose growth it wishes to expand as well (16-17). The proposal for value-education comes at the time of a crisis in education spiraled off by an increasing emphasis on objective facts, whose selection is often arbitrary and relevance ambiguous. Such a situation cannot be resolved by quick bandage solutions of transmitting more information, but this time on “universal and eternal values ...based on our heritage, national goals and universal perceptions”(21) ! The loss of values reflects a larger problem of the weakening of democracy where education with its stress on information promotes elitism through specialists¹, and subservience through the teacher’s inert deposition of information in the student. In India, traditional models of education based on personal development and wisdom have been replaced by specialization oriented towards an employment market, despite which there are increasing numbers of educated unemployed persons and impoverished illiterate persons. This problem will only aggravate by selectively delinking degrees from jobs as the Policy proposes (16), as the latter would only escalate the “practical” mind-set.² The deterioration of reflection emanates from the secondary status accorded to the humanities, which problematize human experience rather than objective facts. Although the Policy is not oblivious to the existence of humanities, it does not utilize them for analyzing or resolving the problems facing education. This paper wishes to explore the challenges facing the educational system consisting of specialists, their relation to the larger public and the spirit of democracy. In this

endeavour, it engages in a philosophical investigation of objective facts and their relation to society, while examining the Platonic question of whether values can be taught. The Policy document would quite confidently answer this question in the affirmative, as the teaching of virtue is seen as an integral aspect of education. But this self assurance has a hollow ring in virtue of its connection with the view that education is the transmission of knowledge.³ The paper has chosen three thinkers who have critiqued the information paradigm as reference points, namely, Michel Foucault, Paulo Freire and Jurgen Habermas.

The first part of the paper spells out the logic and the problems of value-neutral instruction, the thrust of the current educational system and evaluates Foucault's attempt to resolve it in an aesthetic way. It proceeds to explore the model of conscientization propounded by Freire, and finally interrogates Habermas's linguistic contribution. Each section is an on-going search for an alternative to the information paradigm, to connect education with democratic aspirations such as freedom and equality .

I

Foucault's Aesthetic Refusal of the Banking Approach

The standard understanding of the pedagogical relation between teacher and student is one of an all-knowing subject and an ignorant object. The former stores information about an inert, compartmentalized and predictable world in the recipient or student, who memorizes the contents by mentally recording them. Freire terms this one way relationship as the banking paradigm (1972, 45-54). The teacher alone is the subject who begins at the cognitive level at the laboratory or library and narrates this knowledge to the students in the classroom. Numerous insulated fields of specialization at schools and universities in recent times have especially dramatized such a unilateral approach to education.

The obvious problems with this model are those of authoritarianism and alienation. If the teacher alone is an active epistemological agent, the knowledge transmitted to students has no transforming effect on them and thereby alienates them. Moreover, the teacher is also alienated since she or he does not reflect on the

implications of selecting specific items of knowledge. The teacher's indifference to or partisanship with the knowledge handed over emerges from assuming the burden of being a guardian of eternal truth. Thus, a situation of wholesale reification persists.

The pedagogical predicament is not permanent, since the educational system has historically evolved and changed through its links with other social structures. The traditional model of education in Europe and India was directed towards individuals acquiring wisdom for self-development. Philosophy, which was not separated from sciences and humanities, had the privileged task of imparting eternal knowledge. With the advent of the modern era in Europe, the ties between industry, politics and education displaced the traditional pedagogical model. The university subsequently became a site for specialists who transmitted market related skills. In the nineteenth century, specialists in India became prominent when the British colonial power introduced education in bureaucratic skills for reducing administrative expenses a pattern which persists in the current trend of brain-drain. As Foucault perceptively observes, the specialized teacher who has information at his or her disposal has replaced the universal intellectual (1980a, 128-30). The former serves the powers of the state and economy by articulating, hierarchizing and circulating selective knowledge, and thus has power to benefit life or destroy it. This makes the contemporary teacher, a "strategist of life and death", rather than a "rhapsodist of the eternal" (129, 128-30), unlike the universal intellectual. Nostalgia for the universal intellectual who is the sovereign guardian of eternal truth cannot as Foucault has argued resolve the crisis in education (130), since current historical practices play a role in the crisis. Metaphysical points of reference to eternal truths cannot effectively arbitrate the conflicts between specialized skills and loss of values prevailing in the current curriculum. Nor can they question the confinement of the benefits of specialization to elites, both urban and rural. The figure of the universal intellectual only reinforces the quandaries of foundationalism, since the authority of the teacher and the information cannot be effectively justified. The universal intellectual also debilitates the much-needed critical thinking in the present educational system.

Foucault mounts a powerful challenge to the banking approach by linking knowledge with power. According to him knowledge is not a value-neutral given, but is instead a construct, an effect of power and so is the subject who pursues it.

Foucault critiques both knowledge and subjectivity taking into account the role of historical, institutional and political forces in their constitution. This critique can help one comprehend the educational institution with its proliferation of information and subjectivity as a site where power sets into motion a play of forces. Foucault's perceptions in this regard could also help acknowledge that the canon is not inviolable, but a product of numerous historical political forces and can therefore be reformulated (Giroux, 691).

Foucault understands the term subject in two ways : in the sense of being subject to another's control and in the sense of being bound to one's own conscience. In both senses there is a power that produces subjects (1982, 212). The standard perspective on power sees it negatively, as a form of control that executes the intentions of a pre-given subject. Foucault rejects this approach because it is premised upon a central sovereign subject of thought which is outside of history (1982, 219). His own nonmetaphysical approach externalizes power by jettisoning the subject as a corporeal network of practices and relations (Megill, 249). Power is the operation of political technology throughout the social body (Foucault, 1982, 185). The notion of political technology is a continuous ordering of efficient calculation, formalization, organization, regimentation, surveillance, all of which, produce hierarchical relations (1979, 184). Institutions and knowledge cannot be reduced to power, yet they are intelligible only to the extent of being interlocked with it. Power with its complex, polymorphous character is productive, in that it effects relationships, such as the subject/object or teacher / student, through its localization in institutions and knowledge. Thus, on the Foucauldian view, human subjects are not points of application of power but are products of power, which in turn they circulate (1977, 130). As Foucault puts it, "... the subject is stripped of its creative role and analysed as a complex and variable function of discourse" (138).⁴ Power is the general matrix of force relations at any given time, in any given society (1982, 186). Moreover, productive power is not unidirectional in the sense of operating from top to bottom, as domination operates. Rather it is multidirectional where the lower rungs of the hierarchy can also influence it. As Foucault puts it, power is not "a group of institutions ... a mode of subjugation ... a general system of domination exerted by one group over another", rather it is a "...multiplicity of force relations..." (1980c, 93). Those who exercise power and those who are subjugated to it are both actively caught up in it (1977, 156).

Foucault delivers the subject and knowledge from atomicity and eternity to an engagement with the world. In this context, the educational system can be understood as a field of power wherein the teacher, student and the knowledge they study are constructed through a network of relations, though not in a uniform fashion. The teacher is produced along active lines as a cognitive subject, while the student is constructed as a docile body that receives knowledge. The teacher also receives information that is circulated as knowledge from institutions of research, which in turn are located within numerous political domains and so forth. The calculating knower and the passive recipient are poles of bio-power enclosed in a space governed by the logic of efficiency. Knowledge is thus, thoroughly corrupted by power. As an object of consumption and diffusion, it is an ongoing struggle between hegemonic forces espousing information and the forces that resist the same. Indeed, Foucault connects the various academic disciplines that search for statistical data of the human species and population with modern administrative politics (1980c, 25, 13-41; 1980b). He observes that the eighteenth century European administration utilized management procedures and analytical discourses to promote life and growth. Thus, population with its quantifiable features like birth / death rates, frequencies of health and illness, patterns of eating etc., replaced people as political problem and an academic discipline. But this type of quantifiable knowledge also finds resistance in the creative disciplines.

Since power plays a crucial role in all dimensions of life, Foucault argues that one cannot oppose the hegemony of quantitative informative sciences by bringing in normative ideals like freedom and equality, since the latter are not devoid of power relations. Foucault claims that he is not looking for an alternative, since his analysis does not uphold all things to be “bad”, but to be “dangerous” (1984, 343). He maintains that path of critiquing dominant forces as ideological cannot be sustained, since all critiques are located within the matrix of power relations and corrupted by the same (1980a, 118); Indeed, one cannot overthrow hegemonic power on a universal scale to restructure society completely as revolutionaries assume, since this strategy often results in violence. Foucault renegotiates the discourse of specialists without abandoning them. Knowledge is a part of the finite world and not the reward of free spirits or solitude (1980a, 131). The specific intellectual, such as teacher or researcher, occupies a class position, inhabits a field of research and

participates in the politics of knowledge, or the mechanisms that sanction the distinction between truth and falsehood. Since there is a circulation of knowledge in education, the specialized information of the academy is not insulated. The prevailing conditions of reification show that there are forces that do have an upper hand in the production and circulation of knowledge. The specific intellectual / teacher does not have the task of liberating the individual from the institutions such as the state, the academy and so forth, for the latter merely maintains a subjectivity produced by power (1982, 216). Rather the task for teachers and students is one of repudiating the structure of subjectivity, such as say the cognitive subject imposed by existing relations of force, by moving towards newer forms of subjectivity. In this the teacher or the intellectual is like any other citizen or student in not evoking or having a privileged access to some normative utopia such as “Justice”, instead, the teacher opposes dominant power through sheer counter-power. Foucault advocates micro-level resistances to power, which appeals to the inherent relation between power and counter-power, since “...where there is power there is resistance ...never in a position of exteriority in relation to power”(1980c, 95-96). Since power operates discontinuously from multiple sources, the points of resistance are also discontinuous and decentralized (94-96). Thus, the resistance to power will have to repudiate the subjectivity imposed by hegemonic power. Foucault calls for an “aesthetics of existence”, involving the reinvention of the self without taking recourse to any universal rules through daily activities (1984, 350). Teachers, students and citizens will have to recreate themselves by experimenting with models that provide alternatives to quantitative information sciences. Since hegemonic power imposes a uniform pattern that thwarts plurality, they would have to pursue alternatives that permit them their differences.

Foucault’s analysis contains many merits in the context of the current educational scenario’s unprecedented emphasis on information. By viewing subjectivity as a construct and a network of innumerable social forces, he is able to comprehend it in nonmetaphysical terms. Foucault’s renunciation of the universal intellectual for the specific intellectual is salutary in that it makes the intellectual a partisan in real struggles with nonintellectuals. Thus, the authority of the teacher does not have premium, since the teacher and the student are located, albeit unequally, within the same field of power. Moreover, by connecting knowledge and power Foucault opens up the space for scrutinizing the role played by social /political forces

outside the academy in delineating what counts as knowledge within it. Yet these insights can be retained only by addressing some of his drawbacks.

Foucault does not make qualitative distinctions within his highly ambiguous notion of power (Megill, 251). Since, the victims and the oppressors both participate in power, Foucault dismisses all normative commitment as foundational. Consequently, it is not clear why one should become a partisan with the victims of power. Foucault is certainly committed to the oppressed in a tacit way, since he discusses the issue of resistance to power, but his commitment does not emerge from the concept of power struggle as such, which is an all embracing phenomenon.⁵

Foucault's recommendation of converting one's life into a work of art through sheer counter-power is not entirely satisfactory. He selects art because it provides a remedy to the efficiency patterns in the banking paradigm by being creative without coming under the control of rules. Art is a case for struggle against what Foucault calls the "government of individualization" (1982,212), it is a struggle to be different. Moreover, he dissociates art from the specialist's shell to put it on par with daily activity (1984,350). Foucault also eschews the conception of art as the discovery of the true self, a position he associates with Sartre, in order to stress on art as the creation of the self (351). All of this is laudable, but the problem is that Foucault does not explore the dimension of tangibility opened up by his aesthetic turn, nor its promises of receptivity. Art shifts focus from conscious cognition to the visible lived body as the domain of experiences, paving the way for socialization and sharing. Focusing on the receptive dimension of art as Kantian aesthetics does, which Foucaults' stress on invention overlooks, can further strengthen this aspect. Kant explores the aspect of art appreciation as consisting in sharing a feeling that is not merely one of pleasure (1989, 157-62). He terms it as *sensus communis*, or common sense, where by the relation between the cognitive faculty and the imaginative one cannot be subsumed under any general, determinate laws in the manner of scientific experiences. Indeed, if this were the case art would be a mere logical formula! However, the relation between understanding and imagination is not unruly either, since this would make art incoherent; this relation produces a feeling that can be shared because it does not refer to some private feeling of pleasure.⁶ Such a concept of receptivity is significant from the pedagogical point of view, as it moves beyond

solipsism and autocracy that underlie the current crisis in education. However, a preoccupation with producing or inventing art, has the danger of reintroducing the very subject centeredness which Foucault denounces (Wolin, 191-93). Moreover art as difference cannot constitute a buffer against authoritarianism, after all difference too can be caught with the vortex of hierarchical power.

Finally, if power and counter-power are caught up with one another in an inexorable way, then the latter becomes a merely reactive force that cannot achieve much in terms of changing power relations. Foucault in fact localizes this struggle by saying that one looks for one's "immediate enemy" rather than any "chief enemy" (1982,211). Counter-power presupposes hegemonic power, and by emphasizing it one would be enhancing hegemonic power since it needs counter power to sustain itself. Foucault distinguishes three forms of struggle : against forms of control (such as a racial or religious one), against economic exploitation, against subjectivity (212). He contends that though the three could be intertwined, one could identify each form as dominant during given epochs. Thus, the first form of struggle was predominant in the feudal times, while the nineteenth century was characterized by a struggle against economic exploitation. The late twentieth century, according to Foucault, witnesses a struggle against submission to administered subjectivity in which counter power plays a prime role. Foucault's distinction seems to be over compartmentalized because the struggle over subjectivity cannot be separated from the struggle against exploitation and domination. The information-model with its mode of subjectivity is linked with economic control of powerful European and North-American corporations and their domination. If the cumulative force of all three struggles is not taken into account reactive localized subjective struggles can become quite ineffective. Consider the major pedagogical alternatives in recent years to the Eurocentric information oriented paradigm, namely that of multiculturalism and indigenism, which do indeed focus on experiences that are nonquantitative and nonimperialistic. As reactions to the mainstream stress on science/technology in education these alternatives are very much ensconced in the arena of organization and efficiency, and consequently conceal privilege. For example mainstream Indian literature and philosophy can be studied under multiculturalism in total oblivion to dalit, tribal and working class cultures. After all, powerful forces of western imperialism often operative at the site of science and technology have shaped the multicultural/oriental

subject, as Edward said observes (1978). It is precisely due to this that both multiculturalism and indigenous approaches to pedagogy have not managed to transform the existing efficiency oriented technological and management disciplines.⁷ Thus, the hegemonic forces can mediate and co-opt the forces of resistance even at a micro level, so that despite refusing administrative subjectivity, the subject of counter-power remains implicated in it as a reactive force. Foucault seems to assume that the local level of struggle is far more effective than the larger level (1982, 212). Yet the banking paradigm cannot be sporadically tackled in individual class rooms alone since the isolated instances cannot bring about change.⁸ Moreover, considering the various forces at work in information and knowledge one cannot confine oneself to the immediate level exclusively unless one assumes as positivists do that the various facets of human life are cut off from one another! If the purpose of engaging in struggle is to alter relations, as Rabinow argues on behalf of Foucault (1982, 6), counter power will have to be more than mere reaction.

One needs to retain Foucault's insight regarding the historical, character of knowledge his dynamic notion of power and yet effect a normative change in the banking paradigm. The following section turns to Freire's ventures in this direction.

II

Freire's Conscientization of Pedagogy

According to Freire, the banking model of education is manipulative and divisionary, producing ruptures in human interrelations, since each person is against all others in an alienated pedagogical situation. Freire analyses the latter to be a limit situation as made up of dominating and dominated groups, where human subjects have been reduced to objects (1972, 35-36). He points out that this limit situation has to be confronted to move towards what lies beyond it so that education can pursue its task of "converting" human beings from subjugated persons into free beings (25, 37) to help them regain their humanity. For this the teacher cannot foist information on students, but will have to participate with the students in comprehending its relevance and critiquing the forces that influence it. Thus, a pedagogy, which is actively forged "with" and not merely "for" the oppressed, is required (25).

In order to accomplish this task education would have to comprehend the causes of oppression to pave the way for a new situation sans domination.⁹ In this context, causal explanation does not discover invariant external relations between events to predict their future course, or what Hegel calls the causality of nature. This type of causal explanation only exacerbates technical control, which constitutes the interest underlying information. Alternatively causal explanation can also probe into the internal relation between prevailing facts and the forces that underlie them to reflect upon them and effect a change. Such a “causality of fate” is not so much about predicting uniformities but is about restructuring relations to remove the dominating causal factors that produce them. A reformed pedagogy of the type envisaged by Freire would be concerned with the latter type of causation since it does not see events as inexorably related the way the information model does.¹⁰

Freire’s alternative approach to education replaces the discredited dissemination model with a dialogical paradigm that permits both critical thinking and transformatory praxis (41). In the latter, a teacher-student meets a student-teacher in a concrete historical context to cooperatively interrogate the subject matter that is being studied and an investigation into its relation with domination (Freire, 135). As active subjects, the teacher and the student have a reciprocal relation of cooperatively engaging in critical and liberating dialogue (41). Dialogue is not mere sloganeering verbalism, nor is it blind activity, but encourages critique to promote action or “praxis” that initiates change. By presupposing love, humility, faith and hope, dialogue aims at producing trust with a normative commitment to freedom (62-65). All of which enable the subjects of dialogue to put aside their own egos and the urge to dominate, to listen to one another in an unbiased fashion.

Freire improves over Foucault’s aestheticism with his emphasis on dialogue, solidarity and normativity. By making dialogue the central feature of education he introduces the much needed receptivity which enables human beings to transcend the narrow domains of their own subjectivity. Freire also recognizes that education cannot be a purely local phenomenon, since it is conditioned by a larger context, and does not effect a change in the basic relations of established forces à la Foucault. Against this, Freire urges that the situation of subjugation be transformed, since education is the practice of freedom. His causal analysis aims at interrogating the

correlation between information and technical control and thus connects democratization with education.

However, Freire's recommendations are not without certain drawbacks which have to be addressed only in order to achieve his own ideal of liberating pedagogy. Freire maintains that freedom is not a gift (24), but is a form of activity, a painful process of creating a new form of life (25). Thus, human beings transform the world by naming it and dialogue is an "existential necessity" (61). But, Freire also simultaneously believes that human beings have an inherent essence of consciousness which can be realized through pedagogical activity. Indeed, Freire equates oppression, exemplified in the banking model, with a distortion of "full humanity" (21), hence his own alternative is meant to aid human beings in their "...vocation of becoming fully human" (20-21). Freire subscribes to the view that human beings as essentially conscious and free, this primordial given which is repressed by domination has to be recovered through dialogue. The latter makes conscientization possible, a process of becoming aware of oppression and the need for changing it, in order to connect with their inherently good qualities.¹¹ Freire seems to oscillate between two positions, namely that the self is created and that the self is discovered. The former is implied in seeing freedom as an active and painful process of working out a new model of existence, while the latter is very explicitly found in Freire's belief that humanity's essence is consciousness.

The view that human beings have an essence that has to be actualized is quite antithetical to a pedagogy committed to democracy. The human ability for praxis, according to Freire, is derived from the fundamental character of being conscious. This premise is foundational, in that it serves as the first principle on which Freire's theory rests. Yet this assertion would be difficult to justify considering the violence witnessed in human history, since the problem consists in explaining how primordially altruistic human beings can degenerate into violence, self-interest and so forth. Freire is at the other end of the spectrum from Thomas Hobbes who believes that human beings are inherently selfish (Hobbes has to of course satisfactorily explain how self-interested persons can form a community). Regardless of its content, any premise about fixed human nature defies history and practice. Education with its critical and transformatory role is significant only in the latter

context, since human beings can change only if they do not have a preexisting nature. Human completeness is a metaphysical concept that cannot respond to the questions posed by the worldly crisis in education. Having a conscience that is inherently free does not enable historical subjects to dialogue, since the barriers preventing dialogue are a part and parcel of subjectivity. As Foucault pertinently observes, since human subjectivity is constituted through multiple social forces it is not enough to merely liberate human subjects from these forces. The liberation of subjects demands an interrogation of the forces that construct it to reinvent it in new ways - albeit without the situation of oppression. For this subjectivity cannot be treated as exhaustively found on a metaphysical plane, but instead as constantly in the making.

Moreover, although Freire concedes critical space in the educational system, the terms of criticism, namely freedom and equality are derived from a metaphysical ground namely conscious human nature, which as argued above cannot be justified in a satisfactory manner. Yet if freedom and equality are approached from a worldly point of view there is the danger of their becoming corrupted with power as Foucault has argued. Hence, the moot question is about grounding the terms of one's criticisms without falling into the metaphysical or historicist trap.

The strengths of Foucault and Freire, both of who eschew the "banking model", have to be retained while addressing the crisis in the educational system. Foucault recognizes the role played by power in human life and understands human subjectivity to be a construct. Freire pays heed to the democratization of existing power relations and receptivity, albeit from a quasi-metaphysical point of view. One would have to adhere to a socially constructed subjectivity within hierarchical power relations and yet allow for critique and change without falling into a metaphysical hiatus. The following section investigates the extent to which all of this is permitted by Habermas's account of subjectivity as a product of linguistic discourse and his commitment, like Freire, to critical dialogue in the educational system permit.

III

Pedagogy As Critique

Foucault's aesthetic subject and Freire's conscious subject do not succeed in effectively challenging the "banking model" of education due to their ahistorical status. Habermas alternatively comprehends individuation as a product of a complex, worldly realm of activity that is never fully transparent. Language plays a key role in producing subjects who are both constituted and constituting beings.

Habermas is critical of theories of meaning that stress only on one aspect of validity (1992, 57-87). These include, the representative theory that relates speech act to an objective world, the intentional theory that relates speech act to subjective intention and the use theory that relates speech act to the social world. According to Habermas, the subject simultaneously takes up all three perspectives through a speech act, namely, the objective world, the subjective world and the social world, although only one of these aspects can be emphasized at any given time (75-77). One understands a speech act when one knows what makes it acceptable or valid, the hearer cannot understand the speech act directly through the semantic content, but through the reasons that can be adduced in its favor.¹² The hearer will have to be acquainted with the reasons that the speaker cites in support of the speech act. Speakers, who submit validity claims to hearers, do so only by freeing themselves from a dogmatic commitment to their own conscious representations and intentions, as well as, to the prevailing social conventions. Like Freire, Habermas recommends a dialogical teacher/student and student/teacher relation as an important antidote to the authoritarianism of the banking-model (1987, 371-72).

The agents in dialogue, namely teachers and students, are neither Foucault's subjects inexorably caught in a seamless web of power, nor are they Freire's subjects with an unencumbered essence of consciousness. They are, on one hand, products of society, and yet are not determined by society. Their capacity for creatively utilizing reveals that they do contribute to the making of the world in which they live. Moreover, all agents are not constituted in a uniform way, and their individualization contains aberrations that reflect social inequalities leading to communicative distortions (1987, 370-71). Since teachers and students are uneven products of society, they

would have to work towards self-criticism and social-criticism in attempting dialogue. Education as critical thinking would question the barriers to dialogue, posed by normalization and hierarchy of power relations in knowledge. The domination within an educational system is not the product of the maneuverings of a tyrant, they are decentered where particular interests of dominant class, caste, race groups are imposed in the curriculum. Such a process of critique requires a commitment to freedom and equality. Foucault dismisses freedom as foundational only because he associates it with the consciousness paradigm of subjectivity. Freire's affirmation of freedom introduces the dilemmas of conscious atomized subjects.¹³ If individuation is understood through symbolic reproduction of socialization, then following Habermas freedom can be understood as an excess that inheres in language.¹⁴ According to Habermas, speech acts are possible through logical and pragmatic presuppositions. The former are rules of consistency and identity demanded by a coherent usage of language, while the latter pragmatic presuppositions of equality, freedom and reciprocity have a normative character (1982, 79-81). The critical thinking required of the academy could perhaps take recourse to this implicit "surfeit" which makes it possible for agents to speak in variegated contexts. This is also because any critique that wishes to unmask arbitrary exclusions would require a tacit commitment to egalitarian inclusions. The dialogue situation should be open to all those groups and persons who would be affected by the claims to validity that it raises, whereby they have equal freedom to initiate, debate and evaluate them.

The similarities between Freire and Habermas are quite apparent in that both advocate dialogue as a resolution to autocracy in the academy. But Habermas improves upon Freire in interlocking freedom with the worldly domain of linguistic activity rather than consciousness. Normative commitment need not be essentialist as Foucault fears while ruling out ideology critique. Such a dialogical approach to education can replace the current cosmetic status of humanities, especially philosophy's, in the educational system by giving it a more substantial role in the form of dialogue within the curriculum.

The banking model discussed above leads to the factory system of university education that abdicates the responsibilities of training students in extra-professional abilities, critically transmitting traditions and preparing students for citizenship

(Habermas 1971a, 2-3). To fulfill these functions the humanities require the space to critically examine the foundations of science and technology, the interests they serve, their relation to culture and so forth. Further a neutral stress on information also reifies the spheres of institutions and society. A dialogue between the humanities and technology can help move out of the impasse in the banking-model of education to remedy the split between the humanities and natural sciences. Philosophy can play a central role in this endeavor.

Philosophy as Habermas discerns cannot provide ultimate wisdom to produce distinguished individuals by playing the role of an usher (1996, 240, 249). The foundational role of philosophy has been suspect since its separation from science, religion, tradition and elite activities (1983, 10-14). Habermas argues that this autonomy in a pluralistic, secularized context has enabled philosophy to acquire a critical role. For philosophy is able to realize its own dependence on science and yet question the claims to totality made by science, religion, tradition and metaphysics from the point of view of the ordinary person. In the age of specialization, philosophy has the task of fostering collective debate by critically reflecting on the foundations of specialist disciplines, interpret their relation with society, unmask the forces of domination that are at work in research projects etc. Thus, philosophy can play the role of a “stand-in and interpreter” (Habermas 1996, 248-49), whereby it can cooperate with empirical theories to reconstruct their universal claims in a fallibilistic way. Habermas sees speech act theory from which he derives his views on language as having emerged from such a cooperation with linguistics. There are two major levels at which philosophy can cooperate, that of the specialists of different streams within the institutions, and between the institution and the people who inhabit the many worlds outside it. Both these levels require integration. Habermas aptly observes that an expanding dialogue between the skill of the specialists and the will of the people, would enable the university to think through the ramifications of professional ethics, reflect on cultural tradition without dogma and integrate its roles as a scientific institution and social organization (1971, 9-10). After all these are the basic functions of the university in a democracy.

In the Indian context the task of critical thinking with the masses would involve examining among other questions, why despite leading in the production of

human resources for technology, twenty percent is dissolved in brain drain? Why is only 52.19% of the total population of 816.17 million literate? (Nanda, 1992, 51) why is education confined to only 39.19% of the total female population? (Ibid). What are the forces that control the production of information? How can one link information with humanities? In examining these questions issues such as the prominence given to elite scientific research by global institutions, the government's responsibilities in the field of education, the correlation between knowledge and power, the connection between indigenouslyness and imperialism will have to be explored. All of this entails straddling the borders of natural sciences, statistics, socio-political practices and philosophy.

Habermas's conception of communicative action, however, can serve as a pedagogical vehicle only with some qualifications. In response to criticisms that his notion of communication is utopian and oblivious to socio-political realities, Habermas has added a clause that no speaker should be prevented from translating his or her right to equality and reciprocity into a material reality by either internal or external coercions (1990, 268-77). Nonetheless the underprivileged must be empowered enough to enter into the ongoing dialogue that affects their lives and their participation would have to make a difference to the status quo. Habermas defines power as control that is the goal of state institution in its exercise of purposive rationality (1987, 268-77).¹⁵ Indeed, both money and power belong to the realm of material reproduction, strategically employed by isolated subjects to pursue their goals. Clearly such a monological definition of power cannot allow for constructive participation by the oppressed in public debates. Power will have to be redefined by Habermas so that his linguistic advance over Foucault and Freire bear fruit. This would require seeing power in more constructivist and relational terms, wherein those who are sidelined from debates are able to enter it to critique the banking model of education and their critique is also powerful enough to initiate a new turn in the field of education. Thus, a power struggle would take place between the hegemonic banking pattern and the marginalized dialogical one, and pace Foucault, this struggle despite all the complexities and divisions of contemporary life would evoke democratic ideals. Thus, constructive power can be tethered to dialogue, and is also qualitative different from monological forms of power exercised through strategic action, which are implicitly violent. In India this concerns the ability and the destiny of approximately fifty percent

of the population that have no access to education. If one believes that "...the future of philosophical thought is a matter of political practice" (Habermas 1983,17) and the way to this is an education that is "the practice of freedom" (Freire,54) then a dynamic approach to power is needed.

Habermas's additional limit arises from assuming the pedagogical relation to be given in the realm of symbolic reproduction called the life-world (1987,368-73). A prepolitical realm of human interaction and experience governed by communicative action implicit in speech (119-26). Where informal organizations such as school, family and public sphere reproduce culture, society and personality (137-38,318-23). For Habermas the life-world is an autonomous sphere where the communicative rationality required for education prevails.¹⁶ He contrasts the life-world with the systemworld which consists of the institutions of state and economy governed by one sided purposive rationality for the material reproduction of power and money. The "over regulation" of the curriculum that leads to the loss of innovation and so forth (371-72) is the off-shoot of the encroachment of the system world into the lifeworld. The colonization of the life-world by the system world converts the teacher-student relation from a subject/subject one to a subject/object one. However, the presumption of a purified zone of communicative rationality contravenes history with its idealism. Moreover, communicative action is presumed to be realized in the life - world, just as Freire envisaged the completion of freedom in consciousness- a thesis that is ahistorical and foundational. The life-world is after all not a static field, schooling has evolved from the classical model of imparting wisdom to modern informative education and even perhaps to postmodern multiculturalism. Hence the colonization thesis advocated by Habermas, dichotomizes the material institutional sphere of value-neutral specialists from their relation with value-based cultural social space. This dichotomy once again gives culture an autonomy where it is understood without any reference to economic and other material activities. The changes in the cultural sphere reveal that there is an "overdetermination" between cultural and material institutional spheres.¹⁷ The changes in cultural, social and personality patterns influence the system world and vice versa. The relation between the life-world and the system-world should take into account the relation between the prevailing social practices and the myriad subtle and radical human improvisations upon them. The latter are not made possible through the existence of some zone of perfection, such

as consciousness or life world, but due to the communicative excesses contained in language, which have to be tapped while restructuring the teacher/student relationship. Education would have to both be institutionalized and regulated by communicative action to overcome the mire of purposive rationality which governs institutions and the idealism of dialogue.

The limits between these various thinkers notwithstanding, they do make some important contribution to pedagogy. Habermas, like Freire, recognizes the close connection between dialogue and democracy. Foucault's strength lies in a conception of power that is enabling and thus moves beyond its standard depreciatory characterizations as control and so forth. An effective approach to teaching and learning will have to integrate these insights.

To conclude, the crisis in education cannot be resolved by merely imparting instruction on values.¹⁸ Since the problems besieging the curriculum stem from the prominence given to information, which does not pause to reflect on its relation to human practices. Consequently, a dichotomy between science/technology that provide information and the humanities that are culturally oriented has emerged. Moreover, there is an erosion of the critical democratic spirit as well. Hence, merely instructing students on a list of values will not help to remedy these drawbacks in the system. As Plato aptly observes, there are no teachers on earth available to teach virtues.¹⁹ Plato fills this lacuna by taking refuge in eternal truths, whose remembrance can usher in wisdom. In a post-metaphysical world where such eternities have been exhausted, democracy has meaning as an on-going task. Imperfect mortals would have to work towards democratizing education, a task to which philosophy can contribute by dialoguing with the other disciplines.

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Notes

1. The humanities may have produced an elite class in the West, but in India privilege is connected with the hegemony of science and technology (Rai,316)
2. This separation cannot provide for more jobs, which is the task of an economic policy rather than an educational policy. An exclusive stress on vocational education can accentuate the existing crisis further by producing a mind-set that is practical. One does see traces of this in the mainstream disregard for disciplines such as philosophy, literature and so forth. Considering the severity of the employment situation, attempts have to be made to create education-oriented jobs (Rai,310)! This is of course by ensuring that both reach the masses by moving beyond the pressures of markets and profits !
3. Critics of the Policy have perceptively observed that being governed by a mechanistic vision of science and technology, it gives only an ornamental role to the humanities (Rai,308). The preoccupation with values is an attempt to fill in the vacuum left by the neglect of humanities (315-318) Hence, while exploring the conceptual and subversive promise of the humanities, its existing marginal state has to be critiqued (309,315).
4. The dispensability of the author is a leitmotif in Foucault's oeuvre. Discourses in a culture operate in an anonymous way and it does not "... matter who is speaking." (1977, 138).
5. Foucault rejects ideology critique because it contrasts ideology as a superficial phenomenon with a reality called "Truth" and locates the latter in the sovereign subject (1980a, 118). However, there is no necessary relation between normative commitment and foundationalism. One could concede that knowledge is a construct and yet critique its hegemony, after all this is what Foucault wishes to accomplish by disentangling power/truth from the violence of existing domination. Surely the latter cannot just be another attempt at domination! McGill aptly observes that Foucault follows Nietzsche in understanding power as a productive force and reproduces Nietzsches's ambiguity of being indeterminate this respect, as

well (251-52; Dews, 1986 96-97; Merquior, 1985 114-18; Wolin, 1992, 184-87). If all relations are understood as power-ridden and qualitative distinctions cannot be made between them, then neither Nietzsche's nor Foucault's analyses can be taken as anything more than rhetoric. Moreover, if all alternatives to objective sciences are also power - laden then the purpose of critiquing them is futile. Further, the all-pervasiveness of power does not prevent its being linked with interests and so forth (Merquior, 111).

6. "We could even define taste as the ability to judge something that makes our feeling in a given presentation universally communicable without mediation by a concept" (Kant, 162) Kant observes that communication requires a harmonious relation between imagination and understanding, which is nevertheless free since it is not governed by determinate laws. He terms such a relation leading to tastes as *sensus communis aestheticus*, which he contrasts with *sensus communis logicus* of cognitive relations (n. 24) Determinate laws govern a cognitive relation between imagination and understanding that arrives at facts.

7. The project of multiculturalism has been critiqued by Ahmad on analogous grounds (1992, 84-85).

8. Giroux proposes a postmodern pedagogy that produces critical rather than just good citizens (1996). The former can be accomplished, he argues with a commitment to multiculturalism and postmodernism, with their sensitivity to enabling and disabling differences. But privilege between the groups and within the groups should also be investigated which is not permitted by the Foucauldian roots of postmodernism. It is not enough to just introduce groups marginalized by the classic western canon without investigating privilege within them.

9. Habermas's distinction between these types of causal explanations, which he says echoes Hegel, is evoked here to expound Freire's thesis concerning the reflective power of causes. (1971b, 271-73)

10. Foucault fails to see the distinction between the two types of causes, namely that of nature and fate discussed above (n. 9). Yet Foucault's dismissal of ideology

critique is quite inconsistent with his notion of thinkers in social sciences, such as Marx and Freud, or even Galileo as being founders of discursivity (1977, 131-36). The texts of these thinkers have opened up avenues for innumerable reinterpretations. Their statements cannot be pronounced to be false, since they do not provide information like quantitative sciences. Rather some of their claims might strike one as irrelevant in the light of contemporary problems etc. these can be put aside to explore other claims that are more pertinent and so forth. All of which involves modification due to the flexibilities present in the texts. Both psychoanalysis and Marxism can be reconstructed to remove their foundational residues and retain their subversive strengths, as so many contemporary figures such as Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, Jurgen Habermas and even Jacques Derrida have done. Rabinow suggests that Foucault himself is a founder of discursivity and to retain his insights one would have to reconstruct him (26).

11. Thinkers such as bell hooks who have elaborately developed the insights of Freire's works are quite alert to the patriarchal ring in his theory (49). This is explicit in his constant use of the male gender while writing. But it is also implicitly found in his seeing liberation as the realization of consciousness, which is complete manhood. The expanding oeuvre of feminist theory critiques cogito, consciousness and the like for privileging the experiences of men, since historically the subjects of thought have largely been men. Pedagogy also has the task of overcoming sexism which bell hooks admirably addresses. A detailed discussion of this is not possible within the framework of this paper, but if democratization involves critiquing oppression and moving in the direction of freedom then analysis of gender, race, class and caste would definitely be a part of its agenda.

12. According to Benhabib, the type of validity claims made depend upon the intentions of the speaker (340). But in this she goes against Habermas's thesis that communicative action is not intentional, but is an attempt to move out of the aporias generated by interiority of consciousness. Habermas argues that the intentional theory of meaning severs meaning from language by locating it in the intentions of the speaker. He does take the dimension of the speaker's sincerity into account, but along with the natural world and the social world. The subjective dimension does not enter into speech acts as conscious intention, but as lived

experiences in a world that the subject shares with others.

13. Freire does see linguistic agents as “actors in intercommunication” (99), but he is unable to develop this theme consistently. This is because of the primacy he ascribes to consciousness, which as an intangible force alienates human beings from one another. As hooks observes, it is the tangibility of dialogue that enables its participants to come closer to its healing power (174-75). To quote hooks, “... we marginalized and oppressed people attempt to recover ourselves and our experiences in language.” (175)

14. I am indebted to Benhabib (1999) for this interpretation of Habermas.

15. In his early writings, Habermas linked language with a transcendental ahistorical interest in emancipation (1971 b), while his latter writings connect communicative action with an equally ahistorical sphere called the life world (1984).

16. Habermas is also aware of the distinction between money and power (1987, 267-77).

17. The term overdetermination is taken from Althusser (112-14). He uses it to depict the relation between the economy and cultural phenomena, neither of which can be found in a “pure and simple” state but always overlap and influence one another. An isolated economic phenomenon is indeed an abstraction.

18. Rai makes an analogous observation that moral science courses cannot produce values, since dishonesty is not the outcome of instruction (311)!

19. The onus on teachers as bearers of virtue is also the result of according them a privileged position where they have to always be good. Yet being mere mortals teachers can make mistakes. In this context, it is more advisable to treat them as participants along with students, citizens and marginalized people in the search for a better world.

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SUSTAINABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH : ARE THEY COMPATIBLE ?

ALOK TANDON

It is generally assumed that sustainable development and economic growth are compatible objectives. Since no attempt has been made to specify this assumption, the debate on sustainability and growth remains vague and confusing. What is required is not only to clarify the interrelations of the two concepts but also to analyse the context of the frame of reference of the two concepts. Only then we can understand as to what extent, under given preconditions, economic growth and sustainability are compatible. Our problem is that the notion of sustainable development is being proposed as the solution to the environmental problems that have resulted from our modern frame of reference which is diagnosed as inherently destructive to the environment. The ambiguity arises because the notion of sustainable development is being made to fit into the same destructive framework to make it operational. Such treatment of the issue of sustainable development as a technical problem prevents critical reflection upon the frame of reference in which the problem originates. In this paper, we explore the normative and conceptual context of the modern framework in order to determine whether the concept of sustainability fits into freedom dominated framework. We take into consideration both versions of sustainability -conservative and radical - for the purpose. Finally, we conclude that only a radical version of sustainability, having a strong normative dimension, has the capacity to relieve what is acute tension in modern frame of reference and to reconcile individual autonomy with the wider social and ecological good. But this represents a challenge to liberal democracy and its understanding of individual and collective goods. These problems can only be addressed by radical social transformations.

I

Now, it is generally agreed that since there are biophysical limits to humankind's productive prowess, the utilization of world's material resources must

be pursued without compromising the life chances of either present or future generations. Sustainable development is proposed as a way to combine economic growth with ecological health, in which, on the one hand, the continued potential to meet human needs is to be safeguarded, while, on the other hand, environmental limits are to be acknowledged. The common thread running through all political documents/definitions propagating such strategy, is to focus on the preservation of the capacity to fulfill (current and future) human needs and the limitations to (economic) activities which are to be observed in order to achieve this objective. However, the concepts of needs and limitations, and in their wake other interrelated concepts, need to be specified if these definitions are to have any content at all. Otherwise, sustainable development becomes 'a convenient phrase for rallying support, rather than an agent for forcing environmental change.'

Two variants of sustainability - weak and strong - can be distinguished on the basis of restrictions they propose on the process of economic growth. It centers on the degree to which substitution between natural and physical capital is deemed permissible. The weak version conceives both forms of capital as complementary, with unlimited possibilities for substitution, and contends that the requirement of sustainability is met by means of the maintenance or enlargement of the sum of both capital flows. Though it allows for spending of the natural capital stock but it should be offset by a corresponding increase in physical capital stock, so that only the composition but not the total amount of capital stock changes. Thus, such version grants the overall capacity to reproduce the same standard of living to the future generations compared to the present one. Clearly, it is compatible with economic growth and even requires growth to offset environmental damage.

Since many relevant factors such as future consumption preferences, increases in populations and technological progress can not be predicted, we always remain in doubt about the required increase in capital stock to offset environmental degradation or to sustain the same level of well-being. Therefore, a strong version of sustainability is suggested, which acknowledges the supplementary character of both physical and natural capital stock, aiming at a separate maintenance of both stocks of capital assets. Accordingly, future generations should not just be as well off as we are, but should be endowed with at least the same amount of particular

goods, such as environmental assets. Such a version makes the assumption of compatibility of growth and sustainability questionable. Growth that threatens nonrenewable environmental assets is not permissible.

The concepts of sustainable development and economic growth may be said to be compatible if the conceptual and normative interpretations of their constituent concepts of needs and limitations are identical for the two concepts. Thus we need to review the concepts of economic growth and sustainability in conjunction with related concepts and their implicit interrelations to determine whether they can fit together within modern framework. While economic growth is grounded in the belief that the unhampered process of redefinition and expansion of needs creates the incentives and opportunities for initiative and gain, which by including economic activity, are the best guarantee of the fulfillment of essential needs, the concept of sustainable development suggests a different conceptual and normative content of needs, a distinction between needs and desires, as well as the idea that constraints are to be placed upon desires in order to safeguard the fulfillment of essential needs. The overriding importance attached to the fulfillment of essential needs implies that the idea of humanistic solidarity is part and parcel of sustainable development, not an appendage to the concept of liberty. The framework in which economic growth is given priority, freedom of choice and self-determination takes precedence over solidarity, whereas the concept of sustainable development assigns a role to solidarity on an equal plane with freedom. As such, a notion of sustainability that functions within the dominant framework bears a stronger imprint on growth, and thereby sets different requirements for sustainable growth because it is subordinate to the main idea of freedom. Thus, the interpretations of the concept of needs, limitations, liberty and solidarity in relation to the notion of sustainability differ from such interpretations in relation to the concept of growth and therefore, sustainability differs from such interpretations in relation to the concept of growth and therefore, sustainability and economic growth can not be simply assumed to be conceptually and normatively compatible.

Both, the weak and strong notions of sustainability may be said to present a consistent view of the compatibility of economic growth and sustainability achieved by accommodating the analytic context of one or the other concept. While the strong

version implies a plea for a thorough revision of the existing conceptual network to accommodate the notion of sustainability, the weak version smothers the innovative implication of the same concept in a way that it is made operational within this framework. The fundamental differences in the evaluation of the basic values of freedom and solidarity and their mutual positioning implied in the conceptual network of the notion of economic growth and sustainability respectively, require that the ideal foundations of our society be brought into the discussion in order to escape from the confusion that surround the debate on sustainable development. Only a radical understanding of sustainable development can uphold sustainability as much more than mere a compromise between the natural environment and the pursuit of economic growth. For the purpose, we need to examine as to which notions of human wellbeing and autonomy reconcile well with the concept of sustainable development.

2

If sustainability is to be the goal of human activity, wellbeing must be rethought with respect to a different set of goods for the making of good human lives. The market ethic dominant in modern liberal democracies presupposes a narrow conception of human wellbeing, equated with material comfort. Environmental problems engendered by the market stem in part, from the self-understanding it develops. Such limited self-understanding creates a delusory culture of self-interest that stunts the development of human capacities and blends the modern individual to another in an instrumental kind of relationship. No inner need is felt to develop one's capacities to live an ethical life the best of one's capacity. Moreover, because technological progress is a self-reinforcing process, the positive feedback effects of technological success not only compound the accumulating side effects, but they also tend to reinforce aspects of the lower human self, that is, the utilization, making/doing, self-interested, egoistic aspects at the expense of the ethical, altruistic, transparent self. This leads to a poverty of the higher self.

In the present context, when future of all life has become problematic, we not only need to recover the earlier Aristotelian understanding of a 'flourishing human life', but to broaden it to include promoting flourishing of other individual living things and biological collectives as an end in itself, simply because the flourishing of

nonhuman nature in constitutive of human flourishing. The best of human life is one that includes an awareness of and practical concern with the goods and entities in the nonhuman world. Additionally in the light of recent insights in evolutionary biology, competition is not the dominant strategy in nature. Many organisms establish symbiotic relationships to further their chances of survival.

Replacement of the ethically limited understanding by a broader and more satisfying understanding of the good life goes well with the radical interpretation of sustainability, with its recognition that 'quality of life' issues are intimately connected to environmental protection. The implications of such an expanded view of the good life for the social, political and economic institution of modern societies are quite profound. Ecological matters can not be left to the spontaneous order of markets. Public policy must provide for the inclusion of the moral relevance of other species and of future generations at a more profound level than the level of rhetoric.

In modern societies, the human nature relationship has assumed a state of imbalance with human liberty now being opposed to the freedom of nature. The question of interdependence of human freedom and the freedom of nature must be faced and dealt with if sustainable development is to be the ethic that recognizes and promotes the mutuality of ecological and social values in concrete living communities. Human beings need to respect nature if they are to survive and preserve the existential ground on which to assert their freedom. Therefore, there can be no ultimate incompatibility between demands of nature and the exigencies of human freedom. Things have gone wrong not because humans held an anthropocentric view of the universe (they could not do otherwise) but because they erred in defining the value content of their own development and freedom. The mistake lies in believing that the freedom from the constraints of nature is an absolute value, when it really constitutes a negative view of freedom. Freedom from the constraints of nature is a positive value in the sense that it allows freedom for human fulfillment. If humans are to have any possibility of being at least part authors of their lives, of having a range of life choices, uncoerced by others or nature and of possessing the necessary capacities and resources for their self-chosen paths, then individual development depends very much on ecologically responsible behaviour. It depends upon human development strategies which enhance the mutuality of ecological and social goals.

The question to be asked is whether sustainable development as economic strategy can reconcile personal autonomy with freedom of nature and interdependence of life - forms. The capacity to achieve this varies with the degree to which human embeddedness in nature is acknowledged. Thus, the conservative approach retains the modernistic attitude of a society-nature divide, wherein sustainability is achieved by the management of resources through more efficient energy and resource use and new ecologically benign technologies. By contrast, the radical approach, in accepting human embeddedness in nature, recognises that it is human activities which have to be managed in order to achieve ecosystematic and social viability. In policy terms, this distinction, between interpreting sustainability as a problem of human activity rather than as a problem of resource management allows consumption patterns and values which underpin them as well as structure rigidities which militate against the assumption of environmentally sustainable practices to come into focus. It then becomes clear that the transition to an ecologically sustainable society requires more integrated policy approach, in which a range of policy modes is utilized, including standard selling, regulatory intervention, institutional reform, markets, economic instruments and technological innovations. Important elements of any policy mix will include an educative function and incentives for environmentally sound practices in order to stimulate the assumption of ecologically sympathetic attitudes and values.

Another negative manifestation of market economies has been the breakdown of community and other binding ties and the loss of tradition. The success of a market society is measured by its GNP and by its rate of economic growth-the total aggregation of goods and services and the speed at which they are produced, not in how well it fosters and supports the personal and communal relationships, which make up the community, not in how well it cares for ecosystems on which the community depends for life support. Hence there is need for an economic order that supports the pattern of personal relationships that make up the community. Moreover, since we have also extended the field of relationship to the non human community, the economic order should support not only communal relationships but human/nature connections.

In the conservative approach, government solely rely on experts and see environmental problems as questions of appropriate management. These experts

focus only on remedial measures, environments continue to degrade. The 'top down' management structures limit public participation and view it as having only instrumental value in implementations of projects initiated by aforesaid experts. They fail to support and build communal relationships. On the otherhand, the radical approach to sustainability, uses ecological crisis to reflect on practices, values, institutions of industrial society and therefore to rethink social relationships. Encouraging participation as a valuable learning process in negotiating their responsibilities to each other and to environmental protection, if builds new solidarities and understanding of well being. Such process also produce long-term commitment that having environmental problems produces, which 'top down' management system fails to generate.

Our foregoing discussion leads to the following conclusions : First, only a technical solution in the form of simple economic restructuring in order to contain economic growth within environmental limits is an insufficient attempt at a reformulation of economic problem.

Second, any economic strategy which attempts to match human needs and demands of nature and to guide human development must foster respect for the nonhuman environment as well as a sense of the mutuality of social and ecological values.

Third, sustainable development (SD) must ensure sound human flourishing, by furnishing those goods which ensure human autonomy (survival, opportunities for participation, and a good life).

Fourth, SD must preserve and foster forms of community well being which ensure connection with past and future.

Fifth, SD must also preserve and foster ecosystem viability. Sound human development consistent with ecosystem viability is really only possible with the radical interpretations of sustainable development.

Sixth, sustainability as ethical ideal challenges the view of the liberal state

as neutral umpire between different conceptions of the good. Radical approach to SD demands a conception of human flourishing that recognises the intrinsic value of other nature, whose own flourishing is constitutive of a good human life.

Seventh, not only the concepts of human wellbeing but also of individual autonomy, solidarity and collective interest are to be rethought for the purpose of societal transformations according to SD.


Eighth, sustainability is but an interim phase in the pursuit of a livable society. An essential precondition for such transition is to overcome the structural rigidities of capitalist market economies. This means to replace the imperative of ever increasing quantitative growth and individual consumption with an imperative that furnishes qualitative social development and improved communal & ecological wellbeing. But who will do it?

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LINGUISTIC UNDERSTANDING AND HISTORICITY :
AN EXAMINATION OF
THE REPRESENTATIONAL AND THE HERMENEUTIC MODELS

N. SREEKUMAR



To explain linguistic understanding we have to show how the three realms, reality, language and meaning, come together and present a comprehensive framework for cognition and communication. Such a framework is presupposed not only by all theories of linguistic understanding, but also by semantic theories and is also a prerequisite to establish the legitimacy of linguistic activity. Since, it is only in language we find and make access to reality, the understanding of the latter is essentially a process that happens well inside language. Hence there must be an intimate connection between the two realms. Again, it is a truism to state that in linguistic interactions, reality is not directly understood, rather it is the meanings of linguistic expressions that are transmitted and communicated. Hence, unless we could show that these three realms of, reality, language and meaning are intimately connected with each other, we would fail to give an account to the whole process of linguistic understanding and the phenomenon of linguistic communication. Consequently, all theories on language and meaning try to provide explanation to the ways these three realms are related.

But a close examination will reveal that a mere bringing them together will not explain linguistic activity and communication satisfactorily. For this, we have to show that the three realms are, in reality, not independent of each other. In other words we have to prove that they are “inseparably related”. We can see that language is acquiring a center stage in this context. This is because, such an “inseparable relationship” could be legitimately established only by showing how both the realms of reality and meanings are intimately connected with language. Moreover, in order to explain the phenomenon of ‘understanding meaning’, the fact that the latter is an essential property of language and not a mere accidental property has to be primarily established. The latter alternative would evidently make the relationship between the

two realms of language and meaning arbitrary, which eventually lead to a breakdown in the whole activity of language use.

This paper conducts an examination of how some theories of linguistic understanding respond to this primary demand. The analysis carried out in this paper focuses on two models of understanding meaning - the representational model and the hermeneutic model. These two models have been chosen because they represent two prominent and divergent ways in which the relationship between language and reality in connection with the question of linguistic understanding has been discussed. The former conceives language as a representation of the factual world and consequently identifies meaning with the representational content to the former. In this sense, this standpoint asserts what Richard J. Bernstein calls, the basic conviction that there is some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness¹. The hermeneutic model, on the other hand, largely considers language as a product of human interaction and therefore, does not assign to it any single function *a prioristically*. The emphasis on human interaction enabled the philosophers of the hermeneutic tradition to discover certain vital features of language and linguistic understanding. This focus on the interactive nature concludes in viewing language as a hermeneutic medium which ultimately determines even the ontological status of the human self². This, in other words is to admit the basic contingency of language. They contemplated more on the nature of this contingency and identified the phenomenon of historicity as its root cause.

The acceptance of contingency runs in parallel to the recognition of historicity. It will be further argued in this paper that only with such a recognition and assertion of historicity the process of linguistic understanding could be properly explained. In other words this paper tries to show that only with the recognition of the important role of historicity we can establish the “inseparable relationship” between the three realms of language, meaning and reality. The philosophers who subscribe to a representational model - the true representatives of this standpoint are some analytic philosophers - make explicit attempts to overcome this contingency. Though the two models hold diverse views with regard to these issues they indeed encounter certain common problems.

A pressing problem is with regard to the demand of objectivity. Natural sciences, for instance, make objective understanding and communication necessary prerequisites. Science employs the causal - explanation framework in order to analyse the workings of the factual world and derives knowledge and truth about the latter by means of generalisations. The scientific conception of reality, from its very outset, attracted philosophical attention in terms of its simplicity and precisiveness. The certainty of scientific knowledge made this conception more authentic and ideal. The representationalists, when they developed their doctrines of linguistic understanding and communication subscribed to such ideals of certainty and authenticity. Consequently, they came to recognise the prime function of language as consisting in the representation of the factual world. The concurrently developed semantic doctrines eventually propagated a hard core doctrine of meaning invariance.

But this position eventually makes an outright rejection of historicity, which the representationalists envisaged to carry out with the *a prioristic* and external imposition of a fixed structure on language. The Neo Empiricists thus conduct a detail programme of devising a technical-artificial language in order to describe the epistemology of science. By making the structure of language fixed and certain, they aimed a radical rejection of the contingent features of human linguistic system. The choice between contingency and certainty has been made in precise terms. The representational conception of linguistic understanding and meaning evolves out of such a choice made in favour of certainty. The representational framework takes for granted the legitimacy of such a picture of language before it attempts to bring together the three realms. We can see that the notion of meaning itself is introduced largely to establish the intimate association between language and reality. Let us examine this standpoint in detail.

I. The Representational Conception

The standard representational view envisages bringing together the three realms of language, reality and meanings with the concept of a world-representational language. This conception largely conceives language as a medium through which the factual reality is represented and thereby meaning is presented and communicated. A peculiar conception of meaning is extremely crucial for a model of understanding based on empirical representations. Meaning mediates language and the world and

projects the former as the representation of the latter. Gottlob Frege, for instance, introduced a notion of 'sense' and conceived the latter as such a mediating entity. The senses not only guide the uses of language but also determine the basic word-object correlation by presenting the reference with absolute certainty. And by presenting reference, they mediate language and reality³.

The representational model largely conceives science as the paradigmatic human activity. Consequently, they modeled their semantic theories after the process of knowledge acquisition in the natural sciences. This led them to propagate a strict doctrine of meaning invariance. Such a conception of language is much in harmony with the basic parameters of the modern conception of science. As Charles Taylor puts it :

Then we can conceive the idea of understanding a phenomenon like language as we would any other in extra-human nature, that is without invoking any underlying ideas or ideas or thoughts. For this extreme naturalism the basic phenomena of language are the sounds we emit, the marks we make; understanding then is seeing how they are evoked by what surrounds us, and in turn trigger off behaviour.⁴

Initially it is this possibility of explaining language without falling back on internal ideas and images that made representationalism attractive. In this framework, understanding language is the grasping of the meanings of linguistic signs, which again is a matter of knowing to what the words stand for in the world. The order in which the words are arranged informs us about the order of the objects expressed through language. Thus the thought expressed in language becomes directly cognisable without the intervention of mental images and ideas.

But it is a fact that we encounter the issue of understanding meaning in a vast variety of cases outside the domain of natural sciences. In our encounter with a literary text or a historical document, for instance, we do not raise the question whether the linguistic system we encounter provides us an objective understanding of any factual situation which is spatio-temporal. We here look for other forms of agreement, which are sometimes emotional or imaginative in nature, rather than factual. But the strict meaning invariance doctrine of the representationalists' falls

in short of making a harmony with this situation. In other words, the representationalists tried to show that the semantic entities were somehow fixed and determined, so that they could isolate the latter from the multitude of life contexts where language found use and cognise them objectively.

Again, such a notion of semantic determinism often forced the representationalists to adopt a theory of meaning which is highly metaphysical in nature. This move, in turn, was preceded by an investigation into the principal operations of language, or more precisely, to the essential nature of language. They contended that such knowledge would help them avoid certain conceptual errors we committed as a result of getting betrayed by language. Underlying this assumption is the belief that language is deceptive, as far as its expressibility is concerned. "Language disguises thought", says Wittgenstein⁵. Since essence is something which is fixed and determinate, the contingency of language could be overcome if we identified its essence. They found support for such an encounter in the fact that scientific activity, which for them was the paradigmatic human activity, was free from any such shortcomings. Such endeavours reflect the Kantian attempts to discover a unified version of understanding, which ultimately equated human reason with scientific rationality. But the propagation of such a unitary vision was indeed expensive. As Roy. J. Howard observed, for Kant, the demands of such an ideal were satisfied by making knowledge occurring in the non-scientific realms, theoretically untenable and only emotionally, psychologically - in short, irrationally - tolerable⁶. It is this Kantian concern that was inherited by the representationalists when they ventured to identify the essential nature of language. They thus longed to make the meanings of linguistic expressions fixed and determined by extra linguistic entities. This in turn forced them to presuppose a metaphysical theory of meaning.

The implications of this metaphysics ultimately led them to further trouble. On the one hand, language is a contingent phenomenon and cannot house meanings if they are objective entities. The representationalists attempted to tackle this by making the latter extra-linguistic. But then such a separation of the linguistic realm from the semantic realm made them encounter more complicated philosophical issues. We shall now examine how the representational conception deal with this situation. We come across two alternative conceptions.

1) The Logician Alternative

Frege pioneered this position. From the viewpoint of semantic theory, Frege's doctrines can be evaluated as the attempts to save the representational semantics from the shortfalls of mere designativism. Designativism stands for a crude form of representationalism which takes for granted a direct and unconditional correlation between the basic linguistic entities and the extra-linguistic objects, i.e., between words and objects. It eventually makes the activity of naming both epistemologically and logically primitive. But Frege found that linguistic activity and cognition could not be consistently explained by an appeal to a mere combination among words. For this a logical arrangement of linguistic signs was essential. Such a logical arrangement would make clear the peculiar roles different words play in a sentence in language. In other words, Frege argued that a mere syntactical arrangement would not explain the representational line that makes language-reality connection necessary and certain. The logical arrangement of words, he contended, would bring the third realm - the semantic realm - to the forefront and locate it in between language and reality. The prime function of semantic entities or senses, according to Frege is to present the reference. The senses thus mediate between language and reality. Since the senses are logical entities their mediation makes the language - reality connection essential and certain.

But making senses logical entities led to further troubles. Their logical nature demands that, in spite of their mediating role the senses belong to an independent realm far removed both from reality and language. Unlike reality, which is constituted of concrete physical objects, the senses are abstract and logical. This fundamental difference between the two prevents any essential relationship between them. Again, the senses are even independent from language. In other words, they are not linguistic entities. They are rather pure logical entities. Frege reasserts their ultimate logical status as he related the notion of truth to the senses. When we call a sentence true, says Frege, we really mean that its sense is true⁷. The contingency of language does not permit it to house such logical and abstract entities. Hence he invented a separate logical realm to accommodate them. He ignores the psychological counterpart of the cognitive process, as according to him it is irrelevant as far as the understanding of meaning is concerned. The abstract semantic entities, according to him, make themselves known to the cognitive intellect, which is sensitive to comprehend the logical entities.

Frege's semantic realism thus succeeded in explaining the process of objective cognition. The representational tradition later derived the notion of the 'structure of language' and thereby the concept of 'proposition' from the Fregean idea of logical arrangement of linguistic signs by means of semantic entities which are logical. The senses or thoughts, which are logical entities, present the reference in determinate ways. This ensures semantic invariance and consequently enables Frege to assure objectivism.

But as far as the relationship between the three realms of language, reality and meaning are concerned, this logicist position eventually makes them stand separate. Though the semantic realm is introduced in order to explain the availability of a representational line that connects the three realms, they nevertheless lie separate and independent of each other in the Fregean framework. With his third realm of logical entities, Frege resembles Plato and also inherits the ontological separation made by the latter. Consequently, the semantic realm is never essentially related to the linguistic realm.

2) The Empiricist Position

Another explicit attempt to explain the problem in the framework of representationalism was undertaken by some empiricist thinkers, especially the neo-empiricists. Dissatisfied by the highly logical explanation of Frege, which left hardly any room for empirical experience, they endeavoured to proclaim the thesis of meaning invariance by adopting a theoretical framework, which highlighted the representational features of language. Language for them was a talk about the world. Following Wittgenstein they contended that meaning was the representational content of language.

Russell's theory of language and notion of proposition formed the background assumptions for many of the neo-empiricists in explaining meaning as the representational content of language from an empiricist perspective. Highlighting the role of empirical experience in the explanation of meaning, Russell made reference to the actual 'propositional content'. To support this position Russell construes an ontological doctrine the Logical Atomism - and a psychologistic epistemology, in corollary with his theory of propositions.

The problem of understanding meaning can be explained in this framework in the following manner. An assertion made in language through sentences consists of two aspects. There is the objective side where the facts are indicated. Here the truth conditions of the sentences are under focus. The significance of the sentence, on the other hand, is attached to the subjective side where the mental state of the speaker is expressed. The significance of sentences therefore, has to be understood in terms of the psychological factors such as images and other psychic states of the person. Russell says : “.... in the case of a sentence of atomic form the significance is a state of the believer, or rather a set of such states having certain similarities.”⁸

This position is significantly different from that of Frege's as it is explicitly committed to take empirical experience into account. This commitment is asserted by making the word-object relationship central to the explanation of meaning. Frege deliberately avoided focusing on words when they were in isolation - the context principle - as he thought, it would amount to psychologism. But apart from these differences both the logicist and the empiricist conceptions share a common assumption. For both, language is a medium through which reality is filtered, apprehended and communicated. Language is conceived as a medium that stands between two poles - the subject and the object - connecting them by means of logical entities (Frege) or world representation (Empiricism). It is assumed that there exists a world independent of our will and our linguistic categories. This world can be comprehended objectively with reference to those expressions in language, which stand as immediate representatives of the factual reality. Both views hold that the three realms of language, reality and meaning though often come together nevertheless lie separate. While Frege isolated the semantic content from language and reality by positing the former in an independent third realm, the empiricists held a realist view of the factual reality and asserted that it existed independent of our will and linguistic categories. Wittgenstein's picture theory comes up with a different approach and conclusion. Here the representational framework is presented in a different way emphasising on the concept of logical structure. Wittgenstein emphasises on the fundamental logical framework of language and propagates a peculiar doctrine of semantic determinism by making meaning the representational content of language. He conceives logic as the basic scaffolding of language and by connecting meaning and truth to this scaffolding in a comprehensive manner advocates probably the most consistent form of representational doctrine.

3) Wittgenstein's Alternative

Wittgenstein establishes a structural identity between the two realms of reality and language. The concept of 'logical form' is introduced to explain this identity. In the words of Wittgenstein "What a picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in any way at all, is logical form, i.e., the form of reality"⁹. Senses or the semantic entities are the essential properties of linguistic expressions, which exhibit the logical structure (propositions). Therefore, in a way the picture theory of meaning brings together the three realms of language, reality and meaning and establishes their identity - a structural identity - to explain the process of understanding meaning and communication. But this identity was established by ignoring some crucial aspects as far as the nature of language is concerned. The whole representational tradition, for that matter, undermines all that aspects of language that do not subscribe to the framework of language - reality representation. There was an explicit attempt to isolate those expressions in language, which were truth functions. They are the elementary propositions in language, which stand as the immediate representatives of the factual world and whose truth and falsity are known immediately owing to this representative status. Language in this framework therefore, is not a mere representation of the world, but is constituted of a system of truth functions. Here a set of linguistic expressions assumes privileged status in terms of them being immediately related to the factual reality. Wittgenstein even identifies the whole of language with the whole of propositions of natural science¹⁰. The notion of a representational language - the language of science - stems from such a conception. Though Wittgenstein was not a representationalist in the pure sense, his ideas were utilised to develop a representational conception of linguistic understanding. The neo-empiricists, particularly, developed their project of 'unity of science' on the basis of such ideas.

This concept of propositional language conceptually satisfies many of the requirements of a conception of knowledge which is upheld by modern science. It ensures absolute objectivity in expression and communication with the idea of truth-functional linguistic expressions. But it achieves this objectivity in the expense of making meaning an accidental property of language and subsequently separating the three realms from each other. This is because, meaning, as conceived in the

representational framework, is not related to the whole phenomenon of language, but only to its representational features. In other words, the semantic content of language becomes relevant only when language is used as a 'talk about the world'. Consequently, the semantic realm is not essentially related to the linguistic realm and hence this standpoint fails to explain the process of linguistic understanding in a comprehensive way. It ignores the real phenomenon of language, which is a product of socio-cultural interaction.

In the representational conception as a whole, the attention is either on the 'word-object contact' or on the 'sentence-fact isomorphic relationship'. And this was done, as Richard Rorty says, by confining attention to single sentences as opposed to vocabularies¹¹. The emphasis on the idea of 'truth-functional expressions' is an offshoot of this approach. Again here language is conceived as a medium which stands between the self and the non-human reality. The idea of world-language relationship that professes the notion of language as a medium - a medium out of which beliefs and desires are constructed and that which stands between the self and the world. This is to subscribe - though not explicitly - to the subject - object picture, which eventually leads to issues about subjectivism, idealism and realism. Such models of human linguistic system are inadequate to explain the real phenomenon of language, which is basically a product of human interaction. To approach language from such a comprehensive perspective is to admit its contingency and consequently its historicity.

II. Recognition of Historicity

So we have to come back to examine the real phenomenon of language and examine how we are related to it. This may ultimately lead to the recognition of historicity. Language is primarily a product of human interaction. But we could also see that human interaction in turn itself happens through language. Language is essentially human and man is essentially linguistic being¹². In other words, language evolves out of human interaction which itself is essentially a linguistic process. Thus we are presented with a continuous process. This process is eventually a human self-making process, where human beings relate themselves with various situations of life and other human beings and objects in order to attain certain objectives. The various life-situations and interactive contexts form the ultimate ground of all their

praxis. The philosophers of the hermeneutic tradition proceeded with such an analysis of the phenomenon of historicity.

This situation can be understood clearly by analysing the nature of the self-making process from another direction. The human self-making process through language and the evolution of language from it necessarily presuppose a context or situation, both in the natural world and in the historical and cultural sphere. The historical and cultural situation in its turn exerts tremendous influence upon such a process and determines its very dynamism. But then this context of history and culture itself is nothing but a result of the human interaction and therefore, of the human self-making process. It is given to us through language and we live it in language. As Gadamer says, "... in all our knowledge of ourselves and in all knowledge of the world, we are always already encompassed by the language that is our own."¹³

In this context we come across a different conception of reality and the relationship between reality and language. We have seen that the horizon of the linguistic realm is wider than the horizon of representational language. It is the all encompassing realm as far as humans are concerned. Likewise, the horizon of reality also is wider than the horizon of the factual world. In other words, reality does not exhaust with the factual world, which the representationalists identify with reality. It encompasses both the natural situation and the historico-cultural situations where the human self-making process takes place. The Husserlian conception of life-world will clarify the nature of such a picture of reality. Husserl speaks about a pre-theoretical context of life, which is eventually the ultimate basis of all our actions, experiences and judgements. This is the life-world, which exists in advance for us and is the "ground" of all praxis whether theoretical or extratheoretical¹⁴. This factor places the entire wealth of human praxis historically situated. Husserl argues that even scientific practices which consist of objective categorisations are grounded in this fundamental life-world and therefore, represent the various projects that arise from within it as forms of knowledge that reflect the concerns of specific communities and serve their needs.

Again, such a reality cannot be apprehended by means of the logical framework of representationalism. In other words, the relationship between reality

and language is not representational but appears to be interactive and creative. It is therefore, intimate and essential. Reality is a historico-cultural opening up in language which gets unfolded along with the human self-making process and therefore, is given to us in and through language in our concrete lived experiences. Our very existence is constituted out of such live experiences in language. The relationship between language and reality is not representational but existential and therefore is not accidental but essential. Wherever we encounter language, we encounter concrete lived experiences of reality. Here we come across a different notion of language, where the latter functions as a hermeneutic medium rather than a medium of representation.

III. Language - The Hermeneutic Medium

The hermeneutic tradition approaches the problem of understanding meaning and communication from the background of such a conception of reality and language. This conception tells us how language evolves as an all comprehensive horizon - a hermeneutic medium. Hans Georg Gadamer rearticulated these insights by emphasising on the concept of 'tradition' and the idea of our essential situatedness in tradition. We inherit the prejudices of our tradition and Gadamer sees this inheritance as a positive precondition for understanding meaning. The tradition is, in turn, essentially linguistic in nature and this factor categorically asserts the fundamental linguisticity of our being, of reality and of all our knowledge and understanding¹⁵. Tradition encompasses all those factors like beliefs, conventions, customs etc. that influence our perception and thinking and thereby our very way of being. In this way our linguistic categories have determining roles. Language, in other words, provides us a horizon and all our activities and life are fashioned according to the normative power exerted by this linguistic horizon. Whatever significance objects, entities and texts have is essentially related to the horizon.

Our search for the semantic realm also concludes here. Meanings cannot be independent of the traditions. Nor can they occupy a space in the extra-linguistic world. They make language their home. More precisely, they evolve in language. But here apparently more than one linguistic horizon comes into play. This is because, the interactive encounter may involve in this interactive process. Yet they interact and form a common realm. Gadamer observes :

.... there exists in man alone common meaning, common concepts, especially those through which the common life of men is possible without murder and manslaughter - in the form of social life, a political constitution, an organized division of labour. All this is involved in the simple assertion that man is a being who possesses language¹⁶.

The mere fact that man is a being who possesses language suggests that there is a common horizon where meanings evolve. This very idea of 'evolving meanings' directly contradicts the representational conception which envisages a metaphysical theory of meaning, where the latter are taken to be fixed. The hermeneutic conception thus makes the linguistic horizon and the common language of interactive encounter - in short language - the abode of meanings. Since language evolves through such interactions, meanings also evolve. This not only asserts the essential linguistic nature of the semantic realm but also does justice to the basic fact that language is a product of human interaction.

This will eventually establish the ultimate identity of the three realms of language, reality and meaning. In this framework, language is not just a medium that stands between two poles performing the functions of representation and expression but is a hermeneutic medium which encompasses the whole of reality as it is given to man along with himself and all his knowledge and understanding. The representational tradition, which we have examined, failed to recognise such an inseparable relationship between language, reality and the being of man, as it emphasised more on the requirements of objectivity and focused only on the representational features of language. Hence it eventually took a stand which argued for a separation of the semantic realm from the linguistic realm. The representationalists recognised the essential contingent nature of language and its essential historicity. They endeavoured to save both reality and meaning from becoming historical and eventually undermined the idea that these two realms were related to language in essential ways. This, they believed, would enable them to propagate a representational theory of language and a theory of meaning and understanding which conform to the objectivist demands.

But the three realms could be brought together only by recognising the essential nature and implications of the phenomenon of historicity. The first step was

then to reassert the historicity of language followed by an explanation of all the implications of its being so. This historicity can be arrived at from the simple fact that, language is the product of human interaction. This will further show how human interaction itself presupposes the availability of language as a hermeneutic medium. It is in this hermeneutic medium reality is presented to us as a historico-cultural opening up in language. In this context, linguistic understanding and the understanding of meaning do not require the help or mediation of any extra-linguistic realm, but happen well inside language. This hermeneutic medium is a constantly evolving phenomenon and understanding results from such an evolution. This evolution of the hermeneutic medium presupposes a constant dialogic encounter between different linguistic horizons and the latter phenomenon in turn is characterised by the evolution of a common language followed by the evolution of meaning.

With this realisation of language as a hermeneutic medium we can conclude this discussion. It will not only confirm our assumption - that linguistic understanding and communication could be appropriately explained only by asserting the phenomenon of historicity but also reveals the vital role of language in the whole affaire. We shall summarise our discussion in the following way.

Understanding of meaning and language can be coherently explained only by establishing the fact that the three realms of language, meaning and reality are inseparably associated. To be more precise, we have to explain how language brings them together into its interactive and dialectical framework. The metaphysical theories of meaning, conceived by the representationalists, by making the semantic entities extra-linguistic fail in this regard. The main reason for this failure is their rejection of historicity, as they envisaged saving both meaning and reality from becoming historical. The linguistic framework eventually became representational rather than interactive and dialectical. But the recognition of historicity eventually leads to the realisation of a much greater role for language. It explains how language itself evolves out of a dynamic historical process, which also causes the evolution of the semantic realm and reality. Meaning is here the essential property of language and reality is nothing but the historico-cultural opening up in the latter. The three realms not only come together but also are essentially and inseparably related.

Notes and References

1. See Bernstein, Richard : (1983), *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism : Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, p. 8.
2. I have discussed this issue of how the human self evolves out of the various linguistic interactions, where the very evolution of, language is an evolution of the human self and language in turn evolves out of the self-making activities of the self else where. Cf. Sreekumar, N: "Language and the Evolution of the Self", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXIX, No. 2 & 3, April-July 2002, pp 319-33.
3. This issue is discussed in detail at a later section of this paper.
4. Taylor, Charles : (1985), *Human Agency and Language*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 250.
5. Wittgenstein, L : (1961), *Tractates Logico-Philosophicus*, Tr. D.F.Pears and B.F. McGuinness, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Section. 4.002.
6. See Howard, Roy J: (1982), *Three Faces of Hermeneutics*, Berkeley, University of California Press, p. 5.
7. See Fregte Gottlob: (1984), *Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic and Philosophy*, Ed. Brian McGuinness, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, p. 353.
8. Russell, Bertrand: (1992), *An Enquiry Into Meaning and Truth*, London, Routledge, pp. 182-3.
9. Wittgenstein, L: Op. Cit. Section. 2.18.
10. *Ibid.* Section. 4.11.
11. See Rorty, Richard: (1989), *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 5.

12. See, Gadamer, H.G: (1977), *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, (hereafter PH) Trans and Edited by David E. Linge, London, University of California Press, p. 61.
13. *Ibid.* p. 62.
14. See Husserl, Edmund: (1970), *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Tr. David Carr, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, p. 142.
15. See Gadamer, H.G: (1981), *Reason in the Age of Science*, Tr. Frederick G. Lawrence, Cambridge, The MIT Press, p. 50.
16. Gadamer, H.G: *PH*, p. 60.

BHARTṚHARI'S METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

D. N. TIWARI

Interpretation has got a defined meaning with the rise of Hermeneutic circle in Euro-German thoughts and is considered as a method very relevant for uncovering the correct meaning of the text and for avoiding misconception caused by misinterpretations and, thus, correcting our understanding to comprehend the lively meaning of a text or expression in its contextual structure.

Before coming to the discussion on Bhartṛhari's method of interpretation let us clarify the meaning of the terms 'context' and 'text' very popular in Hermeneutical circle. In order to avoid any controversy over my sense of context and text, I have to say that my view of these concepts is based on Bhartṛhari's way of thinking according to which the context of a 'text' is the context of an expression or a sentence in which a word is interpreted. A text is a complete sentence, a complete expression containing arguments, subordinate sentence, words, phrases, etc, and a complete sentence in our view is a complete unit which expresses a complete meaning non-differently in the mind. It is inner, indivisible and ubiquitously given unit of awareness in nature. Meaning non-differently revealed by the sentence is also an indivisible unit, and, hence, there is no possibility of any real division either in the sentence or in its meaning. In Bhartṛhari's terminology the former is *spṛṣṭa* and the latter is *pratibhā* and the two are non-different. The indivisible expression is grammatically analysed¹ for making it understandable to those who can understand it only through piece-meal scheme and then through the synthesis of analysed parts one is helped to understand the indivisible itself. In this sense the whole of the epic *Mahābhārata* or *Rāmāyana* is a single complete sentence comprising subordinate sentences, phrases, words, etc; through which the whole is made understandable to beginners. The situation context, the context of other disciplines concerning subjective or objective mode of reflections are important but as a philosopher we are involved

neither in a subjective reflection having subject as its object, say consciousness or mind nor in an objective reflection having an entity (physiological or psychological) ontic in nature as its object but with reflections on those modes of thinking as object of our reflection. In other words we are concerned with the sentences or the texts of those discipline. Here it is useful to clarify that a sentence is a context in which the meaning of words, phrase, etc; constituting it, is interpreted for a correct understanding of the text but the sentential meaning is not always a contextual meaning. It is a flash of understanding directly revealed either by the text or through the interpretation and analysis of it which serve as instrument in manifesting it. Manifested so, the indivisible sentence reveals the indivisible meaning as a flash of understanding (Pratibhā).

Analysis and interpretation get an importance only if the sentence and the meaning it reveals non-differently in the mind are taken as indivisible units which cannot be understood without analysis and interpretation of the parts in the context of whole i.e. sentence and sentential meaning.

A sentence is clear to the wise but cannot be understood by an ignorant without analysis and interpretation in a piecemeal scheme.² Analysis and interpretation of it, sometimes, is affected by our religious, cultural and other allegiances and, thus, causes the problem of pluri-vocalness and, hence, misconceptions and misunderstandings of meaning in the context of the text.

In order to present Bhartṛhari's idea of interpretation with a contrast to some western philosophers of Hermeneutics, let us start with their ideas for a clear understanding of the science of interpretation.

Gadamer takes interpretation useful for revival of something which had become alien and unavailable due to differences in language and in cultural settings. In very brief, he takes it, specially, as a method for deciphering text having literal and theological meanings. The meaning of a particular text must be interpreted in a way so that it could be understood in the context of a whole and this refers to the ideal of Hermeneutic circle. A part, according to this circle, becomes intelligible only in the context of a whole and equally our understanding of the whole (unity of meaning of the text as a whole) depends upon culminating understanding of the parts.

Dilthey defined philosophy as a condition of interpretation of human experiences. According to his methodological principle, in order to understand an expression we must systematically explore the context in which it stands. For example to understand a religious movement or a philosophical doctrine better we must relate it with the climate of the opinion and the social condition of the time. For example in order to understand Spinoza's philosophy better we have to keep the background of the rise of science and the conflict between different religious sects in 16th and 17th century Europe in mind.

Observing Hermeneutics as the equilibrium of understanding in which subject and object poles of interpretation are reciprocally related Husserl considers interpretation useful for grasping an intentionality other than our own and for grasping a foreign intentionality in such a manner that it can enter into the life-world of subject.

Ricoeur took interpretation as the work of thought which consists in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied in the literal meaning. There is interpretation where there is multiple meaning and it is interpretation that the plurality of meaning is made manifest. He very nicely clarifies that pluri-vocal character of symbols leads to the thesis of plurality of interpretation which consequently leads plurality of self-understanding.

Schleiermacher, as interpreter of Ricoeur, takes interpretation as an act of avoiding misunderstanding and thus unveiling the correctness of understanding. The basic presupposition of early hermeneutics is that interpretation is determined by the context of that which is to be interpreted but Schleiermacher finds the unity of hermeneutics not in context but in procedure of understanding. Totality is not in parts but the parts according to him exist for the whole.

A text, for a *Bhartrhari*, is not confined to written scripts which are only instruments for bounding the text. A text is not always concerned with a specific sociology and history even if in a written form. A text is a given thought, a perpetual being which is revealed in its different decipherings and writings. As a thought it is perpetually significant for all times and places, it is a cognitive being and can be interpreted in different context.

(A) So far the text and its expressive or primary meaning is concerned both of them are flashes and are non-different as the latter is non-differently revealed by the former. The meaning non-differently revealed by the text is a popular meaning and there the problem of interpretation does not arise as it is directly by the text. The problem arises only if -

1. The expressive meaning is not revealed and the expressive meaning is not revealed directly to one who can understand it only through piece-meal scheme.
2. If the speaker uses the language for meanings different from the expressive meaning. Moreover, one is not wise enough to know the intention of the user.
3. If the different interpretations of the text are differing and misleading.
4. If one tries to understand a particular text in a different context.

Interpretation in all the aforementioned conditions is not only significant but also inevitable for a clear understanding of a text. The conditions from one to four will be discussed in due course in the context of contextual meaning of a text. Presently, I confine my observations to the relevance of interpretation in case of the first condition.

- i. The expressive meaning of a sentence is indivisible and those who can understand it only through piece-meal scheme cannot understand the indivisible directly. The interpretation through word meaning is only instrumental in the manifestation of the sentence. Manifested thus it reveals the sentential-meaning non-differently. While interpreting the expressed meaning, an interpreter is required to be free from his religious, cultural and other allegiances namely physiological, psychological, and ontological. If otherwise, the expressive meaning will not be interpreted to the extent of clear and distinct revelation of it.
- ii. The sentence expresses an universal individualized while a word conveys a general universal. The interpretation of a sentential-meaning through the word-meanings in some cases causes misunderstanding. Separate from a sentential meaning the interpretation through word-meanings may provide a meaning different from the sentential - meaning. We may clarify the fact by putting an example given by Punyarāja.³ 'Indorlak sma

*smaravijayina h kant hamulam murārirdignāgānāmmadamalama sībhānji
gandasthālāni. Adyāpyurvīvalaya tilaka! syāmalimnānuliptānyudbhās -
antevadadhavalitam kim yas'obhistvadiyāi h* '. The meaning of the verse
through word-meanings is an abuse (that the glory of the king has whitened
nothing) while it, in case of a sentence, is a praise (that the glory of the king has
glorified everything and those not glorified are so because of their own nature).

- iii. If a text is interpreted through the meaning of words and if any word of the text is left unnoticed, not only the expressive but even the contextual-meaning of the sentence may also be inversed.
- iv. Interpretation through derivation of words, sometimes, leads to a deviation from the expressive-meaning and, hence, to misconception and misunderstanding. While interpreting meaning through derivation, the root of the word must be taken out first and then be interpreted in the light of the text. The derivation must not be arbitrary as it in that case would deviate the interpreters mind from the text.

However, an interpreter of the text should have following rules in the mind while interpreting the text through analysis - synthesis device.

1. The sentence, according to grammarians, in general, and Bhartṛhari, in particular, denotes an action primarily. The primacy of action must be protected in an interpretation. If, otherwise, the meaning of the sentence will be deviated from its purpose. Bhartṛhari has given a number of statements from the Veda. For clarifying the issue, I shall take only two of them, particularly- i. *vṛīhiḥ yajeta* and ii. *Khadire baddhanāti*. He is of the view that the word '*vṛīhiḥ*' and '*khadire*' denote rice and wood post of catechu respectively but if *vṛīhiḥ* and catechu wood-post are not available, respective actions denoted by those statements will not be performed and, thus, there will be a violation of the Vedic command. But this may not occur if these words are taken to denote universal. In the case the provision of a substitute can easily be made and the violation of the Vedic commandment can easily be checked.
2. A command may be in singular number but it should not be confused that it is concerned only with a particular person, place or thing and is useless in context of other persons, etc; because a command is applied universally to all persons, places and things in the same time. For example, the word *Brāhmaṇa* in the sentence '*Brāhmaṇaḥ na hanyāt*' is in singular number and if taken separately

it means a single individual Brāhmin that is 'kill the Brāhmins except one'. This will also be a violation of the spirit of the command. 'Brāhmins should not be killed' can be the true spirit of the command under example only if universal is taken as the meaning of words. Similarly, the word 'kākebhyo' in the expression 'kākebhyo rakṣyatām sarpi'⁴ does not mean mere crows but all those who can destroy curd and this sense is possible only if universal (all the destroyers of the curd) is taken as the meaning of the words.

3. Interpretation of words should be made in the context of sentence. If, otherwise, the interpretation, based on words independently of a sentence may result in opposition, inversion or deviation from the context.
- (B) In section, (A) we have discussed some points in relation to the revelation of expressive meaning of the text and we have seen that text cannot be interpreted because of words without a context due to their pluri-vocal character. The problem of interpretation significantly arises in cases of pluri-vocalness of the words. Let us observe Bhartṛhari's interpretation of contextual meaning of a text. In the connection it has to be kept in mind that Bhartṛhari, unlike the rhetorics of India and to some extent the schools of Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Advaita-Vedānta, does not accept the concept of triad of powers (*abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā* and *vyāñjanā*) in a word. He is allergic to the notion of these powers and their function in interpreting synonymous and polysememic words and is of the view that synonyms and polysemic situations can well be met only on the basis of expressive power of a word, which illuminates all meanings namely expressive, intended and non-intended. He is well aware of the fact that interpretation gets inevitable significance in cases of synonym and polyseme in language, as they demand interpretation in the context of expressive meaning, which serves as the basis of other meanings - intended and non-intended. Let us observe his interpretation of synonyms.

Synonyms, according to Bhartṛhari, are all different words expressive of different meanings. For example, synonymous words *Agni*, *Vahni* and *Purohita* are used generally for a single meaning 'fire' but they as Bhartṛhari observes are separate words expressing their own meanings. The word '*Agni*' denotes that which transforms everything, offered in it, in its own form. The word '*Vahni*' is used for conveying a sense of that which carries offerings for the deities and the word '*Purohita*' is used for denoting that which is kept always ahead in all

religious performances. Nevertheless, ignoring these differences involved in the use of these words, it is generally assumed that all of these words refer to the same substance "fire".⁵

Now coming to observe Bhartṛhari's method of interpretation of multiple meanings of a word, it can be said that he, very like a philosopher of Hermeneutics, when takes a concept for interpretation, puts forth different interpretations of the theorists popular at his time, analyses them and access them separately to clarify as to how these interpretation are successful in approaching these concepts and to unveil those problems left unnoticed by those interpretations. He ultimately furnishes his own verdict based on interpretation of the concept as revealed by language in communication. For example he has furnished at least twelve sort of theories defining the word meaning, eight sorts of theories defining sentence and six sorts of theories defining sentential meaning. He analyses and examines their merits and demerits and finally provides his own view on them. These different theories put forth for observing the concepts given in a history concerning different systems popular at his time. Different theories according to his own holistic view are different interpretation of the concepts, which are ultimately of awareness in nature. Some interpretations are based on syntactical approach, some others are semantically and still some others try to accommodate both of the approaches. Finally he comes to the point that they all are interpretation of the concept which is a cognitive being revealed directly by the language. More interpretation of it is possible because of its cognitive nature and all those interpretations are instrumental in clarifying the concept and providing with the wisdom in making the concept apprehended in its clarity and distinctness. On the issue of utility of observing a concept through different interpretation he very boldly writes "*Prajñā vivekaṁ labhate bhinnairāgam dars'anaiḥ. Kiyadvā s'akyamunnetum svatarko anudhavatā*". (What excellence one can achieve by going through the interpretation of one's allegiance. The observation of different interpretations helps in providing with wisdom.)⁶ Viewing *Bhartṛhari's* method of interpretation of polysemic or multiple meaning of a word in a contextual structure we find that he has approached the problem in the light of different theories chiefly categorized in three, an account of which is given as follows:-⁷

1. *The view of s'abdaekatvavādins* :- According to the view same word by *s'adopacāra* and *arthopacāra* conveys different meanings.
 - (a) *S'adopacāra* :- The same word used for different meanings is taken different conveyors of those meanings with the differences of popularity and unpopularity of the use. The word, in those cases, does not actually change or become many if treated differently through the ground of its popular and unpopular uses.
 - (b) *Arthopacāra* :- At par with *s'adopacāra*, this theory, in order to avoid an irregular relation between a word and meaning, accepts two sorts of *arthopacāra* by which meaning of the same word is treated differently.
 - (i) *Svarūpopacāra* :- The cause of many of a word is the attribution of the form (meaning) to some other form with some similarity and, thus, the meaning of a word is changed or reversed. The primary or secondary of the meanings of the word is decided on the basis of popular and unpopular or expressive and attributed use of the form of the word.
 - (ii) *Vāhyārthopacāra* :- The word expresses universal, which, in an intended use, is imposed on other universals and individuals by some similarity. The word, in those cases, remains the same. Its meanings is treated differently.
2. *The view of s'abdanānātvavādins* :- Unlike *s'abdaekatvavādins*, the theorists of this view accept plurality of the word at par with the plurality of meanings. For example, the word 'cow' is an independent expresser of the meaning 'cowness' and is separate from the word 'cow' used for a cowherd (*vāhika*). The difference, according to this theory, is real and the unity of these words is imagined by resemblance due to some similarity. The primary and secondary of them is decided on the basis of popularity and unpopularity of the use of words.
3. *Holistic view of Vākyas'abdavādins* :- According to the holistic view of *Bhartṛhari* a unit or a complete meaning is expressed by the sentence which is of awareness character. A letter or a word if, in a certain case a complete meaning (extincting the expectancy of a complete meaning (extincting the expectancy of a complete meaning) is revealed by them also serves as a sentence. The words are an outcome of artificial analysis of the indivisible sentence and then their meanings for grammatical purpose are decided. The analysis of an indivisible, for *Bhartṛhari*, is only a remedy for making the indivisible understandable to beginners but the parts acquired by analysis are considered real for grammatical purposes. The parts, as they express their indivisible

meanings, are also indivisible units, though, they for grammatical purpose are also divided in roots and suffixes, prefixes, etc. and their meanings are decided accordingly.

According to Bhart r hari the word is naturally fit to express several meanings like a lamp which illuminates several objects desired or undesired of which that which is directly revealed is the expressed (*Mukhyārtha*) and, hence, primary and other meanings which are known by imposition of the primary meaning is intended or secondary and those non-intended are known by closeness to the expressive meaning. We have clearly discussed the expressive meaning earlier and, hence, require no repetition. The context presently is to discuss the contextual meanings or pluri-vocal words in regard to which interpretation gets high significance. Bhart r hari has discussed different rules of different theories in course of discussing contextual meaning of words, an account of which is given as follows :-

1. *Arthaprakarapas'abđāntarasanniddhāna (Purpose, situation-context and proximity with another word)* :- Extinction of expectancy for a complete meaning is accomplished through or interpretation of meanings of word is required to be done in view of these factors. These factors also help us to determine the cognition of the intention involved in using the word. For example the meaning dull and stupid person (*vāhika*) of the word 'cow' in the expression '*gauḥ pustakam paṭhati*' is accomplished by means of the purpose (referring a dull and stupid *vāhika*) situation context (reading) and with the proximity of another word (*Pustakam*). It is by interpretation through these rules that we determine the meaning 'person' of the word cow in the context of the expression '*Gauḥ pustakam paṭhati*'.
2. *Nimitti (base and based relation)* :- Primary or expressed meaning for the theorists accepting this rule of interpretation is the base of those meanings on which it is imposed and the primary and secondary of the meanings are decided on the basis of popularity and unpopularity of the use of words. Bhart r hari has criticized this criterion as unsteady for deciding the contextual meaning for in many cases the word is used in primary sense in both of the meanings of the word. For example the words *ārāta* and *purā* are equally used in sense of far and near both of the meanings of these words are primary.

3. *More or less of the properties of the objects indicated by the word (Nyunādhikyabhāva) :-* Those who accept external objects as the denotation of words consider the sense of more or less of the properties of the objects indicated by the word as a rule of interpretation of the primary and secondary meaning in a contextual frame. For example, there is indication of more properties of cow when the word is used for the animal 'cow' but conveys a secondary meaning when the word 'cow' is used for a cowherd (vāhika). Bhartṛhari finds this criterion as unsteady and unreliable as in some cases conveyance of less of properties is regarded popular and more of properties as unpopular and it is difficult to decide the degrees of properties by the word itself and, finally, the words neither denote degree nor there is a context of degree in all of its uses.
4. *Similarity :-* A word, according to this theory is pluri-vocal either by the powers vested in them or by exclusion of differences and resemblance. It, for Bhartṛhari, is pluri-vocal because of imposition of the expressive meaning of the word on other meanings by similarity and even dissimilarity based on perception, inference, etc.
5. *Viparyaya (Inversion) :-* In some contextual uses a word is used for an inverted meaning. Puṇyārāja has mentioned inversion by imposition (adhyāropa) and it by identification (adhyasāya). According to his interpretation inversion by identification of the meaning with an other meaning may be the ground for a change of meaning but may not be the ground for a distinction of primary and secondary signification because no occasion is left if inverted meaning is identical to the primary meaning. There is occasion for difference between the two and, hence, for similarly in case of inversion by imposition.
6. *Rūpas'akti :-* The words are fixed in a fixed form and potency for a fixed action. If the word is used with the consideration of rūpa (form) and s'akti (action) both, the meaning the word expresses is primary.
7. The words popular in their forms, for example, the words *gauḥ*, *yusmat*, *mahat*, if added with suffixed 'cvi' conveys secondary and without 'cvi' it expresses primary meanings.
8. Generally, it is taken that the word if used for a popular meaning conveys primary and the meaning known by imposition of the primary is secondary. But the case is different in case of name-words. Clarifying his position on name-words Bhartṛhari remarks it is not true to say that as the form of the words changes

with the difference of causes (*Nimitta*) there should be augment of *sut* with the word *Haris'chandra* (name of a prehistoric sage) but there is no case of augment of *sut* (*s'*) if the word is used for an individual named (other than the sage) and, thus, the form of the word should be *Harichandra*. According to him, there is augment of *sut* (*s'*) if the *Harishchandra* is used for a name of a prehistoric sage and the '*sut*' remains with the word even if the word is used for human individual. The word used for the sage is popular and, hence, conveys primary meaning while it for human individual is secondarily used.

(c) *Nāntariyakārthas* (Non-intended meanings) :- Apart from primary and secondary meanings Bhart ṛ hari has discussed a third category of meanings known as *nāntariyakārtha*. They are called so because they are known by nearness or closeness of the primary meaning of the word and because they, different from intended meanings are known by interpretation of cases where the primary and secondary meanings of the word are not conducive to a particular uses as we find mostly in satirical, poetrical and ironical uses of the language. **Specific rules for interpreting non-intended meanings and determination of their and secondary status in uses** : Bhart ṛ hari has given at least four different rules for interpreting non-intended meanings, an account of which is given as follows :

Guṇapradhanatāvipyaya (Inversion of primary and secondary meanings):

In some uses, the sense of primary and secondary of the meanings of a word is not expected, and, thus, the gender, number, person, tense, etc., are exchanged. For example, the word '*divyati*' in the expression '*Akṣaira divyati*' is used in present tense, first person, singular number, but, as there is no expectancy of primary and secondary, its meaning is exchanged for any number, person etc. which are not expected in the use '*Akṣaira divyati*'. This exchanged number, etc. is *nāntariyakārtha*.

According to *vaiyakaraṇas*, the meaning of the verb is considered as primary and the secondary meaning of the words '*ākṣika*' and '*divyati*' in the expression '*Akṣaira divyati*', there is inversion of meaning of these words. In other words, the verb (*divyati*) in expression '*Akṣaira divyati*' is secondary and the agent (*ākṣika* -the person who plays with dice), is primary. As agent is primary in the use and verb is secondary, there is exchange of primary and secondary meanings which results out of non-expectancy of the primary and secondary

meanings of the words *ākṣika* (agent) and *divyati* (verb) Thus, the meaning of a word which is not expected in a use is taken as *nāntarīyakārtha* of that word.

2. *Padārthakades'āvivakṣā* (Non Expectancy of a part of meaning) :

Just as a fish-eater, though he eats the flesh up and throws the scales and thorns of fish out, does not bring a fish without its scales and thorns inseparably associated with fish, similarly, the word expresses its primary meaning and other meanings like gender, number, person, time etc., which are not expected in the use of the word, are also known on account of close proximity with primary meaning for which a word is considered naturally fit.

3. *Sakalapadārthāvivakṣā*. (Non-Expectancy of the complete meaning of the word) :

The word expresses its Primary meaning. In some uses this expressive meaning is not expected (*avivakṣita*). In such cases, the meaning associated with the primary meaning is taken as the meaning of the word. For example, the primary meaning of the word '*Ardha Hr̥asvam*' (half of a short vowel) in the sutra '*Tasyādita udattamardha hr̥svam*', is not expected, and, so the non-stated meaning-Matra-long and prolonged vowel apart from short vowel, is taken as the meaning of the word.

4. *Upātāpadārthāparītyāgenaivānyārthopalakṣaṇa* :-

In some uses, though the primary meaning of the word is not given up, other non-stated meanings inseparably connected with the primary meaning are understood by implication made on the basis of primary meaning of the word. For example, the primary meaning of the word 'sun' in the expression '*gantavyam dr̥śyatām sūryaḥ*' (see, the departing sun), is not given up but non-stated meaning 'time' (connected with sun), is understood by implication (*upalakṣaṇa*). Similarly, *Upaghātaka sāmānya* (destroyers in general-cat, dog, etc.) is the *nāntarīyakārtha* known by implication made on the basis of the expressive meaning of the word 'crow' used in the expression '*Kākebhyo rakṣyatām sarpi*' (protect the curd from crows). In some cases, many meanings-non-expected, non-stated but closely connected with the primary meaning of the word, are understood. For example, washing the plates, cleaning the pots & hands, etc., though non-stated by the word 'eat' in the expression '*Bhojanamasyopādyatām*' (give food to him), are also understood as they are

accessories to and, hence, closely connected with serving food.

General Rules for deciding the meaning of a word in a sentence :

Apart from the rules and factors, mentioned in earlier pages, for the determination of intended and non-intended meanings of a word in a text, Bhart ṛ hari , for the first time in the history of philosophy, has furnished more than fifteen factors for determination of contextual meaning in cases of ambiguity and plurality of meaning of a word. Perhaps, these factors containing syntactical, semantical, psychological and grammatical elements were popular at his time among different theorists of meaning and Bhart ṛ hari has given a comprehensive list comprising them, as they all are important in context of determining contextual meaning. Almost all later philosophers belonging to different schools have borrowed some or other factors for determining meaning from Bhart ṛ hari' list . The verses enumerating those factors read as follows :-

Vākyāt prakaraṇādarthādaucityād des'akālataḥ , S'abdārthaḥ pravibhajyante na rūpādeva kevalāt. Sansargoviprayogas'asāhcaryamvirodhitā , Arthaḥ prakaraṇam līṅgam s'abdasya yānyasya sannidhiḥ . Sāmarthyamauciti des'ah kālo vyaktiḥ svarādayaḥ , S'abdārtha syānavacchede vis'eṣasmṛtihetavaḥ . (VP. 314-316.)⁸

There is no problem for the determination of meaning of a word in a sentence if we confined to the expressive or primary meaning of the word. The problem arises only if the expressive meanings is not conducive in that use. The secondary and tertiary (nāntarī – yakārtha) meaning of the words are decided on the basis either of imposition of the primary or by its nearness to it respectively. What specific intended or non-intended meaning in a given use is to be taken is decided on the basis of those aforementioned factors. Evaluating the nature and the function performed by those determinants, it can well be said that they comprise syntactical, semantical, grammatical and psychological elements useful for determining the contextual meaning. Moreover, meaning, for him, is always the meaning of a word and other factors are only instrumental in determining the meaning of a word in a context. Context, for Bhart ṛ hari is not a meaning-expressing unit, though it helps in the determination of the contextual-meaning. Thus Bhart ṛ hari's philosophy of contextual meaning of a word should not be observed from the point of view of Naiyāyikas or from the western view of contextual-meaning which consider context in some cases as a meaning-conveying force.

Interpretation as a philosophical problem invites our attention towards the idea of language and meaning because of the reason that a text, for a philosopher, is confined to the language and its meanings. Now the point for our consideration is to observe what idea of language and meaning makes interpretation legitimately possible. This problem has been left unnoticed by the Hermeneutic circle of west. There are chiefly two sorts of thinking about language and meaning.

1. That language is that which stands by proxy for the things meant. It is the reference to a referent where a referent indicated by language is meaning. The followers of this view take the text as ideal, a transcendental signified. In case of a text as a transcendental signified the interpreter may approach the text approximately but not exactly because the former is an ideal for an interpretation. What the interpretations tell is not the transcendental signified but as it appears to us and thus the problem of a difference of reality and appearance arises. One cannot deny the possibility of subjectiveness in interpretation also. In such a circumstances the interpretation may be the interpretation in the context of a text but not of the text as such.

2. That language is expressive by nature. It expresses first itself (when manifested by language-tokens which are instrumental in the manifestation only) and then reveals its meaning non-differently in the mind. It is easy to observe that the text in this theory is revealed in the mind and then we interpreted that, which is revealed, to make it clearly apprehensive to other. In this view the problem of difference of reality and appearance does not arise because the being of interpretation and the interpreted being both are cognitive in nature. It is the theory with which *Bhart ṛ hari* is concerned.

In this regard it is necessary to clarify that the problem is not to interpret the context but to interpret the meaning in context of a text. A context, for *Bhart ṛ hari*, is not the meaning of language but an *ultra virus*. However, it help in our search of meaning in life world. The interpretation of a text in a socio-historical and psychological mode of reflection is not a philosophical activity, though it may be of a high significance for those disciplines as those mode of reflections may be subjective and controversial. A philosophical reflection is neither subjective nor objective but cognitive in the sense that it is a reflection on those modes of reflection also. The search of meaning, revealed by the text

through the context of different interpretations given in the history, is a philosophical activity not because it is concerned with socio-psycho-historical vindication of the meaning but because of the interpretation of it as revealed by the text and its different interpretations. It is a philosophical activity as it is concerned with the interpretation of the cognitive being of the text. As it is a cognitive being there is all and open possibility to interpret the cognitive being with different allegiances and without allegiances and all are significant in their concern but all are not philosophical. Only the interpretation of the text without any allegiance is philosophical as it discloses the being as figured in the mind by text. I do not hesitate in saying that interpretation with religious or cultural allegiances are philosophically blind to see the text and are not cognitive. It is to note here that it is not true to say that all sorts of interpretation are cognitive and that a cognitive interpretation is not lively and sharing the life-world. Even if a religion or cultural text is given to us, we, as a philosopher, have a different vocation- different from those involved in objective and subjective mode of reflections in which the object is an ontic entity whether subjective or objective. This does not mean that we underestimate or do not mind the socio-historical values intertwine with language. We give them due place not as a context but as given virtue of language of human communities. Communication is accomplished by language itself free from and independently of our allegiances. It is our allegiances that causes the problem of pluri-vocalness of it and, hence, of their interpretation in a context of a text or of a situation. Here in order to justify my point I am providing, here below, an example given by Bhartṛhari in the light of his commentator Helārāja. "*Gantavyam dr̥ś'yaṁ sūryaḥ*" (see, the departing sun)⁹. The expressive meaning of the sentence is quite clear to all, the speaker and the hearer, but it is due to different allegiances that some may mean a great man is died, a student may mean 'It is time to give his study a rest, to dancer it may mean the time to get prepared for her performance and to a cowherd it is high time to herd the cows in and so on. Now the question to a hermeneutic philosopher - are all of the meanings to the sentence 'the sun has set' taken by different persons not in the context of the text? Are all the meanings not in the context of different allegiances? If they answer the former question in positive, there will be no possibility of uncovering of a determinate meaning. Any attempt in this way will give birth to a controversy. If the latter question is

replied in yes the purpose of interpretation in the context of a text will itself be defeated.

Interpretation of a text does not mean exactly that it is an activity to show that latter meanings are implication of the former of that interpretation has to relate the latter with the former or that they are imposition of the latter.

Interpretation, for a Bhartṛhariān, is a cognitive activity by which attempt is made to approach distinctly the popular meaning and the meanings on which it is alleged i.e. the expressive and the hidden meanings of the text and even so on the basis of the being as figures in the mind by language (text). This cognitive interpretation, being a reflection on the beings of the text as revealed in the mind by it, is a philosophical activity on one hand and as it approaches the being in the context of the text it includes the vindication of meaning of life-world on the other hand.

Bhartṛhari is well aware of the freedom of human mind in using the language in different ways. The freedom of mind in using the language in different senses is possible not only by the power of mind or by three different powers (abhīdhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā) in a word as Rhetorics assume but because of expressive nature of language. The language reveals a number of meanings out of which that which is directly revealed in the mind is primary while those known by implication of it are secondary meanings. The meaning which is neither primary nor secondary but known by the nearness of the primary is non-intended meaning of words. Thus in order to interpret the pluri-vocalness of words we would not require to accept the three powers, vested in a word, out of which the second power operates when the first power is not conducive and the third power operates when the second is not conducive. It is very difficult to decide which one is operative in a case and in every verbal cognition there will be dependency on deciding the operative power first and then to cognize and this leads to conclusion that verbal cognition is indirect or by memory or by inference. We will involve in the problem of deciding the operative powers (*s'akti*) and justification for them. They are not established in their own ground and the word, being confined only to verbal utterances/noises will not be cognitive base of them. These all problems do not arise if we interpret the pluri-vocalness of words only on the basis of verbal-cognition as figured in the mind by the text and their intended and non-intended meanings having the expressive meaning of

the word as substratum of them. This theory is successful not only in distinguishing the philosophical hermeneutics from other sorts of it on one hand but also in establishing interpretation as a cognitive activity par excellence on the other hand.

The text, according to him, is eternal truths of awareness in nature. It is received directly by the seers who for the welfare of the world community imparted them orally to their pupils and the process of imparting continuously formed a tradition. The purpose of interpretation is to bring out the meaning of the text followed continuously by the tradition.

Expressing his resentment over some of the *smṛtis* misinterpreting the text and somehow or the other forming a tradition of their own *Bhartṛhari* says that such *smṛtis* resulted out of the mala fide intention and allegiance of the author of the *smṛtis*. The *smṛtis* some times seem contradictory on the same issue. For example, some author of *smṛti* forbid killing of a *Brāhmin* as it causes demerit while some others prescribe killing of a *Brāhmin* as essential in the *Puruṣameha* sacrifice as it promotes to heavenly abodes. The reason, as he says, is the allegiance of the malignant author of the *smṛti* to his incendiary longings.

Explaining the difference between the *s'ruti* (text) and the *smṛtis* (probably interpretation) *Bhartṛhari* accepts that there is eternity, in the sense of continuity of the meanings of both. However, he notices following differences between them.

1. There is no part in the *s'ruti*. It is indivisible knowledge having no sequence of verbal-noises and letters in all the times and spaces while *smṛtiyān* are interpretations of the former on the basis of whole-part division.¹⁰

2. *S'ruti* are authorless; they are knowledge revealed in the minds of the seers while *smṛtiyān* are authored either in the form of poetry or of prose on the basis of the knowledge of the favor and contact of the meaning of the words and the indications lying in the Vedas.¹¹

3. *S'ruti* are the seer's knowledge and the seers are free all sorts of allegiances while this is not exactly the same in case of different *smṛtis* as their

authors are not free from religious, cultural and other sorts of allegiances.

So far the authenticity of the knowledge by the *srutiyaṇ* and *smarṭiyaṇ* is concerned *Bhartṛhari* has clarified the issue on the basis of an example of the knowledge by *Apabhraṅśas* in cases of which the correct word is revealed first in the mind after hearing them and then the meaning is revealed non-differently by the correct word. The use of incorrect words may also have a tradition and the meaning may also be known by them but in every case the use of the correct form of the word is recommended by Indian grammarians for the sake not only of knowing the meaning for which the word is used in the tradition of the grammarians but for acquiring merit by using the word as it is used in the tradition of seers (*Ṣiṣṭas*). Seers' use of the words is free from religious, cultural and other allegiances on one hand and is based on the world of communication on the other hand. No meaning, no interpretation is well founded and well established if it not based on communication or if it contradicts the communication. Communication is accomplished even by incorrect uses but in those cases, as *Bhartṛhari* thinks, the real or correct form of the word is revealed first by the utterances of the incorrect forms and then its meaning is revealed by it non-differently.

The meaning of the text, for *Bhartṛhari*, is that which is revealed directly by it in the mind and, thus, a veridical cognition. As it is directly revealed- being there is no possibility of any confusion and fear of confusing verbal cognition as memory or inferential cognition. A text is a revealed being, a complete unit of awareness in nature. Different interpretations of it are required to help those who can understand it only through them. The text is a underlying unity or a cognitive base of the device of interpretations through which an interpreter tries to make the text understandable to those who can understand it only in a context. Thus, the theory provides a cognitive basis not only of interpretation of the text but of a proper estimation of language in a cognition by taking revealed beings as its object and acquirement of wisdom as its aim.

Notes and References

1. For a detailed account of nature and role of grammatical-analysis, see my paper entitled 'Bhartṛhari on grammatical analysis' Darshana International, Vol. XXXX, No. 1-4, Moradabada, U.P.
2. According to Bhartṛhari's philosophy all words generally mean universal but can be interpreted to mean individual or universal as per the context. The contextual meaning of a word must be decided in the context of the sentence so as to preserve the unity of the textual meaning. For a detailed account of the issue see my paper entitled 'Bhartṛhari on single-word expressions and subordinate sentences'. Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, April 1997, PP 197-216.
3. Pūṇyārāja quotes this verse on Vp. 2/247.
4. VP. 2/312.
5. For a clear account of Bhartṛhari's interpretation of synonymous words see, my paper entitled 'Bhartṛhari philosophy of relation between the word and the meaning' JICPR, Vol. XI, No. 2, Jan - April 1994, PP. 50-51.
6. Vākyapadīya ; 2/484.
7. The account given here is based on Vākyapadīya 2/250-312.
8. A brief account of some factors mentioned in those verses is given here below:

i) *Vākyāt* (Sentence) - The syntactical structure of the complete sentences comprising words-nominal, verbs, means, etc; is interpreted as a synthesis of qualified and qualifiers and 'whether a word in a sentence stands in capacity of a qualifier or of a qualified' is decided on the basis of the sentence. This is what *Bhartṛhari*, perhaps, wants to say by the use of the term '*vākyāt*'. In order to make the point clear Pūṇyārāja, his commentator, has given the example of the word, '*bhīṣma*' used in the sentence. "*Kaṭam karoti bhīṣmamudāram dars'anīyam* (He makes a splendid and charming mat). The word '*bhīṣma*' in the sentence under example is not used a substantive but as an adjective, which qualifies the accusative 'mat' (a qualifier of the

action 'karoti'). Similarly the word '*karma*' is generally used for 'action but 'in the given *sūtra* (sentence) '*Karmaṇidvitiyā*' (Pāṇini 2/3/2) it stands for accusation' is decided by the *sūtra* itself.

ii) **Prakaraṇa (context)** : According to Mīmāṃsakas, the context helps in the implication of the meaning for which the word is not spoken, but, according to the Vaiyākaraṇas, context is not a meaning conveying, rather, a meaning conveying unit, for them, is a word. The meaning '*pidhehi*' or '*udaghāṭaya*' is known by the word '*dvāram*' in accordance with context (Vp. 2/334). In *vyākaraṇa* the meaning of the word '*karaṇa*' in the *sūtra* '*kartṛkaraṇyostṛtiyā*' (Pāṇini 2/3/18) is 'a means to an action' and if the word is used in the context of '*s'abda vair kalahābhra kaṇvameghebhyaḥ karaṇe*' (Pāṇini 3/1/17).

iii) **Aucitya (Propriety)** : Fitness of the use of the word in a sentential structure helps to determine the meaning of the word. (Puṇyārāja 2/216). He gives the example of the verse "*yas'ca nimbam paras'unām yas'cainam madhusarpiṣā yas'cainam gandhamālyābhyām*, sarvasva kaṭureva saḥ". It is propriety of the means-respectively an axe, honey and flower-garland on the basis of which they are taken as associated with their respective actions - cuts, irrigates and offers. The meaning of the verse under example is a condemnation of a mean person and this condemnation is known by the propriety of the use of the words in that very syntactical structure.

iv) **Des'a (place)** :- in some cases word indicating place serves as a determinant of the contextual meaning of a word. For example, the word '*dhvārikāyām*' in the expression "*Hariḥ dhvārikāyām*" helps in deciding the meaning of the word *Hari* as *Krishṇa*, the hero of the epic *Mahābhārata* the kingdom of whom was *Dhvārikā*. Even when the particular place is not indicated in an expression the indication by direction helps to locate the meaning. For example, the particular place in the expression '*Mathurāyāḥ prācīnādudīcīnādvā nagarādāgacchāmi*' is not mentioned but the mention of direction 'North-East from Mathurā' helps to determine the meaning of the word '*nagarāt*' as *Pāṭaliputra* (now *Patnā*), which is a particular place in the North-East of Mathurā.

v) **Kāla (Time)** :- The meaning of the word '*pataṅga*' in the expression '*Dr̥s'yatām pataṅgaḥ*' is sun if the expression is addressed in daytime otherwise a grosshopper if the same expression is uttered during night.

vi) **Sansarga (Association)** :- The meaning of a word is determined on the basis of the meaning of another word associated with the former. For example, the word 'dhenu' generally means a cow that gives milk. The same word when used associated with other words, for example, *sakis'orā dhenu*, *savatsādhenu*, *sabarkarādhenu*, *sakarbhādhenu* its meaning is decided respectively as a mere, cow, she-goat and she-camel on the basis of its association to ensuing words.

vii) **Viprayoga (dissociation)** :- Dissociation functions as a determinant only in the cases where association is already reestablished. For example the meaning of word '*dhenuḥ*' in the expressions like '*akis'orādhenuḥ*' is decided by the dissociation of different words linked with the word dhenu. Again, if someone calls '*avarkarādhenuḥ āniyatām*' (bring a she-goat without kid), the hearer takes it to be a command for bringing the 'she goat' without its kid.

viii) **Sāhacarya (Resemblance)** :- Resemblance means companionship. In usual communications, the meaning 'ox' is known by its resemblance to word '*godvitiyam*' (next one of the class of the cow) when the sentence *godvitiyamānya* ' is uttered.

ix) **Virodha (Opposition)** :- It is on the basis of opposition that the meaning of the word '*Arjuna*' in the expression '*Rāmāṛjuna*' is decided as *Paras'urāma* ' who killed *sahasrāṛjuna* and not *Rāma*, the hero of the epic *Rāmāyana*.

x) **Linga (indication)** :- Puṇyārāja clarifies that the meaning of the word '*aktāḥ*' (wetted) in the expression '*aktāḥs'arkarā upadadhātu*' (he places wet pebbles round the sacrificial place) as wetted with clarified butter is cognized on the basis of indication made in another expression '*Tejo vai ghr̥tam*' (clarified butter is a glow).

xi) **S'abdāntara sannidhāna (Proximity of another word)** :- The meaning of a word is determined in some cases, on the basis of syntactical

proximity of it with the word 'pathati (reads) in the expression 'gauh pathati'.

xii) **Sāmarthya (Capacity)** :- The meaning of the word 'ardham' (half), in neuter gender (ardhamnapuṣakam) (Pāṇini 2/2/273), is determined as equal division (*sampravibhāga*) but when used in masculine-gender as in the expression 'Tad grāmasya ardhm Labheta' 'its meaning on account of its gender (Masculine) is cognized as a certain portion of the village (*grāmaika des'amātram*) but, if taken in neuter gender, it means' '*sampravibhāga* (equal division of the village).

xiii) **Dvara (Accent)** :- The accent of the word involved also helps in the determination of the meaning of the word. For example; we take the popular expression 'Indras'atrurvardhasva'. If the accent is there on the former word 'Indra,' it conveys the meaning- Indra, the killer-but if the accent is there on the next word 's'atru', it conveys the sense of the killer of Indra.'

Apart from these factors Bhartṛhari has given a number of grammatical rules helpful for deciding the meaning of a word. Derivation of roots/stems identification of prefixes, suffixes also helps in the determination of the meaning of a word in a text. For example, the word 'as'va' as a substantive means a horse but as a verb formed by root 's'vi' in past tense by the sūtra 'Tuos'vigativṛddhayaḥ' means swelled or increased. The identification of 'na' and 'ṇa' in the words 'pranāyaka' and 'praṇayaka' helps to decide their meanings as the place where the hero has gone' and 'the agent of the action' respectively.

9- VP. 2/310.

10. *Anādimavyavacchinnām s'rutimāhurakartṛkām.*

S'iṣṭairnibadhyamānā tu na vyavacchidyate smṛtiḥ. VP. 1/144.

11. *Avibhāgādvivṛtānāmabhikhyā svapnavacchrutau.*

Bhāvatattvam tu vijñāya liṅgebhyo vihitā smṛtiḥ. VP. 1/145.

RELIGION AND COMMUNALISM

SUDIPTA DUTTA ROY



In India, a wide variety of religions have always existed side by side since centuries. Not only is India the birthplace of different religions, it is also the land where religions from far and wide regions of the world have come and made their places amongst others. It was more or less a peaceful co-existence of all faiths. However, the scenario started changing rapidly, particularly in the twentieth century with the outburst of large-scale communal riots. Under the present circumstances, one of the questions that comes to the forefront is : Is religion the underlying cause of communal outbursts? The present study attempts to get an answer through an analysis of what religion actually means and what its relationship with communalism is.

The term religion is of Latin origin. The Latin term 'religio' denotes the sense of binding together. In Indian (Hindu) context, the word 'Dharma' also conveys the same meaning - dharayati iti dharma. Religion or Dharma binds people together. It also provides them with a system of beliefs, rituals, institutions, traditions and a sense of the sacred. The core of religion is its spirituality, its philosophy of life and soul, and its quest for ultimate reality which is suprarational and metaphysical. This very introduction makes it evident that communal approach does not even remotely concern itself with such ideas. Communalism is involved with purely mundane issues like political or economic interests. While religion represents only one aspect of complex human life, communalism subscribes to the view that it is religion which constitutes the identity of people. The communalists claim that all other distinctions of people in respect of social, cultural, political or linguistic issues are to be made on the basis of their religion only. Hence the followers of a religion, they preach, share not only common religious beliefs, but also common secular interests, i.e. common economic, political, social and cultural interests. Communalism thus starts with separation of people on the basis of religion.

On the other hand, no religion per se incorporates the feeling of separatism. For example, there is a misconception about Islam that it is intolerant of other faiths, and encourages communal discord. However, if we go through the Quran meticulously, we come across such verses as the following : “For every one of you we appointed a law and a way. And if Allah had pleased he would have made you a single people, but that he might try you in what he gave you. So vie with one another in virtuous.”¹ It can be explained as follows : Allah has made people with different ways and laws. He did so because he wants to test whether people with divergences can live amicably with each other. What matters is doing virtuous deeds, not assertion of superiority of one’s faith, culture, creed or race. Hence Quran emphasizes unity of mankind but not uniformity. Quran also recognizes the importance of the approach for harmony in a multi-religious society. So it says : “Say : We believe in Allah and in that which has been revealed to us, and in that which was revealed to Abraham, and Ishmael and Issac and Jacob and the tribes, and in that which was given to Mosses and Jesus....”² We find the same line of thought in Hinduism also. The Upanishads which constitute the very foundation of Hinduism unequivocally proclaim - Truth is one although there are different interpretations of it (*Ekam sad viprah bahudha vadanti*).

Vivekananda provides us with a modern interpretation of the ancient vedantic religion. In order to make it practical, he emphasizes the importance of morality and moral behaviour. Religion for him means leading life in such a way that helps us to manifest truth, goodness and beauty in our thoughts, words and deeds. Stripping Hindu religion of all its narrowness and rigidity, he lifts it to the status of a universal religion. However, by universal religion, he does not mean an amalgam of the best elements of the different religious systems. The import of his universal religion is that one must stick to one’s religion and yet feel the underlying bond of unity among all religions. In his view, the yogas constitute the practical means for attaining the goal of religion. He clarifies that the practice of yogas does not ask you to deliver your reason into hands of priests or to give your allegiance to any superhuman messenger. Yoga tells you to cling to your reason and to take the work in your own hands. He shows that just as every physical science is a pursuit for exploring the unity of all phenomena, similarly the search of religion is aimed at the unity of all existence.

We find similar direction in Radhakrishnan's view of religion. According to him, the crucial feature of religion is a universality which embraces all view points. This is not merely indifference to the many religions, but a tolerance which "follows from the conviction that the Absolute Reality is a mystery of which no more than a fraction has ever yet been penetrated."³

Thus we find the communal approach to religion as a mark of identity asserting difference and separation to be diagonally opposite to the actual religious approach which emphasizes the realization of unity in diversity.

There is hardly any instance of a truly religious person being intolerant of other faiths or beliefs. Sri Ramakrishna says that a truly religious man should think that other religions are also so many paths leading to the Truth.

That communalism has no necessary relation with religion becomes evident from the following considerations. All of us know that there were many leaders of the country who were deeply religious but nobody can blame them for having any communal trend. On the other hand, there are outstanding examples of some political leaders who espoused the communal cause, notwithstanding the fact that they had very little to do with religious faith.

Even though religious symbols, mythology and terminology are widely used in communal propaganda, communalists make no attempt at religious reform. They are not in the least concerned with harmonizing religious beliefs with scientific discoveries. Their sole interest is to mobilize the followers of a faith against a usually imaginary threat. For example, the study of the Bhiwandi riots of 1984 and the Pune riots of 1982, carried out by the Centre for Rural Research and Industrial Development, Chandigarh, reveals the following : "In Bhiwandi and Pune cities, the generally prevailing impressions among the Hindus about the Muslims are : Islam is devouring Hinduism. Islam is a militant religion Muslims want to numerically outnumber Hindus through conversion and the violation of the small family norms so as to establish another Pakistan in India.

Similarly, impressions which are prevalent among sections of the Muslim group about Hindus in Bhiwandi and Pune are as follows : Except Islam, all religions

are adulterated. Superstition is the nickname of Hinduism. Hindus are stingy and moneyminded...”⁴

Such studies of different individual cases of communal riots brings to light how by a skilful manipulation of the religious sentiments of a community, the communalists try to achieve their own political, economic and cultural aspirations. The communalist accent is on the separateness of the religious groups rather than on the factors integrating them together as one people of the country. While religion as a framework of values has the potentiality of bringing order to social life, it is being used for just the opposite purpose by the communal ideologues.


The preceding analysis makes us aware that there is nothing wrong with religion as such. Religion is what its followers make it to be. Just for instance, it is the Hinduism of which Vivekananda was proud and declared so in front of the world audience. Again it is the same Hinduism of which all of us feel ashamed after the Gujarat violence which played havoc with the life, sentiment and property of innocent people in the name of Hinduism¹. It has been observed in a recent article published in The Times of India : “Religion has never been the root of man’s miseries. The problem with man has been man. Religion is but an instrument; man its wielder.”⁵ We have had enough instances of such misuse of religion in our past history as well as present times. Hence, before it gets too late, all of us should stand together and fight against all those elements who are indulging in brutality and inhumanity in the name of religion.

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CONCEPT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

RATAN KUMAR GHOSH



I propose to discuss the concept of social justice in a two-fold fashion and hence the present paper is presented in two parts. The first part would consider the concept in its empirical, culture-specific and historical contextuality. The second part would address some conceptual or philosophical issues relating to the concept. The two parts may be looked upon as complementing each other, shedding light on the historical necessities as well as the conceptual issues arising out of socio-historical perspectives of administering justice in concrete situations. In other words, my intention is to show, or at least, bring home the idea that justice presupposes a society, and the administering justice requires one to take both the letter and the spirit of the law into account. The concept of justice itself calls for a judgement of a conceptual nature no less importantly than administering justice in a straightforward manner.

Part - I

The concept social justice is a remarkably vague one.¹ It is difficult to give it a precise definition. For, whatever definition we choose, it may not be difficult to produce a counter example. Exactly, this has been the spirit of the observation made by the Supreme Court in the *Muir Mill Ltd. vs. Suti Mills Majdoor Union* that social justice is a very vague and indeterminate expression and no clear-cut definition can be laid down which will cover all situations.²

Besides, this concept is highly culture-relative. What is deemed social justice in a particular social formation at a given time may not be so in another culture or in the same culture at a different time. For instance, mutilation of limbs for theft may be considered social justice in a particular culture while it may be repugnant in another. Madras High Court in *Sridharan Motor Service, Attur vs. Industrial Tribunal*,


Madras, has noted this in the following words :

Concepts of social justice have varied with age and clime. What would have appeared to be indubitable social justice to a Roman or Saxon in the days of William the Conqueror will not be recognised as such in England today. What may appear to be incontrovertible social justice to a resident of Quebec may wear a different aspect to a resident of Peking. If it could be possible for Confucius, Manu, Hammurabi and Solomon to meet together at a conference table I doubt whether they would be able to evolve agreed formulae as to what constitutes social justice, which is a very controversial field.³

However hard it may be to formulate a precise definition an attempt can be made to understand what the meaning of social justice is. One way to say what something is, is to say what it is about. And to know what social justice is about we may split it into its constituents 'social' and 'justice'. 'Social' means relating to or pertaining to the society rather than the individual. Society is a group of people with common institutions and 'justice' refers to the quality of being just or fair to all the members of the society.⁴ Fairness among people as regards the possession and/or acquisition of available resources require its equitable allocation among all the members of society. Social justice, so interpreted, aims at the improvement of people's lot by avoiding imbalances- imbalances in the political, social and economic lives of the people. These three areas are interconnected, yet there may be variations in priority considering the particular society we have in mind. In a less economically developed society food, lodging, education, employment, health etc. will come before political rights whereas in a financially stable society which has more or less come to grips with these problems, we may strive for ensuring social security, political right, individual freedom, personality development and the rule of law.

In any case, however, the right of the underprivileged, like the aged, women, children, lower castes, poor and the like is to get special protection of the state from the hardship of life. Thus unqualified equality cannot be the end of social justice. On the other hand, there may be specially gifted persons, persons of special abilities. Social justice does not mean that these persons of higher capabilities should be degraded, but that all efforts must be made to upgrade the position of those who are

weaker and less privileged than others.⁵ Hence adjustment of resources is a key idea in the understanding of social justice. According to Justice P. Jagannathan Reddy, "...social and economic inequalities are to be adjusted in such a way that they are both reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage and attached to positions and office open to all".⁶



But ensuring this depends on the kind of structure of society which we have and which we envisage. That the primary subject of social justice is the 'basic structure of society' has been the view of John Rawls too. By the 'basic structure of society' he means "...the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social co-operation".⁷ By 'major social institutions' Rawls understands,

...the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements. Thus the legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means of production, and the monogamous family are examples of major social institutions. Taken together as one scheme, the major institutions define men's rights and duties and influence their life-prospects,...⁸

Rawls considers the 'basic structure' as 'the primary subject of justice' because

...this structure contains various social positions and that men born into different positions have different expectations of life determined, in part, by the political system as well as by economic and social circumstances. In this way the institutions of society favor certain starting places over others. These are especially deep inequalities...It is these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic structure of any society, to which the principles of social justice must in the first instance apply.⁹

According to Rawls, "The justice of a social scheme depends essentially on how fundamental rights and duties are assigned and on the economic opportunities and social conditions in the various sectors of society".¹⁰

It is clear that recognising rights and assigning duties are not enough. It must be the responsibility of the state and existing law to assure the individual the resources needed for existence and development and 'protection in case of any violation or encroachment on his rights, consistent with the unity of the nation and needs of the society'.¹¹

But we must keep in mind that "... 'social justice' does not mean that reason and fairness must always yield to the convenience of a party - a convenience of the employee at the cost of the employer...Such one-sided or partial view is really next of kin to caprice or humour".¹²

Thus, it seems, social justice is not a simple concept.

Part - II

The concept of social justice has engaged the attention of social philosophers and ethicists since the classical time of Europe. But it is also no less a point to make that no satisfactory or unanimous or exclusively decisive statement of the concept has ever been possible. Even Plato did not succeed in doing that. The Republic remains inconclusive, and even the Laws does not make any further progress in that direction.¹³

If one cares to look at the Indian scenario one could find another dimension of the problem of defining the concept of justice. Any talk of justice appears to presuppose an order, be it divine (as in the Judaic-Hebrew tradition which looks upon God as the judge or dispenser of justice), or cosmic (as in the Vedic notion of *R̥ta*), or social (as in Plato's classification of men into four types, gold, silver bronze and iron, each is required to perform in keeping with their nature), or scripturally pre-ordained (as in Manu and other writers on *Sm̐iti*).¹⁴

The Hindu concept of *R̥ta* or cosmic order is theoretically inviolable. *Varuṇa*, who is the custodian of the order is all-seeing. Whoever dares violate the order cannot hide or escape from *Varuṇa*'s wrath. The *Mīmāṃsaka*s came up with another version of the view. According to them justice is built into human actions. As one sows, so does one reap. This is the barest statement of the thesis called the

law of *karma*. Rewards and punishments are generated by the proper and improper actions. There are actions that are permitted or prohibited by scriptures. If one abides by the permissions and prohibitions, there remains nothing to worry about.¹⁶

The tradition equivocates the term *nyāya* for both 'truth' and 'justice'. *Nyāya* system of philosophy established truth of propositions by arguing syllogistically, and the process also is called *nyāya*. The aggrieved seeks *nyāya* or justice, and the judge, who administers justice (*nyāya vicāra*) is said to incarnate justice and is referred to as *nyāyamūrti*. It was this tradition of equivocating *nyāya* for 'truth' and 'justice' that Gandhi looked up to. According to Gandhi's intention, justice is based upon truth, which he defines as the unity of living beings. Whatever or whichever action violates the unity is injustice or *himsā*. *Ahimsā* is therefore the synonym of 'justice'. This has also been Gandhi's point of criticism of utilitarianism.¹⁶ There is much in Gandhi's critique that is supported by recent thoughts on justice by Bernard Williams namely that utilitarianism ignores the individual.¹⁷


Kurt Baier has argued that justice being a moral concept has overridingness in comparison to rules, law and customs. The question of justice is morally overriding, even though rules and laws are intended to be abided by. It is a rule to stop when red light shines. But should one have to rush a dying patient to hospital, the violation of rule may be ignored by the magistrate keeping in view the morally overriding nature of the trafficker's action.¹⁸

Stuart Hampshire has raised the issue in the context of convention. John Rawls has put forward three properties of justice, rationality, a claim to universal acceptance and naturalness. The rationally preferred idea of justice is said to be independent of the variety of interests and sentiments which distinguish individuals from each other. Hampshire raises the issue of relationship of justice to convention. He argues that morality must not be separated from canons of practical reasoning and of prudence, from the rational foundation of law and justice on the one side, so it cannot be separated from social manners and custom and habits of thought and speech and the distinctive elements of a culture on the other side. Just as any natural language has to satisfy the common requirements of language as such, being a means of communication, so on the other side a language has to develop in history and over

a period of time, its own distinguishing form and vocabulary, if it is to have any hold on men's imagination and memory. A language distinguishes a particular people with a particular shared history and with a particular set of shared associations and with largely unconscious memories, preserved in metaphor that are embedded in the vocabulary. So also, says Hampshire, with some parts of morality and justice, for example, the prohibitions and prescriptions that govern sexual morality and family relationships and duties of friendship.¹⁹

Justice, then has two faces, one the law-like and rational, the other the language-like and imaginative. At all times there has to be a sexual morality which is recognised, but it does not have to be the same sexual morality with the same restraints and prescriptions. There is no ideal, classical and timeless law to tell how one should marry or how one should speak to his children or educate them. The half point of justice is the law, the other half is concerned with situations, individuals with their history, ideals, cultural background and aspirations. The one without the other is justice halved.

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হসার্লের প্রভাসতাত্ত্বিক দর্শন চিন্তার বিবর্তন : একটি পর্যালোচনা

সন্তোষ কুমার পাল

প্রভাসতত্ত্ব (Phenomenology) বলতে আমরা এক বিশেষ ধরনের পদ্ধতিগত দর্শনকে বুঝি। নিরপেক্ষ অবস্থান থেকে স্বরূপগত বিষয়ের অনুসন্ধানের লক্ষ্যকে সামনে রেখে এড্‌মুণ্ড হসার্ল এই চরম দার্শনিক পদ্ধতির সূচনা করেছেন। প্রত্যক্ষানুভবকে বিষয়ানুসন্ধানের প্রাথমিক উৎস ও মাণক হিসাবে গ্রহণ করে যাঁরা সত্তার অনুসন্धानে আত্মনিয়োগ করেন, এবং একই সঙ্গে, অভিজ্ঞতার ক্ষেত্রে জ্ঞাতুচেতনার সৃজনশীল ভূমিকার প্রতি যাঁরা যথোপযুক্ত মনোযোগ দিয়ে থাকেন, তাঁদেরকে আমরা প্রভাসতত্ত্বের প্রবর্তক বলতে পারি। বিংশ শতাব্দীর চিন্তাজগতে প্রভাসতত্ত্ব এক ‘আন্দোলন’ হিসাবে আত্মপ্রকাশ করেছে। অসংখ্য চিন্তানায়ক তথা দার্শনিক এই আন্দোলনের শরিক হয়েছেন। অনেক স্বাধীনভাবে নিজের মতো করে প্রভাসতত্ত্বের অনুশীলন করেছেন। এতৎসঙ্গেও এটা সর্বজনস্বীকৃত যে এড্‌মুণ্ড হসার্লই প্রভাসতত্ত্বের মূল প্রবক্তা। আলোচ্য প্রবন্ধে আমরা হসার্লের প্রভাসতাত্ত্বিক দর্শনচিন্তার বিবর্তনের ইতিহাস পর্যালোচনা করব।

প্রথমেই বলে রাখা ভাল যে হসার্ল কথিত অর্থে দর্শনের ছাত্র ছিলেন না। গণিত, পদার্থবিদ্যা, জ্যোতির্বিজ্ঞান ছিল তাঁর ছাত্রজীবনের পাঠ্যবিষয়। তিনি তৎকালে খ্যাতনামা গণিতজ্ঞ কার্ল উইয়ারস্ট্রাসের কাছে গণিতশাস্ত্রে শিক্ষালাভ করেন। ১৮৭৬ থেকে ১৮৮১ খৃষ্টাব্দ পর্যন্ত তিনি লাইপ্‌জিগ, বার্লিন এবং ভিয়েনা বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়ে গণিতের যে চর্চা করেন তার পরিণতি লাভ করে ‘ক্যালকুলাস অফ ভ্যারিয়েশন্স’-এর উপর কৃত নিবন্ধের জন্য তাঁর ‘ডক্টরেট’ ডিগ্রিলাভের মধ্য দিয়ে। পরবর্তীকালে তিনি ফ্রান্স ব্রেস্তানোর সংস্পর্শে আসেন এবং তাঁর ব্যক্তিত্ব ও বক্তৃতার দ্বারা প্রভাবিত হয়ে তিনি মনস্তত্ত্বের মধ্য দিয়ে দর্শনের জগতে প্রবেশ করেন। ব্রেস্তানোর বর্ণনামূলক মনস্তত্ত্বের দর্শন তাঁকে গভীরভাবে নাড়া দেয়। অন্যদিকে, অধ্যাপক উইয়ারস্ট্রাসের কাছে তিনি গণিতের যে শিক্ষালাভ করেছিলেন তাও তাঁর চিন্তার বিবর্তনকে প্রভাবিত করে। এই দুই আপাত বিরোধী চিন্তাধারাকে এক দার্শনিক পরিমণ্ডলের মধ্যে সংহত করা প্রচেষ্টার মধ্য দিয়েই পরবর্তীকালে প্রভাসতত্ত্বের উৎপত্তি ঘটে। তাই হসার্লের দর্শনের ব্যাখ্যাকারেরা মনে করেন, আমরা যদি হসার্লের দর্শন চিন্তার বিবর্তন এবং প্রভাসতত্ত্বের জন্মবৃত্তান্ত সঠিকভাবে অনুধাবন করতে চাই তাহলে আমাদের সেই ১৮৮৭ খ্রীঃ ফিরে যেতে হবে, যখন তিনি তাঁর ফিলসফি অফ এ্যরিথ্‌মেটিক-এর প্রথম খসড়া তৈরি করতে ব্যস্ত ছিলেন।

যাইহোক, হুসার্লের দর্শন-চিন্তার বিবর্তনের যে বিবরণ সাধারণত: আমরা পেয়ে থাকি তা মূলত: এরকম: ফ্রানৎস ব্রেণ্টানো ও কার্ল স্টাফের দৃষ্টিভঙ্গীর দ্বারা প্রভাবিত হয়ে গণিতজ্ঞ হুসার্লের ফিলসফি অফ এ্যরিথমেটিক্ গ্রন্থে মনস্তত্ত্ববাদের সমর্থন তাঁর দর্শনযাত্রার প্রথম ধাপ। পরবর্তী ধাপে অনেকাংশে গটলব ফ্রেগের কঠোর সমালোচনার দ্বারা প্রভাবিত হয়ে তিনি মনস্তত্ত্ববাদ বর্জন করেন। পরবর্তী পর্যায়ে আমরা পাই মনস্তত্ত্ববাদ-বিরোধী বাস্তববাদী দর্শনের প্রচারক হুসার্লকে। তিনি দুটি খণ্ডে যে লজিক্যাল ইনভেস্টিগেশনস্ (১৯০০-০১) প্রকাশ করেন তাতে বর্ণনাত্মক প্রভাসতত্ত্বের দিকে অগ্রসর হ'ন। বর্ণনাত্মক দর্শনের সূচনাকারী এই গ্রন্থটির প্রকাশ গেটিংগেনে এক ঝাঁক দার্শনিককে (যার মধ্যে তাঁর নিজের ছাত্ররাও ছিল) গভীরভাবে আকর্ষণ করে। তাঁরা এই লজিক্যাল ইনভেস্টিগেশনস্ গ্রন্থটিকে তাঁদের 'দর্শনের বাইবেল' হিসাবে গ্রহণ করেন। এঁরাই পরবর্তীকালে 'প্রভাসতাত্ত্বিক আন্দোলনে'র সূচনা করেন। এর মধ্য দিয়েই হুসার্ল দর্শনের জগতে প্রথম স্বীকৃতিলাভ করেন। যাইহোক, তিনি এই গ্রন্থে উপলব্ধি করেন যে বিষয়ের অর্থ তথা মূল্যের সঙ্গে আমাদের চেতনার ঘনিষ্ঠ যোগ রয়েছে। তিনি মানব অভিজ্ঞতার মৌলিক অবয়ব পর্যবেক্ষণে মনোযোগী হন এবং একই সঙ্গে বৈচিত্র্যময় বিশেষের রাজ্য থেকে তাদের সারধর্ম অনুসন্ধানে আগ্রহী হ'ন। এই পর্যায়কে আমরা বর্ণনাত্মক প্রভাসতত্ত্ব বলতে পারি, যদিও আলোচ্য গ্রন্থের প্রথম সংস্করণে তিনি মনস্তত্ত্বের বেড়াজাল থেকে নিজেকে সম্পূর্ণ মুক্ত করতে পারেন নি।^১ বস্তুতঃ ১৯০৩ খৃষ্টাব্দের পরেই হুসার্ল বুঝতে শুরু করেন যে তাঁর নূতন দর্শন ব্রেণ্টানোর বর্ণনাত্মক মনস্তত্ত্ব থেকে স্বতন্ত্র। তিনি এই উপলব্ধিতে আসেন যে তাঁর নূতন প্রভাসতত্ত্ব যাবতীয় বিজ্ঞান তথা দর্শনের চরম ভিত্তিভূমি হিসাবে কাজ করবে। কান্টের দর্শনের গভীর অধ্যয়নের সময় তিনি স্থির করেন যে তাঁর নূতন দর্শনের নাম হওয়া উচিত 'অধিজাগতিক প্রভাসতত্ত্ব' (Transcendental Phenomenology)। ১৯০৭ খৃষ্টাব্দে গোটিংগেন বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়ে 'দ্য আইডিয়া অফ ফেনোমেনোলজি' শিরোনামে যে কয়েকটি বক্তৃতা দেন সেখানে তিনি প্রভাসতত্ত্বকে 'বিশুদ্ধ প্রজ্ঞার বিচার' হিসাবে চিহ্নিত করেন। পরবর্তী ১৯১৩ খৃষ্টাব্দে প্রকাশিত আইডিয়াজ পার্টেনিং টু এ পিওর ফেনোমেনোলজি অ্যাণ্ড ফেনোমেনোলজিক্যাল ফিলসফি (বুক ১)^২ এ অধিজাগতিক প্রভাসতত্ত্বের প্রথম পূর্ণাঙ্গ পরিচয় আমরা পাই। এই গ্রন্থে তিনি বিচারবিযুক্ত প্রকৃতিবাদী দৃষ্টিভঙ্গী থেকে অনুসন্ধানকারীকে মুক্ত করার উদ্দেশ্যে বহুনীকরণ তথা রূপান্তরকরণ পদ্ধতির প্রস্তাব করেন। এই পর্যায়ে হুসার্ল মনে করেন, বিশুদ্ধ চেতনার আলোকেই অধিজাগতিক বিষয়ী তার সৃজনশীলতার মাধ্যমে জগতের অর্থ তথা যাবতীয় মূল্য সংগঠিত করে। এই পর্যায়ের দর্শনকে তাই অধিজাগতিক ভাববাদের দর্শন বলে অনেকে ব্যাখ্যা করে থাকেন। ফরম্যাল এণ্ড ট্রান্সেনডেন্টাল লজিক্ (১৯২৯), কার্টেসিয়ান মেডিটেশনস্ (১৯৩১), একস্পিরিয়েন্স এণ্ড জাজমেন্ট (১৯৩৯) প্রভৃতি রচনার মধ্য দিয়ে এই অধিজাগতিক, গঠনগত প্রভাসতত্ত্ব সমৃদ্ধ হয়েছে। হুসার্লের শেষ পর্যায়ের দর্শনের পরিচয় পাই তাঁর জীবৎকালে প্রকাশিত শেষ গ্রন্থ দ্য ক্রাইসিস্ অফ ইউরোপীয়ান সায়েন্সেস এণ্ড ট্রান্সেনডেন্টাল ফেনোমেনোলজি (১৯৩৬) -তে যেখানে তিনি এক নূতন ধারণা 'জীবন-জগৎ' (The Life-World)-এর কথা বলেছেন। এই জীবন-জগৎ-ই যাবতীয় অর্থের প্রাথমিক ভিত্তি হিসাবে চিহ্নিত হয়েছে। একইসঙ্গে এখানে অর্থের উৎপত্তিতে সাময়িকতা (temporality) তথা ইতিহাসের (History) ভূমিকার পর্যালোচনা করেছেন তিনি। এই পর্যায়ে প্রভাসতত্ত্বকে তাই জীবন-জগৎগত প্রভাসতত্ত্ব হিসাবে উল্লেখ করা হয়।



এই বিবরণ অনুসারে আমরা তাহলে হসার্লের দর্শন-চিন্তা

- ১) মনস্তত্ত্ববাদ
- ২) বর্ণনাত্মক প্রভাসতত্ত্ব (বা সারসত্ত্বগত প্রভাসতত্ত্ব)
- ৩) অধিজাগতিক প্রভাসতত্ত্ব
- ৪) জীবন-জগৎগত প্রভাসতত্ত্ব

আমরা এখন এই পর্যায়গুলিকে আলাদা করে বোঝার চেষ্টা করব।

১) মনস্তত্ত্ববাদের স্তর : ভিয়েনাতে হসার্ল ব্রেন্টানোর সঙ্গে দর্শনচর্চা করেছেন প্রায় দু'বছর (১৮৮৪-৮৬)। আগেই উল্লেখিত হয়েছে ব্রেন্টানোর সংস্পর্শে আসার পরই হসার্ল দর্শন বিষয়ে আগ্রহী হন। কিন্তু ব্রেন্টানোর দৃষ্টিভঙ্গী ছিল মনস্তত্ত্ববাদের দৃষ্টিভঙ্গী। তিনি মনস্তত্ত্বের মাধ্যমে বিজ্ঞানের তথা দর্শনের তাত্ত্বিক প্রশ্নের উত্তর খুঁজতেন। প্রথম দিকে হসার্লের মনে দর্শনের রাজ্যে প্রবেশ করার ব্যাপারে একটু দ্বিধা ছিল। কিন্তু ব্রেন্টানোর ব্যক্তিত্বের আকর্ষণকে তিনি বেশিদিন প্রতিরোধ করতে পারেন নি। ব্রেন্টানো হসার্লের মনে দর্শন ও তাঁর নতুন বর্ণনামূলক মনস্তত্ত্ব সম্পর্কে আগ্রহ জাগিয়ে তোলেন, যদিও হসার্লের নিজের সমস্যা তথা প্রশ্নগুলি গণিতের পরিধির মধ্যে, বিশেষ করে সংখ্যাতত্ত্বের মধ্যে, সীমাবদ্ধ ছিল। ব্রেন্টানোর নিজের কাছে এসব বিষয়ের আকর্ষণ ছিল খুবই কম। হসার্ল শেষ পর্যন্ত হালে বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়ে দর্শনের এক শিক্ষক পদে (প্রিভ্যাডোংসেন হিসাবে) যোগদান করতে মনস্থ করেন। এখানেই ব্রেন্টানোর ছাত্র কার্ল স্টাম্ফের তত্ত্বাবধানে সংখ্যার ধারণার উপর তিনি একটি খসড়া নিবন্ধ তৈরি করেন। স্টাম্ফও মনস্তত্ত্ববাদের দৃষ্টিভঙ্গির দ্বারা আচ্ছন্ন ছিলেন। কিছুদিনের মধ্যে মনস্তত্ত্ববাদের দৃষ্টিভঙ্গী থেকেই হসার্ল ফিলসফি অফ এ্যরিথমেটিক গ্রন্থটি রচনা করেন। এই গ্রন্থে তিনি দেখাতে চেষ্টা করেন যে সংখ্যার ধারণা, একত্ব, বহুত্ব প্রভৃতির ধারণার ভিত্তিভূমি রয়েছে আমাদের মানসিক গঠনের মধ্যে। এই গ্রন্থের প্রথমার্শে বহুত্ব, একত্ব, ঐক্য এবং সংখ্যা প্রভৃতি প্রত্যয়ের এক মনস্তাত্ত্বিক বিশ্লেষণ করেন। দ্বিতীয়াংশে এই প্রত্যয়গুলির সাংকেতিক প্রতিবেদন সম্পর্কে আলোচনা করেন। এসব আলোচনা মূলসুর একটিই : কোন প্রত্যয়ের স্পষ্টীকরণের অর্থ তার মনস্তাত্ত্বিক উৎসকে নির্দিষ্ট করা। হসার্ল এই গ্রন্থে মনস্তত্ত্ববাদের প্রচার করেছেন। কিন্তু এর অর্থ এই নয় যে তিনি শুধু সংখ্যাগুলির মনস্তাত্ত্বিকীকরণ করেছেন। তিনি কিভাবে প্রত্যয়গুলি আমাদের সামনে প্রদত্ত হয় তার একটা ব্যাখ্যা দেওয়ার চেষ্টা করেছেন।

হসার্ল গ্রন্থটির পর্যালোচনার জন্য গণিতজ্ঞ তথা দার্শনিক ফ্রেগের কাছে পাঠান। ফ্রেগে মনস্তত্ত্ববাদের তীব্র বিরোধী ছিলেন। গণিতের মনস্তাত্ত্বিক বিবরণ পড়ে অধ্যাপক ফ্রেগে এই অভিমত ব্যক্ত করেন যে গাণিতিক বিজ্ঞানসমূহের মধ্যে যে বস্তুগততা, যে অনিবার্যতা রয়েছে তাকে কখনোই আপাতিক মানসিক গঠনের ভাষায় ব্যাখ্যা করা যায় না। তিনি মনস্তত্ত্ববাদের সমালোচনা প্রসঙ্গে বলেন, এই তত্ত্ব মানলে আমাদের স্বীকার করতে হবে যে, যে মুহূর্তে আমি কোন একটি বচন সম্পর্কে চিন্তা করা বন্ধ করে দেব, সেই মুহূর্তে বচনটির সত্তা নিঃশেষ হয়ে যাবে। ব্যাপারটি অনেকটা এরকম : আমি চোখ বন্ধ করলাম, সঙ্গে সঙ্গে সূর্যের অস্তিত্ব নিঃশেষ হয়ে গেল!°

হ্রেণের সমালোচনায় স্বাভাবিকভাবেই হসার্ল প্রথমে আঘাত পান। কিন্তু পরে ক্রমশঃ তিনি উপলব্ধি করেন যে মনস্তত্ত্ববাদ গ্রহণযোগ্য হতে পারে না। একই সঙ্গে বোলজানো ও লোট্জের গণিত-দর্শন তাঁকে প্রভাবিত করে। তাঁর প্রত্যয় জন্মায় যে চিন্তাজগত তথা দর্শনজগৎ থেকে এই সর্বনাশা তত্ত্বকে চিরতরে নির্বাসিত করতে হবে। তাঁর পরবর্তীগৃহ লজিক্যাল ইনভেস্টিগেশনস-এর প্রথম খণ্ডে বিস্তারিত পর্যালোচনার মাধ্যমে মনস্তত্ত্ববাদের খণ্ডন করেন। তিনি এই সিদ্ধান্তে আসেন যে গাণিতিক তথা যুক্তিবৈজ্ঞানিক প্রত্যয় ও নিয়মনীতিগুলির এক অনিবার্য বস্তুগত চরিত্র রয়েছে যা ব্যক্তিগত চেতনার বাস্তব অবস্থা তথা ক্রিয়া-প্রক্রিয়া থেকে স্বতন্ত্র।

হসার্লের এই পর্যায়ের দর্শনকে অনেক ব্যাখ্যাকার প্রাক্-প্রভাসতত্ত্বের স্তর হিসাবে বিবেচনা করে থাকেন। হসার্লের পরবর্তী দর্শনের অনেক উপাদান আমরা পাইঃ এই ফিলসফি অফ এ্যরিথমেটিক' গ্রন্থে। এখানে তিনি 'চেতনার-অবদান'-এর বলেছেন যারমাঝে পরবর্তীকালের অবিজ্ঞাতিক গঠন প্রক্রিয়া, সারসত্তাগত রূপান্তরকরণ, চেতনার নির্দেশধর্মিতা প্রভৃতি বিষয়ের পূর্বাভাস পাওয়া যায়।

২) বর্ণনাত্মক প্রভাসতত্ত্ব : মনস্তত্ত্ববাদের বিদ্রম থেকে মুক্ত হয়ে হসার্ল বাস্তববাদী বর্ণনাত্মক দর্শনের দিকে অগ্রসর হন এবং এরথেকেই যথার্থ প্রভাসতত্ত্বের দিকে তাঁর যাত্রা শুরু হয়। কিন্তু লজিক্যাল ইনভেস্টিগেশনস-এ প্রথম সংস্করণ এবং দ্বিতীয় সংস্করণের মধ্যে তুলনা করলে বোঝা যায় যে মনস্তত্ত্ববাদ ও বর্ণনাত্মক প্রভাসতত্ত্বের মধ্যবর্তী আরও একটি অবস্থান রয়েছে যাকে তিনি নিজেই 'বর্ণনাত্মক মনস্তত্ত্ব' হিসাবে চিহ্নিত করেছেন। পূর্বেই উল্লেখিত হয়েছে এই গ্রন্থে প্রথম সংস্করণে এই বর্ণনাত্মক মনস্তত্ত্বকেই প্রভাসতত্ত্ব হিসাবে বিবেচনা করেছেন হসার্ল। অনেকখানি ব্রেটানো-স্টাফের প্রভাবের মধ্যে থেকেই হসার্ল বর্ণনাত্মক মনস্তত্ত্বের সমর্থন করেছেন এখানে। আমাদের চেতনার ক্রিয়া-প্রক্রিয়া সমূহের বাস্তব বর্ণনা তথা বিশ্লেষণই বর্ণনাত্মক মনস্তত্ত্ব। মানসিক অবস্থা তথা ক্রিয়া-প্রক্রিয়াগুলি যেভাবে সংগঠিত হয় সেভাবেই সেগুলিকে বিচার করাই এর কাজ। এই মনস্তত্ত্ব কোন তাত্ত্বিক প্রশ্নের উত্তর খোঁজে না, বা মানসিক অবস্থা তথা ক্রিয়া-প্রক্রিয়াগুলির আন্তর সম্পর্ক, তাদের উৎস, ইত্যাদি সম্পর্কে কোন আলোকপাত করে না। আলোচ্য গ্রন্থের দ্বিতীয় সংস্করণে হসার্ল হির-নিশ্চয় হয়েছে যে বিশুদ্ধ যুক্তিবিজ্ঞান কখনোই মনস্তত্ত্ব নয়। তাই আমাদের অন্য ধরনের অনুসন্ধানপদ্ধতির আশ্রয় নিতে হবে। এর থেকেই বর্ণনাত্মক প্রভাসতত্ত্বের, বা সাধারণভাবে প্রভাসতত্ত্বের সূত্রপাত হয়।^{১০}

বর্ণনাত্মক প্রভাসতত্ত্ব আমাদের চেতন অবস্থা তথা ক্রিয়া-প্রক্রিয়াগুলি বিশ্লেষণের সাথে সাথে তাদের উৎস, আন্তরসম্পর্ক ইত্যাদি তাত্ত্বিক প্রশ্নেরও উত্তর খোঁজে। এখানে এক নিরপেক্ষ অবস্থান থেকে প্রদত্ত বিষয়কে পর্যবেক্ষণ করা হয়। বিষয়ের সারসত্তাকে অনুভবে গ্রহণ করার চেষ্টা হয়। যেকোন ধরনের রূপান্তরবাদের (reductionism) বিরোধিতা করে এই প্রভাসতত্ত্ব। প্রদত্ত বিষয়ের প্রাথমিকতা মেনে নিয়ে সাক্ষাৎ অভিজ্ঞতায় যা প্রদত্ত হয় তার বিচার-বিশ্লেষণ তথা অর্থ নিরূপণ করাই এই প্রভাসতত্ত্বের লক্ষ্য। 'মূল বিষয়ে ফিরে যাওয়া' ('Zu den Sachen Selbst')-র নীতিকে সামনে রেখে দর্শনকে কঠোর বিজ্ঞানের আদর্শে উদ্বোধিত করার চেষ্টা করেছেন হসার্ল।

বর্ণনাত্মক প্রভাসতত্ত্বকে সারধর্মগত প্রভাসতত্ত্ব বলা হয়ে থাকে। এই পর্যায়ে হুসার্ল বৈচিত্র্যময় বিশেষ বিশেষ দৃষ্টান্ত থেকে বিষয়ের সারসত্তা গ্রহণের কথা বলেছেন। বাস্তব ঘটনা হিসাবে অভিজ্ঞতাগুলি প্রতিনিয়ত সংঘটিত হয় সেগুলি অভিজ্ঞতামূলক বর্ণনাত্মক মনস্তত্ত্বের বিষয় হয়। এই নতুন প্রভাসতত্ত্ব মূল অভিজ্ঞতার আপাতিকতাকে অতিক্রম করে সারধর্মগত আন্তর সম্পর্ক অনুধাবন করার চেষ্টা করে। এই সারসত্তাগত অনুসন্ধানই কেবল গাণিতিক তথা যৌক্তিক প্রত্যয় ও নিয়মনিয়তিগুলির যথার্থ প্রতি প্রদান করে।

এই প্রভাসতত্ত্ব একই সঙ্গে অভিজ্ঞতার ক্ষেত্রে বিষয়ীর সৃজনশীল ভূমিকাকে স্বীকার করে। এই পর্যায়ে, বিশেষ করে ফিফথ ইনভেস্টিগেশন্স-এ চেতনার নির্দেশধর্মিতা (Intentionality) এবং তার বিষয় (Content) এর কথা বলেছেন। এখানে বিষয়গত বিশ্লেষণের সাথে সাথে বিষয়ী চেতনার বিষয়াভিমুখিতা তথা সাংগঠনিক ভূমিকাকে সমানভাবে গুরুত্ব দেওয়া হয়েছে। অর্থাৎ বিষয়গত ও বিষয়ীগত উভয়দিকের পারস্পরিকতার ভিত্তিতে বিষয় তথা অর্থের বিবরণ করা হয়েছে। পরবর্তীকালে আইডিয়াজ-১ এই বিষয়কে 'নোয়েটিক-নোয়েম্যাটিক কোররিলেশন্স' হিসাবে ব্যাখ্যা করা হয়েছে।

৩) অধিজাগতিক প্রভাসতত্ত্ব : যদিও বর্ণনাত্মক প্রভাসতত্ত্ব বিষয়ের অনুভবের সাথে সাথে সারসত্তা গ্রহণের কথা বলা হয়েছে, নিরপেক্ষ অবস্থানের থেকে অভিজ্ঞতার ক্ষেত্রে বিষয়-বিষয়ীর যুগ্ম ভূমিকাকে গ্রহণ করার প্রচেষ্টা আছে, তথাপি অতিবর্তী জাগতিকতার যাবতীয় সংস্কার থেকে সম্পূর্ণ মুক্ত নয় এই দর্শন। গোটিংগেনে বক্তৃতাকালে (১৯০৭) এবং পরবর্তী পর্যায়ে আইডিয়াজ-১ (১৯১৪) প্রকাশের মধ্য দিয়ে হুসার্ল বিষয়-অতিবর্তী যাবতীয় সংস্কার থেকে মুক্ত হয়ে বিশুদ্ধ চেতনা তথা অধিজাগতিক বিষয়ীর আলোকে বিষয়ানুসন্ধান প্রস্তাব করেছেন। এই উদ্দেশ্যকে সফল করার লক্ষ্যে তিনি বন্ধনীকরণ তথা রূপান্তরকরণ পদ্ধতি সূত্রবদ্ধ করেছেন। যাবতীয় বিষয়ের অর্থকে বিবেচনা করা হয়েছে অধিজাগতিক বিষয়ীর সক্রিয়তার ভাষায়। অন্যভাবে বলা যায়, বিষয়ের অর্থ তথা মূল্য নির্দিষ্টভাবে ব্যাখ্যাত হয়েছে বিশুদ্ধ চেতনার আলোকে তথা অধিজাগতিক বিষয়ীর সক্রিয়তার ভাষায়। এই পর্যায়ে প্রভাসতত্ত্বকে তাই অধিজাগতিক প্রভাসতত্ত্ব বলা হয়েছে।

হুসার্ল আইডিয়াজ-১-এ আমাদের স্বভাবগত প্রকৃতিবাদী দৃষ্টিভঙ্গী থেকে মুক্ত হওয়ার উদ্দেশ্যে বন্ধনীকরণের কথা বলেছেন।^৭ তিনি বলেন, এই জগতে মানুষ হিসাবে আমরা বিভিন্ন ধরনের পূর্ব-বিশ্বাস তথা সংস্কারের দ্বারা পরিচালিত হই। যেমন আমরা আগে থেকেই ধরে নিই যে এই জগৎ ছিল, আছে এবং থাকবে। যে কোন বিষয় সম্পর্কে অনুসন্ধান করার সময় তার সম্বন্ধে এই ধরনের বিশ্বাস যথার্থ, নিরপেক্ষ অনুসন্ধানের পথে অন্তরায় হিসাবে দেখা দেয়। প্রকৃতিবাদী সংস্কারের দ্বারা পরিচালিত হলে নির্বিচারবাদ তথা সংশয়বাদের অভিযোগ উঠে। হুসার্ল যাবতীয় সংস্কার ও বিষয়-অতিবর্তী বিশ্বাস থেকে চেতনাকে মুক্ত করার জন্যে প্রভাসতাত্ত্বিক বন্ধনীকরণ তথা অধিজাগতিক রূপান্তরকরণপদ্ধতির প্রস্তাব করেছেন। বন্ধনীকরণ পদ্ধতির মাধ্যমে বিষয়ের সঙ্গে আগত কিন্তু প্রকৃত বিষয়াংশ নয়-এরকম যাবতীয় সংস্কার থেকে চেতনাকে মুক্ত করতে পারি। অধিজাগতিক রূপান্তরকরণ সংস্কার মুক্ত বিশুদ্ধ চেতনা তথা

অধিজাগতিক বিষয়ীর প্রতি আমাদের মনোযোগ কেন্দ্রীভূত করে। চেতনা আর স্বাতন্ত্র্য তথা বিষয়াভিমুখী স্বরূপের মাধ্যম যাবতীয় বিষয়ের অর্থ তথা মূল্যকে গঠন করে। হসার্ল তাঁর বিভিন্ন রচনায়, বিশেষ করে আইডিয়াজ-২ -এ অধিজাগতিক গঠনপ্রক্রিয়ার বিস্তারিত বিবরণ করেছেন। তিনি তথাকথিত বাস্তববস্তু, প্রাণবান দেহ, অপরব্যক্তির সত্তা কিভাবে গঠিত হয় তার ব্যাখ্যা করেছেন এখানে। এই পর্যায়ে দর্শনকে অনেক অধিজাগতিক ভাববাদের দর্শন হিসাবে ব্যাখ্যা করেছেন।

৪) জীবন-জগৎগত প্রভাসতত্ত্ব : হসার্ল - প্রস্তাবিত বন্ধনীকরণ তথা অধিজাগতিক গঠনপ্রক্রিয়া আমাদের অহংসর্বস্ববাদের দিকে নিয়ে যায় বলে অনেকে মনে করেন। হসার্লের অনুগামী অনেক পাঠক, এমনকি তাঁর নিজের ছাত্র ও সহকর্মী হাইডেগারও, এই অধিজাগতিকতার দর্শনকে গ্রহণ করতে পারেন নি। বিষয়টি হসার্লকে চিন্তিত করে তোলে। অনেকটা এরই জন্য তিনি তাঁর প্রভাসতত্ত্বের দর্শনকে নতুন আঙ্গিকে তুলে ধরতে মনোযোগী হ'ন। আমরা দেখি তাঁর দার্শনিক জীবনের শেষ পর্যায়ে 'জীবন-জগৎ' এর এক নতুন তত্ত্ব তুলে ধরতে। তাঁর সর্বশেষ রচনা দ্য ক্রাইসিস্ -এ এই মর্মে ইঙ্গিত দিয়েছেন যে আমাদের অনুসন্ধানকে সার্থক করে তুলতে হলে আমাদের মূর্ত অভিজ্ঞতার আদিমস্তর জীবন-জগতে ফিরে যেতে হবে। এই জীবন-জগৎই যাবতীয় বিষয়ের অর্থ নিরূপণ করে। তাঁর মতে, এই জীবন-জগৎ আমাদের অপরোক্ষ অনুভবে প্রাপ্ত জগৎ যেখানে কোনরূপ ত্বৈততা, বিমূর্ততা বা সংস্কার নেই। এই জগৎ প্রাক-বিশ্লেষণ স্তরের জগৎ, প্রাক-বিজ্ঞানের জগৎ।

অনেকে মত প্রকাশ করেছেন যে হসার্ল তাঁর অনুসন্ধানের শেষ পর্যায়ে জীবন-জগতের তত্ত্ব উপস্থাপন করে তিনি বস্তুতঃ অস্তিবাদের (Existentialism) দিকে ঝুঁকেছেন। তিনি অধিজাগতিকতার 'বিভ্রম' থেকে মুক্ত হয়ে বাস্তবজগতে ফিরে এসেছেন। এই দ্য ক্রাইসিস্ গ্রন্থে তিনি এমন কিছু পরিভাষা ব্যবহার করেছেন যেগুলি সাধারণত অস্তিবাদীরাই ব্যবহার করে থাকেন।^{১৭} কিন্তু এই গ্রন্থটির সামগ্রিক পর্যালোচনা করলে বোঝা যায় তিনি অধিজাগতিক প্রভাসতত্ত্বের অবস্থান থেকে বিচ্যুত হন নি। বরং এই নতুন অন্তর্দৃষ্টির আলোকে হসার্ল অধিজাগতিক প্রভাসতত্ত্বের যাত্রাপথকে আরো উন্নত করেছেন। এই নতুন যাত্রাপথ শুরু হয় প্রাকৃতিক বিজ্ঞানের জগৎ থেকে, পরে অন্তর্নিহিত অর্থের রাজ্য প্রত্যক্ষ অনুভবের জীবন-জগতে ফিরে যায় এবং সবশেষে অধিজাগতিক বিষয়ীর ক্রিয়াধর্মী নির্দেশকতা (Functioning intentionality) - র মাধ্যমে এই জীবন-জগত চরম অর্থ লাভ করে। অর্থাৎ এই জীবন-জগৎকেও হসার্ল অধিজাগতিক প্রভাসতত্ত্বের পরিসরের মধ্যেই গ্রহণ করেছেন।^{১৮}

প্রভাসতত্ত্বের খ্যাতিনামা বিশেষজ্ঞ অধ্যাপক জিতেন্দ্রনাথ মোহান্তি সাম্প্রতিক এক প্রবন্ধে^{১৯} অভিমত ব্যক্ত করেছেন যে হসার্লের দর্শন চিন্তার বিবর্তনে উপর্যুক্তরূপে বিবরণ যথোপযুক্ত নয়, এ হ'ল অতিসরলীকরণ। এরূপ বিবেচনার স্বপক্ষে তিনি যে যুক্তিতর্ক উপস্থাপন করেছেন সেগুলি এরকমঃ প্রথমতঃ, তাঁর জীবৎকালে গ্রন্থাকারে প্রকাশিত কয়েকটি রচনার প্রকাশ হসার্লের চিন্তাধারার সম্যকপ্রতিফলন নয়। অনেক বিক্ষিপ্ত অপ্রকাশিত রচনা, প্রবন্ধ, বক্তৃতা, পুস্তক-পর্যালোচনা রয়েছে যেগুলি বিচারের পরিধির মধ্যে আনলে বোঝা যায় হসার্লের দার্শনিক জীবনের ইতিহাস সরলরেখার অগ্রসর হয় নি।

দ্বিতীয়ত: 'মনস্তত্ত্ববাদ', 'সারধর্মবাদ' বা 'অধিজাগতিক ভাববাদ' এ ধরনের শিরোনাম হুসার্লের প্রভাসতত্ত্বের চিন্তাধারাকে ব্যাখ্যা করলে তাঁর সমস্যা-নিষ্ঠ দৃষ্টিভঙ্গী, তাঁর লক্ষ্য, উদ্দেশ্য তথা তত্ত্বের প্রতি সুবিচার করা হয় না।

তৃতীয়ত: উপর্যুক্ত ধরনের পর্বান্তর (conversion) বা অনুরূপ সাধারণ শিরোনামে হুসার্লের চিন্তাভাবনাকে ব্যাখ্যা করলে তাঁর চিন্তার ধারাবাহিকতা তথা ঐক্যের প্রতি সুবিচার করা হয় না।

অধ্যাপক মোহান্তি তাই হুসার্লের দর্শন-চিন্তার বিকাশকে একটু অন্যরকমভাবে বুঝতে চেয়েছেন:

- ১) ১৮৮৬ - ১৯০০ : হালে পর্যায়
- ২) ১৯০০-১৯১৬ : গৌটিংগেন্ পর্যায়
- ৩) ১৯১৬-১৯২৮ : ফ্রাইবুর্গ শিক্ষণ-পর্যায়
- ৪) ১৯২৮-১৯৩৯ : অবসরকালীন ফ্রাইবুর্গ পর্যায়

আমরা স্থানাভাবের কারণে অধ্যাপক মোহান্তির বিশ্লেষণের অতিসংক্ষেপ বিবরণ করব এখানে:

হালে পর্যায় : আগেই উল্লেখিত হয়েছে ১৮৮৬ খৃষ্টাব্দে হালে বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়ে যোগ দেন হুসার্ল স্টাম্ফের তত্ত্বাবধানে গবেষণা করার উদ্দেশ্য নিয়ে। ১৯০০ খৃষ্টাব্দ পর্যন্ত হালেতে কাটিয়েছেন। এই সময়কার তাঁর কার্যক্রম আমরা নিম্নোক্তভাবে উপস্থাপন করতে পারি :

১৮৮৬-৮৭ : স্টাম্ফের তত্ত্বাবধানে সংখ্যার ধারণার মনস্তাত্ত্বিক বিশ্লেষণের উপর গবেষণাপত্র তৈরি।

১৯৮৭-৯১ : গবেষণাপত্রের সঙ্গে সঙ্গতি রেখে মনস্তত্ত্ববাদের দৃষ্টিভঙ্গি থেকে ফিলসফি অফ এ্যারিথ্‌মেটিক গ্রন্থটির প্রথম খণ্ডের রচনা ও প্রকাশ; শ্রোডারের লেকচারস্ অন দ্য অ্যালজেব্রা অফ লজিক গ্রন্থের পর্যালোচনা (এই পর্যালোচনা-প্রবন্ধের মধ্যেই হুসার্লের পরবর্তীকালে অর্থতত্ত্বের পূর্বাভাস পাওয়া যায়। এখানেই তিনি প্রথম পদের অর্থ, নির্দেশিত বস্তু এবং তার উপস্থাপনার মধ্যে পার্থক্য করেন)।

১৮৯৪ : উক্ত গ্রন্থের দ্বিতীয় খণ্ডের পরিকল্পনা, এবং পরে তার বর্জন (হুসার্ল এখানে 'কার্ডিনাল নাম্বার' সম্পর্কে আলোচনা করতে চেয়েছিলেন। কিন্তু পরে তিনি বুঝতে পারেন যে সার্বজনীন পাটিগণিত 'কার্ডিনাল নাম্বার' থেকে শুরু হতে পারে না। তাই তিনি এই পরিকল্পনা পরিত্যাগ করেন)।

২) গোটিংগেন পর্যায় : হসার্ল ১৯০১ সালে গোটিংগেনে আসেন। এই পর্যায়ে তাঁর দার্শনিক অনুসন্ধানের কার্যক্রমকে এভাবে উপস্থাপন করা যেতে পারে :

- ১৯০০-০১ : মনস্তত্ত্ববাদের খণ্ডন (হসার্ল মনস্তত্ত্ববাদ সম্পূর্ণ বর্জন করেছিলেন শুধু ফ্রেগের সমালোচনার প্রভাবে নয়, বরং বোলজানো এবং লোট্জের প্রভাবে তাঁর নিজের গণিত-দর্শনে যে পরিবর্তনের সূচনা হয়েছিল তাও অনেকাংশে এজন্য দায়ী)।
- ১৯০৫ : প্রাথমিক সময়-চেতনা সম্পর্কে ভাবনা, কাল সম্পর্কে তাঁর প্রথম বক্তৃতা ও বন্ধনীকরণ প্রক্রিয়ার আবিষ্কার।
- ১৯০৬-০৭ : চরম স্বীকৃতিশূন্য দর্শনের প্রস্তাব, জাতিই অর্থ-ইনভেস্টিগেসনস-এর এই অভিমতের বর্জন।
- ১৯০৭-০৮ : চেতনার নির্দেশধর্মিতা তথা 'নোয়েসিস-নোয়েমা'র পারস্পরিক সম্পর্ক নিরূপণ, অথের নোয়েম্যাটিক ব্যাখ্যা, মনস্তাত্ত্বিক বিষয়ী এবং অধিজাগতিক বিষয়ীর মধ্যে পৃথকীকরণ, সৃজনশীল বিপ্লব অধিজাগতিক বিষয়ীর ধারণা গঠন।
- ১৯১০-১১ : আন্তর্যাত্তিকতা বিষয়ক অনুসন্ধান।

৩) ফ্রাইবুর্গ শিক্ষণ-পর্যায় : হসার্ল ফ্রাই বুর্গে পৌঁছান ১৯১৬ খৃষ্টাব্দে। ১৯২৮ খৃষ্টাব্দ পর্যন্ত তিনি এখানে পড়িয়েছেন। এই সময়কালে প্রভাসতত্ত্বে কয়েকটি ভিত্তিপুস্তকের রচনায় তিনি ব্যস্ত ছিলেন। তবে আগের পর্যায়ের মতো নূতন নূতন আবিষ্কারের ঘটনা এই পর্যায়ে কম। এই পর্যায়ে পূর্বে আবিষ্কৃত অন্তর্দৃষ্টিসমূহ আরো গভীরে অনুশীলন করা হয়েছে।

- ১৯১৬-২৮ : সাময়িকতা তথা ঐতিহাসিকতার সমস্যাকে অধিজাগতিক প্রভাসতত্ত্বের সঙ্গে সংহতকরণ, অধিজাগতিক প্রভাসতত্ত্বকে অহংতত্ত্ব এবং পরে তাকে মনাদতত্ত্বে উন্নীতকরণ, আন্তর্যাত্তিকতার সমস্যার সমাধানসূত্র প্রণয়ন, অধিজাগতিক যুক্তিশাস্ত্রের পতন, জীবন-জগতের ধারণা গঠন।

৪) অবসরকালীন ফ্রাইবুর্গ পর্যায় : ফ্রাইবুর্গ বিশ্ববিদ্যালয় থেকে অবসর গ্রহণের পরবর্তী পর্যায়ে তিনি বিভিন্ন বক্তৃতা প্রণয়ন করেন। গভীর অনুসন্ধানের মধ্য দিয়ে অধিজাগতিক প্রভাসতত্ত্বকে আলায়ে উন্নীত করার চেষ্টা করেন। নির্দিষ্ট করে বলতে গেলে এই পর্যায়ে তাঁর ভাবনার বিষয় ছিল এরকম :

- ১৯২৮-৩৯ : সমসাময়িক কালের বিজ্ঞান তথা সংস্কৃতির সঙ্কট সম্পর্কিত চিন্তাভাবনা, জীবন-জগৎ তত্ত্বের মাধ্যমে তার থেকে মুক্তির পথ নির্দেশ, ইতিহাসের নূতন ব্যাখ্যা প্রদান।

উপরের আলোচনা থেকে এটা স্পষ্ট হয় যে হসার্ল প্রথম থেকেই কতকগুলি নির্দিষ্ট সমস্যা নিয়ে ভাবিত ছিলেন। তিনি সারা কর্মজীবন ধরেই বারবার ফিরে গেছেন ঐ মৌলিক প্রশ্নগুলিতে, চেষ্টা করেছেন

সেগুলি আরো গভীরে অনুসন্ধান করতে। সমস্যার দায়সারা স্থায়ী সমাধান দেওয়ার চেষ্টা করেন নি তিনি। ‘চিরন্তন প্রারম্ভ’ (perpetual beginning) -এর যে আদর্শে তিনি উদ্বুদ্ধ ছিলেন তাতে সমস্যার স্থায়ী সমাধানের চেয়ে গুরুত্বপূর্ণ ছিল যথার্থ পদ্ধতির অনুশীলন। এখানেই দার্শনিক হিসাবে তাঁর মহত্ব। আবার এটাই তাঁর চিন্তার ধারাবাহিকতা তথা ঐক্যের সূত্র। তাই অধ্যাপক মোহান্তির সঙ্গে একমত হয়ে আমরা বলতে পারি, প্রভাসতাত্ত্বিক বন্ধনীকরণ পদ্ধতির আবিষ্কার (১৯০৫) ব্যতিরেকে হসার্লের চিন্তার বিবর্তনের ধারায় বড় ধরনের কোন পর্বান্তর ঘটে নি।^{১০} তবে সমস্যাকে দেখার, তার সমাধান খোঁজার ক্ষেত্রে চিন্তাভাবনার ক্রমশঃ গভীরায়ন ঘটেছে।

উৎসপঞ্জী ও টিপ্সনী

১. লজিক্যাল ইনভেস্টিগেশন্স -এর দ্বিতীয় খণ্ড প্রকাশিত হয় ১৯০১ খৃষ্টাব্দে। এই দ্বিতীয় খণ্ডের ভূমিকাংশে ‘Phenomenology’ শব্দটি প্রথম প্রয়োগ করেন হসার্ল। তিনি এখানে বর্ণনাত্মক মনস্তত্ত্বকে ভুলক্রমে প্রভাসতত্ত্ব হিসাবে বিবেচনা করেছেন। ১৯১৩ খৃষ্টাব্দে গ্রন্থটির যে দ্বিতীয় সংস্করণ প্রকাশিত হয় তখন তিনি এর সংশোধন করেন। দ্রষ্টব্য : জে.এন্.ফিণ্ডলে অনুদিত লজিক্যাল ইনভেস্টিগেশন্স (রুটলেজ, ১৯৭০) পৃষ্ঠা : ২৬১-৬৩।
২. হসার্ল এই একই শিরোনামে মোট তিনটি গ্রন্থ রচনা করেছেন : বুক-১, বুক-২ এবং বুক-৩। এগুলিকে যথাক্রমে আইডিয়াজ-১, আইডিয়াজ-২ এবং আইডিয়াজ-৩ হিসাবে উল্লেখ করা হয়।
৩. দ্রষ্টব্য : জে.এন.মোহান্তি (এডি.) : রিডিংস্ অন্ এড্‌মুণ্ড হসার্লস্ লজিক্যাল ইনভেস্টিগেশন্স (মার্তিনুস নিজ্‌হোফ, ১৯৭৭)-এ অন্তর্গত ফ্রেগের গ্রন্থসমালোচনা প্রবন্ধ ‘ডঃ ই. হসার্লস্ ফিলসফি অফ্‌ এ্যরিথ্‌মেটিক’, পৃষ্ঠা : ৬-২১
৪. দ্রষ্টব্য : জে. জে. ককেলম্যানস লিখিত এ ফার্স্ট ইনট্রোডাকসন টু হসার্লস্ ফেনোমেনোলজি, (ডুকীন্‌ ইউনিভার্সিটি প্রেস, ১৯৬৭) পৃষ্ঠা-৩
৫. হসার্লের মন্তব্য এখানে প্রণিধানযোগ্য : “Since it is epistemologically of unique importance that we should separate the purely descriptive examination of the knowledge experience, disembarassed of all theoretical psychological interests, from the truly psychological researches directed to empirical explanation and origin, it will be good if we rather speak of ‘phenomenology’ than of descriptive psychology.” লজিক্যাল ইনভেস্টিগেশন্স, প্রাগুক্ত, পৃষ্ঠা-২৬৩

৬. দ্রষ্টব্য : এফ. কারস্টেন অনুদিত আইডিয়াজ-১ (মার্তিনুস নিজহোফ, ১৯৮৩), পার্ট-২, চ্যাপ্টার-১।

৭. উইলহেল্ম ক্রাইসিস্ গ্রন্থে জীবন-জগৎ সম্পর্কে বলতে গিয়ে 'Existenz', 'den menschlichen Dasein', 'Subjective-relative' ইত্যাদি পরিভাষা ব্যবহার করেছেন যেগুলি সাধারণত: অস্তিত্ববাদীরা ব্যবহার করেন থাকেন। দ্রষ্টব্য : ডেভিড্ কার্ অনুদিত দ্য ক্রাইসিস্ অফ ইউরোপীয়ান সায়েন্সেস্ এ্যাণ্ড ট্রান্সেনডেন্টাল ফেনোমেনোলজি (নর্থওয়েস্টার্ন ইউনিভার্সিটি প্রেস, ১৯৭০) পৃষ্ঠা (যথাক্রমে) ১২, ৫, ৫৪।

৮. প্রাগুক্ত, পৃষ্ঠা-১৭৪

৯. দ্রষ্টব্য : ব্যারি স্মিথ্ এবং ডেভিড উড্রাভ স্মিথ (এভিটেড্) কেমব্রিজ কম্পোনিয়ান টু হুসার্ল (কেমব্রিজ ইউনিভার্সিটি প্রেস, ১৯৯৫) অন্তর্গত 'দ্য ডেভলপমেন্ট অফ হুসার্লস থট', পৃষ্ঠা-৪৬

১০. প্রাগুক্ত, পৃষ্ঠা-৭৪

পঞ্চপাদিকাবিবরণম্

(প্রথমং বর্ণকম্)

মূল, বঙ্গানুবাদ ও বিবৃতিসহ
অমরনাথ ভট্টাচার্য



PAÑCĀPADIKĀVIVARA

(Varnaka I)

Text with translation and exposition in Bengali
AMARNATH BHATTACHARYA

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মূল

এতৎ শক্তিং দোষং পরিহরন্ ভাষ্যখণ্ডস্য সূত্রার্থাদুপান্তবিষয়প্রয়োজনপ্রতিপাদনে তাৎপর্যং দর্শয়তি
— “যুগ্মদ্বন্দ্বংপ্রত্যয়গোচরয়ো”রিত্যাদ্য “হমিদং মমেদমিতি নৈসর্গিকোহয়ং লোকব্যবহারঃ” ইত্যন্তং ভাষ্যম্
“অস্যানর্থহেতোঃ প্রহাণায়াত্মৈকত্ববিদ্যা প্রতিপত্তয়ে সর্ববেদান্তা আরভ্যন্তে” ইত্যেনেন ভাষ্যেণ পর্যবস্যৎ,
শাস্ত্রস্য বিষয়ঃ প্রয়োজনধর্মার্থং প্রথমসূত্রেণ সূত্রিতে ইতি প্রতিপাদয়তীতি। তত্র “নৈসর্গিকোহয়ং লোকব্যবহার
” ইত্যন্তং ভাষ্যমিতি গ্রন্থঃ “শাস্ত্রস্য বিষয়ং প্রয়োজনঞ্চ প্রতিপাদয়তী” তুত্তরেণ সম্বধ্যতে।

অনুবাদ

(দুইটি ভাষ্যগ্রন্থের উপর) আশঙ্কিত এই দোষ পরিহার করিবার জন্য (জিজ্ঞাসা) সূত্রের দ্বারা
আক্ষেপলভা (বেদান্তের) বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন প্রতিপাদনে ভাষ্যদ্বয়ের তাৎপর্য (টীকাকার পদ্বিপাদ) দেখাইতেছেন
— “অনর্থের কারণ ইহার (অর্থ্যং অজ্ঞানের) আত্যন্তিক নিবৃত্তির উদ্দেশ্যে (এবং উহার উপায়স্বরূপ
পরামাশ্রাও) জীবাত্মার অভেদবোধের জন্য (যে জ্ঞানের দ্বারা জীব ও ব্রহ্মের অভেদজ্ঞান জন্ম, ঐ জ্ঞানলাভের
জন্য) সমস্ত বেদান্ত আরম্ভ করা হইতেছে (অর্থ্যং সকল উপনিষদবাক্যের বিচার করা হইতেছে)” এই
ভাষ্যসন্দর্ভের সহিত পর্যবসিত হইয়া “যুগ্মং ও অস্মৎ শব্দজন্য জ্ঞানের বিষয়” ইত্যাদি হইতে “এই আমি,
ইহা আমার, এইরূপ অনাদি লোকব্যবহার” এই পর্যন্ত ভাষ্যগ্রন্থ (এই) শাস্ত্রের বিষয় এবং প্রয়োজন প্রতিপাদন
করিতেছে। “অনাদি এই লোকব্যবহার” এই ভাষ্যাংশটি “শাস্ত্রের বিষয় এবং প্রয়োজনকে প্রতিপাদন
করিতেছে” এই পরভাবী (টীকা) গ্রন্থের সহিত অন্বিত।

বিবৃতি

এস্থলে বিবরণকার প্রকাশাত্মাটীকাকার পদ্যপাদকে অনুসরণ করিয়া অধ্যাসভাষ্যের ভাষ্যত্ব উপপাদন করিয়াছেন। সূত্রকার বাদরায়ণ “তদগুণসারত্বাত্ত্ব তদ্ব্যপদেশঃ প্রাজ্ঞবৎ” এই ব্রহ্মসূত্রে (২/৩/২৯) অধ্যাস স্পষ্টভাবে উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন (দ্রষ্টব্য : বিবরণ প্রমেয়সংগ্রহ, ১ম খণ্ড, পৃ. ৭১, বসুমতী সং)। তিনি তবে “অথাতো ব্রহ্মজিজ্ঞাসা” (১/১/১) এই ব্রহ্মসূত্রে উহার সূচনা করিয়াছেন। মুমুক্শুর পক্ষে অজ্ঞান নিবৃত্তির জন্য তত্ত্বজ্ঞান লাভের উপায় উপনিষদ্বাক্যের বিচার অবশ্য কর্তব্য—ইহা এই সূত্রের আর্থিক অর্থ। যাবতীয় পার্থিব অনর্থ নিবৃত্তির অভিপ্রায়ে ব্রহ্মজ্ঞানের জন্য মুমুক্শু ব্যক্তির অভিলাষ জন্মিয়া থাকে। অনর্থ অধ্যাসবিষয়ক এবং অধ্যাস আবার অজ্ঞানমূলক ইহা জানিতে না পারিলে মুমুক্শু ব্যক্তি ব্রহ্ম জানিবার জন্য উৎসাহী হইবে না। সুতরাং মূলজ্ঞানের ফলে অধ্যাস আবহমান কাল হইতে চলিয়া আসিতেছে এবং অধ্যাসের ফলেই জীবের যাবতীয় দুঃখ-দুর্দশা ঘটিতেছে ইহা না বুঝিলে ‘জিজ্ঞাসা’ সূত্রের অর্থ পরিস্ফুট হইবে না। এইজন্য ভাষ্যকার শংকর সূত্রসূচিত এই অধ্যাসকে অধ্যাসভাষ্যে বিশেষভাবে উপপাদন করিয়াছেন। সুতরাং সূত্রসূচিত অধ্যাস উপক্রমণিকাভাষ্যে আলোচিত হওয়ায় ইহাকে ‘ভাষ্য’ বলা সঙ্গত হইবে।

আরও কথা এই যে, যে কোনও শাস্ত্রগ্রন্থের প্রারম্ভে বিষয়, প্রয়োজন, সম্বন্ধ ও অধিকারী এই চারটি অনুবন্ধের জ্ঞান থাকা আবশ্যিক। অনুবন্ধের জ্ঞান প্রবৃত্তির প্রয়োজক। প্রবৃত্তির প্রতি ইষ্টসাধনতাজ্ঞান ও কৃতিসাধ্যতাজ্ঞান কারণ। ‘ইদং মদিষ্টসাধনম্’ এই ইষ্টসাধনতাজ্ঞান ‘ইদম্’ এই বিষয়জ্ঞানকে, ‘ইষ্টম্’ এই প্রয়োজনকে, ‘মৎ’ এই অধিকারীকে এবং ‘ইদং মৎকৃতিসাধ্যম্’ এইরূপ কৃতিসাধ্যতাজ্ঞান সাধ্য-সাধনসম্বন্ধজ্ঞানকে অপেক্ষা করে। শাস্ত্রকারগণ বিষয়াদি অনুবন্ধের উল্লেখ না করিলে ব্যাখ্যাকারগণ উহা প্রদর্শন করিয়া থাকেন। শাস্ত্রের আরম্ভে অনুবন্ধচতুষ্টয়ের জ্ঞান না থাকিলে বুদ্ধিমান পাঠকের তাহাতে প্রবৃত্তি হয় না। কুমারিল ভট্ট শ্লোকবর্তিকেকে বলিয়াছেন—“সর্বস্যৈব হি শাস্ত্রস্য কর্মণোবাপি কস্যচিৎ। যাবৎ প্রয়োজনং নোক্তং তাবত্তৎ তেনগ্যহাতে।। সিদ্ধার্থং জ্ঞাতসম্বন্ধং শ্রোতুং শ্রোতা প্রবর্ততে। শাস্ত্রাদৌ তেন বক্তব্যঃ সম্বন্ধঃ সপ্রয়োজনঃ” (মী.সূ.১.১.১., শ্রো.বা.১২,১৭)।।

ভাষ্যকার শঙ্কর ‘জিজ্ঞাসা’ সূত্রের ব্যাখ্যায় সূত্রস্থ ‘অথ’ শব্দের দ্বারা বেদান্তের অধিকারী ও ‘অতঃ’ শব্দের দ্বারা সম্বন্ধ বুঝাইয়াছেন। কিন্তু তাঁহার পক্ষে সূত্রস্থ পদ হইতে বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন এই দুইটি মুখ্য অনুবন্ধ বিশ্লেষণ করা সম্ভব হয় নাই। টীকাকার পদ্যপাদের মতে, বেদান্তের বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন ‘জিজ্ঞাসা’ সূত্রের আক্ষেপলভ্য। এইজন্য ভাষ্যকার উহা অধ্যাসভাষ্যে উপপাদন করিয়াছেন। বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন শাস্ত্রারম্ভের কারণ এবং অধ্যাস উহাদের উত্থাপক। টীকাকারের মতে, “নৈসর্গিকোহয়ং লোকব্যবহারঃ” এই পর্যন্ত অবশিষ্ট অধ্যাসভাষ্য বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন প্রতিপাদন করিতেছে। যদিও এই ভাষ্যদ্বয় সাক্ষাৎভাবে বিষয় ও প্রয়োজনের প্রতিপাদক নহে, তথাপি “অস্যানর্থহেতোঃ প্রহাণায়” ইত্যাদি ভাষ্যের সহিত পর্য্যবসিত হইয়া উহার বিষয় ও প্রয়োজনের প্রতিপাদক হয়। নিজের সামর্থ্য না থাকিলেও যাহাতে পর্য্যবসান হইবে, উহা প্রতিপাদক হইলে অসমর্থকেও প্রতিপাদক বলা হয়। এস্থলে টীকাকার পদ্যপাদ অধ্যাসভাষ্যের ভাষ্যত্ব উপপাদন করিতে প্রবৃত্ত হইয়াছেন। সুতরাং উহা প্রতিপাদন করিবার জন্য তিনি “নৈসর্গিকোহয়ং লোকব্যবহারঃ” এই অংশকে ‘প্রতিপাদয়তি’ ক্রিয়ার কর্তা না বলিয়া, “নৈসর্গিকোহয়ং লোকব্যবহারঃ” ইত্যন্তং যৎ তদব্রাহ্ম্যম্’

এইরূপ ব্যাখ্যা করিয়াছেন। এখানে ‘ভাষ্য’ শব্দটি ‘প্রতিপাদয়তি’ ক্রিয়ার কর্তারূপে বিবক্ষিত। অখণ্ডানন্দ তত্ত্বদীপন-টীকাতে বিবরণকারের এইরূপ অভিপ্রায় প্রদর্শন করিয়াছেন (পৃ. ২৪, মেট্রোপলিটন সং, কলিকাতা-১৯৩৩)।

অদ্বৈত বেদান্তিগণ বলেন, ব্রহ্ম ও জীবের ঐক্য বেদান্তের প্রতিপাদ্য বিষয় এবং মোক্ষ বা বন্ধনবৃত্তি উহার প্রয়োজন। এই বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন, বাহ্য অধ্যাসভাষ্যে উপপাদন করা হইয়াছে, সূত্রকার বাদরায়ণ ‘জিজ্ঞাসা’-সূত্রে উহাদের সূচনা করিয়াছেন। প্রথম সূত্রে যে বলা হইয়াছে “মুমুক্ষুর পক্ষে ব্রহ্মবিচার কর্তব্য” ইহা তবেই সংগত হয় যদি বন্ধ অধ্যাস বা অজ্ঞানমূলক হয়। ব্রহ্মজ্ঞান বা ব্রহ্মকার অন্তঃকরণবৃত্তি স্বয়ং পুরুষার্থনহে, বন্ধনবৃত্তিরূপ মোক্ষলাভের উপায়। বন্ধ বা অনর্থরাশি যে অধ্যাস বা মিথ্যা ইহা না জানিলে মুমুক্ষু ব্যক্তির ব্রহ্ম জানিবার ইচ্ছা হইবে না। ইহার ফলে সূত্রটি অসঙ্গত হইয়া পড়িবে। সুতরাং বন্ধনবৃত্তিরূপ প্রয়োজন ‘জিজ্ঞাসা’-সূত্রে বিবক্ষিত হইয়াছে ইহা বুঝিতে হইবে। অনুরূপভাবে বিষয়ও এই সূত্রটিতে সূচিত হইয়াছে। “তত্ত্বমসি” ইত্যাদি মহাবাক্যে জীব ও ব্রহ্মের অভেদ সিদ্ধ হইয়াছে। ‘ত্বম্’ শব্দের বাচ্যার্থ জীব ও ‘তৎ’ শব্দের বাচ্যার্থ ব্রহ্ম বা সাক্ষী। একটি বাক্যে সমানবিভক্তিয়ুক্ত দুইটি পদের মধ্যে অভেদাশয় হয়। শাস্ত্রিকগণও বলেন, ‘নামার্থয়োঃ ভেদাতিরিক্তসম্বন্ধোহব্যুৎপন্নঃ’ অর্থাৎ দুইটি নামার্থের বা প্রথমাবিভক্তিয়ুক্ত পদের অর্থের মধ্যে অভেদ সম্বন্ধ ব্যতীত অন্য কোন সম্বন্ধ প্রামাণিক নহে। এইজন্য এই মহাবাক্যে সমানবিভক্তিয়ুক্ত ‘ত্বম্’ ও ‘তৎ’ এর অভেদ অশয় হইবে। কিন্তু ‘ত্বম্’ শব্দের বাচ্যার্থ অন্তঃকরণাবচ্ছিন্ন জীবচৈতন্য এবং ‘তৎ’ শব্দের বাচ্যার্থ অজ্ঞানোপহিত সাক্ষিচৈতন্য। এই উভয় বাচ্যার্থের মধ্যে অভেদ অশয় সম্ভব নহে। সুতরাং ভাগত্যাগলক্ষণার মাধ্যমে ‘ত্বম্’ শব্দের বাচ্যার্থ হইতে অন্তঃকরণ এবং ‘তৎ’ শব্দের বাচ্যার্থ হইতে অজ্ঞানকে পরিহার করিয়া উভয়পদেরই লক্ষ্যার্থ হইবে চৈতন্য। এই উভয় চৈতন্য অভিন্ন। জীব আত্মাতে কর্তৃত্বাদি অধ্যাস করিয়া ব্যবহার করে। আত্মা হইতে নিজের অভেদ না জানিলে জীবের কখনও কর্তৃত্বাদি অধ্যাস দূর করিবার জন্য ব্রহ্ম জানিবার ইচ্ছা হইতে পারে না। সুতরাং বেদান্তের বিষয়ও সূত্রে সূচিত হইয়াছে (দ্রষ্টব্য : নারায়ণ সরস্বতী প্রণীত বার্তিক, পৃ. ২৬-২৮, মেট্রো, সং. কলিকাতা ১৯৩৩। সূত্রসূচিত এই বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন অধ্যাসভাষ্যে ভাষ্যকার উপপাদন করিয়াছেন।

মূল

ননুক থং ভাষ্যদ্বয়মেব বিষয় প্রয়োজনে প্রতিপাদয়তি ?
শাস্ত্রারম্ভনিমিত্তবিষয়প্রয়োজনসিদ্ধিহেতোরধ্যাসস্যোপস্থাপকত্বাদিতি ব্রূমঃ; হেতুবচনং হি প্রতিজ্ঞাতার্থমেব সাধয়তি। তথাহি —এতৎ শাস্ত্রমারম্ভনীয়ম্, সম্ভাবিতবিষয়প্রয়োজনবস্থাৎ, কৃষ্যাদ্যারম্ভবৎ; শাস্ত্রং চ, সম্ভাবিতবিষয় প্রয়োজনম্, অবিদ্যাশ্লকবন্ধপ্রত্যনীকত্বাৎ, জাগ্রদ্বোধবদিতি। তদেবং শাস্ত্রসারম্ভনিমিত্তবিষয়প্রয়োজনবন্ধপ্রত্যনীকস্য বন্ধস্যাবিদ্যাশ্লকত্বং নির্দিশ্য ভাষ্যদ্বয়ং বিষয় প্রয়োজনে প্রতিপাদয়তীতি।

অনুবাদ

আচ্ছা, ভাষ্য দুইটিই কিভাবে বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন প্রতিপাদন করিতেছে ? (ইহার উত্তরে প্রকাশাত্মা বলিতেছেন) শাস্ত্রের আরম্ভের নিমিত্ত বিষয় ও প্রয়োজনসিদ্ধির হেতু যে অধ্যাস, উহার উত্থাপক বলিয়া

(ভাষ্য দুইটি বিষয় এবং প্রয়োজন প্রতিপাদন করিতেছে) এইরূপ (প্রাণী) বলিব; কারণ হেতু্যাক্য প্রতিজ্ঞাত বিষয়কেই সাধন করে। সুতরাং এই বেদান্তশাস্ত্র আরম্ভ করিবার যোগ্য, যাহেতু উহাতে বিষয় ও প্রয়োজনের সম্ভাবনা আছে; যেমন (বিষয় ও প্রয়োজনের সম্ভাবনা থাকায়) কৃদিকার্য্য প্রভৃতি আরম্ভ করা হয়। আবার এই শাস্ত্রে বিষয় ও প্রয়োজনের সম্ভাবনা আছে, যাহেতু উহা অধিন্যাক্যে ও বন্ধের বিরোধী; যেমন জাগ্রৎকালীন জ্ঞান (অজ্ঞানপ্রসূত স্বাপ্নিক জ্ঞানের বিরোধী)। এইভাবে শাস্ত্রের আরম্ভে হেতুত্ব বিনয় এবং প্রয়োজনের বিরোধী বন্ধ অজ্ঞানমূলক ইহা নিরূপণ করিয়া ভাষ্যাংশ দুইটি (বেদান্তের) বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন প্রতিপাদন করিতেছে।

নিবৃত্তি

ভাষ্যকার শংকর অধ্যাসভাষ্যে বেদান্তের বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন প্রতিপাদন করিয়াছেন। বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন বুঝিতে হইলে অধ্যাসের জ্ঞান আবশ্যিক। বিবরণকার দুইটি অনুমানের মাধ্যমে বেদান্তের বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন স্থাপন করিয়াছেন। তবে রামানন্দ যতি ভাষ্যরত্নপ্রভা টীকাতে এইস্থলে চারটি অনুমান বিধৃত করিয়াছেন। অনুমান চারটির আকার ইহাতেছে - ১) 'শাস্ত্রমারম্ভক্যম্, বিষয়প্রয়োজনবদ্বাং ভোজনাদিবৎ', ২) 'শাস্ত্রং প্রয়োজনবৎ, বদানিবর্তকজ্ঞানহেতুত্বাং, রজ্জুরিয়মিত্যাদিবাক্যবৎ', ৩) 'বদো জ্ঞাননিবর্ত্তোহধ্যস্তত্বাং, রজ্জুসর্পবৎ' ও ৪) 'জীবঃ ব্রহ্মাভিন্নস্তজ্ঞাননিবর্ত্তাধ্যাসাশ্রয়ত্বাং, যদিথাং তত্বথা, বথা শুভ্যভিন্ন ইদমংশঃ' (ভাষ্যরত্নপ্রভা, পৃ. ৩-৪, মোতিলাল সং, ২০০০)। বিবরণকারের সম্মত দ্বিতীয় অনুমানটি ভাষ্যরত্নপ্রভাকার শেষোক্ত তিনটি অনুমানে বিশ্লেষণ করিয়াছেন। উপনিষদের ঋকিরা মুমুকুর পক্ষে অজ্ঞান নিবৃত্তির জন্য বেদান্তের শ্রবণ, মনন ও নিদিধ্যাসনের মাধ্যমে আত্মসাক্ষাৎকারের বিধান দিয়াছেন (বৃ. উপ. ২/৪/৫)। বন্ধের ফলেই সকল অনর্থ ঘটিয়া থাকে। তত্ত্বজ্ঞান উদিত হইলে অনর্থের কারণ এই বন্ধের নিবৃত্তি হয়। বেদান্তদর্শন বন্ধের নিবর্তক তত্ত্বজ্ঞানের হেতু হওয়ার মুমুকুর পক্ষে বেদান্তপাঠ অপরিহার্য। বেদান্ত অধ্যয়নের ফলে যে ব্রহ্মাকার অপরোক্ষ অন্তঃকরণবৃত্তি জন্মে; ঐ জ্ঞানের দ্বারা বন্ধ নিবৃত্ত হয়; কারণ বন্ধজ্ঞানে অধ্যস্ত। রজ্জুতে আরোপিত সর্প রজ্জুর অজ্ঞান হইতে উৎপন্ন হয় বলিয়া রজ্জুর জ্ঞান জন্মিলে যেমন ঐ সর্প নিবৃত্ত হয়, তেমনি জীবের সবিষয়ক অজ্ঞান হইতে যে বন্ধের সৃষ্টি হইয়া থাকে, উহা সবিষয়ক জ্ঞান জন্মিলে নিবৃত্ত হয়। বেদান্তদর্শন বন্ধের নিবর্তক জ্ঞান দেয় বলিয়া মুমুকুর পক্ষে বেদান্তপাঠ অবশ্য কর্তব্য। সুতরাং বেদান্তের প্রয়োজন বুঝিতে হইলে বন্ধ যে অধ্যাস বা মিথ্যা উহা জানা প্রয়োজন। অনুরূপভাবে জীব ও ব্রহ্মের অভেদ যে বেদান্তের বিষয় ইহা জানিতে হইলেও অধ্যাসের জ্ঞান আবশ্যিক। ব্রহ্মজ্ঞানের দ্বারা যে অধ্যাসের নিবৃত্তি ঘটে জীব ঐ অধ্যাসের আশ্রয় হওয়ার জীব ও ব্রহ্মের অভেদ সিদ্ধ হয়। ভ্রমস্থলে অধিষ্ঠান রজ্জুর সত্তা ব্যতীত আরোপিত সর্পের স্বতন্ত্র সত্তা নাই। ঘটের জ্ঞান হইলে ঘটের অজ্ঞানই বিনষ্ট হয়; পটের অজ্ঞান নহে। রজ্জুর জ্ঞান জন্মিলে সর্প বাধিত হয় বলিয়া প্রাতিভাসিক সর্প রজ্জুর অজ্ঞান হইতে উৎপন্ন বুঝিতে হইবে। সুতরাং ভ্রমের বিষয়টি অধিষ্ঠানের অজ্ঞানজন্য হওয়ার অধিষ্ঠান ও অধ্যাসের অভেদ সিদ্ধ হয়। অনুরূপভাবে জীবাত্মিত অধ্যাস ব্রহ্মজ্ঞাননাশ্য হওয়ার জীব ব্রহ্ম হইতে ভিন্ন নহে। অতএব জীবের কর্তৃত্ব-ভোক্তৃত্বাদি অধ্যাস না বুঝিলে জীব ও ব্রহ্মের অভেদও বুঝা যাইবে না। এইভাবে ভাষ্যাংশ দুইটি বিষয় এবং প্রয়োজনের উত্থাপক অধ্যাসকে উপপাদন করিয়া বিষয় এবং প্রয়োজন প্রতিপাদন করিতেছে। সুতরাং 'জিজ্ঞাসা'-সূত্রে সূচিত বেদান্তের বিষয় এবং প্রয়োজন এই দুইটি মুখ্য অনুবন্ধ অধ্যাসভাষ্যে আলোচিত

হওয়ায় ইহার ভাষ্যত্র ও উপযোগিতা অনস্বীকার্য। এই অভিপ্রায়ে সর্বজ্ঞাত্মমুনি বলিয়াছেন — “ব্রহ্মজ্ঞানং সূচয়ান্ সূত্রকারো বন্ধোৎপত্তেহেতুবিধবৎসনায়। এতৎ সর্বং সূচয়ামাস তস্মাদেতৎ সর্বং ভাষতে ভাষ্যকারঃ।।” (সংক্ষেপশারীরক ১/৫৬, পৃ. ৭৫, আনন্দাশ্রম সং. ১৯১৮)।

মূল

ননু বন্ধস্যবিদ্যাত্মকত্বলক্ষণে হেতুরসিদ্ধা; কথমসিদ্ধমসিদ্ধেন সাধ্যত ইত্যত আহ — সর্বে বেদান্তা আরভ্যন্তে ইত্যনেন ভাষ্যেণ পর্য্যবসাদিতি। বিষয়াদিসিদ্ধিহেতোরধ্যাসস্য সিদ্ধিহেতুত্বানি লক্ষণ-সম্ভাবনা-সম্ভাব-প্রমাণানি প্রতিপাদয়তা ভাষ্যেণ সহ লক্ষণাদিভিঃ স্বার্থমধ্যাসং সাধয়িত্বা বিষয়প্রয়োজনে সাধয়তীত্যর্থঃ। অতএব ব্যবধানাব্যবধানাভ্যাং নিবয়াদেঃ সাধকত্বাদেতদন্তমেনে পর্য্যবসাদিতি ভাষ্যস্য বিভাগেনোপাদানং কৃতম্। ননু- তর্হি “সর্বলোকপ্রত্যক্ষ” ইত্যনেন পর্য্যবসাদিতি বক্তব্যম্, সত্যম্; “অস্যানর্থহেতোরি”তি ভাষ্যস্য বিষয়প্রয়োজনয়োবেদান্তবাক্যসম্বন্ধকথনদ্বারেণ বিচার-শাস্ত্রসম্বন্ধপ্রতিপাদনপরত্বাৎ বিচারশাস্ত্রীয় বিষয়প্রয়োজনসাধনে সব্যবধানত্বসাম্যেন পূর্বভাষ্যেণ সহোপাদানং কৃতম্। ননু এবমপ্যসূত্রসম্বন্ধিনী বিষয়প্রয়োজনে কিমিতি প্রতিপাদ্যেতে? ইত্যত আহ — বিষয়ঃ প্রয়োজনং চার্খাৎপ্রথমসূত্রেণ সূত্রিতে ইতীতি। ইতিশব্দো হেতৌ। যস্মাৎপ্রথম সূত্রেণার্থাৎসূত্রিতে, তস্মাৎ প্রতিপাদয়তীতি।

অনুবাদ

আচ্ছা, ‘বন্ধ অজ্ঞানাত্মক’ এই হেতুটি অসিদ্ধ। (কাজেই) ক্রিভাবে অসিদ্ধের দ্বারা অসিদ্ধ সাধিত হয়। এইজন্য (পদ্যপাদ) বলিতেছেন, “উপনিষদ্বাক্যগুলির বিচার করা আরম্ভ হইতেছে” এই ভাষ্যাংশের সহিত পর্য্যবসিত হইয়া (বন্ধ যে অবিদ্যাত্মক ইহা সিদ্ধ হয়)। বিষয় প্রভৃতি সিদ্ধির কারণ যে অধ্যাস। উহার উপপাদনের হেতু লক্ষণ, সম্ভাবনা সম্ভাব ও প্রমাণ প্রতিপাদনের মাধ্যমে ভাষ্যটি লক্ষণ প্রভৃতির সাহায্যে মুখ্যার্থ অধ্যাসকে সাধন করিয়া (তাৎপর্যের অনুরোধে) বিষয় ও প্রয়োজনকে প্রতিপাদন করিতেছে। অতএব সাক্ষাৎ ও পরম্পরাক্রমে বিষয় প্রভৃতির সাধক হইয়াছে বলিয়া (টীকাকার) (নৈসর্গিক এই লোকব্যবহার) “এই পর্যন্ত” ও (উপনিষদ্বাক্যগুলির বিচার করা আরম্ভ হইতেছে এই ভাষ্যাংশের সহিত) “পর্য্যবসিত হইয়া” এইভাবে (অধ্যাস) ভাষ্যকে বিভক্ত করিয়া গ্রহণ করিয়াছেন। আচ্ছা, তাহা হইলে “সকললোকের প্রত্যক্ষ” এই ভাষ্যাংশের সহিত পর্য্যবসিত হইয়াই (নৈসর্গিক এই লোকব্যবহার) এই ভাষ্যাংশে বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন প্রতিপাদন করিতেছে) এইরূপ বলা সমীচীন; ইহা সত্য বটে, তথাপি বিষয় ও প্রয়োজনের সহিত বেদান্তবাক্যের সম্বন্ধ আলোচনার মাধ্যমে বিচার্য বেদান্তশাস্ত্রের সহিত (বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন) সম্বন্ধের প্রতিপাদক হওয়ায় বিচার্য বেদান্তশাস্ত্রের বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন সাধনের অভিপ্রায়ে দূরত্ব-সাদৃশ্যবশতঃ (“সকল লোকের প্রত্যক্ষ”) এই পূর্বভাষ্যের সহিত “অনর্থের কারণ উহার” এই ভাষ্যের গ্রহণ করা হইয়াছে। আচ্ছা, এইরূপ হইলেও সূত্রাসংস্পর্শী বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন কেন প্রতিপাদন করা হইতেছে? এইজন্য (পদ্যপাদ) বলিতেছেন, বিষয় এবং প্রয়োজন প্রথম সূত্রের দ্বারা অর্থতঃ সূচিত হইয়াছে। (এখানে) ‘ইতি’ শব্দটি হেতুবাচী। যেহেতু (বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন) প্রথমসূত্রের দ্বারা অর্থতঃ সূচিত হইয়াছে সেহেতু (অধ্যাসভাষ্যের অন্তর্গত এই ভাষ্যাংশ দুইটি সূত্রকারের অভিপ্রেত বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন) প্রতিপাদন করিতেছে।

বিবৃতি

অধ্যাসভাষ্যে মুখ্যতঃ অধ্যাস উপপাদন করা হইয়াছে। লক্ষণ এবং প্রমাণব্যতিরেকে কোন প্রমেয়বস্তু সিদ্ধ হয় না। সেইজন্য ভাষ্যকার এখানে প্রথমে অধ্যাসের লক্ষণ ও পরে প্রমাণ প্রদর্শন করিয়াছেন। প্রসঙ্গতঃ অধ্যাসের সম্ভাব ও আলোচিত হইয়াছে। অধ্যাসভাষ্যের অন্তর্গত লক্ষণ ও প্রমাণগ্রন্থে লক্ষণ, সম্ভাব ও প্রমাণের আলোচনার মাধ্যমে সামান্যভাবে অধ্যাস উপপাদন করা হইয়াছে। অধ্যাসভাষ্যের প্রারম্ভে “যুদ্ধদ্বন্দ্ব্যৎপ্রত্যয়গোচরয়োঃ” ইত্যাদি ও “নৈসর্গিকোহয়ং লোকব্যবহারঃ” এই পর্য্যন্ত ভাষ্যাংশে চিদাত্মা ও অনাত্মার মধ্যে পারস্পরিক অধ্যাস আক্ষেপ ও সমাধানের মাধ্যমে উপপাদন করা হইয়াছে। টীকাকার পদ্বপাদ অধ্যাসভাষ্যকে দুইটি অংশে বিভক্ত করিয়াছেন। “নৈসর্গিকোহয়ং লোকব্যবহারঃ” এই পর্য্যন্ত সম্ভাবনা গ্রন্থটি প্রথম ভাষ্যাংশ। “অস্যানর্থহেতোঃপ্রহণায়ৈকত্ববিদ্যা প্রতিপত্তয়ে সর্ববেদান্তা আরভ্যন্তে” এই অবশিষ্ট ভাষ্যাংশটি দ্বিতীয় অংশ। যদিও এই দুটি ভাষ্যাংশ সাক্ষাৎভাবে অধ্যাস উপপাদন করিতেছে, তথাপি উহারা বেদান্তের বিষয় ও প্রয়োজনের প্রতিপাদক হইয়াছে বুঝিতে হইবে। প্রথম ভাষ্যাংশটি দ্বিতীয় ভাষ্যাংশের সহিত মিলিত হইয়া বিষয় ও প্রয়োজনের বোধক হয়। ভাষ্যাংশ দুইটির আক্ষরিক অর্থ অধ্যাস হইলেও বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন উহার তাৎপর্য্যার্থ। “যৎপরঃ শব্দঃ স শব্দার্থঃ” এই ন্যায়ানুসারে ভাষ্যাংশ দুইটির বিষয় ও প্রয়োজনে তাৎপর্য্য বুঝিতে হইবে। “পর্বতো বহিমান ধূমাৎ” - এই অনুমিতিস্থলে “ধূমাৎ” এই হেতুবাক্যটি “ধূমবানয়ং” এইরূপ পক্ষধর্মতাজ্ঞান উৎপন্ন করিলেও উক্ত ন্যায়ানুসারে প্রতিজ্ঞাত সাধ্যে হেতুবাক্যের তাৎপর্য্য থাকে বলিয়া “ধূমবানয়ং” এই বাক্যটি হেতুকে প্রকাশ করিয়া সাধ্য বহিকেই প্রকাশ করে। কোনও কোনও দার্শনিক তাৎপর্য্যার্থকে মুখ্যার্থ বলিয়া থাকেন। কিন্তু সকলস্থলে তাৎপর্য্যার্থকে শব্দের মুখ্যার্থ মানিলে লক্ষণার উচ্ছেদ হইবে। সুতরাং আক্ষেপাদি ভাষ্য দুইটি অভিধাবৃতির মাধ্যমে বিষয় ও প্রয়োজনের গমক হয়। এখানে অধ্যাস হইল হেতু এবং বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন সাধ্য। সুতরাং আক্ষেপাদি ভাষ্যাংশ দুইটি হেতু অধ্যাসকে উপপাদন করিয়া সাধ্য বিষয় ও প্রয়োজনকেই প্রতিপাদন করিতেছে—ইহাই টীকাকার পদ্বপাদাচার্যের বক্তব্য। কাজেই ‘জিজ্ঞাসা’ - সূত্রে সূচিত বেদান্তের বিষয় ও প্রয়োজন অধ্যাসভাষ্যে উপপাদিত হওয়ায় ইহাকে ভাষ্য বলা সমীচীন হইবে।

মূল

কঃ পুনরস্য সূত্রস্য প্রসঙ্গঃ ?

অনুবাদ

এই (‘অথাতো ব্রহ্মজিজ্ঞাসা’) সূত্রের প্রসঙ্গই (উত্থাপকই) বা কি আছে ? (অর্থাৎ এই ‘জিজ্ঞাসা’ -সূত্রটির স্বরূপ, মূল, সমগ্র শাস্ত্র, এমন কি শাস্ত্রের প্রথমে রচনার কোন সম্ভাবনা নেই।)

বিবৃতি

বিবরণকার প্রকাশাত্মা টীকাকারকে অনুসরণ করিয়া অধ্যাসভাষ্যের ভাষ্যত্ব উপপাদন করিয়াছেন। পদ্বপাদ

টীকাপ্রারম্ভে ‘ভাষ্য ব্যাখ্যা করিব’ এইরূপ প্রতিজ্ঞা করিয়াছেন। সুতরাং অধ্যাসভাষ্যের উপর টীকাকারের টীকা রচনায় কোনরূপ প্রতিজ্ঞাহানি হয় নাই। কিন্তু প্রতিপক্ষী এখানে পুনরায় প্রশ্ন করিতে পারেন যে, অধ্যাসভাষ্য ভাষ্য কিনা? জিজ্ঞাসা-সূত্রে বিষয় ও প্রয়োজনের ইঙ্গিত আছে কিনা? এইসবতো দূরের কথা, সূত্রটিই সঙ্গত কিনা? উহা রচনার কোনও প্রসঙ্গ আছে কিনা? ইহা অগ্রে বিচার করা আবশ্যিক। কারণ সূত্রটি যদি অসঙ্গত হয়, তবে অধ্যাসভাষ্য সূত্রসংস্পর্শী না হওয়ায় উহা ভাষ্য হইবে না। তাহা ছাড়া, সূত্রটি অসঙ্গত হইলে শাস্ত্রই আরম্ভ করিবার যোগ্য হইবে না। এই অভিপ্রায়ে বিবরণকার এখানে সূত্রটির উপর পূর্বপক্ষীর সম্ভাব্য আক্ষেপ উদ্ভাবন করিয়াছেন।

এই বিবরণ-পংক্তিটির ব্যাখ্যায় অখণ্ডানন্দ তত্ত্বদীপন টীকাতে বলিয়াছেন, স্বরূপাসঙ্গতি, মূল্যাসঙ্গতি, শাস্ত্রাসঙ্গতি এবং শাস্ত্রাদিহাসঙ্গতি এই চারপ্রকার অসঙ্গতি পূর্বপক্ষীর অভিপ্রেত। পূর্বপক্ষীর মতে, “অথাতো ব্রহ্মজিজ্ঞাসা” এই সূত্রটি স্বরূপত: অসঙ্গত। এই সূত্রে বলা হইয়াছে, মুমুক্শুর পক্ষে অজ্ঞাননিবৃত্তির জন্য ব্রহ্মজিজ্ঞাসা কর্তব্য। সন্দিগ্ধ ও সপ্রয়োজন বিষয়েই বুদ্ধিমান ব্যক্তির জিজ্ঞাসা হয় (দ্রষ্টব্য: মী.সূ. ১.১.১ শ্লোকবার্তিক ১২৫)। কাজেই ব্রহ্ম নিঃসন্দিগ্ধ ও নিঃস্বয়োজন হইলে ব্রহ্ম জানিবার ইচ্ছা মুমুক্শুর হইবে না। ব্রহ্ম যদি সর্বথা প্রসিদ্ধ বা জ্ঞাত হন, তাহা হইলে জ্ঞাত বিষয়ে জিজ্ঞাসা হয় না বলিয়া ব্রহ্মজিজ্ঞাসা সম্ভাবিত নহে। ইচ্ছার কারণ থাকিলেই ইচ্ছা উৎপন্ন হয়। জিজ্ঞাস্যবিষয়ে সন্দেহ হইল ইচ্ছার কারণ। জ্ঞাত ব্রহ্ম বিষয়ে যেমন সন্দেহ থাকে না, তেমনই অজ্ঞাত বা অপ্রসিদ্ধ ব্রহ্ম সম্বন্ধেও সন্দেহ থাকিতে পারে না। সংশয়স্থলে ধর্মীর জ্ঞান থাকে; উহার ধর্মে সংশয় হয়। কিন্তু যে বস্তু সর্বথা অপ্রসিদ্ধ বা অলীক, সামান্যভাবেও ঐ ধর্মীর জ্ঞান কাহারও হয় না। সুতরাং প্রসিদ্ধ বা অপ্রসিদ্ধ ব্রহ্ম জানিবার ইচ্ছা মুমুক্শু পুরুষের হইতে পারে না। আবার, অজ্ঞাননিবৃত্তির জন্য ব্রহ্ম জানিবার ইচ্ছাও সম্ভব নহে। কারণ ব্রহ্মজ্ঞান হইলে যে অজ্ঞাননিবৃত্তি হইবে এবং অনর্থরাশির উচ্ছেদ ঘটিবে ইহাতে কোনও প্রমাণ নাই। ব্রহ্মজ্ঞান অজ্ঞানের নিবর্তক ইহা বেদান্তপাঠ হইতে জানা যায় একথা বলাও সঙ্গত হইবে না। যেহেতু বেদান্ত যদি অবশ্যপাঠ্য হইত, তাহা হইলে বেদান্তপাঠের ফলে উহা জানা যাইত। কিন্তু ‘জিজ্ঞাসা’ সূত্রটি ব্যতিরেকে বেদান্তপাঠে প্রবৃত্তি হইতে পারে না। সুতরাং ব্রহ্মকে জানিলে অজ্ঞান নিবৃত্তি হইবে এ বিষয়ে বেদান্তবাক্যকে প্রমাণ বলা যাইবে না। অতএব অজ্ঞান নিবৃত্তির উদ্দেশ্যে ব্রহ্ম জানিবার জন্য সূত্রটিতে মুমুক্শুর প্রতি যে বিধান দেওয়া হইয়াছে, তাহা স্বরূপত: অসঙ্গত। ইহাকে ‘স্বরূপাসঙ্গতি’ বলে।

‘মূল্যাসঙ্গতি’ হইল বিরুদ্ধবাদীর উদ্ভাবিত দ্বিতীয় অসঙ্গতি। সূত্রটির মূলই অসঙ্গত। ‘জিজ্ঞাসা’ সূত্রের মূলে স্মৃতি বা শ্রুতি কোনপ্রকার বাক্যই নাই। ইহা মহর্ষি বাদরায়ণের বাক্য হইলেও কোনও শ্রুতিবাক্যকে ইহার মূল মানিতে হইবে। কারণ — “ঋষীগামপি যদ্বাক্যং তদপ্যাগমপূর্বকম্” অর্থাৎ ঋষিদের যে স্মার্তবাক্য, উহা অবশ্যই আগমমূলক হইবে। যে সকল ক্ষেত্রে স্মৃতিবাক্যের অনুকূল কোনও শ্রুতিবাক্য পাওয়া যায় না, ঐসকলক্ষেত্রে শ্রুতিবাক্য অনুমিত হয়। কারণ শ্রুতিনিরপেক্ষ স্মৃতিবাক্য কখনও প্রমাণ হয় না। “আত্মা বা অরে দ্রষ্টব্য: শ্রোতব্যো মন্তব্যো নিদিধ্যাসিতব্য:” (বৃ.উ. ২.৪.৫) এই শ্রুতিবাক্যকে জিজ্ঞাসা-সূত্রটির মূল স্বীকার করা সঙ্গত হইবে না। কারণ এখানে যে বিধি আছে, ইহা কিরূপ বিধি হইবে? উহা কি কাম্যবিধি, বা নিত্যবিধি, বা নৈমিত্তিক বিধি, বা প্রায়শ্চিত্ত বিধি? ফলের আশায় যে কর্ম করা হয় তাহাকে কাম্যকর্ম বলে। যে বেদবাক্যে কাম্যকর্মের বিধান থাকে, উহাকে কাম্যবিধি বলে। সাধারণতঃ কাম্যবিধিবাক্যে ফলের উল্লেখ থাকে। যেসকল কাম্যবিধিস্থলে কোনও ফলের উল্লেখ থাকে না ঐস্থলে ‘বিশৃজিৎ-ন্যায়’ (মী.সূ.

৪.৩.১৫) অনুযায়ী স্বর্গকে ফলরূপে কল্পনা করা হয়। যেসকল লৌকিক কাম্যকর্মের বিধিবাক্যে ফলের উল্লেখ থাকে না, এসকলস্থলে ‘রাত্রিসত্র-ন্যায়’ অনুযায়ী (দ্র:মী.সূ.৪.৩.১৮, শা.ভা.) “প্রতিষ্ঠিত্তি হবা যে এতা রাত্রীরূপয়ন্তি” এই শ্রুতিবাক্যগত প্রতিষ্ঠাকামনাই ফল বলিয়া বুঝিতে হইবে। কিন্তু প্রতিষ্ঠা-কামনায় কাহারও ব্রহ্ম জানিবার ইচ্ছা হইতে পারে না। কারণ প্রতিষ্ঠাকামীব্যক্তি ব্রহ্ম জানিবার জন্য মুমুক্শুর ইচ্ছা হয় না বলিয়া “আত্মা বা অরে” ইত্যাদি শ্রুতিবাক্যে উল্লিখিত বিধি কাম্যাবিধি নহে। যে বিধিবাক্যে নিত্যকর্ম বিহিত হয়, উহাকে নিত্যবিধি বলে। “নিয়তনিমিত্তহেসতি অকারণে প্রত্যবায়জনকং কর্ম নিত্যকর্ম” অর্থাৎ যে কর্মের নিমিত্ত নিয়মিতভাবে আসে এবং যাহার অনুষ্ঠান না করিলে পাপ হয়, উহাকে নিত্যকর্ম বলে। যেমন “অহরহঃ সন্ধ্যামুপাসীত”, “ত্রি: সন্ধ্যামুপাসীত” ইত্যাদি বিধিবাক্যে ত্রৈবর্গিকের জন্য যে সন্ধ্যাবন্দনা বিহিত হইয়াছে উহা নিত্যকর্ম। কারণ প্রাত:কাল, মধ্যাহ্ন এবং সায়াহ্ন নিয়মিতভাবেই আসিয়া থাকে। যথাবিধি প্রত্যহ সন্ধ্যাবন্দনা করিলে কোনও পুণ্য হয় না; বরং অনুষ্ঠান না করিলে প্রত্যবায় হয়। “অনিয়ত নিমিত্তহেসতি অকারণে প্রত্যবায়জনকং কর্ম নৈমিত্তিককর্ম” অর্থাৎ যে কর্মের নিমিত্ত অনিয়মিতভাবে আসে, অথচ যাহার অনুষ্ঠান না করিলে পাপ হয়, উহাকে নৈমিত্তিক কর্ম বলে। যেমন - অগ্নিহোত্রী পুরুষের জন্য জাতেষ্টি যাগ। পুত্র জন্মিলেই জাতেষ্টি করিতে হয়; পুত্র না জন্মিলে ঐ ইষ্টিযাগ করিতে হয় না। কিন্তু যাঁহার পুত্র জন্মিয়াছে ঐ অগ্নিহোত্রী পুরুষ যদি জাতেষ্টি যাগ না করেন, তাহা হইলে প্রত্যবায় হইবে। নিত্য ও নৈমিত্তিক উভয়কর্ম অনুষ্ঠিত না হইলে পাপ হয়। তবে নিত্যকর্ম অনুষ্ঠানের নিমিত্ত নিয়ত ও নৈমিত্তিক কর্মের নিমিত্ত অনিয়ত ইহাই উভয়ের প্রভেদ। “আত্মা বা অরে দ্রষ্টব্য:” ইত্যাদি শ্রুতিবাক্যস্থ বিধিকে নিত্য ও নৈমিত্তিক বিধি বলা যাইবে না। যে-হতু বেদান্তবাক্যের বিচার না করিলে মুমুক্শুর পাপ হয় না। আবার উহাকে প্রায়শ্চিত্ত বিধি বলাও সমীচীন হইবে না। যে বিধিবাক্যে পাপ প্রক্ষালনের জন্য প্রায়শ্চিত্তের বিধান দেওয়া হয়, তাহাকে প্রায়শ্চিত্তবিধি বলে। কিন্তু কোনও পাপ অপনোদনের জন্য মুমুক্শুর ব্রহ্ম জানিবার ইচ্ছা হয় না। এইজন্য ইহা প্রায়শ্চিত্ত বিধিও নহে। সুতরাং “আত্মা বা অরে দ্রষ্টব্য:” ইত্যাদি শ্রুতিবাক্যে এই চারটি বিধির কোনটিই না থাকায় ইহাকে বিধি ও ‘জিজ্ঞাসা’-সূত্রের উত্থাপক বলা যাইবে না। ইহাই পূর্বপক্ষীর উদ্ভাবিত ‘মূলাসঙ্গতি’ দোষ।

সমগ্র বেদান্তশাস্ত্রের সহিত ‘জিজ্ঞাসা’-সূত্রের কোন সঙ্গতি নাই। বেদান্তদর্শনের চারটি অধ্যায়ে যথাক্রমে সমন্বয়, অবিরোধ, সাধন ও ফল প্রদর্শিত হইয়াছে। প্রথম অধ্যায়ে সকল উপনিষদ্-বাক্যের নির্ভণব্রহ্মে তাৎপর্য নিরূপণ করা হইয়াছে। দ্বিতীয় অধ্যায়ে সাংখ্য, যোগ প্রভৃতি শাস্ত্রের সহিত অবিরোধ দেখানো হইয়াছে। তৃতীয় ও চতুর্থ অধ্যায়ে যথাক্রমে ব্রহ্মাকার অপরোক্ষ অন্তঃকরণবৃত্তির সাধন ও ফল আলোচিত হইয়াছে। ইহাদের কাহারও সহিত ‘জিজ্ঞাসা-সূত্রের’ সঙ্গতি নেই। সুতরাং সূত্রটিতে ‘শাস্ত্রাসঙ্গতি’ দোষ আছে। সমগ্র শাস্ত্রের সহিত যাহার সঙ্গতি নাই, শাস্ত্রের আদিতে উহার রচনারও কোনও প্রসঙ্গ নাই। ইহাকে ‘শাস্ত্রাদিহাসঙ্গতি’ বলা হয়। সুতরাং ‘অথাতো ব্রহ্মজিজ্ঞাসা’ (ব্র.সূ.১.১.১.) এই সূত্রটিতে নানা অসংগতি থাকায় উহাকে সূত্র বলা চলে না। আর ইহা যদি সূত্রই না হয়, তাহা হইলে উহাকে অবলম্বন করিয়া যে অধ্যাসভাষ্য প্রণীত হইয়াছে, উহাকেও ভাষ্য বলা যাইবে না। সুতরাং ঐ অধ্যাসভাষ্যের উপর পদ্বিপাদের টীকারচনা সঙ্গত হয় নাই — ইহাই পূর্বপক্ষীর আক্ষেপের সারকথা।

মূল

উচ্যতে; নিতেনৈবাধ্যয়নবিধিনাধীতস্বাধ্যায়ো বেদান্তবাক্যোহাপাতদর্শনেনেদমবগচ্ছতি -- “আত্মনস্ত কামায় সর্বং প্রিয়মি” ত্যাপক্রমাৎ সর্বতো বিরক্তস্যাহ্যপ্রেমসোঃ “আত্মনি বিজ্ঞাতে সর্বমিদং বিজ্ঞাতম্” “এতাবদরে খন্ডমৃতত্বমি” ত্যাপসংহারাদমৃতত্বসাধনমাত্মদর্শনং “দ্রষ্টব্য” ইত্যনুদ্য তাদর্থ্যেন মনননিদিধ্যাসনাভ্যাং ফলোপকার্য্যপ্ৰাপ্ত্যং ফলোপকার্য্যপ্ৰাপ্ত্যং সহ শ্রবণং নামাঙ্গি বিধীয়ত ইতি। স চ -- তত্র কিয়দ্বিশেষণপর্য্যন্তোহধিকারী? কো বাহসৌ বেদান্তবাক্যবিচারঃ? অন্যতঃ প্রাপ্তোহপ্রাপ্তো বা? কথং চাত্মজ্ঞানং মোক্ষসাধনম্? কিং প্রমাণকং চ তৎ? কিং বা তদাত্মতত্ত্বম্? কিং প্রমাণকং চেতি জিজ্ঞাসতে। তং চ জিজ্ঞাসুং পুরুষার্থকামমুপলভমানো ভগবান্ বাদরায়ণঃ সাধনচতুষ্টয়সম্পন্নস্য মোক্ষসাধনব্রহ্মজ্ঞানায় বেদান্তবাক্যবিচারং বিদধতো বিধৈরপেক্ষিতাধিকারিবিষয়ফলানুবন্ধত্রয়মাগমিকমপি ন্যায়েন নির্ণেতুং সূত্রয়ামাস -- “অথাভো ব্রহ্মজিজ্ঞাসে” তি। শ্রুতিসূত্রয়োরেকরূপ্যাবগমাৎ। মনননিদিধ্যাসনয়োশ্চ শ্রবণাস্তত্ত্বমুত্তরত্র বক্ষ্যামঃ ॥

অনুবাদ

(উক্ত আশঙ্কার উত্তরে) বলা হয় -- নিত্য (“স্বাধ্যায় অধ্যোতব্য” এই) অধ্যয়নবিধি অনুসারে নিজ শাখা অধ্যয়নকারী (ত্রৈবর্গিক) বেদান্তবাক্য হইতে (সংশয়ের অবিরোধী) নিশ্চয়জ্ঞানের ফলে ইহা জানিতে পারে -- “নিজের কামনা চরিতার্থের জন্য সমস্ত বস্তু প্রিয় হয়” এই (উপনিষদ্) বাক্য হইতে আরম্ভ করিয়া “আত্মা জ্ঞাত হইলে সমস্ত বস্তু জ্ঞাত হয়”, “হে মৈত্রেয়ী, ইহাই অমৃতত্ব” এই উপসংহারের মধ্যে আত্মজ্ঞান যে মুক্তির উপায় উহা (“আত্মা বা অরে দ্রষ্টব্যঃ” ইত্যাদি শ্রুতিবাক্যহ) “সাক্ষাৎকার করিতে হইবে” এইভাবে বলিয়া (উহার) নিমিত্তরূপে ফলোপকারক অঙ্গ মনন ও নিদিধ্যাসনের সহিত শ্রবণরূপ অঙ্গী সর্বতোভাবে বিরাগী আত্মতত্ত্বজ্ঞানেচ্ছু পুরুষের পক্ষে বিহিত হইয়াছে। সেই (আপাতদর্শী) পুরুষের এইরূপ জিজ্ঞাসা হয় -- কীরূপ যোগ্যতাসম্পন্ন ব্যক্তি (বেদান্তপাঠের) অধিকারী? বেদান্তবাক্যের বিচারই বা কী? (এ বিচার) কি অন্যভাবে জ্ঞাত বা অজ্ঞাত? আত্মজ্ঞান কিভাবেই বা মোক্ষের সাধন হয়? উহাতে প্রমাণই বা কি আছে? আত্মতত্ত্ব বলিতে কি বুঝায়? এ বিষয়ে প্রমাণই বা কি? পরম পুরুষার্থের অভিলাষী এ জিজ্ঞাসুকে সন্নিহিতে পাইয়া ভগবান্ বাদরায়ণ সাধনচতুষ্টয়সম্পন্ন পুরুষের পক্ষে মুক্তির উপায় ব্রহ্মজ্ঞানের জন্য বেদান্তবাক্য বিচারের বিধান দিতেছে এইরূপ বিধিবাক্যে অপেক্ষিত অধিকারী, বিষয় ও ফল -- এই তিনটি আগমসিদ্ধ অনুবন্ধকে ন্যায়ের আকারে নিরূপণ করিবার জন্য সূত্র রচনা করিয়াছেন -- “অনন্তর অতএব (মুমুক্শুর) ব্রহ্ম জানিবার ইচ্ছা হয়”। (সূত্রকার শ্রুতির কথাই বলিতেছেন) যেহেতু শ্রুতি এবং সূত্রের অর্থ একরূপ হয়। মনন ও নিদিধ্যাসন যে শ্রবণের অঙ্গ ইহা পরে আলোচিত হইবে।

বিবৃতি

আলোচ্য সন্দর্ভে বিবরণকার দেখাইয়াছেন যে, বিরুদ্ধবাদীর উদ্ভাবিত চারপ্রকার অসঙ্গতির কোনটিই এক্ষেত্রে প্রযোজ্য নহে। ‘জিজ্ঞাসা’ সূত্রটি স্বরূপতঃ সঙ্গত, ইহার মূলও সঙ্গত, সমগ্র বেদান্তশাস্ত্রের সহিত ইহার সঙ্গতি আছে এবং শাস্ত্রের আদিতে উহা রচনার সার্থকতা আছে। সূত্রটিতে যে স্বরূপাসঙ্গতি দেখানো

হইয়াছে, তাহা গ্রহণযোগ্য নহে। এই সূত্রে ব্রহ্ম জানিবার জন্য যে উপদেশ করা হইয়াছে, তাহাতে সন্দেহ থাকিয়াই যায়। ব্রহ্ম জীব হইতে ভিন্ন কি অভিন্ন ? ব্রহ্ম জানিবার যোগ্য অধিকারী কে ? কেবল বৈরাগ্য হইলেই কি ব্রহ্ম জানিবার ইচ্ছা হয়, অথবা অন্য কোন গুণাবলীও প্রয়োজন ? ব্রহ্মজ্ঞান হইতে যে ফল পাওয়া যাইবে উহা নিত্য কি অনিত্য ? এইসকল সন্দেহ নিরসনের জন্য ব্রহ্মতত্ত্ববিষয়ক উপনিষদবাক্যের বিচার করা আবশ্যিক। ব্রহ্ম জ্ঞাত হইলে জ্ঞাতবিষয়ে জিজ্ঞাসা হয় না বলিয়া মুমুকুর ব্রহ্ম জানিবার ইচ্ছা হইতে পারে না, আবার ব্রহ্ম অজ্ঞাত হইলে সর্বথা অপ্রসিদ্ধবিষয়ে জিজ্ঞাসা অসম্ভাবিত বলিয়া ব্রহ্মবিষয়ে জানিবার ইচ্ছা হইতে পারে না — এইভাবে বিরুদ্ধবাদী যে স্বরূপাসঙ্গতি দেখাইয়াছেন, উহা সমীচীন নহে। কারণ যে বিষয়ে আপাতজ্ঞান থাকে ঐ বিষয়ে সংশয় হয়। যাহা সামান্যভাবে জ্ঞাত এবং বিশেষভাবে অজ্ঞাত উহা সন্দিদ্ধবিষয়। সংশয়ের অবিরোধী নিশ্চয়জ্ঞানকে আপাতজ্ঞান বলে। আপাতদর্শীর সংশয় দূর করিবার জন্য বিচার প্রয়োজন। বেদাধ্যয়ন হইতে ব্রহ্মবিষয়ে মুমুকুর আপাতজ্ঞান জন্মে। মুমুকুর পক্ষে সংশয়নিবৃত্তির জন্য বেদান্তপাঠের সন্দিদ্ধফল, সন্দিদ্ধ অধিকারী ও সন্দিদ্ধ প্রতিপাদ্যবিষয় বিচার করা একান্ত আবশ্যিক। অতএব বেদান্তবাক্য বিচারের কর্তব্যতা বিধায়ক “অথাতো ব্রহ্মজিজ্ঞাসা” এই সূত্রটি স্বরূপতঃ সঙ্গত।

এখানে প্রসঙ্গতঃ উল্লেখ করা যাইতে পারে যে, বেদান্তের বিষয়, ফল ও অধিকারী “আত্মা ও অরে দ্রষ্টব্যঃ শ্রোতব্যঃ” ইত্যাদি শ্রুতির (বৃ.উ. ২/৪/৫) ‘শ্রোতব্যঃ’ এই বিধিবাক্যে বিহিত হইয়াছে। “যজ্ঞেত” ইত্যাদি বিধিবাক্যস্থলে “যাগ করিবে” এই বিধান হইতে যেমন কে যাগ করিবে ? কি ফলের জন্য যাগ করিবে ? এবং কি যাগ করিবে ? — এইসকল বিষয় একান্ত অপেক্ষিতভাবে জানা যায়, তেমনই ‘শ্রোতব্যঃ’ এই বিধিবাক্যস্থলেও “শ্রবণ করিবে” এইরূপ বলায় কে শ্রবণ করিবে ? কি শ্রবণ করিবে ? এবং কেন শ্রবণ করিবে ? অর্থাৎ শ্রবণের অধিকারী, বিষয় ও ফল এই তিনটিই নিহিত থাকে। এইজন্য ইহাকে অনুবন্ধ বলে। প্রশ্ন হইতে পারে, সূত্রকার কেন পুনরায় উহাদের আলোচনা করিলেন ? বস্তুতঃ সূত্রকারের সূত্ররচনা পিষ্টপোষণ নহে। শ্রুতির প্রতিপাদ্য বিষয়কে তিনি ন্যায়ের আকারে পরিবেশন করিয়াছেন। “বিষয়োবিশয়শ্চৈব পূর্বপক্ষস্তদন্তরম্। সঙ্গতিশ্চেতিপক্ষসং শাস্ত্রে অধিকরণং স্মৃতম্।।” অর্থাৎ বিষয়, সংশয়, পূর্বপক্ষ, সিদ্ধান্ত ও সঙ্গতি — এই পঞ্চাঙ্গবিশিষ্ট বিচারকে মীমাংসাশাস্ত্রে ‘অধিকরণ’ বলা হয়। ইহাকে ‘ন্যায়’ও বলে। তবে প্রাচীনরা ষড়ঙ্গ অধিকরণ মানিতেন। ‘প্রয়োজনংসঙ্গতিশ্চ প্রাঞ্চঃ অধিকরণং বিদুঃ’ (ভাট্টদীপিকা, পৃ.৫) অর্থাৎ বিষয়, সংশয়, পূর্বপক্ষ, সিদ্ধান্ত, সঙ্গতি ও প্রয়োজন — এই ছয়টি ন্যায় বা অধিকরণের অবয়ব। পূর্বমীমাংসা ও উত্তরমীমাংসাতে ন্যায়ের মাধ্যমে শ্রুতিবাক্যের অর্থ বিচার করা হইয়াছে। ‘জৈমিনীয়ন্যায়মালা’ ও ‘বৈয়াসিকন্যায়মালা’ গ্রন্থে পূর্বমীমাংসা ও উত্তরমীমাংসার ন্যায়সমূহ সংকলিত হইয়াছে। শ্রুত্যর্থের সহিত সূত্রার্থের একরূপতা থাকে। ‘শ্রোতব্যঃ’ এই বিধিবাক্যে শ্রুতিসিদ্ধ যে তিনটি অনুবন্ধ বিবক্ষিত হইয়াছে, সূত্রকার ‘জিজ্ঞাসা’সূত্রে উহাই ন্যায়ের মাধ্যমে বিধৃত করিয়াছেন। এখানে শ্রুত্যর্থের সহিত সূত্রার্থের মিল আছে। অতএব সূত্রটির স্বরূপ সর্বথা সঙ্গত (দ্রষ্টব্যঃ ভাষ্যরত্নপ্রভা- টীকা, পৃ.৩, মোতিলাল সং, ২০০০)।

সূত্রটিতে ‘মূলাসঙ্গতি’ও নাই। “আত্মা বা অরে” ইত্যাদি বিধিবাক্য ‘অথাতো ব্রহ্মজিজ্ঞাসা’ এই সূত্রটির উত্থাপক। শ্রবণে কোনপ্রকার বিধি নাই — এইরূপ যে শঙ্কা করা হইয়াছে, উহা অমূলক। ইহা

নিত্যবিধি, বা নৈমিত্তিক বিধি, কিংবা প্রায়শ্চিত্তবিধি নহে, ইহা কাম্যবিধি। কাম্যবিধিহুলে বিধিবাক্যে সাধারণতঃ ফলের উল্লেখ থাকে। কাম্যকর্মের ফল জানা না থাকিলে ঐ কর্মে কাহারও প্রবৃত্তি হয় না। সুতরাং বিধুদ্দেশে ফলের উল্লেখ না থাকিলে ‘বিশৃজিৎ’-ন্যায় অনুসারে সেক্ষেত্রে স্বর্গকে সেই কর্মের ফলরূপে কল্পনা করিতে হয়। মীমাংসাসূত্রের (৪/৩/১০-১৯) শবরভাষ্যে ‘বিশৃজিৎ’ ন্যায় সম্পর্কে বিস্তৃত আলোচনা আছে। মীমাংসাসাশ্ত্রে দুইপ্রকার ‘বিশৃজিৎ’-যাগের কথা বলা হইয়াছে — একটি প্রায়শ্চিত্তাত্মক ও অপরটি একাহ সোমযাগ। প্রায়শ্চিত্তাত্মক বিশৃজিৎ যাগের ফল পাপ বা বৈগুণ্য পরিহার করা, স্বর্গ নহে। শ্রুতিবাক্যে একাহকাণ্ডে ফলসংযোগহীন আরেকপ্রকার বিশৃজিৎ যাগ উপদিষ্ট হইয়াছে। সোমলতার রস নিষ্কাশন করিয়া যে যাগ করা হয় তাহাকে সোমযাগ বলে। যে সোমযাগ একদিনে অনুষ্ঠিত হয়, তাহাকে একাহ বলে। একাহকাণ্ডে যে বিশৃজিৎ যাগের উল্লেখ আছে, তাহাতে ফলশ্রুতি নাই। সুতরাং ঐ কাম্যকর্মের ফলরূপে স্বর্গ কল্পিত হইয়াছে। ইহাকে ‘বিশৃজিৎ ন্যায়’ বলে। কিন্তু ফলের উল্লেখ না থাকিলে সর্বদা বিশৃজিৎ ন্যায়ে সকল কাম্যকর্মের ফলরূপে স্বর্গ কল্পিত হইবে না। কাম্যবিধির সংলগ্ন কোনও অর্থবাদ বাক্যে ঐ কাম্যকর্মের প্রশংসা করা হইলে, উহাকেই ঐ কর্মের ফল বলিয়া বুঝিতে হইবে। ইহাকে ‘রাত্রিসত্র ন্যায়’ বলে। যেমন - “প্রতিষ্ঠিত্তি হ বা য এতা রাত্রীকপবতি” এই অর্থবাদবাক্যে ফলের উল্লেখ না থাকিলেও রাত্রিসত্র কর্মের প্রশংসা করা হইয়াছে। সুতরাং প্রতিষ্ঠাকেই এখানে ফল বলিয়া বুঝিতে হইবে। এই অর্থবাদবাক্যে “প্রতিষ্ঠাকামো রাত্রিসত্রং কুর্যৎ” এইভাবে বিধি ও ফল কল্পনা করিতে হয়। “আত্মা বা অরে দ্রষ্টব্যঃ” ইত্যাদি বাক্যে ‘শ্রোতব্যঃ’ স্থলে ‘তব্য’ প্রত্যয় দ্বারা স্পষ্টতই বিধি উল্লিখিত হইয়াছে। সুতরাং এখানে বিধি কল্পনা করিতে হয় না। কিন্তু এখানে ফলের উল্লেখ না থাকায় ইহার সংলগ্ন “অমৃতত্বস্য তু নাশান্তি বিভেন” (বৃ.উ.২.৪.২) অর্থাৎ অর্থের বিনিময়ে মোক্ষপ্রাপ্তি হয় না এই অর্থবাদবাক্যে প্রশংসা থাকায় অমৃতত্বই ‘শ্রোতব্যঃ’ এই কাম্যবিধির ফল হইবে। সুতরাং “অমৃতত্বসাধনকামো বেদান্তবাক্যবিচারং কুর্যৎ” অর্থাৎ মুক্তির উপায় জানিতে অভিলষী মুমুক্শুব্যক্তিকে বেদান্তবাক্যের যথাযথ তাৎপর্য অবধারণ করিতে হইবে এইরূপ কল্পনা করিয়া ‘শ্রোতব্যঃ’ বিধিবাক্যটি যে ফল ও বিধেয় বিচার উভয়েরই নির্দেশ দিতেছে ইহা বুঝা যায়। শ্রুতার্থের সহিত ‘অথাতো ব্রহ্মজিজ্ঞাসা’ এই সূত্রার্থের এইস্থলে একরূপতা রহিয়াছে। সুতরাং ‘আত্মা বা অরে দ্রষ্টব্যঃ’ এই বিধিবাক্যই এই সূত্রটির মূল বা উত্থাপক; এখানে ‘মূলসঙ্গতি’ দোষ নাই। এই অভিপ্রায়ে রামানন্দ সরস্বতী বিবরণোপন্যাস গ্রন্থে বলিয়াছেন — “তদ্বিধিমূলকত্বমস্য সূত্রস্য সিদ্ধম্” (পৃ. ৭, পং ১০-১১, বেনারস সং.সি.)।

এখানে প্রশ্ন হইতে পারে, “আত্মা বা অরে দ্রষ্টব্যঃ” ইত্যাদি বিধিবাক্যে শ্রবণের ন্যায় দর্শন, মনন ও নিদিধ্যাসনেরও ত বিধান রহিয়াছে। কিন্তু কেবল শ্রবণে বিধির কথাই বলা হইতেছে কেন? ইহার উত্তরে আমরা বলিতে পারি — দর্শনে বিধি নাই ইহা পরে বিবরণকার স্বয়ং আলোচনা করিবেন। অবশিষ্ট তিনটি শ্রবণ, মনন ও নিদিধ্যাসন বিধেয় হইলেও ইহাদের মধ্যে শ্রবণ অঙ্গী অর্থাৎ প্রধান এবং মনন ও নিদিধ্যাসন উহার অঙ্গ অর্থাৎ অপ্রধান। ইহারা শ্রবণের ফলোপকারক অঙ্গ। মীমাংসাদর্শনের পরিভাষায় ইহাকে ‘আরাদুপকারক’ বলা হয়। মীমাংসকগণ সন্নিপত্যোপকারক ও আরাদুপকারক এই দ্বিবিধ কর্ম মানিয়াছেন। যেসকল কর্ম সাক্ষাৎভাবে প্রমাণের সহিত সংশ্লিষ্ট নহে, কিন্তু প্রমাণজন্য ফলের সহায়ক হয়, তাহাকে ‘আরাদুপকারক’ অঙ্গ বলে। যেমন — প্রযাজ, অনুযাজ ইত্যাদি। যেসকল কর্ম সাক্ষাৎ বা পরম্পরাক্রমে ফলের সাধক যাগের সহায়তা করিয়া অপূর্বের কারণ হয়, উহাকে সন্নিপত্যোপকারক কর্ম বলে। যেমন

“ব্রীহিন্ প্রোক্ষতি” এই বিধিবাক্য অনুসারে প্রোক্ষিত ব্রীহি হইতে তুৰ্ব্ববিমোচনাতির মাধ্যমে পুরোডাশ প্রস্তুত করিয়া ঐ পুরোডাশের দ্বারা যাগ করিলে বিহিত ফল পাওয়া যায়। সুতরাং প্রোক্ষণ সংস্কার উৎপন্ন করিয়া প্রধান যাগের উপকার সাধন করে (অর্থসংগ্রহ, পৃ.৮৮-৮৯, চৌ. সং. ১৯৭৬)। শ্রবণও প্রমাণের সহিত সাক্ষাৎ সংশ্লিষ্ট। ‘শ্রবণ’ শব্দের অর্থ তাৎপর্যনির্ণায়ক লিঙ্গবটকের দ্বারা ‘তত্ত্বমসি’ (ছা.উ.৬.৮.৭) প্রভৃতি মহাবাক্যের তাৎপর্য বিচার করা।

সুতরাং শ্রবণ “তত্ত্বমসি” প্রভৃতি মহাবাক্যের সহিত অর্থাত্ শব্দপ্রমাণের সহিত সাক্ষাৎভাবে সংশ্লিষ্ট হওয়ায় ইহা সন্নিপত্যোপকারক কর্ম। মনন ও নিদিধ্যাসন ফলোপকারক বা আরাধ্যোপকারক কর্ম। উহার শব্দপ্রমাণের সহিত সাক্ষাৎ সংশ্লিষ্ট নহে, কিন্তু প্রমাণবোধিত প্রমেয়ের সহিত সংশ্লিষ্ট। শ্রবণের ফলে বেদান্তবাক্যের যে তাৎপর্যজ্ঞান জন্মে, উহাতে মুমুকুর বিভিন্নপ্রকার সন্দেহ হইতে পারে। মনন ক্ষত্যানুকূল যুক্তির দ্বারা ক্ষতপদার্থের সম্বন্ধে ঐ অসম্ভবনাকে নিরাস করে। সুতরাং মনন মহাবাক্যরূপ শব্দপ্রমাণবোধিত প্রমেয়ের প্রতিষ্ঠায় উপকার করে বলিয়া উহা ফলোপকারক কর্ম। অনুরূপভাবে নিদিধ্যাসনের দ্বারা প্রমেয় ক্ষতপদার্থ সম্বন্ধে বিপরীতধারণা দূরীভূত হয়। শ্রবণজন্য প্রমেয়ের সহিত সংশ্লিষ্ট হইয়া ইহা প্রমেয়ের উপকার করে। সুতরাং ইহাও ফলোপকারক কর্ম। সন্নিপত্যোপকারক কর্মই প্রধান এবং ফলোপকারক কর্ম অঙ্গ বা অপ্রধান। এইজন্যই বিবরণকার শ্রবণকে অঙ্গী এবং মনন ও নিদিধ্যাসনকে উহার অঙ্গ বলিয়াছেন। বিবরণমধ্যে প্রথম বর্ণকের শেষে এ বিষয়ে বিস্তৃত আলোচনা আছে। সুতরাং বিবরণকারের মতে ‘শ্রোতব্যঃ’ বিধিটি কাম্যবিধি এবং উহা ‘জিজ্ঞাসা’-সূত্রের মূল। এখানে ‘মূলাসঙ্গতি’ দোষ নাই।

এই সূত্রটিতে ‘শাস্ত্রাসঙ্গতি’ ও ‘শাস্ত্রাদিত্বাসঙ্গতি’ দোষও নাই। উপোদঘাতরূপেই বেদান্তবিচারশাস্ত্রের সহিত উহার সংগতি বুঝিতে হইবে। “চিন্তাং প্রকৃতসিদ্ধার্থমুপোদঘাতং প্রচক্ষতে” অর্থাত্ আলোচ্য প্রকৃত বিষয় সিদ্ধির জন্য প্রকৃত বিষয় হইতে এক স্বতন্ত্র আলোচনা, যাহাকে আলোচ্য বিষয় নির্ভর করে, তাহাকে পণ্ডিতগণ ‘উপোদঘাত’ বলেন। “জন্মান্দস্য যতঃ” (ব্র.সূ.১.১.২.) হইতে আরম্ভ করিয়া “অনাবৃতিঃ শব্দাদনাবৃতিঃ শব্দাৎ” (ব্র.সূ. ৪.৪.২২) এই পর্যন্ত ব্রহ্মসূত্রসমূহে উৎনিষদ্ধাক্যসমূহের তাৎপর্য বিচার করা হইয়াছে। ‘জন্মান্দি’ সূত্র হইতে এই ব্রহ্মবিচার শাস্ত্রের আরম্ভ হইলেও মুমুকুর পক্ষে ব্রহ্মবিচার যে অবশ্যকর্তব্য, উহার ফল আছে এবং প্রতিপাদ্য বিষয়ও সম্ভাবিত — ইহা জানাইয়া না দিলে মুমুকু ব্রহ্মবিচার করিবে কেন?” অথাতো ব্রহ্মজিজ্ঞাসা” এই সূত্রটি আগমসিদ্ধ এই অনুবদ্যত্রয়কে জানাইতেছে। সুতরাং উপোদঘাতরূপে সমগ্র ব্রহ্মবিচার শাস্ত্রের সহিত সূত্রটির সঙ্গতি আছে। অতএব সূত্রটিতে ‘শাস্ত্রাসংগতি’ দোষ নাই। বিবরণকারের এই অভিপ্রায়ে রামানন্দ বিবরণোপন্যাসে স্পষ্টভাবে ব্যক্ত করিয়াছেন -- “অনেন সূত্রেণ শ্রবণবিধে: স্বার্থে বিচারকর্তব্যে সমময়ে সিত্তি জন্মান্দি সূত্রমারম্ভ বিচার: প্রবর্ততে ইতুপদঘাতত্বাচ্ছাস্ত্রে প্রথমধ্যায়াদিবস্য সূত্রস্য সংগতি:” (পৃ.৭, পং ১৩-১৫, বেনারস সং. সি.)। উপোদঘাত প্রথমই থাকে বলিয়া শাস্ত্রের আদিতেই উহার নির্দেশ যুক্তিযুক্ত। সুতরাং এখানে ‘শাস্ত্রাদিত্বাসংগতি’ দোষও নাই। অধ্যাসভাষ্য এই সংগত সূত্রার্থের সংস্পর্শ হওয়ায় পদপাদ যে উহার উপর টীকা প্রণয়ন করিয়াছেন তাহা সংগত হইয়াছে।

(ক্রমশঃ)

অখ্যাতিবাদ : একটি অদ্বৈতবাদী সমীক্ষা

মৃদুলা ভট্টাচার্য



AKHYATIVĀDA : A STUDY FROM AN ADVAITA APPROACH

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(২)

অদ্বৈতবেদান্তিগণের সম্মত খ্যাতিবাদকে অনির্বচনীয়খ্যাতিবাদ বলে। সাধারণতঃ জ্ঞানতত্ত্বের বিশ্লেষণ প্রসঙ্গে খ্যাতিবাদ আলোচিত হয়। এটি একটি জ্ঞানতাত্ত্বিক (epistemological) বিশ্লেষণ। কিন্তু অনির্বচনীয়খ্যাতিবাদে জাগতিক বিষয়ের আধিবিদ্যক স্বরূপ (metaphysical status) বিশ্লেষিত হয়ে থাকে। অদ্বৈতবাদিগণ ভ্রমস্থলে ভ্রমীয় বিষয়কে প্রাতিভাসিক সন্দ্বস্ত বলেন। তাঁদের মতে ভ্রমস্থলে অধ্যস্ত বিষয়টি পারমার্থিক সন্দ্বস্ত নয়, প্রাতিভাসিক সন্দ্বস্ত, যাকে তাঁরা মিথ্যা বা অনির্বচনীয় বলেন। ভ্রমতীকার বাচস্পতি প্রমুখের মতে যা সৎ নয়, অসৎ নয় ও সদসৎ নয় তা অনির্বচনীয়। সন্দ্বস্ত তিনকালে অব্যাহিত থাকে। অসতের প্রতীতি হয় না। অসতের শব্দভিত্তিক ধারণা হলেও তা হতে প্রবৃত্তি জন্মায় না। সদসৎ বস্তু যুক্তি ও অনুভববিরুদ্ধ। ভ্রমীয় বিষয়টি জ্ঞাননাশ্য ও প্রাতীতিক হওয়ায় তাকে অনির্বচ্য বলে। কিন্তু ইন্টুসিদ্ধিকার বিমুক্তায়ন বলেন, সৎ, অসৎ বা সদসৎ এই ত্রিকোটিভিন্নকে অনির্বচনীয় বললে অজ্ঞান নিবৃত্তিরূপ মোক্ষকে অনির্বচনীয় বলতে হয়। এজন্য তিনি যা সৎ, অসৎ, সদসৎ ও অজ্ঞাননিবৃত্তি হতে ভিন্ন তাকে অনির্বচনীয় বলেন।

অখ্যাতিবাদী প্রভাকর মীমাংসকগণ অদ্বৈতবাদীর অনির্বচনীয় খ্যাতিবাদে দোষ উদ্ভাবন করে থাকেন। তাঁরা বলেন, ভ্রমীয় বিষয়কে অনির্বচনীয় বললে অদ্বৈত সিদ্ধান্তের সাথে বিরোধ দেখা দেবে। “এটি রজত” এই ভ্রমস্থলে যে মিথ্যা রজতের প্রতীতি হয়, “এটি রজত নয়” এই পরবর্তী বাধকজ্ঞানের দ্বারা তার মিথ্যাত্ব প্রতিপন্ন হয়। অদ্বৈতমতে মিথ্যা বস্তু নিজের অধিকরণে তিনকালেই থাকে না। অখ্যাতিবাদীর প্রশ্ন হল, অদ্বৈতবাদী কিভাবে একদিকে মিথ্যা রজতের প্রতীতি আবার অন্যদিকে তার ত্রৈকালিক অভাব মানছেন? রজতের ত্রৈকালিক নিবেদনের সাথে মিথ্যা রজতের অস্তিত্বের বিরোধ অপরিহার্য।

বিন্যাসগত বিবরণ প্রমেয়সংগ্রহ গ্রন্থে অখ্যাতিবাদীর এই সমস্যা আপত্তি উত্থাপন করে খণ্ডন করেছেন। তিনি বলেন, শুদ্ধিরাজতস্থলে ভ্রমের বিষয় প্রাতিভাসিক রজত। আর “এটি রজত নয়” এই বাধকজ্ঞানের বিষয় ম্যবহারিক রজত। শুদ্ধিতে ব্যবহারিক রজত কোনকালেই থাকে না। কাজেই এখানে কোন বিরোধ নেই।

অখ্যাতিবাদী পুনরায় প্রশ্ন করতে পারেন যদি অদ্বৈতবাদী “এটি রজত নয়” এই বাধকজ্ঞানের দ্বারা ব্যবহারিক রজতের নিষেধ স্বীকার করেন তাহলে “অপ্রসক্ত প্রতিষেধ” দোষের প্রসঙ্গ হবে। যার প্রসক্তি বা প্রাপ্তি আছে তারই নিষেধ হয়। অপ্রসক্তের বা অপ্রাপ্তের নিষেধ একপ্রকার দোষ বলে গণ্য হয়। একে “অপ্রসক্তপ্রতিষেধ” বলে। ভ্রমস্থলে ব্যবহারিক রজতের প্রসক্তিই যখন নেই তখন উহার নিষেধকে অপ্রসক্তপ্রতিষেধ বলতে হবে। এর উত্তরে বিদ্যারণ্য বলেন, ব্যবহারিক রজতার্থী ব্যক্তির প্রাতিভাসিক রজতে প্রবৃত্তি হতে প্রতিপন্ন হয় যে, ভ্রমস্থলে ব্যবহারিক রজতের সামান্যত প্রসক্তি থাকে। এইভাবে ব্যবহারিক রজতের সামান্যত প্রসক্তি না মানলে ভূতলে ঘটের নিষেধও অসঙ্গত হয়ে পড়বে। ভূতলে ঘটের উপস্থিতিতে ‘ঘট নেই’ এক্ষা বলা যাবে না। আবার ভূতলে ঘটের অনুপস্থিতিতে ‘ঘট নেই’ বললে অপ্রসক্তপ্রতিষেধ হবে। বিদ্যারণ্যের মতে, অভাবের স্থলে যেমন সামান্যত দেশ ও কালকে উপাধি ধরে ভূতলে ঘটের প্রসক্তি স্বীকার করা হয়, তেমনি ভ্রমস্থলেও দেশ-সামান্য বা কালসামান্যকে উপাধিরূপে বুঝে ভ্রমে ব্যবহারিক রজতের সামান্যত প্রসক্তি স্বীকার করলে “মিথ্যা রজত প্রতীত হয়েছিল” এবং “এখানে রজত নেই” এই দুটি জ্ঞানই উপপন্ন হবে। প্রথম জ্ঞানটির বিষয় প্রাতিভাসিক রজত এবং দ্বিতীয় জ্ঞানটির বিষয় ব্যবহারিক রজত। সুতরাং ভ্রমে রজতের প্রতীতির সাথে পরজীবী রজতনিষেধের কোন বিরোধ নেই।

এস্থলে বিদ্যারণ্য আরও বলেছেন যে, অখ্যাতিবাদী বলতে পারেন — অদ্বৈতবাদী ভ্রমে প্রাতিভাসিক রজতের আপরোক্ষ্য অনুপপন্ন হয় বলে শুক্তির সাথে রজতের সংসর্গজ্ঞান কল্পনা করেছেন। আবার শুক্তিরজতের এই সংসর্গউপপাদন কর’র জন্য রজতের মিথ্যাত্ব কল্পনা করেছেন। কাজেই একটি কল্পনার উপপত্তির জন্য আরেকটি কল্পনা করা হয়েছে। এই কল্পনার পরিহার করে শুক্তি ও রজতের সংসর্গ ছাড়াই রজতের আপরোক্ষ্য উপপাদন করা যায়। অপরোক্ষ শুক্তিকাজ্ঞান হতে রজতজ্ঞানের অবিবেকের ফলে রজতের অপরোক্ষ্য উপপন্ন হতে পারে। এর উত্তরে বিদ্যারণ্য বলেন, রজতের অপরোক্ষত্ব কখনও শুক্তি-রজতের অবিবেকের ফলে উপপন্ন হবে না। এরূপ মানলে বাধকজ্ঞানের দ্বারা যখন উভয়ের ভেদ নিশ্চিত হবে ঐ সময় “এতক্ষণ পর্যন্ত শুক্তির সাথে অপৃথক রজত” এরূপ অবিবেকেরই জ্ঞান হত। বস্তুত বাধকজ্ঞানের দ্বারা জানা যায়, ‘এটি রজত নয়’, শুক্তি-রজতের অবিবেক নয়। তাছাড়া, বাধকজ্ঞান হলে “এতক্ষণ পর্যন্ত এটি রজত বলে প্রতীত হয়েছিল” এরূপ প্রত্যভিজ্ঞা হয়ে থাকে। এই প্রত্যভিজ্ঞা হতে শুক্তি ও রজতের সংসর্গজ্ঞান যায়। এইভাবে বিদ্যারণ্য দেখিয়েছেন যে, ভ্রমস্থলে পুরোবর্তী মিথ্যা রজতকে স্বীকার করতে হবে। মিথ্যা রজতের সাথে শুক্তির সংসর্গ না মানলে শুক্তি দেখার পর রজতে প্রবৃত্তি উপপন্ন হবে না। সুতরাং ভ্রমে প্রতীয়মান রজত স্বর্যমাণ নয়, স্বর্যমাণ রজতের সদৃশ। পূর্বানুভবজন্য সংস্কার হতে রজতের ভ্রম জন্মায় বলে ভ্রমীয় রজতটি স্বর্যমাণ রজতের সদৃশ হয়। তাই রজতের অনুভব যার হয়নি তার রজতভ্রান্তি হয় না। অর্থাধ্যাসের স্থলে ভ্রমীয় বিষয়টি যেমন সংস্কারজন্য হয়, তেমনি অধ্যাসের জ্ঞানও সংস্কারজন্য ইহাই বিদ্যারণ্যের বক্তব্য।

অখ্যাতিবাদী এস্থলে আপত্তি করতে পারেন যে, অর্থাধ্যাস সংস্কারজন্য হলেও জ্ঞানাধ্যাস সংস্কারজন্য হতে পারে না। পূর্বপক্ষীর এই আক্ষেপকে বিদ্যারণ্য একটি অনুমানের আকারে বিধৃত করেছেন। অনুমানটির আকার হল — “বিমতং নং সংস্কারজং স্মৃতিব্যতিরিক্তজ্ঞানত্বাৎ, প্রত্যক্ষবৎ”। অর্থাৎ অধ্যাসের জ্ঞান স্মৃতিজন্য

নয়, যেহেতু তা স্মৃতিভিন্ন জ্ঞান, যেমন প্রত্যক্ষজ্ঞান। এই অনুমানে 'বিমত' বলতে অধ্যাসজ্ঞানকে বোঝানো হয়েছে যা অনুমানের পক্ষ। 'ন সংস্কারজন্ম' কথাটির অর্থ সংস্কারজন্য নয়। সংস্কারজন্যত্বের অভাব হল সাধ্য। 'স্মৃতিভিন্নজ্ঞানত্ব' হেতু এবং দৃষ্টান্ত হ'ল প্রত্যক্ষজ্ঞান। যারা যারা স্মৃতিভিন্ন জ্ঞান তারা সংস্কারজন্য হয় না। যেমন প্রত্যক্ষজ্ঞান স্মৃতিভিন্ন জ্ঞান এবং তা সংস্কারজন্য নয়। অখ্যাতিবাদীর আপত্তি হল — অধ্যাসের জ্ঞান যেহেতু স্মৃতিভিন্ন জ্ঞান সেজন্য তা কখনই সংস্কারজন্য হবে না। কাজেই জ্ঞানাদ্যাসকে কোনমতেই সংস্কারজন্য বলা চলে না।

বিদ্যারণ্য বিবরণপ্রমেয়সংগ্রহে অদ্বৈতমত উপপাদনের জন্য অখ্যাতিবাদীর উদ্ভাবিত উক্ত অনুমানটিতে দোষ দেখিয়েছেন। তাঁর মতে ঐ অনুমানটি সোপাধিক হেত্বাভাসে দুষ্ট অর্থাৎ উক্ত অনুমানের হেতুতে 'ইন্দ্রিয়সন্নিকর্ষমাত্রজন্যত্ব' উপাধি আছে। যে ধর্মটি সাধ্যের সমব্যাপক এবং হেতুর অব্যাপক তাই উপাধি। অন্যভাবে বলা চলে, যা দৃষ্টান্তে সাধ্যের ব্যাপক হয় এবং পক্ষে হেতুর অব্যাপক হয় তাকে উপাধি বলে। বিদ্যারণ্যের মতে, উক্ত অনুমানে 'ইন্দ্রিয়সন্নিকর্ষমাত্রজন্যত্ব' ধর্মটি দৃষ্টান্তে সাধ্যের ব্যাপক ও পক্ষে হেতুর ব্যাপ্য হয়েছে। দৃষ্টান্তে প্রত্যক্ষজ্ঞানে সংস্কারজন্যত্ব নেই অথচ ইন্দ্রিয়সন্নিকর্ষমাত্রজন্যত্ব আছে। কাজেই ঘট, পট প্রভৃতির প্রত্যক্ষজ্ঞানে সংস্কারজন্যত্বের অভাব আছে ও ইন্দ্রিয়সন্নিকর্ষমাত্রজন্যত্ব আছে বলে ইন্দ্রিয়সন্নিকর্ষমাত্রজন্যত্বকে সংস্কারজন্যত্বাভাবের ব্যাপক বলতে হবে। আবার পক্ষ অধ্যাসজ্ঞানে স্মৃতিভিন্নজ্ঞানত্ব আছে, কিন্তু ইন্দ্রিয়সন্নিকর্ষজন্যত্ব নেই। কারণ অদ্বৈত মতে, অধ্যাসের জ্ঞান ইন্দ্রিয়সন্নিকর্ষের ফলে উৎপন্ন হয় না। তা অবিদ্যাবৃত্তি, অন্তঃকরণবৃত্তি নয়। কাজেই পক্ষে হেতু থাকলেও ইন্দ্রিয়সন্নিকর্ষমাত্রজন্যত্ব না থাকায় তা হেতুর ব্যাপক। কাজেই দৃষ্টান্তে সাধ্যের ব্যাপক ও পক্ষে হেতুর ব্যাপ্য হওয়ায় 'ইন্দ্রিয়সন্নিকর্ষমাত্রজন্যত্ব' ধর্মটি এখানে উপাধি। হেতুতে উপাধি থাকায় উক্ত অনুমানটি ব্যাপ্যত্বাসিদ্ধ হেত্বাভাসে দুষ্ট — এই হল বিদ্যারণ্যের বক্তব্য।

এখানে অখ্যাতিবাদী প্রশ্ন করতে পারেন যে, 'ইন্দ্রিয়সন্নিকর্ষমাত্রজন্যত্ব' ধর্মটি উপাধি নয়, যেহেতু তা সাধ্যের ব্যাপক হয়নি। যেমন, অনুমিতি, শব্দবোধ প্রভৃতি জ্ঞানে সংস্কারজন্যত্বের অভাব আছে, অথচ ওইগুলি ইন্দ্রিয়সন্নিকর্ষমাত্রজন্য নয়। এর উত্তরে বিদ্যারণ্য বলেন, অনুমিতি প্রভৃতি জ্ঞান সংস্কারজন্য। অনুমিতি জ্ঞান ব্যাপ্তিসংস্কারজন্য, উপমিতি সাদৃশ্যসংস্কারজন্য এবং শব্দবোধ পদার্থের সংস্কারজন্য হওয়ায় এসকল জ্ঞানে সংস্কারজন্যত্বের অভাব নেই, সংস্কারজন্যত্ব আছে। সুতরাং পূর্বপক্ষীর প্রদর্শিত অনুমানের হেতুতে উপাধি আছে।

(ক্রমশঃ)

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